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Jeroen de Zeeuw 
 
Political Party Development in Post-War Societies: The Institutionalization 
of Parties and Party Systems in El Salvador and Cambodia 
 
 
This thesis argues that civil war has a significant, lasting impact on the 
formation, development and institutionalization of parties and party systems. 
Through in-depth examination of the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia it 
shows that dominant party systems and uneven institutionalization of individual 
political parties prevalent in post-war societies can to a not insignificant extent be 
attributed to war-related factors such as war-time origins of parties, the way in 
which war ended, the nature of the peace agreement, and post-war design of 
electoral, media and other public institutions. 
 Its focus on party and party system institutionalization is rooted in the 
Western-oriented party politics literature, which suggests that the nature of 
electoral competition, the impact of societal cleavages and the workings of 
formal political institutions are primary explanatory factors. By contrast, this 
thesis argues that in non-Western developing countries affected by civil war, 
war-related factors and post-war security, socio-economic and political 
conditions are equally if not more important for understanding post-war party 
development. 
 Through a structured focused comparison of party and party system 
institutionalization in El Salvador and Cambodia based on extensive interviews 
and field research, the thesis demonstrates that the war-time origins of the main 
Salvadoran and Cambodian parties have left a deep imprint on their 
organizational structures and leadership style, just as war-time political exclusion 
set the tone for unbalanced party competition after the war. Although El 
Salvador’s party system is more institutionalized than Cambodia’s and there are 
many other differences, there are also clear cross-national patterns of unequal 
individual party institutionalization and ruling party dominance that are a product 
of the war. Given that institutionalized parties and a competitive party system are 
important ingredients for a healthy democracy these findings are important for 
understanding the challenges and prospects of democratization in these and other 
post-war countries. 
xi 
 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
This thesis argues that civil war has a significant, lasting impact on the 
formation, development and institutionalization of parties and party systems. The 
purpose of this introductory chapter is to show why the study of post-war party 
development matters, share the theoretical underpinnings of the study and the 
main questions that structured the research, introduce the research design and 
methods, and establish the key concepts that are used. 
 
1.1 Why Study Post-War Party Development? 
 
Political parties have a poor reputation, especially in places like Rwanda, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nepal, Afghanistan, Guatemala and other 
countries that have experienced or are still experiencing long periods of major 
armed conflict. In such post-war societies, political parties are often associated 
with the monopolization and abuse of power, corruption and the incitement of 
(ethnic) hatred.  
 Yet, these same parties are also considered an important part of the solution 
to the conflict. Stable and representative political parties are vital for the 
development of a sustainable and democratic peace after civil war just as they are 
important to building representative democracy in its own right. They can 
1 
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represent urgent popular demands, mediate in group conflicts and deliver and 
prepare the new leaders that are needed to address the huge post-war governance 
challenges. Considering the important role parties play in healthy democracies, it 
should therefore not come as a surprise that there has been growing attention in 
the academic and policy communities for ways to regulate party political 
behaviour and make party competition less conflict-prone.1  
What is surprising, however, is that there has been little attention to how 
political parties in post-war societies develop in the first place and what 
particular challenges they face. Until recently our understanding of political 
parties was mainly informed by the trajectories of party development in Western 
established democracies.2 Only in the last two decades or so has there been more 
attention for party formation in the so-called ‘Third Wave’ or ‘new democracies’ 
of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa.3 But the parties 
and party systems of countries ravaged by civil war in these regions have not 
received much attention.4 Systematic information about what influences party 
                                                 
1 See for example Reilly and Nordlund, Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, 
Engineering and Democratic Development. 
2 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems. 
3 Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century; Randall, Political 
Parties in the Third World; Van Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies. Party 
Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe; and Salih, African Political Parties. 
Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance. 
4 A notable exception is the work by Carrie Manning at Georgia State University, who has done a 
lot of work on the internal organizational challenges of rebel-to-party transformation in post-war 
societies. In contrast to this thesis, however, Manning’s research does not systematically assess 
alternative theoretical explanations to party formation and seems less interested in party and party 
system categorization. See Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Mozambique”; and Manning, The Making of Democrats. Elections and Party 
Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador, and Mozambique.  
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development in post-war societies is lacking. This is all the more surprising 
given the fact that more than 50% of new democracies are post-war countries.5 
The primary aim of this thesis is to fill this gap in information and to explain 
how the post-war situation makes post-war party development so special. More 
specifically, it seeks to identify what factors are particularly important in the 
development of parties and party systems in post-war countries. By examining 
the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia, it explains how the main political parties 
emerged, assesses how institutionalized they are and evaluates the relevance of 
different causal explanations offered by the party politics literature.  
Crucially, this study argues that although electoral competition, social 
cleavages and formal institutions matter there are other, war-related factors that 
are equally, if not more important. In doing so, it shows that war has a lasting 
impact on the formation, development and institutionalization of parties and 
party systems as well as on the behaviour and interactions of party leaders. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Foundations 
 
In an attempt to theorize post-war party development, this study builds primarily 
on two relatively separate literatures, namely the literature on party politics and 
the conflict and peace-building literature. Where relevant it also refers to the 
more specialized writings about international democracy promotion. Until 
recently there has been remarkably little exchange between these bodies of 
knowledge and scholars in one field do not usually engage with the questions 
raised in the other fields, or vice versa.  
                                                 
5 Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says –Or Doesn’t Say– About Post-War 
Democratization”, p.159. See also chapter 3. 
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The party politics literature, for example, does not generally address the 
(violent) conflict potential of competitive elections and multi-party interactions 
in volatile situations, which is a topic of great concern to scholars working on 
post-conflict peace-building.6 Rather, studies in the field of party politics have 
focused on understanding the nature of political parties by comparing their 
organization, function and strategic behaviour in various geographical locations. 
This has led to different typologies of parties and party systems and produced 
sophisticated analyses about how parties relate to their voters, the state and other 
organizations.7 It has also highlighted the crucial role of political parties and 
other domestic actors in democratic transition and consolidation.8 More recently, 
attention has focused on how political parties adapt to increasing voter 
detachment and the changing socio-political context in many countries.9 
Characteristically, however, most studies in this field focus on Western 
established democracies and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, 
where civil war has been largely absent in the past fifty years. But even when the 
focus shifts to the parties and party systems of the new, more conflict-prone 
democracies of the Balkans, Caucasus, Latin America, Asia and Africa –as is 
                                                 
6 See for example Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. 
7 Duverger, Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State; Sartori, 
Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis; Epstein, Political Parties in Western 
Democracies; and Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: An Introduction”. 
8 See O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies; and Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 
9 Katz and Mair, How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in 
Western Democracies; Webb, Farrell and Holiday, Political Parties in Advanced Industrial 
Societies. 
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increasingly the case– countries that have experienced civil war are often 
excluded from the analysis.  
There are only a few studies that have explicitly recognized the importance 
of conflict history in explaining party development. Mohamed Salih, for 
example, indicates that the organizational structures, leadership and ambitions of 
former African liberation movements turned into political parties are still 
influenced by their conflict experience and “the ethos of the liberation 
ideology”.10 Similarly, analysts such as Manning and Allison refer to the distinct 
civil war backgrounds in rationalizing the differences in party system stability in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mozambique, Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Nicaragua.11 But these studies are exceptions and they do not explain how war 
and war-related factors impact on the growth and institutionalization of parties 
and party systems per se. In general, the party politics literature gives no 
systematic treatment to post-war societies and the arguments and theories put 
forward by it are predominantly based on Western, non-conflict experiences of 
party development. This thesis builds on those few studies that do take the 
distinct context of post-war countries seriously and focuses on the links between 
war and the origins, organization and institutionalization of political parties and 
party systems.  
Similarly, analysts in the field of conflict and peace-building generally pay 
inadequate attention to the writings by party politics specialists about the effects 
of party organization and functioning on the stability and institutionalization of 
                                                 
10 Salih, “Introduction: The Evolution of African Political Parties”, p.18. 
11 Allison, “The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America”; 
and Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of War”. 
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party systems. Huntington, for example, already demonstrated in the 1960s that 
“by regularizing the procedures for leadership succession and [assimilating] new 
groups into the political system, parties provide the basis for stability and orderly 
change rather than for instability”.12 This conflict mitigating role of parties has 
been confirmed in a recent study, which argues that “the capacity of parties to 
manage incipient or actual conflicts depends crucially on the nature of the party 
system and the structure of individual parties”.13  
Nevertheless, most studies in the field of conflict and peace-building tend to 
ignore these nuances and highlight the dangers of political party competition, 
particularly in societies with deep ethnic divisions. Moreover, they argue that 
what is needed first and foremost in post-war societies is not political party 
development or democratization for that matter, but the development of a strong 
state that can provide security, ensure the rule of law and deliver basic services.14 
Although this thesis will not examine the controversy about the conflict potential 
of party competition as such, it deserves mention here as it is one of the reasons 
why the international community has been reluctant to engage more actively with 
political parties in post-war peace-building processes. 
Another characteristic of the conflict and peace-building literature is the 
strong focus on the role of international actors, including international 
peacekeepers, third-party mediators and regional organizations in ending 
                                                 
12 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p.405. 
13 Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”, p.823. 
14 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”; and Ottaway and Mair, 
States at Risk and Failed States. Putting Security First. For a critical review of this argument, see 
Carothers, “The Sequencing Fallacy”. 
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hostilities and creating a durable peace.15 To some extent this is logical as the 
international community has played a large role and has often had significant 
influence in post-war settings. However, the peace-building literature has given 
little attention to important domestic actors such as political parties, let alone 
analyzed the impact of international peacebuilding assistance on political party 
development. This is an omission that needs to be addressed, even if the findings 
of research only served to confirm that their importance is minimal. Therefore 
this study explicitly focuses on domestic actors and critically reviews the party 
political impact of international peacebuilding activities.  
Finally, this thesis is also informed by the relatively new literature on 
international democracy promotion.16 Although this literature in general does not 
focus on post-war societies as such, it is an important source of information 
about the policies and practices of international aid agencies supporting 
processes of democratization and political party development in post-war 
settings. From this literature it has become clear that, until recently, only a 
handful of agencies were directly involved in specific ‘international party 
assistance’ activities, including the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung (KAS).17 Political sensitivities and the bad reputation of 
                                                 
15 See for example Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of 
Peace Agreements; and Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict. 
16 See Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve; and Burnell, Democracy 
Assistance. International Cooperation for Democratization. 
17 See Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link. Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies, 
pp.78-82; Burnell, “Globalising Party Politics in Emerging Democracies”, p.6; and Burnell, 
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parties in many places kept other democracy assistance organizations away from 
political parties and steered them in the direction of civil society instead.18 
However, with the growing realization that civil society organizations alone have 
not provided the ‘magic bullet’ for democratization or peacebuilding and cannot 
substitute for political parties this attitude seems to have changed.19 Nowadays 
political parties are said to be back on the international policy agenda, where they 
are recognized as “a keystone of democratic governance”.20 Yet despite a 
significant number of lessons learned about party assistance, it remains clear that 
there is a “shortage of systematic knowledge about the impact of such assistance, 
particularly in post-conflict societies”.21 
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the literatures outlined above in several ways. 
First, it aims to fill the gap in information in the party politics literature about 
parties and party systems in post-war countries. More specifically, by comparing 
the trajectories of party development in Western and non-Western democracies 
with the organizational development of political parties in countries affected by 
civil war, it will identify a specific set of conditions and factors that are largely 
unique to post-war countries. Second, the thesis makes an empirical contribution 
                                                                                                                                    
“Promoting Parties and Party Systems in New Democracies: Is There Anything the ‘International 
Community’ Can Do?”. 
18 Hearn and Robinson, “Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa”; and Carothers and 
Ottaway, “The Burgeoning World of Civil Society Aid”, pp.6-8. 
19 Doherty, “Democracy Out of Balance. Civil Society Can’t Replace Political Parties”, p.26; and 
Burnell, “Globalising Party Politics in Emerging Democracies”, p.8. 
20 Derviş, “Foreword”, p.v; and Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link, p.89. 
21 Comment made by a senior NDI representative during an international expert meeting on 
‘Political Party Assistance to Post-Conflict Societies’ organized by NIMD and the Clingendael 
Institute on 5 July 2007 in The Hague. 
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to both the party politics and conflict and peacebuilding literatures by taking a 
closer look at previously understudied political parties in El Salvador and 
Cambodia. Third, it will apply and evaluate the relatively new theoretical 
concept of party institutionalization in two post-war settings by systematically 
assessing and comparing the degree of development of the main political parties 
in El Salvador and Cambodia. And finally, the thesis sheds light on several party 
assistance programmes in El Salvador and Cambodia, which helps to expand the 
knowledge base about the role of international actors in post-war party 
development.  
 
1.3 Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 
The analysis in the following chapters is motivated by a number of assumptions 
or hypotheses that need to be made explicit here. The first crucial assumption is 
that war and the political conditions after civil war have a significant influence 
on the organization, functioning and interaction of individual parties in post-war 
societies. This stems from a belief that the post-war socioeconomic and political 
context in these countries is fundamentally different from non-war established 
and new democracies and that this context matters for post-war party 
development. It is also grounded in the idea that war can be seen as a 
“historically defining moment”, which can have an independent effect on how 
 
10 Introduction  
parties and party systems subsequently develop and institutionalize.22 Although 
we can never know the counterfactual and it is virtually impossible to establish 
that the nature of party politics in post-war societies is a direct consequence of 
the war, this study attempts to demonstrate that key aspects of parties’ 
organizational structures and their behaviour in the political arena today have 
persisted since their founding during the period of war and war resolution. In 
other words this study is rooted in the belief that party development in post-war 
societies is significantly path dependent.23 
 Existing theories of party development do not take into account this specific 
historical context and generally do not pay attention at all to parties and party 
systems in non-Western developing countries with a history of civil war. Based 
on the experiences of (early) party development in Western established 
democracies, the party politics literature emphasizes the role of electoral 
competition, the influence of socioeconomic cleavages and the impact of formal 
political institutions in party and party system development.24 This study shows 
that these factors are also important in countries that experienced civil war, but 
that they cannot fully explain why certain post-war parties are more 
institutionalized than others and why most post-war party systems are dominated 
by one or two strongly institutionalized parties.  
                                                 
22 This is based on of the core arguments by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner in their 
seminal 1960s volume about world-wide party development. They argue that certain historical-
situational developments or ‘crises’ “not only provide the context in which political parties first 
emerge but also tend to be a critical factor in determining what pattern of evolution parties later 
take”. LaPalombara and Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, p.14. 
23 For a discussion of path dependency and its grounding within historical institutionalist theory 
see Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New’ Institutionalism, pp.71-86. 
24 See for example, Duverger, Political Parties; and Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, 
Party Systems and Voter Alignments”. 
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Therefore what is needed is an approach that is more sensitive to the unique 
civil war background of post-war societies. This thesis argues that there are 
important war-related factors, which carry at least as much, possibly more weight 
in explaining the institutionalization of post-war parties and party systems. Such 
factors include, for example, the war-time origins of parties, the way in which the 
war ended (military victory or peace agreement), and the design of post-war 
institutions. The second major hypothesis of this thesis therefore holds that an 
historical-institutionalist perspective that takes into account the war-related 
dynamics of party development can complement mainstream theories of party 
politics that rely on election competition, class-based socioeconomic cleavages 
and formal political institutional factors and fail to fully capture the 
institutionalization of party politics in post-war societies. 
To operationalize the hypotheses, the following research questions will guide 
the analysis: 
 What historical, political-institutional and socioeconomic factors (both 
domestic and international) have influenced political party development in 
various parts of the world, how and to what effect? 
 What most clearly distinguishes post-conflict developing countries from 
other countries with regard to the development of political parties and party 
systems? 
 To what degree are parties and party systems institutionalized in post-conflict 
countries, and what explains the degree of institutionalization? 
 Why are dominant party systems so prevalent in post-conflict countries, and 
which strategies of parties to become or remain dominant can be 
distinguished? 
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 To what extent and how has engagement by the international community 
contributed to party development and institutionalization? 
 What is the impact of war on the organization and functioning of parties and 
party systems? 
 
An obvious additional research question would have centred on the implications 
of party institutionalization and one-party dominance for political stability and 
democratization in post-conflict countries. Given that it seems reasonable to 
presume that dominance by one party or highly unequal institutionalization 
between various parties in the long term has a negative impact on 
democratization, such questions certainly deserve further study. However, when 
it comes to the study of post-war party politics, about which little is yet known, 
this for now is one step too far. The focus of this study is therefore primarily on 
the factors influencing the nature and institutionalization of post-war parties and 
party systems, not on the role or influence of parties and party systems on 
political stability or democratization. The next section will explain how the 
above research questions will be answered and what methods will be used for 
collecting the necessary data. 
 
1.4 Research Design and Methods 
 
To gain a better understanding of party development in post-war societies, this 
research uses the comparative method.25 Focusing on only a few cases (‘small-
N’), this method has important advantages over the alternative statistical and 
                                                 
25 See Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”. 
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single case study methods and seems more appropriate for the specific focus of 
this thesis.  
For example, the focus on a limited number of cases enables a more in-depth 
examination than is possible with the statistical method with its large-N design. 
The latter gives only scant attention to historical processes of change and 
country-specific explanations. By contrast, a small-N analysis can delve much 
deeper into the process of post-war party development and study the various 
factors that influence it in greater detail. The richer data resulting from this 
analysis is particularly useful for an unexplored field of study such as post-war 
party politics. Yet by focusing on a few cases it is still possible to identify cross-
national patterns of post-war party development and highlight important 
variation. It also increases the possibility of generalizing conclusions, at least to 
some extent. This is not possible with the single case study approach. 
Focusing on a small number of cases is also more feasible in an area of study 
about which little information or theory yet exists. The almost complete absence 
of reliable data on post-war parties and countries makes it extremely difficult to 
use a large-N statistical method, despite the potential benefits that this method 
could have had for the topic of study.26 Although the empirical part of this 
research required extensive field work and foreign language training, this still 
compared favourably with the data and time needed for compiling a 
comprehensive quantitative dataset. 
                                                 
26 A statistical analysis of the total number of post-war cases would not only have allowed for 
better control of variables and the detection of ‘deviant’ cases, but would also have enabled, at 
least potentially, stronger inferences that have a wider applicability. See Geddes, Paradigms and 
Sand Castles. Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics. 
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 The specific comparative strategy used is that of a ‘most different systems 
design’ with El Salvador and Cambodia as the two case studies. Arguably, two 
cases may not be an ideal number but it is appropriate to the formal constraints 
governing a research project of this nature. The objective of this strategy is “to 
identify those features that are the same among different countries in an effort to 
account for a particular outcome”.27 The main reason for choosing this strategy, 
and not the alternative ‘most similar systems design’, lies in the difficulty of 
finding similar post-war cases. In addition, the most different systems design has 
the advantage of making generalizations of findings to other post-war countries 
easier.  
 El Salvador and Cambodia are two post-war countries that diverge in several 
important areas, including historical context, culture, socioeconomic 
development as well as geographic location. However, they share the more or 
less same outcome of an unbalanced party system that is dominated by one 
highly institutionalized political party. By identifying the key factors that account 
for this same outcome in these two very different cases this research makes it 
possible to learn more about what determines post-war development, not only in 
El Salvador and Cambodia but also in the many other post-war cases that share 
this outcome. In other words, political parties and party systems are treated as the 
dependent variables in this research. Independent variables include factors 
already highlighted in the party politics literature, namely electoral competition, 
socioeconomic cleavages and formal political institutions, as well as new (war-
                                                 
27 Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics. An Introduction, p.29. See also 
Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, pp.62-67. 
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related) factors such as international engagement, the war-time origins of parties, 
the way in which the war ended, and post-war institutional design. 
 There are, however, two main methodological risks with this research 
design. One is that there are more variables than cases, which if not addressed 
makes hypothesis-testing impossible. The other is selection bias, which 
potentially limits the validity of conclusions.28 Although these problems cannot 
be completely avoided, this research tries to mitigate them by employing the 
methods of structured focused comparison and process tracing as well as by 
identifying the wider universe of post-war cases and carefully choosing case 
studies from it.  
Structured focused comparison refers to the use of standardized, general 
questions that are asked of each case.29 Here this is done by assessing all the 
main political parties in El Salvador and Cambodia on the same four dimensions 
of party institutionalization and examining the same potential causal factors for 
party and party system institutionalization in the two cases. This not only 
increases the number of observations of post-war party development but also 
facilitates a cross-national comparison with more generalisable conclusions. 
Process tracing helps to make sense of the large number of variables by 
identifying the causal process between independent and dependent variables 
within the two cases.30 Here, it is used to explain the different ways in which 
party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador and Cambodia is 
                                                 
28 See Geddes, Paradigms and Sand Castles, pp.131-173; Landman, Issues and Methods in 
Comparative Politics, pp.40-51. 
29 George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison”. 
30 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pp.205-232. 
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related to the war and post-war context of each country. Finally, the discussion 
about other post-war cases in chapter 3 gives an overview of the range of 
variation in post-war party and party systems. This makes it possible to identify 
unique and more representative cases.  
The reasons for selecting El Salvador and Cambodia as the two main case 
studies are fivefold. First, El Salvador and Cambodia have party systems that are 
more or less representative of the range of party systems found in post-war 
societies. As is demonstrated in chapter 3, most post-war party systems can be 
categorized as dominant party systems that revolve around one highly 
institutionalized ruling party. With the strong ruling Cambodian People’s Party 
(CPP) dominating the country’s political scene, Cambodia is one of the clearest 
examples of a dominant party system. At first sight, El Salvador’s party system 
seems slightly more balanced with two parties competing for power. In practice, 
however, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) has clearly dominated 
El Salvador’s post-war period (at least until 2008).  
A second reason for choosing El Salvador and Cambodia has to do with the 
relative political stability of these two post-war countries. Many of the other 
post-war cases are unsuitable for an in-depth assessment because their wars have 
ended only in the last few years or so and their parties and party systems have not 
had time to sufficiently crystallize. El Salvador and Cambodia, by contrast, were 
among the first post-war cases after the end of the Cold War. In both countries 
the main political parties have had more than 15 years to develop between the 
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end of the war and the most recent national elections, which allows for a more 
meaningful long-term assessment.31  
Third, both El Salvador and Cambodia have had a particularly intense and 
long-drawn-out war, which has turned these countries into some of the most 
difficult settings for post-war party development. In El Salvador the war lasted 
for more than 10 years, claiming more than 75,000 lives and leading to the 
electoral exclusion of almost all left-wing political parties. In Cambodia, the 
period of war was spread out over more than 30 years, claiming more than 1.5 
million lives and bringing party development almost to a complete stop. By 
choosing two of the most conflict-affected cases the research can highlight the 
influence of war-related factors more clearly.  
A fourth reason for choosing El Salvador and Cambodia is because this 
allows us to study the role of international actors in post-war party development. 
In both countries there has been large-scale international involvement in the 
peace building process and international actors have actively engaged in 
elections and democratic reform that influenced party competition. More 
importantly, there has been significant direct international political party 
assistance in El Salvador and in Cambodia, unlike in other post-war cases. 
Finally, there has been relatively limited scholarly attention for the main 
political parties and party systems of these two countries. Although various 
aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction and democratization processes of El 
Salvador and Cambodia have been studied before, there is little systematic 
                                                 
31 The period of study for party development in Cambodia starts with the Paris Peace Agreement 
in 1991 and ends with the country’s fifth national post-conflict elections in 2008. In El Salvador 
it starts with the Chapultepec Agreement in 1992 and ends with the country’s sixth national post-
conflict elections in 2006. 
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information available about the development and institutionalization of their 
parties and party systems. This and the fact that both countries share the outcome 
of an unbalanced party system make El Salvador and Cambodia an interesting 
pair for comparison. 
  
The material presented in this thesis comes from a variety of sources. The 
theoretical parts are based on a review and analysis of primary sources, including 
political party documents, party and news websites and official publications, as 
well as secondary sources, which include academic books and journal articles, 
and non-academic working papers, reports and survey data from think tanks and 
non-governmental organizations. An overview of all primary and secondary 
sources used is presented in the References at the end of the thesis. The empirical 
parts of this study are informed by more than 70 semi-structured interviews with 
party leaders and staff, government and electoral officials, civil society leaders, 
academic experts, and representatives of international agencies. Additional 
information has been obtained through informal conversations with a number of 
international country specialists and through observation of election campaign 
activities and party-related formal meetings. By checking the validity of research 
findings against a variety of sources (triangulation) I have attempted to make the 
account as reliable and comprehensive as possible. For an explanation of how the 
semi-structured interviews were designed, how methodological problems were 
addressed and who was interviewed see Appendices I and II.  
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1.5 Key Concepts 
 
To minimize confusion it is helpful to define some of the concepts used in this 
thesis. The concept of political party is the most frequently used term and 
arguably in need of defining most because of its variety of meanings in different 
contexts and time periods. One of the most famous and widely used definitions is 
that by Edmund Burke, who defines a party as “a body of men united for 
promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular 
principle in which they are all agreed”.32 However, the emphasis on a shared 
ideology among party members in this definition does not seem to apply to most 
parties in non-Western, post-war societies –nor to some parties in contemporary 
Western democracies– that lack a clear ideological profile, have a much more 
fluid membership and operate on a more pragmatic, clientelist basis. A more 
minimalist definition that still captures the crucial representational function of 
political parties is more appropriate. This thesis therefore uses Giovanni Sartori’s 
definition: “a party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable 
of placing through elections, candidates for public office”.33 A party system 
subsequently refers to a collection of parties competing with other parties in 
elections for the control of public office.34 
The term political party development is defined as the process through 
which a political party originates, evolves into an organized structure and 
becomes either more or less electorally accountable. It is important to note that in 
                                                 
32 Burke, “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents”, p.317. 
33 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, p.57. 
34 See also Wolinetz, “Party Systems and Party System Types”. 
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practice this is a non-linear, multi-dimensional process. A closely related concept 
is that of institutionalization, which is primarily used in the context of party and 
party system institutionalization. Following Randall and Svåsand’s analysis, it is 
here defined as “the process by which the party [or the party system] becomes 
established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or 
culture”.35 This concept is further elaborated in chapter 2. 
When talking about political culture, this research refers to the predominant 
beliefs, attitudes and actions of political elites regarding their role and capacities 
within the political system of their country.36 It here particularly refers to the 
supposedly prevailing norm of authoritarian leadership of political elites in many 
post-war countries. 
Finally, this research concentrates on post-war countries. These can be 
defined as countries that have concluded major armed conflict throughout their 
territory, which ended by a peace agreement signed by the main warring parties 
or a military victory by one of the warring parties. 37 The term, which is used 
interchangeably with post-conflict countries, is further discussed in chapter 3. 
 
                                                 
35 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.12. 
36 This is based on Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical 
Africa, p.662. See also Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development. 
37 Following the widely used definition of the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, major armed 
conflict or war is here defined as “a contested incompatibility, which concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year”. See 
http://www.ucdp.uu.se. 
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1.6 Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters, including this introduction. The 
following chapter reviews the academic literature on party politics. It first 
highlights important differences in parties’ historical background in consolidated 
Western democracies and new democracies in the developing world. It then gives 
an overview of the functions, organizational structures and types of political 
parties and discusses some of the main theories and typologies devised by 
scholars to understand them. Chapter 2 also reviews the different methods and 
classifications for understanding party systems. The key concepts of party and 
party system institutionalization are introduced as useful analytical tools. It 
concludes by reviewing the main analytical approaches for explaining party and 
party system development. 
 Chapter 3 examines the conflict and peace-building literature and 
concentrates on parties and party systems in post-war countries. It examines the 
distinctive socioeconomic, political and security context of post-war countries 
and shows that there is wide variety. It also highlights the particular challenges 
for party development in these settings. The chapter discusses the different kinds 
of parties present in post-war countries. It does the same for party systems and 
then presents a unique classification of the party systems of all post-war 
countries. The final section briefly introduces the two case studies of El Salvador 
and Cambodia. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the post-war politics of El Salvador and 
Cambodia and use the concepts of party and party system institutionalization 
introduced in chapter 2. The two chapters have a similar structure. Each one 
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traces the origins and ‘paths of development’ of the main political parties in the 
two case study countries. They also give an overview of the peace process and 
the results of post-war elections. Based on interview and field research findings, 
chapters 4 and 5 then assess the degree of party and party system 
institutionalization on a number of dimensions. Finally, both chapters compare 
the different degrees of party institutionalization and the nature of party 
competition against various theoretical explanations, and make an assessment of 
how much explanatory weight the different explanations actually provide in each 
case. 
 Chapter 6 pulls the case study findings together by outlining some of the key 
differences and similarities in terms of party and party system institutionalization 
in El Salvador and Cambodia. It also analyzes how war has impacted on 
individual parties and the overall party system. In addition, it revisits where the 
two cases belong in the bigger universe of post-war cases, and how the research 
findings of this thesis relate to other post-war countries. 
Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of the research. It highlights the 
major findings and compares them with the key hypotheses and research 
questions informing this thesis. It then identifies important implications of the 
research for theory and policy. The chapter concludes by proposing several 
suggestions for future research. 
Finally, appendices I, II, III, IV, V and VI provide important background 
material about interview strategies and structure, the names and positions of 
people interviewed, the official electoral results as well as international 
assistance to El Salvador and Cambodia, respectively.  
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Parties and Party Systems in Established and New 
Democracies 
 
 
In order to find out what makes post-war party development special, we first 
need to know more about the emergence of political parties in countries that have 
not recently suffered from civil war, or at least not in such large measure. This 
chapter therefore reviews the literature on political party development that has 
traditionally focused on the more established democracies of Western Europe 
and North America, and in recent years has been extended to the new 
democracies of Central-and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara 
Africa.  
 The analysis in this chapter is structured around five basic questions: when, 
why and under what conditions did political parties emerge? (section 2.1); how 
did they organize themselves? (section 2.2); and what patterns of interaction 
between different political parties can be distinguished? (section 2.4). The 
answers to these questions on party development, party function, party 
organization and party systems provide some of the key themes in the current 
literature on party politics. The chapter also introduces the concepts of party and 
party system institutionalization (sections 2.3 and 2.5) and discusses the various 
analytical approaches that have been used to explain them (section 2.6). 
23 
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The extensive literature review below helps identify the main theories and 
concepts of previous research on party development that can assist the empirical 
investigation in this thesis. Moreover, it provides an understanding of party 
development in ‘non-war’ contexts –a sort of ‘control group’ if you like– that 
will serve as an important point of reference when analyzing party development 
in post-war societies later on. 
 
2.1 Variety in Origins and Development of Political Parties 
 
The academic literature on party politics has traditionally focused on the 
experiences of a limited group of Western countries, which reflects the belief 
among political scientists that West-Europe and North America are the 
‘heartlands’ of political party development and democratization.38 As a 
consequence, much of this literature concentrates on parties in Britain, France, 
Germany and the United States. Closely related to the interest in the ‘third wave 
of democratization’ and the role of political parties in consolidating democracy, 
there has recently been a growing interest in the study of parties in Latin 
                                                 
38 See Duverger, Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, pp. xxiii-
xxxvii; Daalder, “Parties, Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe”, pp. 45-52; 
Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p. 24; and Scarrow, “The Nineteenth-Century Origins 
of Modern Political Parties: The Unwanted Emergence of Party-Based Politics”, pp. 16-19. 
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America, Central-and Eastern Europe, and to a somewhat lesser extent, also Asia 
and Sub-Sahara Africa.39 
The early to mid-twentieth century literature on party politics focused 
mainly on how political parties and party systems in those countries originated 
and how they subsequently developed, both organizationally and 
programmatically.40 The recent academic literature pays more attention to the 
various types of parties and party systems, their functioning in elections, as well 
as their linkages with other political institutions, notably the state. Other recent 
topics of study include the funding of political parties and their apparent 
‘decline’ in the current age of globalization.41 
 Many of the recent comparative studies have indicated that not only are there 
large differences between political parties in different regions of the world, but 
also that there is a large variation in how parties emerged and developed.42 The 
next section will highlight some of the main geographical differences in party 
development. For the sake of argument this chapter makes generalizations about 
regional experiences and/or ‘paths’ of party development. However, it is 
                                                 
39 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America; van 
Biezen, Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central 
Europe; Manikas and Thornton, Political Parties in Asia. Promoting Reform and Combating 
Corruption in Eight Countries; Sachsenröder, “Party Politics and Democratic Development in 
East and Southeast Asia – a Comparative View”. Volume I: Southeast Asia; Salih, African 
Political Parties. Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance; and Mozaffar and Scarritt, 
“The Puzzle of African Party Systems”. 
40 See Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties; Michels, Political 
Parties; Duverger, Political Parties; and LaPalombara and Weiner, Political Parties and 
Political Development. 
41 Gunther, Montero and Linz, Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges; and Burnell, 
“Globalising Party Politics in Emerging Democracies”. 
42 Randall, Political Parties in the Third World, pp.1-6. 
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important to remember here that in the end each political party is a unique 
product of its own historical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural background. 
 
Party Origins and Development in Established Western Democracies 
Organized political parties in West-Europe and North America roughly date back 
some 150 years. Before that, there were loosely structured political factions 
organized around a set of singular, narrow interests.43 In countries like Britain, 
France, Germany and the United States, political parties – at least in the form of 
structured groups of people sharing and representing certain societal interests and 
competing for government power in competitive elections– did not emerge until 
the mid-nineteenth century. At the time political parties developed in response to 
the needs of national governance systems that were changing from loosely 
organized smaller regions to bigger and more structured nation-states. In order to 
account for the adequate representation of the broad range of interests of people 
living in the new West-European and North American states, these states 
required an institution that could link “voters to political office-holders and hold 
those in power accountable to the mass electorate”.44 By unifying a group of 
leaders that could represent the population, channel their interests and by being 
elected into public office could put their ideas into practice, political parties 
proved to be the most appropriate vehicles for interest representation and 
government formation. Yet, largely as a result of the particular country context, 
the parties that emerged developed in different ways. 
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In the United States, for example, the earliest political groupings such as the 
Federalists and Jeffersonian Democratic Republicans emerged in the eighteenth 
century as a reflection of opposing views over what the new nation should look 
like, over how power should be distributed and over how the federation of states 
should be run. At first, the American parties consisted of loose, weakly organized 
and rather elitist structures that were nevertheless capable of representing a large 
variety of societal interests.45 This changed in the early nineteenth century, when 
the electorate expanded significantly and party competition increased. To help 
mobilize the new voters, the two parties established ‘party machines’ that were 
able to recruit large numbers of party activists with various incentives, including 
jobs and other party-channelled favours.46  
In Britain, structured political parties did not materialize until the Reform 
Acts of 1832 and 1867, which widened the franchise and enabled the electorate 
to grow significantly. This caused the elitist and loosely structured political 
groupings in parliament, the then Tories (the predecessor of the Conservative 
Party) and the Whigs (the predecessor of the Liberal Democrat Party), to create 
electoral committees to register party supporters among the electorate and to 
form extra-parliamentary organizations to attract new party members outside 
parliament. It also led to introduction of ‘party whips’, which helped foster 
greater party discipline needed for garnering majority support in votes over 
important policy decisions. However, universal suffrage was not introduced in 
Britain until 1928.47  
                                                 
45 Crotty, “Party Origins and Evolution in the United States”, pp.27-28. 
46 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p. 91. 
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and Fisher, British Political Parties, pp. 2-3.  
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In Germany, the formation of political parties did not start until after the 
establishment of a parliament in the mid-nineteenth century and the formation of 
the Second Reich in 1871. The earliest German parties represented only a small 
elite in society, however. In contrast, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that 
originated in 1863 represented the interests of a growing working class and is 
considered as one of the first examples of the ‘mass party’.48  
France shows a somewhat different picture to other European countries in 
that most of its early political parties did not depend on large memberships. Most 
of the groups that had consolidated themselves into parliamentary political 
parties after the Revolution of 1789 remained highly elitist, loosely organized 
and disapproved of party discipline and membership obligations. In addition, in 
nineteenth century France few people were allowed to vote and “the election 
took place (…) amongst gentlemen”.49 Although this situation changed 
somewhat when suffrage was expanded in 1848 and finally extended to all adults 
in 1919, most French political parties did generally not develop a mass party 
organization and establish closer links with voters until after the Fifth Republic 
of Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969).50 
There are a number of factors that influenced the emergence and 
development of political parties in Western Europe and the United States. A first 
important factor was the introduction and gradual extension of the right to vote 
(suffrage) to the wider population. According to some scholars, the resulting 
growth in the electorate increased the formal responsibilities of the legislature 
                                                 
48 Braunthal, Parties and Politics in Modern Germany, pp.18-19 and p.23. 
49 Duverger, Political Parties, p.xxvii. 
50 See Knapp, “France. Never a Golden Age”, pp.107-108; and Ware, Political Parties and Party 
Systems, p.49 and pp. 84-85. 
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which, in turn, gave rise to the formalization of parliamentary groups 
representing certain interests.51 The second important factor was 
‘parliamentarization’, which refers to the process whereby national assemblies 
gained increasing influence and control over the executive branch of 
government. This latter factor has been highlighted by those who argued that 
political parties grew out of parliamentary groups. According to this view 
parties’ formal structures evolved as a result of competition with other parties to 
gain the votes of a growing electorate.52 Although there is a debate in the 
literature over the exact influence of each of the two factors, there is a general 
consensus that both factors strongly influenced early party development in 
Europe and the United States.53  
Where suffrage and parliamentarization played an important role in early 
party development, industrialization and urbanization were important factors in 
later party development in the early and mid-twentieth century. The growth of 
political parties and the consolidation of the early British two-party system, for 
example, was particularly influenced by the emergent national press, new and 
improved transport facilities, the simple majority electoral system, the 
introduction of party manifestoes and changing patterns of employment (from 
agricultural to industrial labour) related to the processes of industrialization and 
urbanization at the end of the nineteenth century. Seeking better working-class 
representation in a parliament dominated by Liberals and Conservatives, various 
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British trade unions in 1900 established the Labour Representation Committee 
(LRC), which later became the Labour Party.54 
Needless to say, not all political parties in the West have undergone the same 
evolutionary process of party development as described above. Over time, each 
country has had a variety of political parties with a broad range of organizational, 
electoral and/or ideological characteristics. In addition, in some West- and South 
European countries party development has been seriously hampered by wars, 
authoritarian rule and legal provisions restricting organized political activities. 
And finally, in East- and Central Europe party development has been heavily 
shaped by the different varieties of communist rule.55 
Important to note here is that in the majority of Western countries political 
parties have mainly been affected by changes in their domestic political settings. 
This stands in sharp contrast to the situation in non-Western developing 
countries, to which we will now turn. 
 
Party Origins and Development in the Developing World 
Compared to party development in the Western world, political parties in regions 
such as Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa are of a much more recent origin and 
typically have not benefitted from decades of parliamentary experience. In Latin 
America there is a somewhat longer history of party politics. However, in all 
                                                 
54 Industrialization played a particularly important role in stratifying British society in different 
social classes, making class divisions the dominant factor shaping British politics at the time. See 
Fisher, British Political Parties, p. 4 and pp.9-10; and Ball, British Political Parties, p.27 and 
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three developing world regions the political, economic and socio-cultural context 
is fundamentally different from Western societies.56 
  In political terms, many of the sovereign states in developing countries are 
fairly new and gained their independence from colonial administrations only in 
the last half century or so. The political parties that emerged in these countries 
have been profoundly affected by these external forces. Economically, the 
majority of developing countries, particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa, have not 
experienced the same level of growth as countries in Europe and North America. 
As a result, economic factors such as industrialization and technological 
development have not (yet) had the same impact on party development as in the 
West. And finally, developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have 
different political, social, religious and other norms than Western countries that 
reflect their unique history and cultural heritage. 
These different conditions, in combination with the immense cultural and 
historical variation of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America make it much 
more difficult to come up with a generalized theory of party development for 
these regions. Extrapolating the emergence of political parties from the 
experiences of a few major countries in each region –let’s say South Africa, 
Brazil, or India– seems inappropriate as well, as these countries are not wholly 
representative of the different political systems found in those areas. Moreover, it 
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would not do justice to the sheer variety of origins, forms and structures of 
political parties found within Asia, Latin America and Africa.  
Another problem that hinders the analysis is the lack of detailed knowledge 
about political parties and party systems in these regions, especially in Southeast 
Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. In contrast to the scholarly attention for all aspects 
of Western parties, there are few systematic studies on the party politics of 
Southeast Asian and African countries, even by scholars hailing from these 
regions.57 And although there is an emerging literature on non-Western party 
politics that is careful not to be Euro- or ethnocentric, many of the concepts and 
references used in this literature are still taken from analyses of Western party 
development. In addition, so far there has been no alternative body of literature 
or single generally accepted theory about party politics in developing countries. 
The latter does not necessarily have to be a problem, as long as we are aware that 
the context for party development and the nature of political parties themselves 
can be very different in the various regions. The next paragraphs identify some of 
the most distinctive features of (early) party development in each of the three 
main developing regions. 
Latin America has some of the oldest political parties and party systems in 
the world. But because of the strong influence of (Spanish) colonial rule as well 
as the region’s diverse cultural heritage and historical experience, political 
systems have often been shaped in different ways than in Europe and/or North 
America. Currently, most countries in Latin America are either consolidated 
democracies or are in a process of political flux. In both situations, political 
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parties play a crucial role. Though many of them have remained weak, elitist and 
clientelistic, overall, political parties in Latin America have institutionalized 
significantly over the last four decades. Nevertheless, the political influence of 
parties varies heavily per country, and particularly in Central America, this is not 
always very high. This has partly been attributed “to parties’ relations with other 
institutions in the political system”, in particular the military that has played a 
long-lasting and dominant role in Latin American politics.58 In addition, 
countries in Latin America differ in the degree to which party competition has 
become institutionalized with some highly institutionalized party systems in 
countries like Costa Rica and Uruguay and less institutionalized systems such as 
in Peru and Bolivia.59 
 Asia is probably the most diverse of the developing regions, not only in 
demographic and socioeconomic terms, but also when it comes to its political 
context. The political regimes found in this region vary from the liberal 
democracies of Japan and Taiwan, the ‘soft-authoritarianism’ of Singapore and 
Malaysia, to the communist regimes of China and Vietnam and the military 
dictatorship of Burma/Myanmar.60 Similar to Africa, many Asian countries are 
known for their distinct (political) culture, comprising among others a group or 
communal orientation, the extensive use of religion in daily life, and affinity with 
more ‘managed’ or authoritarian-led government, together often captured under 
                                                 
58 Goodman, “Political Parties and the Political Systems of Central America”, p.5; Diamond and 
Linz, “Introduction: Politics, Society and Democracy in Latin America”, p.21; and Diamond and 
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59 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.1. 
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the ill-defined concept of ‘Asian values’.61 With regard to political party 
development, political parties in Asia are a much more recent phenomenon than 
in West-Europe, North and Latin America. With the exception of a few ‘stable’ 
political parties like Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) and Japan’s 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that originated during the 1940s and ‘50s, or the 
Communist parties of China and Vietnam that go back even as far as the 1920s 
and ‘30s, the majority of parties in Asia are still relatively young, weakly 
institutionalized and not very programme-oriented.62 
 Sub-Sahara Africa is the region where the development of political parties is 
probably furthest removed from the West-European or North American 
experience, in the sense that the wider socioeconomic and political context 
differs markedly from most Western societies.63 Despite the impressive 
economic and technological progress made by some African countries, most of 
the continent has experienced limited economic growth and industrialization. The 
majority of households lives in the rural areas and survives on subsistence 
farming. In addition, the political context in many African societies is 
characterized by weakly institutionalized states run on a non-bureaucratic, ‘neo-
patrimonial’ form of governance.64 Although there are a few notable exceptions, 
the origins of most African political parties lay in the period of decolonization 
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after the Second World War.65 Therefore, in contrast to their Western 
counterparts, the majority of African political parties are only several decades 
old.  
Before the period of decolonization, African party development was rather 
limited as several key conditions for political mobilization and party formation, 
such as competitive elections, suffrage and parliamentary representation either 
did not exist or were restricted under European colonial administrations. Because 
of this, a lot of African parties did not emerge from domestic political pressures, 
but emerged in response to what was increasingly perceived as the repression by 
Western, imperialist powers. Several of the most prominent African political 
parties that emerged during the 1950s and ‘60s can directly be traced to national 
liberation movements aimed at achieving independence from the European 
colonial authorities.66 Other important factors that influenced party development 
in Africa were the relatively late introduction of universal suffrage as well as the 
contacts between new African political movements and reformist intellectuals in 
France, the Arab-Muslim world, the USSR, Britain and the US.67 
 Regarding the nature of party politics in the developing world, a number of 
general characteristics can be distinguished. Notwithstanding important country 
variations, developing world politics has for a long time been characterized by 
                                                 
65 The True Whig Party in Liberia (founded in 1860) and the African National Congress in South 
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66 Salih, “Introduction: The Evolution of African Political Parties”, p.2. Examples of such anti-
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Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, p. 661. 
 
36 Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies  
single-party, military or one-party dominant rule. Particularly in African and 
Asian societies these uncompetitive forms of politics were often justified by 
distinct political ideologies.68 Other common features of party politics in the 
developing world include the personalization of power by party leaders and 
presidents; the limits placed on the role of interest groups, especially trade 
unions, both by the colonial authorities and the new post-independent rulers; the 
subordination of the party to the state; the use of clientelist networks in 
mobilizing party support; and, particularly in the African context the emergence 
of parties based on ethnic cleavages.69 
 
Conclusion 
Party development in established Western democracies has been heavily 
influenced by the introduction and extension of suffrage, parliamentarization, 
and several technological developments including industrialization. Moreover, 
Western parties and party systems have been consolidated over a long period of 
mostly stable electoral competition. The development of political parties and 
party systems in Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa has been subject to 
forces internal as well as external to their political context. Colonial 
administration, in combination with periods of military rule and civil war, have 
in many cases been restraining factors on the emergence and institutionalization 
of competitive party politics in these regions. Due to the absence in several 
developing countries of political institutions such as parliaments and competitive 
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elections until the mid-twentieth century, political parties have often played a 
marginal role in the decision-making process, particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa 
and Asia. Late industrialization and low levels of economic development have 
further impeded the growth of parties. The result is a diverse picture of party 
development in the developing world with some significant differences from 
Western experiences. 
 
2.2 Functions, Organizations and Types of Political Parties 
 
Having highlighted the variety in origins and development trajectories of 
political parties around the world, the next important step is to see what functions 
parties perform in different contexts. Related to this is the nature of party 
organization and the different types of parties that can be distinguished on the 
basis of organizational structure and other important criteria. 
 
Party Functions 
Political parties perform a number of functions. Some theorists have clustered the 
main functions per arena in which parties operate while others have provided a 
more general overview of functions represented by parties across the world.70 In 
general, parties play a crucial role in articulating, aggregating and representing 
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the demands and interests of individual voters. They also recruit and train 
candidates for public office. And they hold the government accountable for its 
policies and actions. All of these functions are considered crucial for the 
maintenance of a democratic political system and are therefore core tasks of 
political parties in new and established democracies. This means that political 
parties are indispensable in a democratic political system. For many, “political 
parties created democracy and (…) modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of parties”.71 
 However, in many emerging democracies, including most post-war 
countries, there is as yet no established democracy to be maintained. There, a 
democratic political system first needs to be created and the functions of parties 
might not be the same therefore. Moreover, it is likely that in these settings there 
are other functions that are more important in the short term. This has been 
reflected in studies that emphasized the role of political parties in fostering 
political stability, national integration, and/or nation- and state-building.72 Of 
special interest is the analysis of authors that have highlighted the conflict 
management role of parties. Reilly, for instance, indicates that “because they 
channel, aggregate, and express political demands, political parties play an 
important role in the management of conflict in societies divided along cultural, 
linguistic, religious, regional or other lines”.73 In a similar fashion, Burnell says 
that “in divided societies seeking to establish democracy out of the ruins of 
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violent conflict, interest aggregation is one of the most vital public goods that can 
easily be undersupplied”.74 
Suffice to say here that different authors have identified different functions 
of parties, as summarized in table 2.1 below. The relevance of each function in a 
particular context depends on the overarching aim (democratization, nation-
building, conflict management) that parties are trying to achieve –or should be 
aiming at. However, it may also depend on the perspective that analysts are 
trying to impose on the analysis. In some cases, parties or their leaders may not 
be motivated by any grand public service objectives, but are simply trying to 
achieve power. Attributing certain functions to parties might then be more a 
question of what the analyst reads into them than reflecting parties’ actual 
function(s). 
Table 2.1 Functions of Political Parties  
Type of function Main proponents 
- representation of popular demands 
- integration of voters into political system 
- aggregation of interests 
- recruitment and training of political leaders 
- making government accountable 
- organizing opposition 
Key (1964), Diamond (1999), Dalton and 
Wattenberg (2000), Gunther and Diamond 
(2001), Randall and Svåsand (2002) 
 
- nomination of candidates 
- mobilization of electoral supporters 
- structuring societal and policy issues 
Gunther and Diamond (2001) 
- state- and/or nation-building 
- creation of political stability 
Huntington (1968); Coleman and Rosberg 
(1966); LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) 
- political communication between people and government 
- providing benefits in exchange for electoral support 
Tordoff (2002) 
- mediation of conflicting interests 
- unite social groups and contributing to societal cohesion 
Tordoff (2002), Reilly (2006), Burnell 
(2006) 
- democratization of global governance Scholte (2006) 
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Party Organization 
In order to perform its various functions a political party needs a structure as well 
as human and financial resources. This is normally referred to as the party 
organization and includes the various organizational organs of a party, its rules 
and regulations, its financial resources, its cadre, supporters, members and 
activists, and its linkages with other institutions. The study of organizational 
aspects of parties has a long history and is usually associated with the work of 
four authors.  
The first is Mosei Ostrogorski whose work dates from the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Ostrogorski highlighted the growing influence of ‘party 
machines’ and caucuses of senior party leaders as organizational mechanisms for 
collective interest representation, particularly in the United States and Britain.75 
This was followed by the work of Roberto Michels, who after analyzing the 
organizational structure of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany 
concluded that the specialist knowledge and interests of party leaders ensures 
their domination over rank-and-file supporters. According to Michels any type of 
organization will eventually controlled by a small elite (‘iron law of 
oligarchy’).76 
A few decades later, Michel Duverger made the first typology of parties 
based on their organizational structures. Distinguishing between parties that are 
unitary (direct structures) and parties that are an amalgamation of different 
organizations (indirect structures), he identifies four basic organizational 
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‘elements’ from which parties are formed: the caucus, the branch, the cell and the 
militia. Duverger concludes that, despite the large variety in existing party 
organizations, there has been a general transformation from elite parties based on 
restricted caucuses to mass parties with a more open branch structure.77  
The most recent and most comprehensive examination of party organization 
is that of Angelo Panebianco. In contrast to Duverger and others who argued that 
the structure and form of party organizations is determined by the competition 
for votes, Panebianco traces the organizational structure to the origins of the 
party and its early development. According to his ‘genetic model’ of party 
organization, the formation of a ‘dominant coalition’ (party elite) and the degree 
of internal cohesion are influenced by the way in which a party grows –from the 
centre to the local level, vice versa or a combination of the two. Moreover, he 
argues that the presence or absence of an ‘external sponsor institution’ and 
charismatic leadership are important variables in early party development.78 In 
the subsequent control for power within the organization, selective and collective 
incentives are said to play a key role. Selective incentives are ‘private goods’ that 
consist of jobs, money, patronage, prestige, which aim to recruit and retain party 
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leaders and party activists. Collective incentives, on the other hand, are ‘public 
goods’ such as appeals to identity, solidarity, ideology, and even fear.79 
By underscoring the importance of the formative phase for a party’s current 
functioning, organization and power configuration, Panebianco’s analysis of 
party organization is strongly path-dependent. In his words: “the crucial political 
choices made by its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational 
control, and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an 
indelible mark”. His analysis is particularly interesting from a political studies 
point of view because of his emphasis on “explaining the functioning and 
activities of organizations [as well as the changes they undergo] above all in 
terms of alliances and struggles for power amongst the different actors that 
comprise them”.80 Together with the origins and historical development of 
parties (the ‘genetic model’), the intra-party dynamics between followers and 
party elites not only determine the type of party organization, but also influence 
the degree of party institutionalization according to Panebianco (see below).  
Despite his focus on Western European parties, Panebianco’s genetic model 
and power analysis is highly relevant for studies that aim to investigate the 
relationship between the origins of parties, their subsequent organization and 
functioning. Considering the explicit aim of this thesis to relate post-war party 
organization to historical periods of conflict, Panebianco’s operationalization 
will therefore gratefully be used in this thesis. 
 
Party Types 
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In order to study the main characteristics of political parties, political scientists 
have developed numerous party typologies or party models. In this connection, 
the elite party, the mass party, and the catch-all (electoralist) party are most 
commonly used models in the literature.81 
The elite (or cadre) party is characterized by its loose organizational 
structure with local autonomous party associations and no real central party 
office. Its core consists of a closed caucus of prominent individuals representing 
the party in public office. This is the party model associated with the early 
parliamentary parties that operated in late nineteenth century Britain, United 
States and some other West-European countries.82  
The expansion of the franchise in the early twentieth century in most 
Western countries stimulated the emergence of another type of political party, the 
mass party. This party type is characterized by a more structured organization 
with a professionalized central office and local branches with dues-paying 
members. Moreover, political parties described by the mass party model were 
generally more ideologically oriented and had stronger links with ‘extra-
parliamentary’ institutions, such as professional associations, trade unions or 
church groups.83  
                                                 
81 More recent party types distinguished in the literature include the ‘cartel party’ and the 
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The third model, the catch-all party, represents those parties that “originate 
from mass parties that have professionalized their party organization and 
downgraded their ideological profile in order to appeal to a wider electorate than 
their original class or religious social base”. The strong focus of these parties on 
winning votes across broad segments of the population on less strictly 
ideological and more interest-based political platforms, has led some scholars to 
define them as ‘electoralist catch-all’ or ‘electoral-professional parties’.84 Catch-
all parties have emerged in many Western countries since the mid-twentieth 
century, handily making use of new technologies for mass communication such 
as radio and television. Nowadays, many if not most parties in established 
democracies are of the catch-all type, and characteristically they are arguably 
more interested in vote maximization than interest representation. They are also a 
common phenomenon in emerging democracies in non-Western countries.  
It is important to emphasize here that all of the above-mentioned party 
models are ‘ideal types’ that by emphasizing the defining features of each 
specific party type serve as analytical tools for better understanding the 
differences between various parties. However, because of this these models also 
have their problems. First, their highly abstract nature is also their main 
weakness. Political parties throughout the world might share some of the traits of 
these models, but this does not necessarily mean that their characteristics exactly 
‘fit’ all the main criteria of the particular model. We should therefore be 
extremely careful when categorizing real world parties as belonging to certain 
models, and not automatically assume that these parties will behave in the same 
                                                 
84 Krouwel, “Party Models”, pp. 250-258; Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western 
European Party Systems”; and Panebianco, Political Parties, pp. 262-267. 
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way or develop in the same direction as their ideal type models presume they 
will.85 
Another problem with the distinction between elite, mass and catch-all 
parties is their almost exclusive focus on organizational aspects. Although the 
typology provides useful information on how parties belonging to a certain type 
normally emerge and are subsequently structured, it says little about the type of 
strategies used to mobilize supporters or the intra-party power struggles.  
The final problem with the above mentioned typology lies in its narrow 
geographical basis. The three ideal types of parties were largely conceptualized 
in a Western-oriented analysis of party politics and therefore mainly reflect the 
experiences of party development in the United States and a small number of 
Western European countries.86 As described earlier, political parties in Africa, 
Latin America, Asia and other parts of the world have emerged and developed in 
different historical, socioeconomic, and political contexts with particular impacts 
on their organization and functioning. As a result, they defy easy classification 
on the basis of the above party types. In contrast to the relatively limited variety 
of Western political party types, research indicates that the situation is perhaps 
more complex and certainly more diverse in the developing world.87 A less 
                                                 
85 See also Montero and Gunther, who argue that typologies can be useful for the identification of 
parties’ distinguishing characteristics, but that their ideal-type nature can easily lead to 
methodological problems, such as an assumed sequencing and evolution of party types and an 
oversimplification of party characteristics. Montero and Gunther, “Introduction: Reviewing and 
Reassessing Parties”, p.15 
86 Krouwel, “Party Models”, p. 249. The idea that the Western (European) experience of political 
party formation can be described as a unilinear developmental trajectory from elite-to-mass-to-
catch-all party has been heavily criticized in the literature. See Katz and Mair, “The Ascendancy 
of the Party in Public Office”, p. 114. 
87 Randall, Political Parties in the Third World, pp. 175-183. 
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Western-centric, more inclusive analysis therefore requires a different typology 
that accounts for the great variation in party formation, organization and 
functioning in Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. 
One typology that is specifically designed to do this is that by Richard 
Gunther and Larry Diamond. In addition to focusing on the degree of formal 
organization, their typology also takes into account the nature of the party’s 
programmatic commitment as well as its strategies and behavioural norms. The 
outcome is a typology of five party ‘genera’, including elite-based types, mass-
based types, ethnicity-based types, electoralist types, and movement party types. 
Each of these types can be subdivided on the basis of their organizational, 
programmatic and strategic criteria, resulting in fifteen different ‘species’ or 
subtypes (see table 2.2 below). 
Table 2.2 Gunther and Diamond’s Typology of Parties88 
Degree of organization Programmatic commitment Strategy / Behaviour  
Thick/mass Thin/elite Ideological Particularistic Pluralistic Hegemonic 
Elite-based parties: 
1. Traditional local 
notable party 
2. Clientelistic party 
 
- 
- 
 
X 
X 
 
- 
- 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X   
 
- 
-  
Mass-based parties: 
3. Leninist party 
4. Class-mass party 
5. Pluralist-nationalist 
party 
6. Ultranationalist party 
7. Denominational party 
8. Fundamentalist party 
 
X 
X 
X  
X  
X  
X  
 
X 
-  
- 
X  
- 
- 
 
X  
X  
X  
X  
X  
X  
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
X  
X  
- 
X 
- 
 
X  
- 
- 
X 
- 
X  
                                                 
88 Table developed by author on the basis of narrative by Gunther and Diamond, “Species of 
Political Parties: A New Typology”, p. 173 and pp. 175-189. See also Gunther and Diamond, 
“Types and Functions of Parties”, pp. 9-11. 
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Ethnicity-based parties: 
9. Ethnic party 
10. (Ethnic) congress 
party 
 
X  
- 
 
X  
X 
 
- 
-  
 
X 
X 
 
- 
X  
 
X 
- 
Electoralist parties: 
11. Personalistic party 
12. Catch-all party 
13. Programmatic party 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
X  
X  
X  
 
- 
X  
X  
 
X  
X  
- 
 
X  
X  
X  
 
X  
- 
- 
Movement / Parties: 
14. Left-libertarian party 
15. Post-industrial 
extreme right party 
 
- 
- 
 
X  
X  
 
- 
X  
 
- 
X  
 
X  
- 
 
- 
X  
Apart from recognizing and further specifying the main party types found in the 
established Western democracies, Gunther and Diamond’s typology also 
captures political parties found in non-Western countries. Parties resembling the 
ethnic congress party type, for example, can be found in India (Congress Party), 
Nigeria (People’s Democratic Party) and South Africa (African National 
Congress). In Africa, the (pluralist) ethnic congress party is said to be the most 
common type of political party.89 In contrast, parties belonging to the purely 
ethnic party type, which by definition is based on one ethnic group only, are 
much rarer. Examples include the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa and the 
(Sikh) Shiromani Akali Dal in India.90 The typology also enables the 
identification of personalistic parties whose “only rationale is to provide a 
vehicle for the leader to win an election and exercise power”.91 
                                                 
89 Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa, p. 
15. 
90 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 292; Gunther and Diamond, “Species of Political 
Parties”, p. 183. 
91 Gunther and Diamond, “Species of Political Parties”, pp. 187-188. 
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 Gunther and Diamond’s typology is certainly not perfect, as they themselves 
honestly admit. Although it does pay attention to non-organizational criteria, 
their typology can, for example, not escape a bias in focus on organizational 
elements. In addition, their typology can be criticized for being too broad, too 
deterministic and still too Western-oriented.92 However, these criticisms seem 
slightly exaggerated. After all, only by being more comprehensive and less 
parsimonious can the limitations of the earlier tripartite typology be seriously 
addressed. Also, the use of genera of party types does assume a certain path-
dependency, but this is not necessarily the same as being deterministic. Gunther 
and Diamond state that “a political party comes into existence within a specific 
social and technological context that may evolve over time, and this ‘founding 
context’ can leave a lasting imprint on the basic nature of the party’s 
organization for decades to come”.93 And finally, the use in Gunther and 
Diamond’s typology of certain labels and categories taken from the existing 
literature on Western parties should be seen as an attempt to bring the plethora of 
different typologies and their categories together, not as the application of a 
Western lens for looking at political parties in non-Western contexts. Exactly for 
                                                 
92 Krouwel, “Party Models”, p. 250; Randall, “Case Study One: Political Parties, Their Social 
Ties and Role in Political Change”, p.6. 
93 Gunther and Diamond, “Species of Political Parties”, pp. 173-174. This underlines the 
importance of understanding a party’s origins, echoing Panebianco’s notion of the ‘genetic 
model’ of party organization and the path-dependent nature of party development. However, 
Gunther and Diamond are also careful to note that “neither do we assert that one party type is 
likely to follow a predictable trajectory, evolving into another type”. They subsequently give two 
reasons for why a transformation from one party type to another does not necessarily have to take 
place: “the basic nature of the party’s organizational structure may be ‘frozen’ and therefore 
become resistant to pressures for change” and “the relationship between social or technological 
change and the programmatic or strategic motivations of party leaders is much more tenuous or 
non-existent”. 
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these three reasons – the typology’s comprehensiveness, its recognition of path 
dependency, and its integrated nature– this thesis will refer to some of Gunther 
and Diamond’s party types when analyzing the organizational, programmatic and 
strategic characteristics of some of the main political parties in post-conflict 
developing countries. 
 It is important to make one caveat here, however. The use of a single 
typology should not disguise the fact that political parties, as has been 
highlighted before, are very distinct entities in different parts of the world. 
Although we might be dealing in all cases with organizations that present 
electoral candidates for public office, most political parties in Latin America, 
Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa differ significantly from parties in Western Europe, 
the United States and other established democracies, not only in organizational 
and ideological terms, but also in their strategies for gaining and maintaining 
public support.94 Some of the older ruling parties, such as the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) and the Ba’ath Party in both Syria and Iraq, for example, could be 
classified as mass parties because of their extensive party organization with local 
branches and a large network of (grassroots) supporters. In this view they would 
resemble, at least in organizational terms, the classic mass parties of Western 
Europe.  
However, in reality these are of course elite-based organizations providing a 
(semi-democratic) ‘party façade’ for different factions of powerful leaders that 
often have limited direct links with grassroots members. Their programmatic 
focus is often unclear and their ideological stance can generally not easily be 
                                                 
94 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 126-128. 
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measured in terms of the ‘left-right’ spectrum common in established 
democracies. In addition, because of the semi-democratic or non-democratic 
contexts in many African, Asian and Latin American countries, ruling parties 
often use a broad range of official and non-official strategies to compete for and 
maintain power in what are often flawed elections. Similarly, many of the 
smaller catch-all parties in Africa, Asia and Latin America that present 
themselves as ‘opposition’ parties provide no real programmatic alternative and 
are often nothing more than urban-based political vehicles for power-hungry 
leaders. Many of them lack the grassroots support and organizational capacity to 
maintain a political presence in between elections and are true ‘flash parties’, 
which emerge just before the elections, only to disappear soon after. In 
exceptional circumstances, as has apparently been the case during several past 
elections in Uganda, organizations posing as ‘opposition’ parties are in fact 
surrogates or ‘fronts’ for the ruling party.95 Whatever their exact nature, the 
essential point here is that ‘political parties’ can be very different sorts of 
organizations in different parts of the world. 
 
2.3 Party Institutionalization 
 
The mere existence of a political party as an organizational structure is usually 
not sufficient for it to perform its functions, whether it intends (or is supposed to) 
to manage societal conflicts or aims to contribute to democratic consolidation. In 
order to become functionally meaningful, a political party needs to transform 
                                                 
95 Kiiza, Svåsand and Tabaro, Party Developments in the Run-Up to the 2006 Elections in 
Uganda. A Research Note, p.7. 
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from an organization into an institution, i.e. its procedures and activities must 
become routinized and durable over time.96 This process of institutionalization 
has been defined in various ways, including “the process by which organizations 
and procedures acquire value and stability” and “the way the organization 
‘solidifies’ (…) [and] becomes valuable in and of itself”.97 When focusing on the 
institutionalization of individual political parties, Randall and Svåsand’s 
definition captures not only structural-organizational but also attitudinal 
dimensions: “the process by which the party becomes established in terms both 
of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture”.98 
 Randall and Svåsand’s comprehensive analytical framework draws from the 
work of four authors who have written about (party) institutionalization. 
Huntington defined the political institutionalization of any group or procedure, 
including political parties, on the basis of four criteria or scales: adaptability-
rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-subordination, and coherence-disunity. 
The logic being that the more adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent a 
party is, the more institutionalized it is. Conversely, the more rigid, simple, 
subordinated and less unified, the lower its level of institutionalization.99 
Panebianco identified two measures for party institutionalization, including a 
party’s degree of autonomy in relation to its environment and its degree of 
‘systemness’, which refers to the internal coherence of the party organization.100 
                                                 
96 Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science. The ‘New Institutionalism’, p.29; See also 
March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. 
97 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 12; and Panebianco, Political Parties, 
p.49 and p.53. 
98 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.12. 
99 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 12-24. 
100 Panebianco, Political Parties, p.55. 
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Arguing that institutionalization does not solely concern the routinization of 
organizational aspects of a party, Levitsky argues that it is also important to look 
at ‘value infusion’, i.e. the extent to which a party becomes “infused with value 
beyond the technical requirement of the task in hand”.101 Finally, Janda draws 
attention to the external dimension of institutionalization, which refers to the 
societal perception of a party.102 After an in-depth comparison of these different 
conceptualizations, Randall and Svåsand propose a straightforward framework 
that outlines four central dimensions of party institutionalization covering the 
structural/attitudinal and the internal/external aspects of the process.103 
Considering the importance of the concept of party institutionalization in this 
study, it is worth exploring Randall and Svåsand’s framework in greater detail. 
Systemness is the structural-internal dimension of party institutionalization 
and refers to the “scope, density and regularity of interactions that constitute the 
party as a structure”. It captures both Panebianco’s measure of systemness and 
Huntington’s criterion of complexity. Systemness is said to be influenced by the 
origins and subsequent growth of a party, the resources (including funding) 
available to it, the relationship between party leader and party organization, the 
degree of factionalism and the degree of clientelism.104 These factors have 
usually impacted party development in developing countries differently than in 
Western (European) contexts. In the absence of dues-paying members, for 
example, many political parties in developing countries have had to rely on 
                                                 
101 Levitsky, “Institutionalization and Peronism. The Concept, The Case and the Case for 
Unpacking the Concept”, p.79, quoting Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological 
Interpretation, p.17. 
102 Janda, Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey. 
103 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, pp. 12-13. 
104 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, pp.13 and 17. 
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private or public sources of funding. Because of their incumbency and access to 
power, ruling parties have often relied on profitable links with business groups or 
used their clientelist networks for securing popular support during elections, or, 
indeed, used public resources directly. Opposition parties, however, usually 
lacked financial resources, unless they were able to secure the sponsorship of 
wealthy business men. The absence of a sustained and reliable source of income 
has negatively impacted on the organizational capacities of many political parties 
in the developing world, particularly in countries emerging from war as we shall 
see later. 
 The level of “freedom from interference in determining its own policies and 
strategies”, or decisional autonomy, is the second structural dimension of party 
institutionalization. It is an external aspect insofar as it says something about a 
party’s strength and position vis-à-vis actors outside its own structures. This is a 
slight adaptation of the autonomy criterion by both Huntington and Panebianco 
in the sense that it is more responsive to different possible forms of 
interdependence between parties and other actors. The two aspects said to 
influence decisional autonomy are the existence of linkages between the party 
and other actors, such as the state or civil society groups, as well as the presence 
of so-called ‘sponsoring institutions’. Traditionally, the latter include trade 
unions, professional associations or other extra-parliamentary institutions from 
which parties can draw support. More recently these have included diaspora 
groups and transnational party networks. Nevertheless, in many countries in 
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Africa and Asia, the linkages between parties and other civil society actors often 
remain limited and weak.105  
 Value infusion, the third attitudinal-internal dimension, refers to “the extent 
to which party actors and supporters (..) acquire an identification with and 
commitment to the party which transcend more instrumental or self-interested 
incentives for involvement”. In the context of developing countries it is usually 
not class that is the key issue of identification, but other issues such as ethnicity, 
region, religion and/or language. The degree to which supporters therefore can 
identify with a political party very much depends on whether that party is 
recognized as representative of a particular ethnicity, religion or language. In 
addition, value infusion is also influenced by a party’s ability to use clientelist 
practices as “party support would be conditional on the expectation of tangible 
benefits to the individual or community”.106 
 The fourth and final attitudinal-external dimension is reification. This refers 
to “the extent to which a political party becomes installed in the popular 
‘imaginary’ and as a factor shaping the behaviour of political actors”. This 
covers Janda’s notion of the importance of party’s external relations. The degree 
of reification is said to be shaped by whether a party is seen as having a certain 
(unique) place in a country’s history and symbolizes particular values; how well 
it can project its message, especially through effective use of the media; and its 
                                                 
105 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.14 and pp.22-23. 
See also Grabendorff, “International Support for Democracy in Contemporary Latin America: 
The Role of the Party Internationals”; and Widner, “Political Parties and Civil Society Societies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa”. 
106 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.13 and p.22. 
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longevity, i.e. its ability to survive over time.107 As with the other dimensions, 
these factors are assumed to play out differently in developing countries than in 
Western developed countries. Referring to the latter factor, longevity, this is 
generally a problem for most parties in the developing world. Although there are 
parties with a long history, the majority of political parties in Sub-Sahara Africa 
and Asia date from the period of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. Many 
did not even emerge until the ‘third wave of democratization’ of the 1980s and 
1990s and are therefore only several decades old at the most. This short life span 
usually has a negative effect on how well parties ‘stick’ in the minds of people, 
and even whether they are considered a factor to reckon with by other more 
established institutions like the state and the military. 
 Randall and Svåsand’s model does seem to represent a clear step forward in 
comparison with the other measures of institutionalization offered in the party 
politics literature and has a number of advantages. The distinction between 
external and internal as well as structural and attitudinal dimensions, for 
example, not only helps to broaden the scope beyond the narrow view of a party 
as an isolated entity, but also provides a much-needed correction to the emphasis 
on organizational-structural aspects in the study of political parties. Also, 
because their model builds on and integrates other notions of party 
institutionalization put forward in the literature without trying to replace or 
discard them entirely, it allows the researcher to remain flexible in the exact 
application of the model depending on the particular theoretical interests or 
empirical circumstances. In addition, because of the clear distinction made 
between party and party system institutionalization at the outset of the 
                                                 
107 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.23. 
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framework, it also removes any potential analytical confusions between the two 
(see also section 2.6 below). And finally, because Randall and Svåsand focus 
specifically on the situation in new democracies in ‘Third World’ contexts, the 
model is well-suited for the analysis of party development in post-war 
developing countries as well.  
The only potential problem with the model lies in the empirical application 
of the two attitudinal dimensions, ‘value infusion’ and ‘reification’. These 
dimensions are not as straightforward to analyze or measure as the other two 
dimensions, and might by some perhaps be considered as effects rather than 
characteristics of party institutionalization.108 Nevertheless, the overall model 
covers all the main aspects of the institutional strength of individual parties and 
is therefore a useful analytical tool for this research. 
 
2.4 Interaction between Parties: The Party System 
 
When we shift our attention from individual political parties to the nature of 
party interactions within a political system, our unit of analysis becomes the 
party system. This section reviews some of the key concepts and methods used in 
the party politics literature to distinguish between different types of party 
systems. This is useful not only for showing how scholars have tried to make 
sense of the wide variety of party systems, but also for gaining a better 
                                                 
108 This observation is shared by Basedau and Stroh, who argue that when it comes to measure 
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elements, and immediate consequences”. Basedau and Stroh, Measuring Party 
Institutionalization in Developing Countries: A New Research Instrument Applied to 28 African 
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understanding of the specific party system typology that will be used in the next 
chapter on post-war societies as well as the subsequent case study chapters. 
 
Different Methods for Counting and Classifying 
The variation between party systems across the world is substantial. Current 
systems range from the one-party regimes in China, Cuba and Vietnam to 
different forms of multi-party systems in Britain, the Netherlands and Lebanon. 
Generally speaking, party systems vary on a number of aspects, including the 
number of parties in elections and parliament, the relative size and strength of 
political parties, the ideological distance between parties, their willingness to 
cooperate in government formation and governance, the degree of openness of 
competition over government, and the degree of institutionalization.109 
 In order to analyze the ways in which parties interact, scholars have 
developed different classifications of party systems. A first well-known typology 
of party systems is that by Jean Blondel, whose main contribution is his 
distinction between different types of two- and multiparty systems. Focusing 
exclusively on the party systems of established Western democracies, Blondel 
distinguishes between two-party systems, two-and-a-half party systems, 
multiparty systems with a dominant party and multiparty systems without a 
dominant party.110 Although his classification seems a step forward in 
comparison with the older, more general typologies of Duverger and Neumann, 
                                                 
109 Wolinetz, “Party Systems and Party System Types”, p.53. 
110 Blondel, “Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies”. 
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Blondel’s typology has been criticized for not being distinctive enough and 
putting together party systems whose dynamics can be very different.111  
 A more elaborate and comprehensive classification was subsequently 
developed by Giovanni Sartori. The significance of his work lies in the use of 
four criteria for classifying party systems: the number of parties, the relative size 
of parties, the ideological polarization of parties and the interaction pattern 
between parties. By using these criteria and distinguishing between the 
consolidated party systems of ‘formed states’ and the unconsolidated party 
systems of ‘unformed or fluid polities’, Sartori has developed two separate, but 
related typologies, each subdivided into different classes of party system (further 
explained below).112  
Other, more recent classifications are those by Alan Ware, Peter Mair and 
Alan Siaroff, who in addition to numbers, relative size and ideological 
polarization of parties also take into account the extent to which parties penetrate 
societies, the closed or open structure of competition for government, and the 
size and relative strength of parties.113 
It is important to recall here that most classifications of party systems focus 
on the numerical criterion, i.e. how many parties there are in a system. But 
among these classifications, there are different methods for counting the relevant 
number of parties. Some of the most well-known methods use quantitative, 
mathematical rules for establishing the number of relevant parties. These include 
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Rae’s fractionalization index and Laakso and Taagepera’s method for measuring 
the relevant or ‘effective’ number of electoral or parliamentary parties.114 By 
measuring parties’ weighted vote or seat share in elections both methods provide 
a continuous measurement of the relative size of parties. 
But there are also methods that use qualitative rules for assessing how many 
relevant parties there are. The simple counting method, for example, consists of 
nothing more than counting all political parties that are registered or represented 
in parliament within a particular country. A more widely used method is to 
include only those parties that obtain a certain number of votes or seats in 
parliament. Common thresholds in this regard are 3%, 5% or 10%. The problem 
with both methods, however, is that they say little about a party’s political 
strength or relevance in the overall party system. For example, small parties that 
are unable to obtain 3%, 5% or 10% of the seats in parliament can still play an 
important role in the creation of a coalition government with parliamentary 
majority. That is why a third qualitative method is more useful.  
According to this method by Sartori, parties should not only be counted on 
the basis of their relative size (vote or seat share), but also on the basis of their 
potential to influence the formation of government coalitions and direction of 
party competition. In this view, only those parties are relevant that find 
themselves “in a position to determine over time, and at some point in time, at 
least one of the possible governmental majorities” (coalition potential), or whose 
“existence, or appearance, affects the tactics of party competition and particularly 
when it alters the direction of the competition –by determining a switch from 
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Number of Parties. A Measure With Application to West Europe”. 
 
60 Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies  
centripetal to centrifugal competition either leftward, rightward, or in both 
directions– of the governing-oriented parties” (blackmail potential).115 In 
practice, the coalition potential of a party can easily be deduced from the fact 
whether it has taken part in a government coalition or whether a party has 
provided a government with the necessary political support for it to take or stay 
in office. The blackmail potential of a party can be inferred by its ability to veto 
legislation within parliament. 
Sartori’s measure of relevance has the benefit that it draws attention to the 
interactions between parties and outlines the power configuration within party 
systems. This stands in sharp contrast with the other counting methods which 
focus mainly on the format (numbers of parties) and do not really capture the real 
essence of a party system, i.e. the workings and interactions between parties. 
This is important because a party system is more than the sum of its individual 
component parties. After all, it is “the forms and modes of their coexistence 
[that] define the ‘party system’”.116 
The value of the various typologies and counting rules becomes noticeable 
when identifying party systems that are dominated by a single party. As is 
highlighted by Bogaards, definitions of these so-called ‘dominant party systems’ 
vary significantly in the party politics literature, depending on what classification 
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or counting rule is used.117 Coleman, for instance, applies a relatively high 
threshold and argues that in a ‘one-party dominant system’ the dominant party 
holds more than 70% of the seats and the opposition is fragmented.118 In Ware’s 
classification, a predominant party system is characterized by “more than one 
relevant party but only one party ever controls the legislature”.119 Blondel 
characterizes a multi-party system with a dominant party as having “one very 
large party (…) [obtaining] about 40 per cent of the electorate and generally 
[gaining] about twice as many votes as the second party”.120 Pempel, finally, 
argues that we can speak of dominant party rule if there is “electoral dominance 
for an uninterrupted and prolonged period, dominance in the formation of 
governments, and dominance in determining the public agenda”.121  
The problem with these definitions is that the reasons for a particular vote or 
seat threshold remain vague and arbitrary. They also say little about the relation 
between threshold and the power balance between the different political parties. 
In addition, it is not always clear what the unit of analysis is; the individual party 
or the party system? Sartori’s definition, on the other hand, addresses most of 
these problems. According to him, in a dominant party system there is only one 
relevant party that has won an absolute majority of seats in parliament over at 
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118 Coleman, “The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa”. 
119 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p.159 and p.162. 
120 Blondel, “Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies”, p.186. 
121 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, quoted in Giliomee 
and Simkins, The Awkward Embrace. One-Party Domination and Democracy, p.xvi. 
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least three consecutive elections.122 The absolute majority criterion indicates the 
dominant party’s power to govern alone, while the time requirement reflects its 
endurance. The main advantage of Sartori’s definition, however, is that it allows 
for a further specification of different types of dominant party system, including 
(consolidated) predominant and hegemonic party systems as well as 
(unconsolidated) dominant-authoritarian and dominant non-authoritarian 
systems. 
 
Consolidated Party Systems 
Recognizing that there are major differences in the nature of party systems across 
the world, Sartori proposes two different typologies: one for what he terms 
“formed states with consolidated party systems”, and another for “fluid polities 
with unconsolidated party systems”. Despite the differences in consolidation, the 
two typologies are closely related. Sartori even assumes that the various classes 
within the unconsolidated party system typology will crystallise into the 
corresponding party systems of the consolidated typology. For our purposes it is 
useful to briefly review both of them. We start with the typology for consolidated 
– i.e. moderately to highly institutionalized – party systems, which applies to 
                                                 
122 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 171-177; Bogaards adds that Sartori’s counting rules 
mainly apply “to parliamentary systems in which the government rests on parliamentary 
majorities”. According to him, in presidential systems “the parties that count are simply the ones 
that make a difference in helping (or obstructing) the president’s election, and that determine his 
having (or not having) a majority support in the legislative assemblies”. The latter addition is of 
particular relevance to post-conflict developing countries, many of which have presidential forms 
of government as we shall see in chapter 3. Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying 
Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.175. and p.184, quoting Sartori, Comparative 
Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry Into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. p.34.  
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Western established democracies plus a few other countries with “solidly 
entrenched mass parties”.123 
 Based on the above-described rules for establishing the relevance (‘r’) of 
parties, Sartori proposes a classification with seven different ‘types’ of party 
system (see box 2.1 below). The first main distinction being made is whether the 
party system is competitive or not. In competitive systems, there are no 
restrictions on the contestation between different political parties, and “electoral 
contests are unrestrained and bitterly fought”. In non-competitive systems on the 
other hand, there is no real contestation for power between political parties. In 
Sartori’s words, “(…) competition ends, and non-competition begins, wherever 
contestants and opponents are deprived of equal rights, impeded, menaced, 
frightened, and eventually punished for daring to speak up”.124 In practice, the 
distinction between competitive and non-competitive systems largely 
corresponds with the distinction made between democratic and non-democratic 
or authoritarian regimes. This is one of the reasons why regime type is used by 
many scholars as an indicator of, or even one of the explanatory variables for the 
nature of a party system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.217. 
124 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, pp.193-194. 
 
64 Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies  
Box 2.1. Classification for Consolidated Party Systems125 
 
Non-competitive party systems 
 One-party (r = 1) 
 Hegemonic party (r = 1) 
 
Competitive party systems 
 Predominant party (r = 1) 
 Two party (r = 2) 
 Limited (moderate) pluralism (r = 3 – 5)  
 Extreme (polarized) pluralism (r = 6 – 8)         
   
 Atomised: (r = > 9) 
 
In one-party, hegemonic party and predominant party systems, there is really 
only one relevant political party (r = 1). But because open party competition is 
prohibited in one-party systems and strictly controlled in hegemonic party 
systems, these first two systems are essentially non-competitive whereas 
predominant party systems are (slightly) more competitive. One-party systems, 
where there is only one official party, include countries such as China, Vietnam, 
the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.  
 In hegemonic party systems, there are usually other minor parties in addition 
to the ruling or hegemonic party. However, the hegemonic party does usually not 
allow for an unrestrained electoral competition and actively makes it difficult for 
other parties to contest its dominant power position. In one-party and hegemonic 
party systems the level of party fragmentation is usually rather low due to the 
very limited number of relevant parties.126 Although it is impossible to 
characterize the ideological distance of a party system when it only has one 
                                                 
125 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.110. ‘r’ refers to the number of relevant parties, i.e. those 
parties having either coalition or blackmail potential. 
126 According to Sartori, a party system is fragmented “only when it has many parties, none of 
which approaches the absolute majority point”. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p. 110 
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political party, the ideological content of these party systems may vary.127 For 
the purposes of this study this subdivision is of lesser importance, however. 
                                                
The category of competitive party systems is divided into five different 
types. In a predominant party system there are various parties that exist and 
regularly compete for power, but there is one party that manages to win an 
absolute majority (more than 50% of the seats in parliament) during at least three 
consecutive elections. The key difference between a predominant party system 
and the earlier-mentioned hegemonic party system lies in the nature of the 
regime. In case dominance is achieved through competitive (democratic) 
elections, it is a predominant party system. However, if dominance is “achieved 
through political repression and the denial of civic rights to actual or potential 
competitors”, it clearly belongs to the hegemonic variant.128 Research has shown 
that hegemonic and/or predominant party systems are relatively rare in 
industrialized and semi-developed (industrializing) countries.129 Mexico (with 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party between 1929 and 2000), Japan (with the 
Liberal Democratic Party between 1955 and 1993) and Sweden (with the Social 
Democratic Labour Party between 1951-1993) are among the few countries that 
have had dominant party systems. This stands in sharp contrast with less 
developed, particularly post-war countries. As we will see in the next chapter, 
there dominant party systems are much more common. 
 
127 Sartori distinguishes between one-party totalitarian, one-party authoritarian, one-party 
pragmatic, ideological-hegemonic and pragmatic-hegemonic systems. See Sartori, Parties and 
Party Systems, p.197 and p.205. 
128 Lewis, “Party States and State Parties”, p.477. 
129 Pempel, Uncommon Democracies; Giliomee and Simkins, The Awkward Embrace. 
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When there are two major relevant parties, with one having a parliamentary 
majority large enough to govern alone, we speak of a two-party system. The main 
distinction between this and a predominant party system is that the margin in seat 
share between the two largest parties is so small that the expectation of 
governmental turnover is very real.130 In other words, in a two party system there 
are two major parties alternating in power. Only if one party rules for more than 
three consecutive elections, the system becomes predominant. In addition, it is 
important to realize that there are usually more than two political parties in a 
two-party system. However, the other parties are usually much smaller and not 
strong enough to rule by themselves. In case a third minor party is able to draw a 
significant share of the vote it is sometimes described as a two-and-a-half party 
system.131 
In the next two types of party system there is no single party that dominates 
the party interactions or can control government because of its seat share. 
Instead, there is a multiplicity of smaller independent political parties that have 
to create coalitions in order to create a parliamentary majority or form a 
government. In a situation of limited pluralism there are between three and five 
political parties that compete for power. This is the situation in countries like 
Belgium and Germany. Where there are more than five relevant political parties 
the system is usually described as extreme pluralism. The party systems of the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy are cases in point. Factoring in the 
                                                 
130 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.165. 
131 Blondel, “Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies”. Classic 
examples of two-party systems are the United States, New Zealand and Britain (until 1970). 
Because of the electoral strength of a third party, Britain now more resembles a two-and-a-half 
party system. 
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ideological distance between the multiple political parties, Sartori further refines 
this class by distinguishing between ideologically moderate pluralism 
(fragmented, but not polarized) and ideologically polarized pluralism 
(fragmented as well as polarized). The latter, polarized pluralist class is 
characterized by a number of aspects. 
First, there are anti-system parties that contest the legitimacy of the regime 
and the system of government. Also, there are multiple opposition parties at 
different ends of the political spectrum, making a unified opposition joining 
forces against a governing party extremely difficult. Third, the system is 
multipolar, having not only a clear left and right-wing party, but also a party or a 
group of parties occupying the political centre. In addition, the system is 
polarized because of its large ideological distance. In other words, the two main 
parties are “literally two poles apart, and the difference between them covers a 
maximum spread of opinion”.132 Fifth, as the political centre is occupied by 
weak parties –or at least parties with a weak ideological message– while the 
parties at the extreme ends are much stronger, votes tend to go to one or both of 
the extremes (centrifugalism). As a result, the fundamental (ideological) 
differences between parties are so big that there is almost no room for 
pragmatism, which is another characteristic. A seventh feature is that there is no 
real alternation of power by alternative coalitions of parties. The only thing that 
exists is a ‘peripheral turnover’, i.e. a permanently ruling party that changes its 
governing partner. And finally, in a polarized pluralist system the main opposing 
parties tend to outbid each other for electoral gains without being able to deliver 
                                                 
132 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.120. 
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on their promises.133 Although primarily found in Western established 
democracies this form of party competition can also be found in post-war 
societies, including El Salvador as we will see later in this study. 
                                                
The final type identified under the typology for consolidated party systems is 
the atomised party system. This is more a residual category than a proper class as 
it comprises situations in which “the number of parties – whether ten, twenty or 
more – makes little difference”.134 In this category, parties are loose coalitions of 
largely independent candidates, which come and go at different elections. 
 
Unconsolidated Party Systems 
Sartori’s second typology covers the unconsolidated – i.e. weakly to non-
institutionalized – party systems found primarily in Africa, Asia, and parts of 
Latin America. Many countries in these regions not only have party systems that 
are still embryonic, but also individual political parties that, with a few 
exceptions, are characterized by weak organizational structures, unprogrammatic 
and vague ideological profiles, and a strong focus on personalistic leadership.135  
The typology distinguishes between four types, including dominant, 
dominant-authoritarian, non-dominant and pulverised party systems (see box 2.2 
below). Sartori developed this typology specifically for African countries, but it 
seems to apply also to other developing countries where individual political 
parties are weak and the party system is still in flux. As will be seen in chapter 3, 
 
133 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, pp. 116-124. 
134 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.111. 
135 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, pp.217-226; see also Randall, Political Parties in the Third 
World. 
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it applies particularly well to most post-war countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, 
Central America, and even Southeast Europe. 
 
Box 2.2. Classification for Unconsolidated Party Systems136 
Dominant party systems 
 Dominant authoritarian (r = 1)        
 Dominant non-authoritarian (r = 1) 
 
Other party systems 
 Non-dominant (r = 2 – 8)  
 Pulverised (r = > 9) 
 
In this typology there are two types of dominant party system. The dominant 
authoritarian type represents the most restrictive variant, both in terms of the 
number of (relevant) parties and in terms of inter-party competition. Sartori 
includes in this type a dominant party that “results from mergers and tends to be 
characterised by an aggregative outlook” as well as “the typically coercive single 
party (…) that has banned all the other parties, tends to be closed, and generally 
abides by exclusionary policies”.137 In the first case opposition parties are still 
allowed to exist, although their presence makes little difference. In the second 
case there is usually no more than one party. Even in case opposition parties do 
exist, the dominant party puts in place severe restrictions, effectively denying 
opposition parties the possibility to challenge the party in power. Examples 
include Guinea, Tajikistan and Yemen.  
The dominant non-authoritarian party system is the less restrictive, more 
pluralistic version of a dominant party system. There is still only one relevant 
party (r=1) that has an absolute parliamentary majority over at least three 
                                                 
136 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, pp.226-231. 
137 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.229-231. 
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consecutive elections, but there are also various other political parties. Most 
importantly, in this situation there is a substantial degree of competitiveness. 
Parties compete for votes more or less freely during elections and opposition 
parties are generally not (directly) restricted to challenge the power of the ruling 
(dominant) party. This type more or less corresponds with the predominant party 
system in the earlier typology for consolidated party systems. Recent examples 
of countries with a dominant non-authoritarian party system include South Africa 
since 1994 and Mozambique since 1992. 
In practice there are various strategies for achieving and maintaining 
dominance, ranging from the use of preferential access to the media, the 
utilization of state resources and personnel in election campaigns, the co-optation 
of specific interest groups, to outright vote rigging and attacks on opposition 
supporters.138 What is important to stress here is that in dominant non-
authoritarian situations such strategies are employed within the confines of the 
electoral or democratic framework. In other words, a party becomes dominant by 
repeatedly winning (relatively free and fair) elections, which can be a result of 
the strength of the dominant party or the weakness and fragmentation of 
opposition parties. This is not the case in dominant-authoritarian systems. There 
the dominant party generally uses all means necessary to stay in power, even if 
this means taking extra-democratic measures that restrict the competitive nature 
                                                 
138 See, for example, Arian and Barnes, “The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of 
Democratic Stability”. 
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of elections or lead to the harassment and banning of opposition parties.139 Both 
types exist in post-war countries as well. 
 In situations where there is no single party with a parliamentary majority, the 
party system is characterized as non-dominant. In that case the party system 
comprises “relatively few relevant parties that actually counterweigh one another 
(i.e. none of which is dominant)”. Sartori does not specify exactly how many 
relevant parties this category entails. However, based on his assumption that this 
type of party system might later evolve into a two-party, limited pluralist or 
extreme pluralist system, it seems logical that in practice it comprises between 
two and eight relevant parties. Because of this rather broad range, real world 
examples include very diverse party systems, such as those of Malawi, Kenya 
since 2002, and Senegal.140  
Finally, there is a residual category of pulverised party systems that have a 
very high number of small and weak parties. Following the counting rules 
identified above, these party systems generally have more than nine political 
parties that all receive some share of the parliamentary seats while none of them 
                                                 
139 Examples of how –particularly African– dominant parties have consolidated their position 
include actions to convert, neutralize or eliminate political opposition forces, the ‘nationalization’ 
of non-party associations, adaptation of constitutional and electoral regulations, and the 
development of a rationale “defending, rationalizing, or affirming the virtues of a one-party 
system”. For a more extensive analysis on this issue, see Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties 
and National Integration in Tropical Africa, pp.664-668; and Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of 
Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa. 
140 Erdmann and Basedau put the threshold for a pulverised party system at more than 5 parties. 
This does not follow directly from Sartori’s classification, however. Taking into account that the 
category of atomised party system starts where the polarized pluralism category ends, the 
corresponding category of a pulverised system should start where the non-dominant category 
ends, i.e. around more than 9 parties. Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of Categorizing and 
Explaining Party Systems in Africa, pp.26-28. 
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is able to make a decisive political impact. The pulverised party system 
corresponds with the atomised party systems in the earlier typology for 
consolidated party systems. Current examples arguably include countries like 
Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
 When we integrate the two typologies for consolidated and unconsolidated 
party systems, as shown in table 2.3 below, the correspondences between the 
various categories “from fluidity to crystallisation” become clear. We can now 
see that – under the assumption that “each inchoate pattern is allowed to develop 
‘naturally’ without interference from exogenous variables” – the loose, 
provisional categories of the unconsolidated situations might over time transform 
into the more structured, specific categories of the consolidated party systems, 
albeit in practice this does not always happen.141  
 
Table 2.3 Sartori’s Integrated Typology of Party Systems142 
 Monopartism 
(non-competitive) 
Polypartism 
(competitive) 
Initial stage 
(fluidity) 
 
Dominant authoritarian 
party system 
Dominant 
non-
authoritarian 
Non-dominant 
party system 
Pulverised 
party 
system 
Structural 
stage 
(crystallisation) 
One party 
dictatorship 
Hegemonic 
party system 
Predominant 
party system 
Two-partism – 
limited pluralism 
Extreme pluralism 
Atomised 
party 
system 
 
The essential point to emphasize here is that party systems can change over time. 
As multiple elections are held and competition between parties becomes more 
                                                 
141 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.231. 
142 Adopted from Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party 
Systems in Africa, p.7. See also Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.230. 
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regular and stable, the general pattern emerging is from a fluid to a more 
consolidated party system. However, in some cases it is possible for party 
systems to “de-institutionalize” and reverse from consolidated to a more fluid 
pattern of party interaction.143 
As we will see in the next chapter, party systems in post-war societies differ 
quite substantially in terms of their institutionalization. Some of these countries 
have a history of competitive party politics, and therefore have moderately 
institutionalized party systems. Others, however, have weakly institutionalized 
fluid party systems with no stable and structured pattern of inter-party 
competition. These different cases will therefore have to be dealt with by 
different typologies. In order to decide which typology to use, we will need a 
measure for assessing the degree of consolidation of party systems. The measure 
proposed in the literature for this is party system institutionalization, which will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
Conclusion 
The study of party systems has spawned different typologies for characterizing 
the patterned interactions between parties. This thesis uses Sartori’s counting 
rules and party system typologies as its main reference point for analyzing the 
party systems of post-war developing countries, for a number of reasons.  
                                                 
143 On party system change within institutionalized party systems, see Mair, “Party System 
Change”; on the reversal of stable systems to fluid party systems (deinstitutionalization) in 
African and South American countries, see Lindberg, “Institutionalization of Party Systems? 
Stability and Fluidity among Legislative Parties in Africa’s Democracies”; and Sanchez, 
“Transformation and Decay: the De-Institutionalisation of Party Systems in South America”.  
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First, Sartori’s qualitative rules for counting parties have several advantages 
over other quantitative rules. Sartori’s numerical criteria of coalition and 
blackmail potential, for example, not only allow us to distinguish between parties 
that are (politically) relevant and irrelevant, but also give an indication of how 
these parties affect the political competition within party systems. In contrast, the 
methods that use mathematical indices only provide a measure of relative size. 
Other problems with these latter methods are that different party constellations 
can hide behind the same value of fractionalization or effective number of 
parties, that they do not take into account the relative value (identity) positions of 
parties, and provide little information about the power dynamics of different 
types of party systems.144 Finally, the quantitative methods repeat their 
calculations for each new election but fail to indicate whether certain parties are 
dominant over longer periods of time, or whether there is alternation of parties in 
government.145 Sartori’s detailed specification –especially of dominant party 
systems– does not have these limitations and is therefore particularly helpful for 
identifying the different types of post-war party systems. 
Another reason is because Sartori’s approach provides one coherent 
analytical framework that systematically integrates counting rules with a party 
system typology. As a result, it becomes possible to infer the type of party 
system directly from the number of relevant parties. Party system typologies 
based on effective number of parties by contrast have to rely on conversion rules 
                                                 
144 Wolinetz, “Party Systems and Party System Types”, p. 59; Bogaards, “Counting Parties and 
Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.184; and Dunleavy and Boucek, “Constructing 
the Number of Parties” 
145 Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.187. 
 
  Parties and Party Systems in New and Established Democracies 75 
that use arbitrary cut-off points to identify the type of party system.146 Moreover, 
because the latter methods provide a continuous party number, these party 
system classifications are ill-suited to the discontinuous “jump, or the all-or-none 
threshold (…)” of the “majority that wins a share (…) and the absolute majority 
that wins all” in the real world of politics.147  
A third reason that makes it attractive to use Sartori’s framework is because 
it is also used by several scholars who write about party system 
institutionalization, which will be one of the main concepts applied in this thesis 
for assessing the strength and development of post-war party systems.148  
And finally, Sartori’s framework is particularly valuable because of its 
separate typology for unconsolidated party systems. The latter enables us to 
analyze the interactions between parties on the basis of concepts that are not 
necessarily Euro- or Western-centric and can therefore ‘travel’ more easily to the 
political arenas of the developing world, arguably even to the highly volatile and 
weakly institutionalized party systems of post-war countries. 
 
                                                 
146 For example, a party system with a value between 1.8 and 2.4 in the measurement of effective 
parliamentary parties corresponds with a two-party system, whereas a party system with a value 
between 2.5 and 2.9 would be classified as a two-and-a-half party system. See Bogaards, 
“Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.189, referring to 
Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions. 
147 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.277; Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying 
Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, p.188. 
148 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions; Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of 
Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa. 
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2.5 Party System Institutionalization 
 
In this section we will concentrate on the institutionalization of the overall 
system of party interactions. It is important not to confuse this with (individual) 
party institutionalization, which would lead to the wrong conclusions as party 
and party system institutionalization are not necessarily mutually reinforcing.149 
Party system institutionalization has mainly been used in the literature on 
democratization where a regular and stable form of inter-party competition is 
considered particularly important for democratic consolidation.150 
 There are different criteria to assess the degree of consolidation or 
institutionalization of party systems. Some scholars use a temporal criterion, 
categorizing party systems as institutionalized when a certain period of time has 
passed, specified with or without a certain number of elections.151 An alternative 
criterion is the existence of “solidly entrenched mass parties”.152 The problem 
with this latter criterion, however, is that it seems to discount the relevance of 
different types of political parties, such as electoralist catch-all or ethnic parties, 
which might not have a broad mass basis but do receive popular support in 
elections and do participate in government in many countries. Measuring party 
system consolidation exclusively on this criterion would classify many party 
systems – including several party systems in more established democracies! – as 
                                                 
149 Randall and Svåsand, “Introduction”.  
150 See, for example, Dix, “Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American 
Political Parties”; Kuenzi and Lambright, “Party System Institutionalization in 30 African 
Countries”. 
151 Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa, p.9. 
152 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.217. 
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a priori unconsolidated whereas in practice several of them do display a certain 
degree of established inter-party competition.  
Arguably the most useful definition of party system institutionalization has 
been put forward by Mainwaring and Scully.153 In their view there are four 
conditions for an institutionalized party system: stability in the rules and nature 
of inter-party competition; ‘rootedness’ of parties in society; acceptance of 
parties and elections as the legitimate institutions that determine who governs; 
and the existence of party organizations with reasonably stable rules and 
structures.154 Each of these dimensions can subsequently be operationalized on 
the basis of several qualitative and quantitative indicators.  
One of the most widely used methods to assess the degree of stability of 
inter-party competition is Mogen Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility. This 
measures “the net change in seat (or vote) shares of all parties from one election 
to the next”.155 Another, qualitative method is to analyze the occurrence of splits 
within parties or the emergence and disappearance of parties just before and after 
elections. Finally, regular and stable party competition can also be gleaned from 
other indicators, such as the organization of several subsequent elections in the 
absence of coups, serious civil unrest and violent conflict.156 The reasons for the 
varying degrees of stability in inter-party competition differ per country, but 
possible explanations include the introduction of new legislation regulating the 
                                                 
153 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions. 
154 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.1 and p.5. See also Mainwaring 
and Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the Third Wave of 
Democratization”. 
155 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.6; Pedersen, “On Measuring 
Party System Change. A Methodological Critique and a Suggestion”. 
156 Erdmann and Basedau, Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa, p.9. 
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registration and composition of political parties as well as the organizational 
strength of individual parties. The exact causes are a matter for further empirical 
analysis, however. 
The second dimension, the extent to which parties have stable roots in 
society, can be assessed by analyzing the linkages between parties and other 
societal actors. Mainwaring and Scully propose to measure this by calculating the 
difference between presidential and legislative voting, assuming that where 
parties are deeply rooted in society voters will vote for the same party label in 
legislative and presidential elections.157 A different, perhaps more interesting 
approach is to take a closer look at wider survey results and check how parties 
are regarded by the population or to what extent ideological voting plays a role in 
elections. In case voters have weak ideological or programmatic attachments to 
parties and rather vote “because of sympathy for the personality traits of a 
candidate” – which seems to be the case in many new (electoral) democracies – 
political parties are not anchored in society. This would generally reflect a 
weakly institutionalized party system.158 Another option would be to look at the 
linkages that exist between parties and “major social organizations, including 
unions, student groups and neighbourhood associations”.159 Strong linkages 
imply that parties are deeply rooted in society, and the party system is thereby 
more institutionalized. Potential explanations for variations on this dimension are 
the different backgrounds or origins of political parties, their participation in or 
association with locally popular initiatives, as well as their longevity. 
                                                 
157 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.9. 
158 Mainwaring and Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the 
Third Wave of Democratization”, pp.215-216. 
159 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.12. 
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The third dimension of party system institutionalization is the extent to 
which parties and elections are considered legitimate institutions for deciding 
who governs. This is slightly more difficult to gauge. One option is to analyze 
whether electoral outcomes are generally accepted by party leaders, or in case 
they are rejected, whether the dispute is settled via the appropriate legal channels, 
such as the court system. Another method is to examine the degree to which 
political parties, or alternatively personal connections, are central for gaining 
access to state power.160 Possible explanations for this third dimension are the 
prevalence of a clientelist elite political culture, and the existence and level of 
enforcement of a legal framework for party regulation and elections.  
Finally, an institutionalized party system should have political parties with 
relatively strong party organizations. As indicated in the earlier section on 
(individual) party institutionalization there is a large variety of indicators to 
measure this aspect, including the existence and functioning of a (nationwide) 
network of party offices, the regularity of party meetings, secure access to 
financial resources, the degree of factionalism and ‘floor crossing’, and the 
degree of party discipline. Most of these indicators are relatively easy to 
measure. 
 The concept of party system institutionalization as defined by Mainwaring 
and Scully is useful for a number of reasons. One of the main advantages is that 
it allows for a continuous measurement of institutionalization, in contrast to the 
static dichotomy of consolidated or unconsolidated systems suggested by 
Sartori’s criterion of the presence of mass parties. A continuum of 
institutionalization better reflects reality where there is not only significant 
                                                 
160 This is also suggested by Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, p.14. 
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variation in the degree of party system institutionalization between countries, but 
where this can also vary within countries over longer periods of time. This is also 
the case in post-war countries where parties and party systems usually have a 
relatively short history and party interaction is often extremely volatile.  
Mainwaring and Scully’s concept does have some drawbacks, however, 
although these mainly have to do with their preference for using quantitative 
data. In their assessment of the institutionalization of 18 Latin American party 
systems, for example, they use Pedersen’s index for electoral volatility as a tool 
for measuring the stability of inter-party competition, and the difference between 
presidential and legislative voting as a measure of parties’ societal penetration. 
The problem with these indicators is that they heavily depend on the availability 
of reliable and consistent time-series data, which is often not available in the case 
of post-war developing countries. To redress this problem this thesis makes use 
of quantitative material where it is available, but also utilizes qualitative data 
from other sources, particularly from interviews in the two selected case study 
countries. Another problem with applying quantitative indicators in post-war 
settings is that they do not work well in non-democratic regimes, where 
authoritarian control over elections generally favours the governing party.161 In 
any case, the fact that many post-war countries at the time of writing have not 
had more than three subsequent elections since the end of the conflict makes 
their classification as fluid (non-institutionalized) party systems slightly easier.  
The second problem is that Mainwaring and Scully’s measures are 
specifically designed for competitive party systems. Countries with 
                                                 
161 Mainwaring and Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory After the 
Third Wave of Democratization”, p.207. 
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uncompetitive party systems, including hegemonic or dominant-authoritarian 
systems, are placed in a residual category not belonging to either the 
institutionalized or the inchoate party system categories.162 This seems odd, 
because the level of competitiveness, although extremely important, does not 
necessarily determine the level of institutionalization. After all, a dominant-
authoritarian or hegemonic system with one dominant party and several minor 
opposition parties can still be well-entrenched over time, despite the fact that 
elections and the party system itself are largely uncompetitive. This seems to 
have happened in several African countries where multi-party elections have 
taken place, albeit under un- or semi-competitive circumstances, and where the 
lack of alternation has left undisturbed the relatively institutionalized pattern of 
interaction between dominant and minor parties.163 Anticipating a similar 
outcome for party systems in several post-war developing countries, we therefore 
need to keep in mind that there is a distinction between an uncompetitive, but 
institutionalized party system and an uncompetitive and weakly institutionalized 
party system. 
Despite these shortcomings, Mainwaring and Scully’s conceptualization 
remains the only systematic model of party system institutionalization available 
and has been widely used in analyzing the party systems of Latin America, Sub-
Sahara Africa, Asia, as well as post-communist countries.164 This thesis uses 
                                                 
162 In Latin America this is, for example, the case with Mexico and Paraguay. See Mainwaring 
and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, pp.20-21. 
163 Bogaards, “Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”; and van de 
Walle, “Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems”. 
164 See, for example, Coppedge, “The Dynamic Diversity of Latin American Party Systems”; 
Kuenzi and Lambright, “Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries”; and 
Bielasiak, “The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States”. 
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their model to measure the degree of party system institutionalization in post-war 
countries. Where it proves difficult to operationalise the dimensions or to find 
reliable quantitative data, other indicators or methods as described above are 
used. 
 
2.6 Theoretical Explanations of Party and Party System Development 
 
The fact that political parties are organizationally, ideologically and 
behaviourally different to a large extent boils down to their unique historical 
background and the socioeconomic and political conditions of the countries in 
which they emerge. The same goes for the nature and patterns of inter-party 
competition. However, apart from the many differences there are also several 
similarities in the ways in which individual parties and party systems emerge, 
develop and institutionalize. With regard to the emergence and development of 
political parties, we already discussed the limited number of ‘genetic models’ 
and the ways in which parties institutionalize. With regard to the organizational, 
ideological and behavioural aspects of political parties we made distinctions 
between elite-based, mass-based, ethnicity-based, electoralist, and movement 
type parties. And with regard to party systems we identified different patterns of 
party competition and different levels of institutionalization.  
But until now we have not fully addressed the question why parties and 
party systems are what they are. More specifically, what exactly explains why 
some parties are more institutionalized and have strong party structures, a unified 
political leadership and a clear political identity, while other parties are weakly 
institutionalized with poor links between the different organizational units, with a 
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leadership divided into factions and a political identity which is too vague for 
voters to identify themselves with? Similarly, how can we explain that the 
patterned interactions between parties in some cases lead to a dominant party 
system while in other cases the party system is pulverised? Regime type –i.e. the 
extent to which a polity is democratic or not– obviously matters. It is an 
important factor in how political parties interact and compete for votes to form a 
new government. Therefore party systems in democratic countries develop and 
operate differently than party systems in semi-democratic or non-democratic 
countries. However, considering the fact that there are several countries with 
similar regime types but different party systems, even in non-democratic settings, 
regime type by itself seems insufficient to explain the difference. 
 In the party politics literature many explanations have been provided for the 
type and institutionalization of individual parties and party systems. For practical 
purposes these can roughly be grouped into three different analytical approaches. 
These are related to the nature of electoral competition, the existence of 
important socioeconomic cleavages and the influence of (formal and informal) 
institutions.165 Each approach has different things to say about parties and party 
systems. 
 
The Electoral Competition Approach 
The first approach argues that parties’ main function is to mobilize popular 
support during elections and that their organizational structures are a reflection of 
                                                 
165 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 94-105 and pp.184-202. See also Lawson, The 
Comparative Study of Political Parties, pp. 4-16; and LaPalombara and Weiner, Political Parties 
and Political Development, pp. 7-21. 
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the way in which parties compete for votes in election campaigns. According to 
some it is therefore logical, particularly in times or places where mass media are 
not yet introduced, that parties will develop an extensive party organization with 
many local branches subordinate to a strong party centre in order to create a wide 
base of members and supporters that can be mobilized during elections.166 Other 
scholars in this field have argued that political parties are nothing more than 
electoral machines, which become increasingly active during electoral campaigns 
but are largely dormant in the period between different elections. In this view, 
there is a natural tendency for parties to move towards more flexible electoral 
organizational arrangements with a small core of party cadre and a limited party 
organization because of the high expenses involved in maintaining a large, 
membership-based organizational structure.167 In reality both types of parties 
exist –organizationally thick and organizationally thin– and sometimes even 
coexist in the same country. 
With respect to the overall party system, scholars adopting the electoral 
competition approach have argued that the type of party system is primarily the 
result of the way in which parties compete and cooperate to maximize the 
number of votes they can get during elections. As we have seen above a 
particular party system type is influenced not only by the number of parties 
participating in elections and government formation, but also by the relative size 
in terms of votes and seats, and the ideological distance between parties. The 
latter is argued by scholars like Downs and Budge who emphasize the ‘spatial 
                                                 
166 Duverger, Political Parties, pp.23-27. 
167 Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies. 
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competition’ of parties on one or multiple ideological spectrum(s).168 Despite 
their differences in emphasis, most scholars adhering to the electoral competition 
approach see parties as rational actors aimed at maximizing their electoral 
support. Therefore, there is a strong (behaviouralist) focus on the influence of 
choices by party leaders and (expected) voting behaviour. In addition, these 
scholars all underscore the importance of electoral competition as the key 
explanatory variable for structuring party organizations and party systems. This 
distinguishes their analyses from the other two approaches, in which social 
factors and certain formal and informal institutions are considered the main 
driving forces behind the organization and institutionalization of parties and 
party systems. 
 
The Sociological Approach 
The second approach draws attention to a party’s human and financial resources 
and its linkages with other important actors, such as trade unions or the state. 
According to this so-called sociological approach, the organizational structure of 
an individual political party reflects its possession of or access to funding, 
personnel (cadre and supporters), charismatic leadership, and state resources. In 
Ware’s words: “how a party responds to the challenge of developing its 
organization in a way that enables it to maintain (or improve) its electoral 
competitiveness depends on where it perceives its potential new resources 
residing”.169 As a result, a political party with close links to rich businessmen or 
                                                 
168 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy; and Budge, Robertson and Hearl, Ideology, 
Strategy and Party Change. Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 
Democracies. 
169 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p.106. 
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preferential access to state resources will not immediately need a large 
membership-based organization, and can rely on a limited, but well-funded and 
professionalized party organization to mobilize popular support during elections. 
In contrast, a political party that does not have such links will try to maximize its 
electoral support by focusing on the establishment of ties with trade unions, 
professional associations or other groups with a large body of supporters.  
With regard to party systems, the sociological approach highlights the 
importance of certain divisions or cleavages in society. Although earlier studies 
in this tradition stress the importance of class divisions in explaining voting 
behaviour and interactions between parties, later studies emphasize that in 
addition to class there are other societal divisions that shape party and party 
system development. Theorizing about the importance of societal divisions or 
cleavages is mainly associated with the work of Lipset and Rokkan, who 
identified four main cleavages in Western societies related to the Reformation, 
the creation of nation-states, the industrial revolution and the Russian 
Revolution.  
The first cleavage between ‘centre and periphery’ refers to regionalist 
(religious and linguistic) divisions within societies, particularly the extent to 
which these divisions are integrated into one (state) religion and/or (national) 
language or are allowed to exist in separate religious and/or linguistic 
communities. The second line of cleavages concerns religious divisions between 
the ‘state and church’ over citizens’ loyalties and their education. Closely related 
to the nineteenth century process of industrialization in Western Europe, the third 
set of divisions identified by Lipset and Rokkan concerns conflicts between 
interests over ‘land versus industry’, including societal divisions between urban 
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and rural areas. Class divisions between ‘owner and worker’ interests provide the 
final line of cleavages. Countries have coped with these major societal divisions 
in various ways and as a result have come up with different solutions. According 
to Lipset and Rokkan the important point is that political parties that emerged in 
early twentieth century Europe organized themselves around one of the cleavages 
mentioned above (national religion/language, industry, worker). The interactions 
between parties took place along the same ‘fault lines’ and the resulting party 
system basically reflected the resolution or persistence of those deep divisions in 
society. This has since become known as the ‘freezing hypothesis’.170  
A key argument in sociological analyses of party politics is that no amount 
of institutional engineering (such as changing the electoral system or the type of 
government) or actions by party leaders will fundamentally alter the nature of 
parties or the party system.171 In contrast to the other two approaches, the 
sociological approach argues that the major societal divisions are so determining 
that neither institutions nor choices by individual political actors really matter. 
 
The Institutionalist Approach 
The institutionalist approach highlights the influence of important political 
institutions. This includes formal institutions such as electoral systems and the 
type of government as well as informal institutional arrangements such as 
                                                 
170 Lipset and Rokkan argued that divisions are sometimes so deeply ingrained in society that 
political parties will still use these divisions as key reference points in their interactions long after 
these divisions have stopped being salient. As a result, many of the party systems in Western 
Europe in the 1960s were considered ‘frozen’, reflecting the main cleavages in society of the 
1920s. Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An 
Introduction”. See also Mair, “The Freezing Hypothesis: An Evaluation”. 
171 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 189-190.  
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clientelism. In contrast to the sociological approach, institutions as well as the 
relevant actors initiating and maintaining them do matter in this view and are 
believed to have an important if not decisive influence on parties and party 
systems.  
But before explaining how this works, it is important to emphasize that, like 
the other two approaches, the institutionalist approach is not a homogenous 
school of thought and actually covers a variety of different institutionalisms.172 
Rational choice institutionalism is premised on the assumption of instrumental 
behaviour of individual actors to maximize certain preferences. In this view a 
specific type of party system, for example, is considered a consequence of 
strategic interaction between relevant actors and will survive in a particular 
institutional form because it provides the optimal amount of benefits for the 
relevant actors given the constraints in a particular context. Sociological 
institutionalism, on the other hand, provides a much broader definition of 
institutions, and highlights the importance of symbols, cognitive scripts and 
moral templates. It argues that institutional forms and procedures should not 
solely be seen as the logical outcome of rationality or efficiency, but primarily as 
‘culturally-specific practices’. A certain institutional practice (clientelism) or 
form (party system) in this view can be explained by the high value and 
legitimacy attached to them by the broader cultural environment. Finally, 
historical institutionalism is slightly more eclectic in that it accepts both the 
‘calculating’ and the ‘cultural’ view of human behaviour. Its analysis focuses 
                                                 
172 See March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics; Hall 
and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”; and Peters, Institutional 
Theory in Political Science. 
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more on the asymmetries of power embedded in political institutions and the 
persistent nature of those institutional arrangements. In this view a clientelistic 
arrangement between a certain party and its supporters, for example, reflects the 
way in which power is distributed among political actors. This view also argues 
that institutions can be traced back to particular ‘critical junctures’ or ‘founding 
moments’, after which they have tended to follow a certain path of historical 
development.173 
Most of the institutionalist analyses related to party politics have focused on 
electoral systems, which are essentially formal institutional formulae for 
translating votes into seats, and whose primary effect is to determine which 
candidates are elected and which parties gain power.174 The strongest argument 
in this connection is presented by ‘Duverger’s Law’, according to which there is 
“an almost complete correlation” between a simple-majority single ballot 
electoral system and a two-party system.175 In Duverger’s view, the emergence 
of a two-party system is not due to underlying social cleavages, but can be 
explained by the ‘mechanical’ and ‘psychological’ effects of the First-Past-the-
Post (FPTP) system. In the same vein he argues that proportional representation 
(PR) electoral systems, particularly those that allow multiple ballot choices, 
generally favour a multi-party system and stimulate the emergence of many 
                                                 
173 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, pp.937-950. 
174 Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, 
p.5. 
175 In a FPTP or simple majority electoral system, where the party with the most votes wins, the 
percentage of seats for smaller (third, fourth, fifth) parties under-represents their percentage of 
votes, even more so than in the case of the second party (‘mechanical effect’). Because voters 
realize that “their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party”, or other small 
parties, they will only vote for one of the two major parties (‘psychological effect’). Duverger, 
Political Parties, p.217 and pp. 224-226. 
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smaller parties, though many of them will find it difficult to gain seats in 
parliament.176 Despite criticisms over the ‘law-like’ nature of such effects and 
objections over the generalization of these effects across different political 
contexts, the central idea behind Duverger’s original argument that the choice for 
an electoral system has a certain (lasting) effect on the formation and 
consolidation of party systems is still widely accepted.177 More recently, 
scholarly attention has shifted to other party effects of electoral systems, 
including effects on party organization (internal cohesion or factionalism), party 
behaviour (discipline, campaign strategies) and interaction between parties 
(coalition formation and conflict management).178 
Another formal political institution highlighted in institutional analyses is 
the nature of executive-legislative design. Here the focus is on how parties and 
party systems are influenced by a parliamentary, a presidential or a mixed (semi-
presidential) system.179 In the few parliamentary systems with a plurality 
electoral system, such as the United Kingdom, there is usually a (strong) single-
party government. More common, however, are parliamentary systems that 
organize elections on the basis of proportional representation. This generally 
                                                 
176 Duverger, Political Parties, p.245-255. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘Second Law’ of 
Duverger. 
177 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 191-192; and Sartori, “The Party Effects of 
Electoral Systems”. 
178 Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, Electoral System Design, p.6. 
179 The key differences between a parliamentary and presidential type of government are the way 
in which the head of government is elected (indirectly by the legislature in the former, directly by 
voters in the latter), their autonomy in office (dependent on support in parliament in the former, 
strong and with fixed office terms in the latter), and the nature of decision-making (collective or 
collegial in the former, solitary in the latter). Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government 
Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, pp. 117-118 and Lijphart, Parliamentary Versus 
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results in a multi-party system and a (more fragile) coalition government. In 
contrast, presidential systems, particularly in African and Latin American 
countries, are generally associated with more personalized and weakly-
institutionalized dominant party systems. This is often a result of the 
concentration of executive powers in the hands of a directly elected president 
with a more limited influence for political parties, particularly opposition parties. 
Despite these archetypical differences, however, it is important to realize that 
both parliamentary and presidential systems come in many different forms and 
shapes, each of which has different implications for the development and 
functioning of parties and party systems.180 
 In addition to electoral systems and types of government, there are several 
other institutions which are addressed in institutional accounts of parties and 
party systems. The federal nature of a state, for example, may impact on the 
strength of political parties at different levels in society. Also, political party laws 
that regulate the rules and procedures related to registration, organization, 
election campaigning and party financing can have a significant effect on the 
type of parties that emerge and the nature of their competition.181  
Moreover, there are certain (historical) institutional legacies that can also 
play an important role, both at the level of the individual party and the level of 
the wider party system. First, political parties can themselves be considered as 
institutions, in that they consist of certain norms, rules, procedures and decisions. 
Particularly the choices made at the birth of a new political party often have a 
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lasting effect on the nature of the party organization, its decision-making and 
leadership structures and behaviour, as well as its political ideas and programme. 
Although the degree of institutional ‘lock-in’ of such structures, behaviour and 
ideas can differ per party, Panebianco’s research on different types of party 
organization indicates the strong path-dependent nature of early choices made by 
the dominant coalition within a party.182 
Second, as parties themselves are parts of a larger party system, any (major) 
change in the nature of individual parties is likely to have an impact on the 
systemic level, shaping and influencing the interactions with other parties and 
thereby influencing the nature of the party system.  
Third, important institutional outcomes or decisions that are not directly 
related to the electoral system, the type of government or regulatory framework, 
but have more to do with the broader (external) context in which party politics 
takes place can also have an important effect on parties and party systems.183 The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and its effects on communist and communist 
successor parties in Eastern and Central Europe is an example. In the case of 
post-war countries in Africa, Asia and Central America, examples may include 
regional peace initiatives, the type of conflict ending (military victory or 
negotiated settlement) as well as the nature of the peace agreement and power-
sharing arrangements.  
Fourth, informal practices such as clientelism also impact on how party 
organizations develop and particularly on how party systems operate. Access to 
state resources, including funding, personnel and the privilege to make political 
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appointments, all favour those parties that control government and gives them an 
important advantage over other parties in mobilizing electoral support and in 
maintaining their (dominant) position in the party system.184 
And finally, in some cases the direct and indirect engagement from 
international actors can also have an influence on the type of party organizations 
emerging and particularly the resources made available to them. Such 
international engagement does not only include linkages with parties in the 
region and organizations like the liberal, socialist and Christian-democratic 
‘party internationals’, but may also consist of a wide variety of political, 
technical and financial party support often provided by specialized party 
assistance agencies as part of wider democracy assistance programmes.185 
 
Evaluation of the Three Approaches 
Each of the three above-mentioned approaches has some value when it comes to 
explaining the nature of parties and party systems in countries across the world. 
The electoral competition approach has mainly been applied in (liberal) 
established democracies, where political systems are (usually) highly 
competitive. In situations where this is not the case, the electoral competition 
approach seems to lose much of its value, however.  
                                                 
184 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, p.196. These factors could also be included under 
the sociological approach. It is important to note here that clientelist practices in party politics are 
not only prevalent in many African, Asian and Latin American countries, but have also been 
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Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link. See also section 3.1 in chapter 3. 
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For example, in many non-western emerging democracies in Africa and Asia 
characteristics of a party organization or the nature of a party system are only 
partly a result of electoral competition. They usually have more to do with a 
party’s links with powerful economic interests, its access and control over state 
resources (including the security apparatus), and its ability to shape the 
institutional environment which regulates party politics. In the same way, ‘spatial 
competition’ explanations which assume an ideological basis for party 
competition during elections have seemingly little relevance in African and 
Asian contexts, where party differences cannot easily be characterized in ‘left-
right’ ideological terms. But despite these limitations, it would be wrong to deny 
that electoral competition and the management of electoral processes have 
influence on the institutionalization of parties and party systems in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America even if elections are held there under suboptimal competitive 
conditions. Though it will not be the primary focus, the analysis of post-war 
party development in subsequent chapters will therefore also give attention to the 
effects of electoral competition and the way the elections are conducted. 
 The application of the sociological approach beyond Western Europe is 
arguably also limited. This is mainly because the significance of certain social 
cleavages differs in other parts of the world. The four main lines of cleavages 
identified above –region, religion, rural-urban, and class– are to some extent part 
of most societies. However, their degree of influence varies greatly per region. In 
most African countries economic class cleavages are less significant than ethnic 
and regional differences. In contrast, ethnic and religious divisions are less sharp 
in many Latin American countries, due to the reduction of the indígena 
population and the installation of Catholicism as the official religion over the 
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past few centuries. At the same time, economic class divisions are much more 
pronounced in Latin America than in Africa, due to the former’s earlier 
industrialization. Irrespective of the existence of certain cleavages, however, the 
important point here is that –while they may exist– societal cleavages in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America are not corresponding with the development of parties 
and party systems in the same manner as they did in Western Europe. In many 
countries the picture is much more varied, and parties and party systems are not 
merely a reflection of societal cleavages. In addition, the sequence of party 
development in many non-Western developing countries has been less stable 
over the past century than in Western countries, with party competition 
interrupted by colonial administration, military coups and extended periods of 
violent conflict.186 
The institutionalist approach does not generally share the geographical 
limitations of the other two approaches. In addition, it has the big advantage of 
being much more attentive to the influence of not only formal and informal 
institutions, but also the actions of important actors such as party leaders. With 
its focus on asymmetrical power relations, path dependence and acceptance of 
both calculating and culturally-specific behaviour, the historical institutionalist 
variant seems particularly well-suited to the broader context of political party 
development in post-conflict developing countries. In these environments the 
dominant nature of the majority of party systems seems to be more a reflection of 
the configuration of power related to the conflict and the way in which it was 
resolved by strategic actors, than directly attributable to the outcome of electoral 
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competition or to societal cleavages. This is at least one of the main hypotheses 
of this thesis, which will be put to the test in the case study chapters (and found 
to have corroborating evidence there). Important institutional legacies, such as 
the origins of parties, the nature of the conflict, the type of conflict ending, the 
nature of the peace agreement, clientelism, and the nature of international 
engagement are all assumed to be important independent variables for explaining 
the institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-conflict developing 
countries. However, in order to establish whether the historical institutionalist 
approach indeed holds the biggest explanatory power with regard to party 
development in post-conflict societies, it will be necessary to pay at least some 
attention to the other two approaches as well. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the literature on party politics by 
describing the nature of party development in Western Europe, North America, 
Latin America, Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa. It has highlighted the main 
functions, different organizational forms and types of political parties, as well as 
explained how the institutionalization of individual parties can be analyzed with 
the Randall and Svåsand model. Moreover, it has focused on the nature of 
different party systems and has selected Sartori’s framework for consolidated and 
fluid party systems as the most useful typology for analyzing party systems in 
(post-conflict) developing countries. In order to analyze the strength and 
durability of patterns of party interaction, Mainwaring and Scully’s concept of 
party system institutionalization has been introduced. And finally, the previous 
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section has reviewed three main analytical approaches for explaining the nature 
of parties and party systems around the world.  
It concluded that in comparison with the electoral competition and the 
sociological approach, the institutional approach has several advantages for 
analyzing the development and institutionalization of parties and party systems in 
developing countries. Moreover, it asserted that the historical institutionalist 
variant with its emphasis on asymmetrical power relations and path dependence 
provides the most meaningful ‘lens’ for analyzing party development in post-war 
developing countries. The following chapters will apply the most relevant 
concepts and typologies introduced in this chapter, albeit that some of the 
concepts will be slightly modified –in ways that will be clearly spelled out– in 
order to fit the specific context of post-war developing countries. 
 
 3 
  
The Development of Parties and Party Systems  
in Post-War Societies 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the development, functioning and institutionalization of 
political parties and party systems in a specific subset of developing countries, 
namely post-war developing countries in Africa, Asia and Central America. The 
parties and party systems of post-war countries share many of the organizational, 
programmatic and behavioural characteristics of their equivalents in non-war 
developing countries discussed previously. However, as we will see below, the 
context in which post-war parties and party systems emerge is different and 
profoundly shaped by the specific causes, intensity and duration of the armed 
conflict. This results in a unique set of historical, political and socioeconomic 
conditions for party development. 
With a few exceptions –all of them very recent– there has been little 
attention to the development of political parties and party systems in countries 
emerging from war.187 The literature on party politics, reviewed in the previous 
chapter, does not usually address the specific conditions of post-war societies. 
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Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador, and Mozambique; and Bjornlund, Cowan and 
Gallery, “Election Systems and Political Parties in Post-Conflict and Fragile States”. 
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Conversely, the literature on armed conflict and peace-building discusses a broad 
variety of topics relevant to post-war societies, but gives scant attention to 
political parties. This chapter identifies relevant party- and conflict-related 
aspects by drawing on both literatures.  
In contrast to a general tendency to lump together all post-war countries and 
treat parties and party systems as homogenous entities that exist as “given” after 
war, this chapter demonstrates for the first time that –although there are 
similarities– post-war parties and party systems vary substantially across 
different settings. And not least because war and post-war can mean different 
things in different situations or societies. In addition, it argues that the 
institutionalization of parties and party systems has been shaped by their origins 
and power-configuration during and after the war. This particular chapter 
addresses these points for post-war countries in general. Chapters 4 and 5 
subsequently focus on specific post-war contexts, and check whether the 
argument actually holds in the cases of Cambodia and El Salvador. 
 
3.1 What the Conflict Literature Says –Or Doesn’t Say– About Political 
Parties188 
 
What is sometimes referred to as the ‘conflict literature’ is actually a very diverse 
set of writings belonging to and crossing the boundaries of security studies, 
conflict resolution, politics and international studies, development studies and 
various other social science sub-disciplines. The broad focus of this literature, 
                                                 
188 With apologies to Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says –Or Doesn’t Say– 
About Post-War Democratization”. 
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ranging from conflict motivation and manifestation to international peace-
keeping, economic reconstruction, transitional justice and even state-building, 
reflects the wide range of issues related to the four key phases of conflict and 
peacebuilding: conflict causation, conflict settlement, post-war transition and 
post-war democratization.189  
 A comprehensive examination of all these areas exceeds the scope of this 
thesis and would not necessarily be relevant to the specific topic of this 
investigation. A selective review of the conflict literature that explicitly refers to 
political parties and the context in which they emerge seems more appropriate. In 
order to be useful, however, such a party-focused analysis of the conflict 
literature has to be guided by a number of questions that help us to identify what 
we already know and what we do not know (but need to know) about political 
party development throughout these four different phases of conflict and 
peacebuilding. The answers to these questions can give us important clues as to 
how we should proceed to fill in the gaps in information and, more specifically, 
to gain insight into the impact that conflict can have on the subsequent 
development of parties and party systems. 
When it comes to conflict causation, political parties are believed to play a 
role, but the exact nature of their involvement as well as their organizational 
development during war remains unclear. Therefore, the first two important 
                                                 
189 Sambanis, “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative 
Literature on Civil War”, p.218; and Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Contemporary 
Conflict Resolution. See also Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, Ending Civil Wars. The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements; Junne and Verkoren, Postconflict Development. Meeting 
New Challenges; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding; and 
Burke, Recovering From Armed Conflict: Lessons Learned and Next Steps for Improved 
International Assistance.  
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questions that need to be asked are what do we already know about the causes of 
conflict and the role of political parties therein, and is there any knowledge about 
the origins of parties before, during or after conflict that says something about 
their subsequent institutionalization? 
Wars are ended in different ways and under the influence of different 
factors, the actions of political parties presumably being one of them. Many 
studies refer to the crucial role played by the international community in helping 
to settle conflicts. Given the fact that the presence and assistance programmes of 
the international community can have a substantial effect on war-torn countries, 
it makes sense to analyze how this relates to the role of domestic actors –
including political parties– in conflict management and what, if any, the effects 
of international engagement are on party development. 
The immediate post-conflict transition period between the conclusion of a 
ceasefire or peace agreement and the installation of a new legitimate government 
through post-conflict elections is said to be another crucial interval. Although 
much of the literature on this topic concentrates on the role of external actors, we 
know that the latter cannot substitute for domestic political will and commitment 
to reform.190 It is therefore crucial to also consider the actions of domestic actors, 
in particular those of political parties. This gives us two additional questions for 
the literature review: what role do political parties play in the early post-conflict 
transition process, and how is their behaviour and organization influenced by the 
various transition tasks?  
Finally, once the post-conflict transition period is over and the challenge of 
building long-term peace begins, new institutional arrangements are designed in 
                                                 
190 de Zeeuw and van de Goor, “Findings and Recommendations”, p.282. 
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order to prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict and stimulate the 
development of democratic inter-party competition. Such efforts at post-war 
democratization are often supported through international democracy promotion. 
Considering that there is a growing body of knowledge about –applying both to 
war and non-war societies– it is worthwhile to ask what this literature has to say 
about the effects of institutional design and international democracy promotion 
on the organization and behaviour of political parties in post-conflict societies. 
 
Political Parties and Conflict Causation 
Scholarly inquiry into the causation of war has provided different explanations 
for why and under what conditions armed conflict arises and how it is 
perpetuated by various actors. Focusing primarily on intra-state violent conflicts 
–which have been the most prevalent form of conflict since 1945– there are three 
main perspectives.191 
Theories highlighting political explanations of violent conflict concentrate 
on the repressive, non-inclusive and unaccountable nature of certain political 
regimes, state structures and other political institutions. Although autocratic 
regimes can be either more or less stable, undemocratic governments, for 
example, that allow little to no popular political participation and/or forcibly 
limit the input of opposition voices to decision-making are widely believed to 
                                                 
191 Singer, “Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification to 
Explanation”, p.35; Smith, Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict, p.5; and Sambanis, “A Review 
of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War”. For an 
informative overview of the extensive literature on the causes of war, see Gardner, “Diagnosing 
Conflict: What Do We Know?”. 
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increase the risk of conflict.192 The same goes for states that are weak or 
“vacuous”, particularly common in many African countries, which either do not 
have the capacity to accommodate the varying interests and demands of different 
societal groups, or according to Chabal and Daloz are simply façades that 
“conceal the patrimonial and particularistic nature of power”.193 
Many of these problems can be traced to historical developments. The post-
World War II decolonization process, for example, has created a residue of 
disputed territories “leading inevitably to conflict over the adjustment of 
boundaries and over the legitimacy of states”.194 This has led some analysts to 
argue that the roots of conflict in many developing countries lie in the process of 
state formation and nation-building. According to Ayoob “the two imperatives of 
consolidation of state power and democratization” are often difficult to 
reconcile.195 Other scholars attribute the outbreak of wars to unaccountable 
single-party governments, or the military’s ambitions for political power and the 
violent response from society that it can sometimes provoke, as has been the case 
in many Latin American and African countries.196 
 A different set of theories focuses on the linguistic, religious, and ethnic 
differences between different groups in society as the main source of tension and 
violence. Partly in response to the outbreak of identity-related conflicts in the 
early and mid-1990s in places like Rwanda, Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
                                                 
192 Gurr, Peoples Versus States. Minorities At Risk in the New Century. 
193 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works, p.2. 
194 Bloomfield, Ghai and Reilly, “Analysing Deep-Rooted Conflict”, p.35. 
195 Ayoob, “State-Making, State-Breaking and State Failure: Explaining the Roots of ‘Third 
World’ Insecurity”, p. 85. 
196 See, for example, Joseph, “Autocracy, Violence and Ethnomilitary Rule in Nigeria”; and 
Millet, “Politicized Warriors: The Military and Central American Politics”, p.53. 
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Kosovo, and Sri Lanka commentators such as Huntington and Kaplan have 
argued that post-Cold War conflicts should be understood as ‘ethnic wars’ that 
can be traced back to primordial animosities between socio-cultural groups, and 
are influenced by environmental pressures related to land degradation and/or 
population density.197  
 This view has been challenged from several fronts, however. Some have 
qualified the argument by asserting that what leads ethnic groups into conflict are 
not the cultural differences per se, but the fears and anxieties of one group over 
their security, political and economic position vis-à-vis other groups.198 
Anthropologists such as Richards and Bowen have formulated a more vehement 
critique to the cultural explanations of war. Richards argues that Kaplan’s ‘new 
barbarism’ thesis is seriously flawed and that the war in Sierra Leone, for 
example, is not caused by ethnic hatred, population pressure or environmental 
collapse, but is “a product of protracted, post-colonial, crisis of 
patrimonialism”.199 Referring to the conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Sri 
Lanka, Bowen demonstrates that the assumptions that ethnic identities “are 
ancient and unchanging, (…) motivate people to persecute and kill, and that 
ethnic diversity itself inevitably leads to violence” are incorrect. He argues that 
‘ethnic conflict’ is in fact a product of choices by leaders of parties and other 
                                                 
197 Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”; Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, 
Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our 
Planet”; Maynes, “Containing Ethnic Conflict”; and Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: 
Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict”. 
198 This is the argument of the various contributions in Lake and Rothchild, The International 
Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation.  
199 Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest. War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone, p.xv and 
p.xviii. 
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groups seeking to capture or consolidate power.200 Fearon and Laitin’s 
quantitative analysis of more than 120 conflicts has confirmed these arguments 
and refutes the claim that ethnic or religious diversity by itself causes violent 
conflict.201  
 The final component of the causes of war literature focuses on economic 
explanations of rebellion and war.202 Earlier theories in this field primarily 
discuss the relationship between violent conflict and rapid economic growth, 
economic inequality, and poor economic conditions, such as low per capita 
income or a country’s vulnerability to world price changes of primary 
products.203 More recent economic theories are based on rational choice models 
and focus on the economic rent-seeking and criminal behaviour of rebel groups 
and individual rebel leaders in explaining violent conflict. Perhaps the best-
known argument in this connection is put forward by Paul Collier, who argues 
that economic factors, such as a country’s economic dependence on natural 
resources, low levels of education, a high proportion of young men, as well as 
economic decline are the main drivers of conflict. On the basis of large-scale 
statistical analysis, Collier and others conclude that political and socio-cultural 
grievances over income and asset inequality, ethnic and religious divisions and 
political repression are less important in the explanation of civil war than the 
                                                 
200 Bowen, “The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict”, p.3 and p.13. 
201 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”. See also Horowitz, Ethnic Groups 
in Conflict, which argues that the relationship between ethnically-based parties and conflict 
depends heavily on context. 
202 For a useful overview see Sambanis, “A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in 
the Quantitative Literature on Civil War”. 
203 Russett, “Inequality and Instability”; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Gurr, 
Why Men Rebel; and Sen, On Economic Inequality. 
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economic greed of certain rebel groups.204 This argument has since spawned a 
substantial literature on the political economy of intra-state and regionalized 
conflict that fiercely debates the salience of greed and grievance factors.205  
Despite continuing debate between the proponents of the various 
perspectives outlined above, there is a growing understanding that conflicts are 
multi-dimensional, and that the outbreak of violence is the result of a 
combination of factors, not limited to single political, historical, socio-cultural, 
economic, or even environmental factors.206 Referring to the fact that not all 
countries that display certain political, socio-cultural or economic conditions 
associated with conflict actually experience violent conflict, some have 
concluded that we should therefore shift the focus from causes of conflict to 
vulnerability to conflict. In this view, the most vulnerable cases are those “where 
there are severe horizontal inequalities, that is, inequality in political, economic, 
and/or social conditions among culturally and/or geographically distinct 
groups”.207 The complexity and multi-dimensionality of conflict is now even 
confirmed by some of the earlier advocates of the greed thesis, who have started 
to agree that “contemporary civil wars simply cannot be reduced to ‘resource 
                                                 
204 Collier, “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective”, p.110 and pp. 95-101; See also 
Collier and Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War”. This research was part of a major 
World Bank-sponsored research project “The Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence” 
conducted between 1999 and 2005. See: http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict 
205 For example, Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars; 
Keen, “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence”; and Cramer, “Homo Economicus Goes to 
War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War”. 
206 Nafziger, Stewart and Väyrynen, War, Hunger, and Displacement. The Origins of 
Humanitarian Emergencies. Volume 1: Analysis. For a critical analysis on the presumed 
relationship between resource scarcity, the environment and armed conflict, see Gleditsch, 
“Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature”. 
207 Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict”, p.106.  
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wars’ sparked by the predatory designs of governments and/or the actions of 
greedy, loot-seeking rebels”, and that there is a clear need to move beyond the 
greed versus grievance debate.208  
 But what does this specific subfield of conflict literature say about political 
institutions such as parties and party systems? Frankly, not much. The majority 
of writings in this field concentrate on the actors that are directly involved in 
violent conflict, notably government forces, rebel groups, and criminal gangs. 
Some theorists do take into account the actions of political elites, including 
representatives of political parties. They argue that it is these elites engaged in 
power struggles that often exacerbate existing political, cultural and economic 
tensions and can even instigate violence among different societal groups in order 
to strengthen their power position.209 But political parties and the nature of party 
competition are usually not the subject of analysis per se. In this view, political 
party organizations are seen as the pawns or casualties (put differently, a 
dependent variable), not the main players (an independent variable), and in this 
branch of the literature largely ignored for that very reason. 
 Nevertheless, the political theories about conflict causation provide some 
information on how the elite-based, unrepresentative and unaccountable nature of 
some political (party) systems –and in some cases the absence of parties– can 
create tensions and cause conflict. This helps us to understand why certain 
groups that are totally excluded from politics decide to rebel, or why certain 
                                                 
208 Berdal, “Beyond Greed and Grievance – And Not Too Soon”, p.691; Ballentine and Sherman, 
The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance; Collier et al., Breaking 
the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy; Bøås and Dunn, African Guerrillas. 
Raging Against the Machine. 
209 See, for example, Ali and Matthews, “Conclusion: Conflict, Resolution and Building Peace”; 
and Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Confict”. 
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parties, represented in parliament but marginalized by the governing elite, choose 
to transform their political opposition into armed opposition forces.  
  
Political Parties and Conflict Settlement 
Another major subfield in the study of conflict concentrates on the ending of 
civil wars and the creation of peace. This field can be divided into two parts.210 
Studies focusing on conflict prevention and conflict resolution on the regional or 
grass-roots level are one part. Here theorists concentrate mainly on ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches to conflict settlement and conflict transformation, aimed at 
overcoming deep-rooted sources of conflict between individuals, groups and 
communities.211 
The other, better-known part focuses primarily on state-level efforts at 
ending civil wars and consolidating peace by domestic elites and international 
actors. Based on the classic distinction between preventive diplomacy, peace-
making, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building, this literature 
concentrates on the various actors and institutions that can help to end the 
hostilities and “strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict”.212  
An important component of this latter research concentrates on the way in 
which wars end, and on why the majority of conflicts do not end via 
                                                 
210 Call and Cook, “On Democratization and Peacebuilding”, p.235. 
211 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization; and 
Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. For an extensive 
overview of the conflict resolution field, see Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Contemporary 
Conflict Resolution; and Reychler and Paffenholz, Peace-building: A Field Guide. 
212 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 
p.11. 
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negotiations.213 King, for example, explains that deep-seated hatreds and 
emotions of the belligerents, their incompatible values and identities, and the 
‘structure’ of the conflict itself (including the incentives for continuing violence 
and the disincentives for compromise) can provide strong obstacles to a 
negotiated settlement.214  
Others focus on the question why some peace agreements succeed while 
others fail, highlighting in particular the role of international actors.215 Hampson 
argues that sustained third-party engagement during the negotiation and peace 
implementation phase is the most important success factor.216 Barbara Walter 
adds that it is not just the engagement of third-party actors as such, but the extent 
to which they are able to provide credible security guarantees for the warring 
parties which determines a successful outcome.217 The latter argument has been 
disputed by Stedman, however. In his view, there are some groups, which 
regardless of the provision of security guarantees by international actors, are 
intent on ‘spoiling’ the peace agreement in order to win the conflict or profit 
from its continuation.218 Finally it has become clear that peace-building success, 
in addition to the factors mentioned above, strongly depends on “the difficulty of 
                                                 
213 Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993”; and 
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the implementation environment and the willingness of international actors to 
provide resources and risk troops”.219  
But what does this mean for political parties? According to most of these 
studies, political elites that include representatives of political parties play a 
crucial role in civil war settlement and peace implementation. As we have seen in 
the previous section, it is the actions of political elites that can motivate certain 
groups to take up arms over certain political, socio-cultural, economic 
grievances, and/or greed. In a similar fashion, it mainly comes down to political 
elites to diffuse the tensions again between these groups and their warring 
factions, and to make sure that certain grievances can be addressed through non-
violent, political dialogue. In practice, however, political elites and the political 
parties they represent often do not choose automatically or unequivocally for 
either war or peace. A realistic chance that they can preserve in the post-conflict 
period their power position built up during the war is a key requirement for elites 
and parties to actually enter into peace negotiations.  
In addition, as research has shown, strong international intervention is 
usually needed to cajole parties into coming to an agreement.220 However, to 
have a chance of being successful in this endeavour international actors must 
understand the local political alignments and divisions in their full complexity, 
for they can be both many and subject to a conflict dynamic even as a peace 
process proceeds. Often this means that political parties are not the unitary actors 
they may present themselves to be, as we will see below and also in the two case 
                                                 
219 Stedman, “Policy Implications”, p.664. 
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studies. Different factions within the party are sometimes pulling in opposite 
directions, and as a result parties often waver between pro-war and pro-peace 
positions during the negotiations. Once a peace agreement has actually been 
signed, and a timetable for the first post-war elections has been set, the various 
elites then face the challenge of mobilizing electoral support that will give their 
particular party the mandate to implement the peace deal and set out the new 
policy priorities. Manning shows that party organizational motivations and intra-
party dynamics are important factors in peace-building success, but she is one of 
very few to pay attention to such issues.221 And although the primary focus of 
this thesis differs in that it is not how parties impact on peace-building, these 
considerations are relevant to the question of how parties emerge and develop in 
post-conflict situations, because of the typically fluid and interactive nature of 
these situations. Yet the main focus of the conflict settlement literature remains 
on structural factors and the role played by international actors, not on political 
party development. 
 
Political Parties and Post-War Transition 
The transition process between the signing of a peace agreement and the first 
post-war elections can also have a critical influence on the success and long-term 
sustainability of peace-building, and more immediately on how parties develop. 
Three factors are believed to be particularly influential for the required 
“demilitarization of politics”: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) of ex-combatants and reform of the security sector, the transformation of 
rebel groups into political parties, and the establishment of (conflict-managing 
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  Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies 113 
and electoral) interim institutions.222 The exact implementation of each of these 
tasks has a direct bearing on how political parties and inter-party competition 
develop. 
 A great deal of the security problems and lack of trust between former 
warring parties in post-conflict societies is caused by the presence of armed 
fighters and the widespread availability of arms. Therefore in most cases, a DDR 
process is set up to address these problems by “controlling and reducing the 
possession and use of arms, by disbanding non-state armed groups and 
rightsizing state security services and by assisting former combatants to 
reintegrate into civilian life”.223 The main aims of the disarmament process are to 
prevent the renewed outbreak of violent conflict and the creation of a secure and 
stable environment that can help to address the deep mistrust between ex-
combatants.224 The latter can have a positive effect on the initiation of dialogue 
between those political parties that have been supporting different sides in the 
war, or even have had close links with armed militias. The creation of a secure 
environment is also a necessary condition to start or resume political party 
activities, many of which are often suspended during times of conflict. 
The demobilization phase intends to break the command structures between 
rebel leaders and their armed militias, and to reduce the size of government-
controlled army and police forces. This is done either by integrating ex-
combatants from rebel and army forces into new (joint) army and police units, or 
by splitting up some units and reforming them. The aim of this second phase is to 
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initiate the first steps towards a functional, capable and civilian-controlled 
security sector. For those former rebel groups that aspire to a political role as 
normal political parties in the new post-conflict setting, this demobilization phase 
is a crucial step in the rebel-to-party transformation process. In addition, the 
development of a new security apparatus that is accountable to civilians also 
involves the building and/or strengthening of key oversight institutions, such as 
ministries and parliaments. Because political parties play an important role in 
these institutions, both in terms of staff provision and accountability, this process 
can help boost their status in the new post-conflict context. 
Reintegration is a largely socioeconomic process that helps former fighters 
with training, land, employment or other resources in order to help them sustain 
themselves as normal, civilian members of society.225 The link between this 
aspect of DDR and political party development is less clear, although the way in 
which this process is handled, and by whom, is likely to have an effect on voters’ 
party support, for example if resources are allocated on a partisan basis. 
 The conversion of armed rebel groups from militarized organizations into 
non-armed political organizations that can take part in democratic elections is the 
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second major post-conflict transition process.226 Rebel-to-party transformation is 
directly related to the previously mentioned DDR process in the sense that the 
disarmament of former rebel fighters and the disbanding of military command 
structures is a core element. Three other core structural and attitudinal elements 
of the transformation process include the development of a new party 
organization, the adaptation of organizational strategies, and the democratization 
of the former armed group’s decision-making processes. A recent comparative 
study by the Clingendael Institute concludes that the full, partial or non-
implementation of these four aspects can lead to different types of rebel-to-party 
transformation.227 
 To understand the organizational change that underlies the transformation of 
rebel groups into political parties some authors have referred to Panebianco’s 
distinction between selective and collective incentives.228 Both types of 
incentives are said to be crucial not only for political parties but also for armed 
rebel groups in order to “help overcome the collective action problem and 
facilitate mobilization”.229 However, the exact content and mix of these 
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incentives in the post-conflict period is likely to be different from those used 
during the war. For example, war-time sources of funding for distributing 
patronage among party leaders may no longer exist after the war, just as the 
leadership of a post-conflict party might have to be different from that party’s 
war-time equivalent in order to have legitimacy and develop a new political 
organization that is able to attract popular support during elections. In this view, 
put forward by Carrie Manning, rebel-to-party transformation is a process of 
organizational adaptation, in which increased electoral competition forces the 
new parties to adjust the relations between party elites and revisit their strategies 
for mobilizing popular support.230 
 A final aspect of post-conflict transition concerns the building of interim 
institutions, such as electoral administrations, transitional authorities, and other 
consultative mechanisms for managing the transition period immediately after 
the ceasefire or peace agreement. A recent study of various domestic interim 
institutions argues that “to the extent that transitional regimes operate on the 
basis of joint decision-making and collaborative problem-solving and create 
norms that protect the interests of key constituencies, they can build confidence 
in the peace process and provide an institutional context that encourages the 
demilitarization of politics and successful elections”.231 A special type of interim 
institution are the so-called international transitional administrations, such as 
those in East-Timor (UNTAET), Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and Kosovo 
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and Mozambique”, p.59; and Manning “Party Building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Mozambique”, pp.255-256. 
231 Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics, p.110. 
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(UNMIK). In these cases international actors assume most or all decision-making 
powers, leaving only limited authority to domestic stakeholders.  
 According to some, post-conflict settings with an international interim 
administration are likely to limit the autonomy and institutionalization of 
domestic actors, including political parties.232 Others have challenged this view 
for being too deterministic and indicate that domestic actors often have sufficient 
capacity to resist change, both in international and domestic transitional 
institutions. Stanley, for example, argues that in Guatemala and El Salvador a 
variety of actors in the security forces, judiciary and political-economic 
establishment “with vested interests in the previous order” successfully resisted 
key democratic reforms laid down in the internationally-brokered peace accords 
for the two countries. Going a step further, Manning indicates that incumbent 
parties and former armed groups often predominate in the decision-making over 
interim governance arrangements and argues that this is likely to have a lasting 
and positive effect on their institutionalization and competitive advantage.233 
 
Political Parties and Post-Conflict Democratization 
The final phase of conflict and peacebuilding concentrates on the broad range of 
institutions that need to be built or reformed in order to stimulate socioeconomic 
                                                 
232 Chesterman, You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-
Building; and Tansey, Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration. 
233 See Stanley, “Multiple Transitions and Interim Governance in El Salvador and Guatemala”; 
and Manning, “Interim Governments and the Construction of Political Elites”. 
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development, prevent future conflict and contribute to sustainable peace.234 The 
building of democratic political institutions after conflict often receives special 
attention in this regard, especially from international actors. 
International democracy promotion has become the umbrella term for a wide 
range of political, diplomatic, economic, technical and even military initiatives 
by different international actors to support democratization in emerging 
democracies, including post-conflict societies. Democracy assistance, which 
covers the various grant-aided, logistic, training and technical assistance 
programmes, is one of the most visible aspects of democracy promotion. It 
covers not only assistance for the organization, administration and monitoring of 
elections, but also aid for civil society, media, human rights, political parties, the 
rule of law sector (including police, judiciary and prison system), among 
others.235 In countries emerging from war, democracy assistance covers many of 
these activities but is generally more targeted to specific post-conflict needs, such 
as capacity-building of electoral administrations, the establishment of war-crime 
tribunals and truth commissions, support to conflict resolution organizations and 
political party capacity-building.  
                                                 
234 Taking into account the different stages of post-conflict recovery, many of the earlier studies 
on this subject have used a sectoral approach by highlighting, amongst others, the significance of 
restoring security, providing emergency aid and reviving the healthcare system, jumpstarting the 
(formal) economy, reconstructing infrastructure, the organization of elections, and the monitoring 
and protection of human rights. See Kumar, “The Nature and Focus of International Assistance 
for Rebuilding War-Torn Societies”; and Junne and Verkoren, Postconflict Development. 
Meeting New Challenges. 
235 For a broad overview of the field of democracy promotion and a critical review of the 
achievements and problems of democracy assistance, see Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. 
The Learning Curve; and Burnell, Democracy Assistance. International Cooperation for 
Democratization. 
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In the absence of systematic and independent evaluations, the exact impact 
of such democracy and party assistance programs on political party development 
in post-war societies remains unknown.236 Recently there have been a few 
scholars that have looked at international aid in relation to party development, 
albeit from different perspectives. One recent study that focuses on new (non-
war) democracies concludes that political party assistance has generally had a 
modest effect on parties’ campaign techniques, organizational development and 
acceptance of their role in a democratic political system, but at the same time has 
not had any “transformative impact”.237 Another study that does look at post-war 
societies, particularly in the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, argues 
that in spite of far-reaching governing powers international administrations have 
generally not exerted “substantial impact on political parties and their 
(democratic) development in either institutional or cultural dimension”.238 
Broadly similar conclusions are presented by studies that look at other aspects of 
international engagement with political parties in post-conflict societies, such as 
                                                 
236 Apart from a general institutional reluctance to be self-critical, Andrew Greene and Richard 
Kohl attribute the limited number of democracy and party assistance evaluations to a range of 
practical problems including a lack of resources, internal capacity and expertise, as well as 
methodological problems of attribution, and data availability. See Greene and Kohl, “Challenges 
of Evaluating Democracy Assistance: Perspectives From the Donor Side”, pp. 153-160. 
237 According to Thomas Carothers, “[party] aid is transformative if it helps a leader-centric, 
structurally debilitated, ideologically incoherent, weakly rooted party establish genuine internal 
party democracy, build a strong organizational structure, embrace and embody a clear 
ideologically rooted platform, and develop an extensive social base”. Carothers, Confronting the 
Weakest Link, p.163, and pp.184-189. 
238 Nenadović, “An Uneasy Symbiosis: The Impact of International Administrations on Political 
Parties in Post-Conflict Countries”, p.20. 
 
120 Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies 
party regulation and electoral system design.239 The overall lesson from this 
literature therefore seems to be that political party development is primarily an 
internal, domestic process in which the role of international actors is largely 
peripheral.240  
Nevertheless, advocates of post-conflict democracy promotion argue that 
support to these types of programmes is (still) justified and desirable because of 
the domestic demand for political change, because a democratic political system 
is conducive to economic development and because in the long run it is the best 
institutional mechanism to deal with disputes in a non-violent manner.241 To 
support the latter argument, reference is often made to the democratic peace 
thesis, which argues that (liberal) democracies are less likely than non-
democracies to go to war, as a result of the democratic checks and balances 
acting as a brake on executive decisions to do so.242 
                                                 
239 Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”, p.823; and 
Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties”. 
240 See De Zeeuw, “Projects Do Not Create Institutions: The Record of Democracy Assistance in 
Post-Conflict Societies”. 
241 Halperin, Weinstein and Siegle, The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote 
Peace and Prosperity; Diamond, “Promoting Democracy”; and Muravchik, “Promoting Peace 
Through Democracy”. For an overview of the various reasons to support democracy after 
conflict, see also Kumar and De Zeeuw, “Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies”, pp.4-
7.  
242 Key texts on this topic include Rummel, War, Power, Peace; Russett, Grasping the 
Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World; and Doyle, “Liberalism and World 
Politics”. For an extensive review of the democratic peace literature, see Chan, “In Search of 
Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise”. 
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However, post-conflict democracy promotion also has its critics who have 
raised serious questions about its strategies, effectiveness and legitimacy.243 
Some scholars assert that the scope of international democracy assistance 
programmes has become too large for it to be effective. Ottaway, for example, 
claims that international actors have increasingly predicated their programming 
on a ‘maximalist democratic reconstruction model’ that –because of the 
enormous challenges in post-conflict societies– is often too complex, too costly 
and therefore politically unrealistic.244 In addition, Manning argues that in places 
like Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq the focus of international democracy and state-
building strategies to facilitate the emergence of ‘desirable’ parties and party 
leaders and “shoehorn them into power” is too voluntaristic and ignores the 
importance of economic, social and cultural context factors that can lead a 
political transition in a different direction.245 Others claim that some recent forms 
of international action have actually undermined the legitimacy of democracy 
promotion. They focus their critique on international efforts to block some 
groups from entering into power, and to support undemocratic regimes in the 
interest of anti-terrorism or other security objectives.246 
A particularly powerful challenge to the international democracy promotion 
agenda is put forward by those who claim that under particular conditions the 
                                                 
243 The special issue on ‘securing democracy in complex environments’ of the journal 
Democratization in December 2006 highlights a number of critical perspectives on international 
democracy promotion. See Buxton, “Securing Democracy in Complex Environments”. 
244 In Ottaway’s view, the only option is to scale down on ambitions in post-conflict settings and 
focus on a more modest, minimally acceptable political system, at least in the short run. See: 
Ottaway, “Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices”, p.315 and p.321. 
245 Manning, “Political Elites and Democratic State-Building Efforts in Bosnia and Iraq”, p.725. 
246 Buxton, “Securing Democracy in Complex Environments”, pp.712-715. 
 
122 Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies 
process of democratization can be dangerous. Disputing the validity of the 
democratic peace thesis particularly in young and democratizing states, 
Mansfield and Snyder assert that when democratization takes place in settings 
without strong political institutions such as –as is usually the case in post-conflict 
environments– the process itself can create new tensions which might easily lead 
to violent conflict. According to them, in contrast to consolidated democracies 
(and even autocracies), democratizing states without an effective state, rule of 
law, organized parties and professional news media are particularly vulnerable to 
violent conflict.247 In a similar fashion, Roland Paris indicates that international 
action has sometimes been part of the problem, arguing that “the very strategy 
that peace-builders have employed to consolidate peace –political and economic 
liberalization– seems, paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed 
violence in several of these states”.248 
 These scholars argue that, particularly in post-war settings, more attention 
should be given to the often contradictory objectives of international action, the 
timing and sequencing of political reforms, and that as a general rule 
democratization should not be started before some basic governance structures 
                                                 
247 Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight. Why Emerging Democracies Go To War, p.2; and 
Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”. 
248 Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict, p.6. See also Paris, “Peacebuilding 
and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”. 
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are in place and function adequately.249 Effective state institutions that actually 
hold the monopoly on the use of violence and have the capacity to deliver basic 
social services are believed to be most crucial in this respect. International actors 
are therefore increasingly advised to focus on ‘state-building’, aiming to create 
new or strengthening already existing state institutions such as the police, the 
army, the judiciary and civil service.250 Nevertheless, despite the current trend 
towards what has been described as ‘stateness first, democracy later’ and the 
related debate about ‘democratic sequencing’, there is also recognition that the 
two agendas of democracy promotion and state-building cannot really be 
separated in post-conflict societies.251 What is clear therefore is that the exact 
balance between democracy promotion and state-building remains a difficult one 
and will strongly depend on the particular circumstances. 
 A final body of literature in this field concentrates on how formal rules and 
institutions –not internal transition processes or external actors– can influence the 
behaviour of political actors and thereby contributes to conflict management and 
democratization. The underlying assumption here is that conflict, in terms of 
                                                 
249 Larry Diamond, for example, argues that the failure of many post-conflict democracy building 
initiatives often emanates from a failure to acknowledge and mitigate the tensions endemic in 
some of its key tasks, including the establishment of an authoritative security sector (capable of 
providing order but subject to civilian control and respecting human rights and the rule of law), 
the installation of a transitional authority (necessary for stabilization and administration, but 
potentially an impediment to a locally-chosen and democratically legitimate post-conflict 
government), and the organization of quick elections (needed for legitimating government, but 
when ill-timed and ill-prepared risking political instability and even new conflict). Diamond, 
“Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States. Lessons and Challenges”, pp.97-101. 
250 For a critical discussion of the current international focus on post-war state-building, see Paris 
and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace 
Operations. 
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“Promoting Democracy in Post-Conflict and Failed States”, p.96. 
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diverging opinions and goals, is not necessarily a negative thing and is actually 
part and parcel of healthy democratic debate. What needs to be avoided is that 
such conflict is expressed violently. In this view, democracy can help to express 
differences and divergences between groups in society in non-violent ways and is 
therefore seen as a “workable system for the positive management of 
conflict”.252 However, in order to perform this conflict management function, the 
design of political institutions is of particular importance. The main institutions 
highlighted in this regard include the structure of the state, the type of 
government, the type of democracy, and the electoral system. Each of these can 
influence party competition and party behaviour in different ways.  
                                                
 In order to manage conflict in deeply divided and post-conflict societies –
most notably in mid-sized to large countries– some form of federalism, often in 
combination with a certain level of autonomy for particular regions, is usually 
suggested. Because power is devolved to the subnational level in a federal 
system, regional or local minorities and ethnic groups have easier access to the 
political system and therefore potentially a bigger say in state decision-making 
and the distribution of state resources. Because political parties are (ideally) the 
vehicles for interest representation of such minorities and ethnic groups, a federal 
system will generally not only boost the number of parties at the local and 
regional level, but may also lead to the formation of coalitions between parties 
representing different groups with similar demands. However, federal 
arrangements can be problematic, as they may give rise to the mobilization of 
 
252 Bloomfield and Reilly, “The Changing Nature of Conflict and Conflict Management”, p.18. 
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communities along ethnic lines, lead to new single ethnic parties, and further 
fragment the party system.253 
 The nature of executive government (parliamentary or presidential) is 
another important aspect of institutional design. In relation to conflict 
management and democratization, parliamentary and presidential systems have 
their own strengths and weaknesses. Depending on the type of electoral system 
used, parliamentary systems are generally better able to include into government 
coalitions a broad range of groups and minorities represented in the legislature. 
This inclusive nature of parliamentary systems can have an important conflict-
mitigating effect, in so far as all major groups can have their say and no one feels 
excluded. It is mainly for this reason that parliamentary systems are believed to 
be particularly suited for societies that are deeply divided by ethnic cleavages or 
violent conflict. At the same time, the inclusive nature of parliamentary systems 
may also lead to deadlock “caused by the inability of the various parties to agree 
on a coherent position on issues of disagreement”.254 And because governing 
coalitions have the tendency to change quickly in parliamentary systems, they 
may sometimes lead to weak and unstable governments.  
Presidential systems, on the other hand, are usually associated with higher 
degrees of stability and more decisive governance. But because the presidency is 
often captured by a single political or ethnic group, and is not always subject to 
real checks and balances, a presidential system can also become a major obstacle 
for bridging divisions and reducing tensions in divided and post-conflict 
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societies. In this connection, it has been argued that a concentration of power in 
the hands of directly elected presidents tends to inhibit party development, for 
instance through giving parties (especially opposition parties) very little 
influence between elections. However, this is contingent to some extent on such 
factors as whether president and parliamentarians are elected concurrently.255 
 Recognizing the different nature of parliamentary systems, a further 
distinction is usually made between majoritarian democracies and consensus 
(power-sharing) democracies. In majoritarian democracies, represented most 
clearly by Britain’s Westminster model, parliamentary power is concentrated in 
the hands of the majority and the government is formed by a one-party majority 
cabinet. Consensus democracies, on the other hand, operate on the “principle to 
let all or most of the important parties share executive power in a broad 
coalition”.256 In contrast to majoritarian forms of democracy where the ‘winner 
takes all’, consensus or power-sharing democracies are more inclusive and are 
therefore often seen as better suited to (ethnically) divided and/or post-conflict 
societies. The way in which power is shared between groups can vary, however.  
In countries using a consociational approach to power-sharing, groups or 
segments of society that are divided by ethnicity, religion, language or other 
characteristics are explicitly recognized and power within government is shared 
between them. This is usually done by the establishment of a grand coalition 
representing the elites of all the main groups, the provision of autonomy to these 
                                                 
255 Reilly, “Executive Type: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism”, pp.184-185; see also Van 
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groups, ensuring proportionality (e.g. via a PR electoral system or through quotas 
for jobs and government spending), and giving minority groups the power to veto 
proposals on the most vital issues affecting their rights and autonomy.257 
Because in this form of power-sharing ethnic, religious, linguistic or otherwise 
divided groups are treated as the building blocks of society, political parties 
representing these groups will tend to organize themselves along the same 
divisions, usually creating mono-ethnic parties. However, as a premium is put on 
the differences between societal groups, this can sometimes lead to ‘centrifugal’ 
party politics in which parties and party leaders look for more extreme positions 
instead of searching for the middle-ground (as happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
for example).258 
                                                
The alternative, integrative approach to power-sharing aims to transcend the 
various societal divisions, by building political alliances among the different 
groups, “creating incentives for political leaders to be moderate on divisive 
ethnic themes, and enhancing minority influence in majority decision-making”. 
This can be achieved by the use of certain electoral systems that encourage ‘vote-
pooling’ across ethnic lines (such as the alternative vote, AV), non-ethnic 
federalism with regional autonomy, and preferential educational, business and 
employment policies to reduce ethnic disparities.259 Another way of stimulating 
cross-ethnic cooperation and moderation is to ‘regulate’ party formation, 
 
257 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, p.97 and p.107. 
258 Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”; and Manning, 
“Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties”. 
259 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict., pp. 601-680;  and Sisk, “Power-Sharing Democracy: An 
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registration and behaviour through formal rules, constitutions and party laws.260 
Whatever the incentive, when it is successful the outcome of this form of power-
sharing tends to be multi-ethnic parties or party coalitions that integrate societal 
divisions. Because party leaders are stimulated to accommodate differences and 
look for less extreme positions in the political centre, this approach is said to lead 
to a more ‘centripetal’ type of party politics.261 Nevertheless, depending on the 
specific circumstances, both the consociational and the integrative approach have 
their strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, debate remains about which of the 
two power-sharing approaches is best for divided and post-conflict societies. 
 Much of the influence that these different forms of institutional engineering 
have on party politics depends on the choice and functioning of the electoral 
system. This is because electoral systems are not only the institutional 
mechanism through which elected representatives are held accountable, but also 
because they determine the degree of “proportionality between votes cast and 
seats won”, and “give incentives for those competing for power to couch their 
appeals to the electorate in distinct ways”.262 
 Plurality-majority systems such as FPTP favour the small number of 
winning parties (usually only one), and hinder a large group of losing parties. 
Because of their mechanical and psychological effects (see chapter 2), they tend 
to result not only in a (stable) single-party government, but also in an adversarial 
two-party system. Under a presidential system, this may result in the situation 
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that both parliament and the presidency are held by one single party. Although 
this can create problems with presidential accountability, it maximizes 
government efficiency. PR systems also have their strengths and weaknesses. 
Because it is more difficult to gain a majority under PR, proportional systems 
tend to lead to less adversarial coalition governments. Because it is easier for 
smaller (minority) parties to gain seats, PR systems are typically more inclusive 
and are therefore often seen as one of the crucial elements of a (consociational) 
power-sharing package for deeply divided or post-conflict countries.263 At the 
same time, large coalition governments can be unwieldy and the emergence of 
many new parties may contribute to party system fragmentation. 
Although each of the different institutions mentioned above has a particular 
effect on the behaviour of individual political parties and the dynamics of inter-
party competition, there is a lot of variation, depending on the specific country 
context and the presence of moderate elites for example. Therefore, the actual 
effectiveness of initiatives to purposively ‘engineer’ certain outcomes, 
particularly in volatile post-conflict environments, remains a matter of debate. 
Where some are more positive and point to the capacity of governmental, 
electoral and other institutions to manage conflict and consolidate democracy, 
others are more cautious and point out that “the institutional devices selected by 
constitution makers seldom function quite in the way intended”.264 In this 
context it is important to realize that institutional choices are not crafted in a 
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vacuum but often reflect the power distribution that already obtains, as  political 
actors seek to fashion the institutional environment to personal and partisan 
political advantage. Particularly when such institutions have over time become 
deeply entrenched, ‘engineering’ them to obtain a different outcome will be 
extremely difficult.265 This caveat is also reflected in the focus of this thesis, as it 
argues that the particular dynamics of post-war party politics is the sum of a 
complex set of factors, many of which have proven to be difficult to manage by 
formal institutional incentives alone. 
                                                
 
Conclusion 
Coming back to the overall question of what the conflict literature tells us about 
party politics in post-war environments, we can draw a number of conclusions. 
First, it is clear that the development and institutionalization of political parties 
and party systems as such has not received much attention in studies about 
conflict causation and conflict settlement. The role of political parties in conflict 
causation is generally not spelled out in the literature, and their organizational 
history usually receives limited attention. Even when the behaviour of political 
elites that include representatives of political parties are examined, the nature of 
party politics is at best an indirect object of analysis.  
The only exceptions are the few studies that focus on shifts in intra-
organizational structures and leadership behaviour during post-conflict transition 
and rebel-to-party transformation, as well as the institutionalist analyses that 
focus on the effect of power-sharing arrangements and electoral systems. This 
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still small specialized conflict literature by the likes of Timothy Sisk, Carrie 
Manning, Benjamin Reilly and Jeroen de Zeeuw does take into account the 
origins and historical background of parties, and thereby provides important 
insights into how political parties develop and how inter-party competition is 
affected by internal and external pressures, as well as formal and informal 
rules.266 
 Second, the strong focus on international actors in conflict management and 
peace-building seems to have come at the expense of attention to the role of 
domestic actors, including political parties. Also, notwithstanding the importance 
of third-party mediation and security guarantees provided by international 
peacekeeping forces, the willingness (or reluctance) of all main domestic actors 
to settle the conflict is often underplayed. International actors are often couched 
in terms of ‘peace-makers’ whereas domestic actors are seen as obstacles or even 
‘spoilers’ of peace.  
 Third, studies increasingly recognize that rebel-to-party transformation is a 
crucial aspect of the war-to-peace transition. Recent research on this topic 
demonstrates that intra-party dynamics matter for a successful transformation 
from an armed rebel group to an unarmed political party. 
 Fourth, the effect of international engagement with political party 
development remains largely untested, including the common assumption that 
assistance for elections and other forms of democracy promotion benefit political 
party institutionalization. With regard to the effects of institutional design on the 
                                                 
266 See Sisk, “Pathways of the Political. Electoral Processes After Civil War”; Manning, The 
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organization and behaviour of political parties, the findings point in different 
directions. On the one hand, it is clear that certain institutional arrangements are 
more inclusive for new or smaller (minority) parties and thereby can have an 
important conflict-mitigating effect in divided and post-conflict societies. At the 
same time, such institutional design can also entrench societal divisions into the 
political system, thereby making it more difficult for multi-ethnic parties and 
centripetalist party competition to emerge. Because of the large number of 
factors at play in volatile post-conflict party politics, the extent to which 
institutional design really can influence the behaviour of party leaders in 
particular directions remains undetermined. 
To conclude, it seems fair to say that most of the conflict literature pays little 
attention to the origins, development and functioning of political parties during 
and after conflict. Nor does it specifically address the impact of violent conflict 
on the type and institutionalization of parties and party systems that emerge after 
conflict. Nevertheless, by extracting relevant information about political parties 
and party systems from the rich case study literature on specific conflicts, it is 
possible to fill in these gaps in information. The next three sections therefore 
present a general picture of the context and nature of party development in 
different post-war environments. 
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3.2 Post-Conflict Environments: Definition, Characteristics and Political 
Context 
 
‘Post-Conflict’: An Accepted Misnomer? 
The term ‘post-conflict’ (or ‘post-war’) is widely used in the academic literature 
on peace and conflict studies and judging from its use in policy speeches and 
even special organizational units it is also widely accepted in international policy 
circles.267 However, as a few concrete examples illustrate, this does not mean 
there is a single shared understanding of what ‘post-conflict’ means. 
For instance, the conclusion of the 23-year civil war in Afghanistan by the 
removal of the Taliban and the signing of the Bonn peace agreement in 2001 led 
many to describe Afghanistan as a post-conflict country. But although conflict 
indeed ended in some parts of the country, fighting continued between 
government and international military forces, local armed militias, and Taliban 
fighters and since 2006 escalated into a full-blown war again, especially in the 
southern provinces of Afghanistan. As a result, more and more observers now 
question the official interpretation of Afghanistan as a ‘post-war’ country.268  
                                                 
267 See Pouligny, “Promoting Democratic Institutions in Post-Conflict Societies: Giving Diversity 
a Chance”; Nieminen, “The Difficult Equation of Long-Term Peace and Post-conflict 
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Uganda provides another example. Some consider it as a post-conflict 
country on the basis that it concluded its civil war with the military victory of the 
National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1986. Others still regard Uganda as a 
country in conflict and point to the conflict zones of Northern Uganda, where 
until recently the Ugandan army has been fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA). And finally there are those who refer to Uganda, after twenty years of 
relative political stability and a ‘minor, localized conflict’ in the North, as a 
‘normal’ developing country.269 Similar problems of categorization exist in 
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other places where a 
peace agreement exists between the main warring parties, but where fighting in 
major parts of the country continues. As these examples illustrate, without a clear 
definition and criteria for the term ‘post-conflict’ it has almost become a bit of a 
misnomer. 
The term ‘post-conflict’ also raises the important questions of what conflict 
exactly is, and when it can be considered ‘over’. In general, conflict can range 
from minor non-violent disputes between two or more people all the way to 
major armed conflict or war between various armed groups. In this thesis, 
conflict refers to major armed conflict or war. Following the widely used 
definition from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) and the 
International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), war is here defined as “a 
contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government 
                                                 
269 For a discussion of the problematic nature of the term ‘post-conflict’ in the case of Uganda, 
see Barya, Opolot and Otim, The Limits of ‘No-Party’ Politics. The Role of International 
Assistance in Uganda’s Democratisation Process. 
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of a state, results in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year”.270 On the basis 
of this definition, we can in theory limit the term ‘post-conflict’ to those 
situations where the number of battle-related deaths per calendar year has 
dropped below 1,000.  
But a numerical criterion alone says little about whether a violent conflict 
has actually ended, and is therefore not sufficient. It also leaves the problem of 
the continuation of violent conflict in certain sub-national regions unresolved. A 
more comprehensive definition of a ‘post-conflict’ country therefore needs to 
take into account the existence of a peace agreement, ceasefire or, alternatively, a 
clear military victory that brings a complete end to the violent contestation. The 
definition of a ‘post-conflict’ (or ‘post-war’) country that is used here meets most 
of these criteria: a country that has concluded major intrastate armed conflict 
throughout its territory, which ended by a peace agreement signed by the main 
warring parties or a military victory by one of the warring parties. On the basis 
of this definition we can identify approximately 30 post-war countries emerging 
since the end of the Cold War (see table 3.1 on the next pages). 
 
270 Harbom and Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004”, 
p.634, referring to Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946 – 2001: A New Dataset”. 
 Table 3.1 Selected Data on ‘Post-War’ (and ‘Lapsed Post-War’) Countries (1989-2008)271 
 
Region/Country War 
Period272
Estimated 
Casualties273    
 
Main Conflict 
Issue274
Conflict Ended 
Through 
International peace 
mission275
Ranking UNDP 
Human Development 
Index 2005276
Sub-Sahara Africa (14)       
Angola  1975 – 2002 100,000 – 
350,000 
National power, 
resources 
Military victory UNAVEM (1989-1995) 
MONUA (1997-1999) 
160 (low HD) 
 
Burundi 1993 – 2003 200,000 National power Peace agreement ONUB (2004–2006) 169 (low HD) 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1997 – 2003 10,000 National power Ceasefire - 142 (medium HD) 
Congo (Kinshasa)* 1996 – 2002 1.5 – 3 million National power, 
resources 
Peace agreement MONUC (1999– ) 
167 (low HD) 
                                                 
271 The table includes both ‘recent’ post-war countries –i.e. where the civil war ended between 1989 and 2008– as well as ‘lapsed’ post-war countries, i.e. post-war 
countries that have fallen back into war either throughout the country or only in some parts of the country. The latter are marked with an asterisk (*). 
272 The time periods presented in this column for some countries cover separate periods of civil war, sometimes interrupted by (short) ceasefires. For presentational 
purposes, such consecutive war periods with intermittent ceasefires are treated here as one single civil war period. 
273 Figures in this column are rough estimates based on Lyons, Demilitarizing Politics, p.14, p.18, p.20, and p.34; Leitenberg, Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th 
Century, p.77-78; and various tables from research centres studying conflict trends, mentioned in note 278. ‘n.a’ means ‘data not available’ 
274 See main text for an explanation of this categorization. Source: Conflict Barometer, available at: http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html 
275 Information from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/. See also List of Acronyms. 
276A high score on the Human Development Index signals low levels of economic and social development. See: United Nations Development Programme, Human 
Development Report 2005. International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World. 
 
   
Eritrea 1961 – 1991 150,000  Military victory - 161 (low HD) 
Ethiopia 1974 – 1991 250,000 – 1 
million 
System/ideology, 
national power 
Military victory - 
170 (low HD) 
Guinea Bissau 1998 – 1999 n.a. National power Peace agreement - 172 (low HD) 
Liberia  1989 – 2003 250,000 National power, 
resources 
Ceasefire UNMIL (2003– ) 
n.a. (low HD) 
Mozambique  1975 – 1991 1 million National power Peace agreement ONUMOZ (1992–1994 ) 168 (low HD) 
Namibia  1966 – 1990 13,000 Decolonization Peace agreement - 125 (medium HD) 
Rwanda  1990 – 1994 1 million National power Military victory UNAMIR (1993-1996) 159 (low HD) 
Sierra Leone  1991 – 2002 50,000 National power, 
resources 
Peace agreement UNAMSIL (1999–2005) 
UNIOSIL (2005– )  
176 (low HD) 
 
Sudan* 1983 – 2005 2 million Secession, 
resources 
Peace agreement UNMIS (2005– ) 
141 (medium HD) 
Uganda* 1980 – 1986 400,000 National power Military victory - 144 (medium HD) 
Europe (4)       
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 – 1995 100,000 Secession Peace agreement UNMIBH (1995-2002) 68 (medium HD) 
Croatia 1991 – 1995 20,000 Secession Peace agreement UNCRO (1995-1996) 45 (high HD) 
Kosovo 1992 – 1999 10,000 Secession Military victory  UNMIK (1999– ) n.a. 
Georgia (Abkhazia) 1990 – 1993 2,500 Secession Ceasefire UNOMIG (1993–  )    100 (medium HD) 
Americas (4)       
El Salvador  1979 – 1992 75,000 System/ideology, Peace agreement ONUSAL (1991–1995) 104 (medium HD) 
 
  
national power 
Guatemala  1960 – 1996 200,000 System/ideology, 
national power 
Peace agreement MINUGUA (1994–2004) 
117 (medium HD) 
Nicaragua  1979 – 1990 35,000 System/ideology, 
national power 
Peace agreement ONUCA (1989-1992) 
112 (medium HD) 
Haiti 1994 – 2004 Unknown National power Ceasefire  MINUSTAH (2004– ) 153 (low HD) 
Asia (5)       
Afghanistan* 1978 – 2001 1.5 – 2 million National power, 
system/ideology 
Military victory UNAMA (2002– ) 
n.a. (low HD) 
Cambodia  1970 – 1991 2.5 – 3 million System/ideology, 
national power 
Peace agreement UNTAC (1992–1993)  130 (medium HD) 
 
East-Timor 1975 – 1999 150,000 – 
200,000 
Secession Peace agreement UNTAET (1999–2002) 
UNMISET (2002–2006) 
UNMIT (2006 – ) 
140 (medium HD) 
 
 
Tajikistan  1992 – 1997 100,000 National power Peace agreement UNMOT (1994-2000) 122 (medium HD) 
Nepal 1996 – 2006 13,000 System/ideology, 
national power 
Peace agreement UNMIN (2007 – )  
136 (medium HD) 
Middle-East (2)       
Lebanon 1975 – 1990 130,000 National power Peace agreement UNIFIL (1978– ) 81 (medium HD) 
Yemen 1994 Unknown Secession Military victory - 151 (low HD) 
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Variation in Intensity, Nature and Ending of War 
Often post-conflict countries are analyzed as one category. But as table 3.1 above 
indicates, the historical, political and socioeconomic background of post-conflict 
countries differs widely, not only in terms of conflict duration, the scale/intensity of 
violence, and the nature of conflict, but also with regard to the type of conflict 
ending, and the way in which peace was restored.  
 Many of the conflicts that ended in the early or mid-1990s were started in the 
late 1970s and 1980s. In exceptional cases, such as Eritrea and Guatemala conflicts 
have lasted for more than two decades. The number of battle-related deaths also 
varies significantly per conflict, ranging from 13,000 in Nepal to more than 3 million 
in the DRC.277 
The nature of war also differs per country. Major academic studies focusing on 
the long-term trends of armed conflict, such as those conducted by the Correlates of 
War Project (COW), the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachen Forschung (AKUF) 
and the earlier mentioned UCDP/PRIO, have come up with several useful 
categorizations to distinguish conflicts for example on the basis of their intensity 
(low, medium, high) and type of parties in dispute (inter-state, extra-systemic, 
intrastate/civil war).278 However, as perspectives and definitions of conflict continue 
to differ, there is no consensus as to how each conflict should be classified.  
                                                 
277 It should be emphasized, however, that much of this data consists of rough estimates, and that the 
total number of long-term battle-related deaths –due to illness, disability, and other problems related 
to conflict– is likely to be much higher in many cases. Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett, “Civil Wars Kill 
and Maim People – Long After the Shooting Stops”; and Leitenberg, Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in 
the 20th Century. 
278 For more information, see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/; http://www.sozialwiss.uni-
hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/index.htm;  http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-
Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. Other conflict-related data sets are produced by the Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, see: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/. 
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Categorizations on the basis of causes, motivations and triggers of conflict have 
led to expressions such as ‘class conflict’, ‘ethnic conflicts’ or ‘resource conflicts’. 
Such popular labels have been highly controversial, however, because they do 
usually not reflect “the complex and dynamic nature of most conflicts [where one] 
factor can rarely be singled out as the root cause”.279 For the purposes of this 
research, which is interested in the broader war context and does not seek to 
explicitly link the nature of conflict to the type of parties or party systems, the 
relatively straightforward method by the Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research (HIIK) is arguably the most useful. HIIK’s Conflict Barometer 
distinguishes 10 key ‘conflict issues’ over which conflicting parties hold different 
views and are prepared to fight. These are ‘territory’, ‘secession’, ‘decolonization’, 
‘autonomy’, ‘system/ideology’ (including the type of political, economic or religious 
regime type ideology), ‘national power’, ‘regional predominance’, ‘international 
power’, ‘resources’ and ‘others’.280 For practical purposes table 3.1 lists only the 
most important conflict issue per case. 
A final important difference between post-conflict countries concerns the type of 
conflict ending. There are cases where one of the parties gains a military victory, 
cases where a ceasefire is reached in order to end the hostilities, and cases where a 
more comprehensive peace agreement is signed. Although since 1945 the majority of 
wars have ended by military victory, “between 1995 and 2004 negotiated settlements 
were three times as likely to end war as outright victory” as is also reflected in the 
fifth column of table 3.1.281  
                                                 
279 van de Goor, Rupesinghe and Sciarone, “Introduction to the Themes”, p.2. 
280 Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research (HIIK), Conflict Barometer 2008. 
281 Call and Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace, p.3. 
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 Based on the outcome of the war and the nature of the settlement, a study by the 
Chr. Michelsen Institute for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
distinguishes 3 types of post-war situations in this connection. In cases of ‘self-
enforcing peace-building’, such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Uganda, there is a clear 
victor that installs itself as the new government, usually with only limited support 
from the international community. In ‘mediated’ cases, like Cambodia, Mozambique 
and El Salvador, where “war is fought to a standstill and ends with a compromise”, 
the international community plays a much larger role in the peace process by 
building trust between the former warring factions and providing substantial support. 
And finally, there are ‘conflictual’ cases where “the war ends with military victory of 
one side, but the peace settlement does not incorporate the defeated party and/or the 
populations associated with it”. In these cases, peace-building is usually extremely 
problematic and, because the underlying conflict issues are not addressed, often 
leads to new violence (such as in Afghanistan).282  
This categorization is not perfect, as categories one and three are not mutually 
exclusive, for example. Also, it probably has more value to offer to the designing of 
policy options for international actors than as a comprehensive typology for 
analyzing different post-war situations. Nevertheless, it is useful for this research in 
that it sheds light on the political starting conditions of old and new parties in the 
post-war period. For example, where conflict is ended through a military victory and 
peace can be ‘self-enforced’ it is likely that most if not all state resources will accrue 
to the victorious party, which will benefit its organizational capacities and strengthen 
its dominance in the political party arena. This is probably not the case in mediated 
cases, where financial resources and political power are usually much more 
                                                 
282 Chr. Michelsen Institute, Governance Interventions in Post-War Situations: Lessons Learned, pp. 
3-4. 
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fragmented and will have to be shared among the main political groups taking part in 
the peace negotiations. There, it is not unlikely that the significant involvement of 
international actors –in the form of assistance, political pressure, or even (imposed) 
transitional administration– affects the organizational development of certain parties. 
Finally, in the more conflictual cases, political development will most likely be 
skewed in favour of the victorious party. In contrast to the first category, however, 
that development can be undermined by renewed violence from armed militias and 
other groups not represented in the peace settlement.  
What has become clear from the above discussion is that the term ‘post-conflict’ 
remains poorly conceptualized and in practice covers a wide variety of situations. 
The choice in this thesis to focus on two ‘mediated cases’ has –apart from the 
reasons already identified in chapter 1– to do with the facts that ‘mediated cases’ are 
the most common type of post-war situation, that they allow us to study the role of 
international actors and that they are arguably the most interesting category due to 
their uncertain outcome (in terms of party institutionalization). However, a more 
comprehensive treatment of party development in all post-war societies –which 
unfortunately is outside the scope of this particular study– would have to include 
‘self-enforcing’ and ‘conflictual’ cases as well. 
 
The Adverse Post-War Environment for Party Development283 
From the perspective of political party development, there are a number of 
conditions that are quite similar in post-war settings. Although some of these 
conditions are also prevalent in other emerging democracies, their intensity and 
                                                 
283 This section is a revised version of Kumar and De Zeeuw, “International Support for Political 
Party Development in War-Torn Societies”, pp.263-264. 
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complexity is usually much greater in post-war societies and are therefore likely to 
have a more pronounced effect on party development. 
First, the security and governance situation in societies emerging from conflict is 
usually not conducive to the growth of political parties.284 The risk of war 
recurrence, for example, is much higher in post-conflict societies, which may not 
only dissuade groups from organizing themselves, but also makes competitive party 
politics potentially more dangerous.285 Even in case major armed conflict can be 
avoided, the law and order situation remains problematic and with state institutions 
having little or no presence in many parts of the country, crime rates often soar in 
former war zones.286 Ineffective and/or corrupt law enforcement agencies further 
compound the situation. A subculture of impunity can exist for many years in post-
war societies, eroding the legitimacy of public and political institutions. The limited 
trust people have in public institutions also translates to political parties, which are 
often seen as part of the conflict. In addition, the lack of security in remote and rural 
areas restricts movements of political parties and hinders their capacity to recruit and 
educate party members or mount election campaigns to attract popular support. 
A second common condition of post-conflict societies is the severe economic 
problems they face, which is partly reflected in their unfavourable scores on UNDP’s 
Human Development Index (see the final column in table 3.1). Wars tend to have 
devastating effects on the physical and institutional economic infrastructure of 
countries. During the war, economic resources are diverted from productive to 
                                                 
284 For a recent overview of the various governance challenges in post-conflict societies see 
Brinkerhoff, Governance in Post-Conflict Societies. 
285 Between 33% and 50% of all ended conflicts are estimated to revert to war within five years. See: 
Call and Cousens, Ending Wars and Building Peace, pp.3-4; and Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict 
Trap. 
286 Call and Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices After Civil Wars”. 
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destructive use. Whatever economic development programmes were launched prior 
to conflict are halted or disrupted. One study estimates that gross domestic product in 
post-conflict societies is typically reduced by 15% in comparison to non-conflict 
countries.287 In addition, post-conflict societies invariably face high inflation, 
widespread unemployment and budgetary deficits. These poor economic conditions 
negatively affect the institutionalization of party organizations. Because of the 
scarcity of financial resources, most political parties find it difficult to establish local 
offices or take part in expensive electoral campaigns. Some political parties are co-
opted by powerful economic actors. Under such conditions, political corruption can 
easily become rampant and public disillusionment over the performance of parties is 
often high. 
Third, many post-war societies suffer from widespread social disorganization. 
The traditional bonds of family, kinship and community are adversely affected by 
prolonged war and bloodshed and trust across different socioeconomic, political and 
ethnic groups is eroded. Moreover, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other cleavages in 
society are often deepened during conflict and become entrenched in post-war 
politics. War-torn societies such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan are 
examples of situations where ethnic identities, and more importantly groups’ 
allegiance to such identities, have changed and become politicized during the war.288 
For political parties in these and other post-conflict countries it has therefore become 
more common to align themselves with these separate societal groups, instead of 
representing groups across different social, cultural or ethnic cleavages. As a result, 
                                                 
287 Collier, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery, p.2. 
288 Aitken, Cementing Divisions. The Impacts of International Interventions on Ethnic Identities and 
Divisions, pp.3-7. 
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inter-party dialogue and cooperation between political parties representing different 
groups is more problematic in post-conflict societies. 
Another important feature of many post-conflict societies that affects party 
development is the existence of a peace agreement or some form of power-sharing. 
These arrangements provide an important part of the post-conflict institutional 
framework for all political actors, in particular for political parties. Peace agreements 
can also contain rules or regulations about the registration, membership distribution, 
organization, and financing of political parties that not only influence party 
behaviour during the transitional period, but may also have an enduring effect on 
longer-term party institutionalization. And in some cases, like in Burundi, peace 
agreements comprise specific quota for the political representation of ethnic groups, 
women and other minorities that directly impacts the membership composition of 
political parties as well as the make-up of their leadership. In addition, such quotas 
are usually specifically designed to influence the distribution of power between 
different political parties. 
Finally, there is often a strong international (military) presence in post-conflict 
countries. Since the early 1990s there has been a large increase in the number of 
international peace missions, ranging from monitoring or observing missions (such 
as the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, ONUSAL), traditional military 
peacekeeping missions (such as the UN Operation in Burundi, ONUB), to multi-
dimensional peace-building missions that comprise a wide range of military and 
civilian tasks (such as the UN Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ) (see also table 
3.1 above).289 Countries such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo, moreover, 
have had special international transitional administrations to help manage the various 
                                                 
289 Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding”, p.781. See also the website of the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ 
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military, political, economic and social tasks during the post-conflict transition 
period. Depending on their mandate, these international missions have provided 
technical, material and financial assistance for DDR, refugee repatriation, police and 
military reform, the organization of elections and a broad range of civil society 
capacity-building programmes. As part of electoral and other democracy assistance 
programmes, such international aid has sometimes also included training and 
capacity-building support for political parties.  
To conclude, post-war environments present unique challenges for political 
parties. Problems with security, financial resources and lack of trust hinder the 
growth of political parties in these situations. Although the presence of international 
troops and external support through party assistance programmes can to some extent 
mitigate such challenges, the effects of such programs have generally been very 
modest (as discussed in section 3.1). Overall, it appears therefore that post-war 
countries remain some of the most difficult settings for party development. 
 
3.3 Political Parties in the Aftermath of War: Types and Institutionalization  
 
The previous section has outlined a number of conditions prevalent in post-war 
societies, many of which are hindering or limiting the emergence of political parties. 
But in spite of the adverse conditions in the aftermath of war and with the exception 
of countries like Uganda and Rwanda –where political parties have been banned or 
their development severely restricted–, political parties have mushroomed in many 
post-war societies.  
In Afghanistan, for example, more than eighty political parties registered for the 
2005 elections for the Wolesi Jirga, the Afghan parliament. In the Democratic 
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Republic of Congo (DRC), more than 250 political parties took part in the 2006 
parliamentary elections. However, most of these parties are unlikely to survive as the 
experience from post-war Guatemala suggests. There, “since 1985, fifty-seven 
different political parties have been formed (…) but few have been able to stay alive 
or establish themselves as stable institutions.” This rise and fall of so many political 
parties can be attributed to parties’ institutional weaknesses, the ease with which 
party leaders switch parties or form new ones, and the fact that political parties often 
serve more as “temporary vehicles to access power rather than as permanent vehicles 
to represent citizen interests”.290 But despite the fact that all political parties in post-
war countries face challenging conditions whose precise nature will differ from case 
to case, based on their organizational histories and war background I distinguish 
between three different groups of parties: long-time ruling parties, political parties 
that emerged out of armed rebel groups, and new post-war political parties. 
The first group comprises parties that have been able to secure an absolute 
majority of seats in each consecutive election since the end of the war, and 
sometimes even before. Long-time ruling parties such as the Popular Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Cambodian People’s Party, the Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the National Resistance 
Movement/Army (NRM/A) in Uganda would probably score relatively high on each 
of the four dimensions of Randall and Svåsand’s measure of party system 
institutionalization (see chapter 2).  
First, these political parties have relatively strong party organizations with clear 
hierarchical structures and members and leaders that meet occasionally. Most of 
these parties maintain an extensive network of party offices throughout the country 
                                                 
290 Azpuru et al., Democracy Assistance to Post-Conflict Guatemala. Finding A Balance Between 
Details and Determinants, p.23. 
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and have members in key political and administrative positions inside and outside 
the government. Second, they are generally not dependent on other institutions such 
as the state or trade unions, at least not in a way that affects these parties’ autonomy. 
As a matter of fact, these parties often directly control state institutions to such an 
extent that decisions taken by the parties’ executive committees have a direct effect 
on government policies, thereby almost blurring the line between party and state 
institutions. The control that these parties have over key state institutions and access 
to economic resources ensures their dominant role in the post-war party system. 
Third, the high degree of electoral support they receive from the population indicates 
that significant parts of the population identify themselves with these ruling parties, 
although it is not always clear whether such support is a result of the political values 
and positions these parties espouse, their privileged position in the political system, 
or their offers of financial and material benefits to potential supporters. Finally, long-
running ruling parties are often strongly embedded in the minds of people and seen 
as the dominant factor shaping post-conflict politics. Because of their historical 
background as anti-colonial liberation movements, some parties like FRELIMO and 
the MPLA have become national symbols of sovereignty and nation-building. Other 
parties, such as the NRM/A and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) are credited with defeating unpopular and brutal regimes and have 
long symbolized a new style of African politics, by either banning competitive 
ethnicity-based party politics (Uganda) or, in contrast, by institutionalizing it via 
ethnic federalism (Ethiopia).291 
A second group of parties almost unique to post-conflict societies consists of 
those political parties that emerged out of politico-military groups or armed rebel 
                                                 
291 See, for example, Ottaway, Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction. 
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movements. The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador are two examples.292 Their 
degree of institutionalization depends strongly on the nature of rebel-to-party 
transformation as indicated earlier. However, in general these parties do not (yet) 
have a strongly developed party organization with regular meetings of party officials 
and members. Many of the organizational structures within such parties are highly 
centralized and not open to democratic decision-making, reflecting their background 
as military organizations in which a clear top-down chain of command is considered 
more effective.293 Moreover, in case the rebel-turned-party is an amalgamation of 
different previously armed groups, the party organization can become factionalized, 
as is the case with the FMLN (as we will see in chapter 4).294 The decisional 
autonomy of this type of party can vary, again depending on the nature of 
transformation. In case there still is a strong link between the party and its armed 
militias, the political wing’s autonomy to take decisions can be severely restricted by 
the strategies and actions of the militias’ military commanders. The degree of value 
infusion tends to be relatively high with this type of party, particularly when such 
parties have fought the war representing the grievances of certain socioeconomic, 
regional or ethnic groups. Finally, because of their background rebels-turned-parties 
are often seen as symbols of resistance to the wrongs of a political system. In case 
the rebel-turned-party was widely supported during the war, there is good chance 
that the party can use this symbolic appeal and translate it into popular electoral 
support after the war. 
                                                 
292 Some of the earlier mentioned ruling parties also belonged to this type of party in the past, but their 
incumbent position and longevity now puts them in a different category. 
293 De Zeeuw, “Understanding the Political Transformation of Rebel Movements”, p.14. 
294 Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN” 
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And finally, in many post-conflict countries there is a plethora of new small 
political parties that have emerged only after the end of the war. Most of these 
parties pride themselves for not being involved in the conflict and actively use their 
relatively ‘clean’ reputation for attracting voters and party supporters. Some of them, 
such as the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in Cambodia and the Forum for Democratic 
Change (FDC) in Uganda, are established by (diaspora) intellectuals or democrats 
disillusioned by the existing state of affairs. Others, such as the Encounter for 
Guatemala (EG) and the Green Party of Mozambique (PVM) are founded by special 
interest groups, and focus on, for example, anti-corruption issues, women’s and 
indigenous peoples’ rights, territorial unity and the environment. Because of their 
young age, urban or foreign basis, and narrow-interest agenda, the degree of 
institutionalization of these new post-conflict parties is generally low. As a result, 
many of these parties turn out to be “flash parties” that come and go whenever there 
are elections. Only some of them are able to survive by gradually building up 
popular (and economic) support. 
This tripartite distinction is important not only because the three groups more or 
less cover the broad range of parties found in post-war countries, but also because it 
draws attention to the war background of particular parties, which as this thesis 
argues matters for party development. Some of the parties in these groups might 
resemble one of the fifteen party subtypes outlined by Gunther and Diamond (see 
section 2.2 in chapter 2). Post-conflict countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, for example, 
are often home to what Gunther and Diamond describe as mono-ethnic and ethnic 
congress parties. In these and other societies where conflict was triggered or 
influenced by identity issues related to religion, race, linguistic or tribal affiliations, 
 
  Development of Parties and Party Systems in Post-War Societies 151 
such ethnicity-based parties still have a strong popular appeal.295 But because the 
actual degree of organization, programmatic commitment and strategy/behaviour of 
post-war political parties is so difficult to assess, classifying each one of them on the 
basis of conventional typologies is practically impossible. The alternative three 
group categorization based on historical background seems to be more appropriate. 
Although it is not ideal, it does draw attention to the origins of parties before, during 
or after the war, which as we will see later on is a fundamental aspect of party 
institutionalization. 
Similar to the caveat made with regard to political parties in developing 
countries in chapter 2, it is important to emphasize again that political parties in post-
war societies cannot be easily compared with their counterparts in Western 
established democracies. The latter are traditionally associated with membership-
based organizations with clear ideological profiles, even though that profile might be 
less relevant today. By contrast, political parties in post-war societies –if they can be 
considered “parties” at all– are often elite-based, embryonic political organizations 
that draw their support mainly from urban areas and do not have strong roots in 
society. The larger ruling parties that have extensive party organizational structures 
and mass memberships are an exception. Moreover, similar to other parties in “new 
democracies” almost all of the parties found in post-conflict societies revolve around 
charismatic leaders and rely on personal patronage for political support. 
 
 
                                                 
295 This has also been the case, for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina where ethnic parties have 
continued to dominate the political scene since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. See 
Manning, “Political Elites and Democratic State-Building Efforts in Bosnia and Iraq”.  
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3.4 Post-War Party Systems: Types and Institutionalization 
 
Having focused on the characteristics of individual political parties, it is now time to 
take a closer look at party systems in post-conflict societies. In order to be able to 
systematically analyze these party systems of post-war societies, we need to have a 
comprehensive framework that can cover the broad variation of post-war party 
contexts. The framework of Sartori provides arguably the only framework capable of 
categorizing the complexity of post-war party systems.296 
 Because a systematic dataset on post-conflict party systems does not yet exist, it 
is necessary to collect the information needed for each aspect of the framework from 
different sources. To assess the relative size of parties in a particular country, we first 
need data on the main parties’ vote and seat share in various post-conflict elections. 
This information can be found in several databases, including the Election Guide 
from the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES), the Political 
Database of the Americas from Georgetown University, Adam Carr’s Election 
Archive, the African Elections Database, and the specialized election data handbooks 
edited by Dieter Nohlen and others.297  
 This vote and seat share data provides important information. First, the 
difference between vote and seat share per party gives an indication of the 
proportionality of the electoral system; the smaller the difference, the more 
                                                 
296 See section 2.4 in chapter 2. 
297 The IFES Election Guide is available at http://www.electionguide.org/; the Political Database of 
the Americas is available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/; Adam Carr’s election archive is available at 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/; and the African Elections Database is available at 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/. See also Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut, Elections in Africa: A 
Data Handbook; Nohler, Grotz and Hartmann, Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook. 
Vol.I: Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia; Nohlen, Elections in the Americas: A Data 
Handbook. Vol. I: North America, Central America, and the Caribbean.  
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proportional the electoral system generally is. Second, the vote share value tells us 
whether a certain party has gained an absolute majority in parliament. In case of an 
absolute majority, the vote share has a value of 50 percent or more. This information 
is a basic element for deciding whether a certain party system is dominant or not. 
Finally, the difference between the seat share of the winner and the seat share of the 
runner-up is an important indicator for the largest party’s political power vis-à-vis its 
nearest competitor. 
 Following Sartori’s counting rules, the number of relevant parties in a party 
system is equal to the number of parties that have coalition or blackmail potential. In 
dominant party systems where one party has gained an absolute majority of 
parliamentary seats in three consecutive elections and is capable of governing alone, 
the number of relevant parties is by definition 1. In that case the dominant position of 
the majority party is not affected by the presence of other parties that might have 
also gained a significant (but less than the absolute majority) share of seats. In cases 
where two parties have coalition and/or blackmail potential, parties tend to rotate in 
and out of power during consecutive elections. These cases are categorized as two-
party systems. Where there are more than two but less than five relevant parties, the 
party system is categorized as either non-dominant or limited pluralist, depending on 
the degree of system institutionalization. Where there are more than nine relevant 
parties –with their actual ‘relevance’ a big question mark– party systems can be 
classified as pulverised. 
 Finally, in order to determine the competitiveness of party systems we need 
information about the regime type of post-conflict countries. This can be found by 
analyzing the annual Freedom House scores, which although problematic are one of 
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the most frequently used indicators for this.298 In so-called ‘free’ countries, political 
competition between parties can take place unhindered both during and between 
elections. In ‘non-free’ countries political party competition is severely restricted, 
with opposition parties and their supporters often being harassed, threatened and 
their activities being impeded. Even in case restrictions are temporarily lifted and 
party competition is allowed during elections, the party systems of non-free countries 
remain non-competitive. This difference in competitiveness determines whether a 
dominant party system is classified as dominant authoritarian or dominant non-
authoritarian (see also chapter 2). 
When all this information is inserted for each post-conflict country identified 
earlier in table 3.1, we get a clearer picture of the nature of post-conflict party 
systems. Table 3.2 on the next three pages provides an overview of the election 
results of almost 30 post-conflict countries between 1989 and 2006 as well as a 
characterization of their party systems. It is arguably the first attempt by anyone to 
present this information on post-war party systems all around the world in one single 
table.299 
 
298 The Freedom House scores provide a rating for political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) on a 1 
to 7 point scale. Countries whose combined average rating of PR and CL falls between 1.0 and 2.5 
(from 2003: 3.0) are designated as ‘free’ (F), between 2.5 (from 2003: 3.0) and 5.5 ‘partly free’ (PF) 
and between 5.5 and 7.0 as ‘not free’ (NF). For a critical review of the accuracy and scope of the 
Freedom House scores see Mchenry and Abdel-Fattah, “A Critique of Quantitative Measures of the 
Degree of Democracy in Israel”. 
299 A similar overview for emerging party systems in Africa alone has been presented in Bogaards, 
“Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa”, pp.180-181. 
 Table 3.2 Party Systems in Post-War Countries (1989-2008)300 
Region  / 
Country 
Form of 
Gov’t 
Electoral 
System301
Election 
Year 
(legislative 
elections) 
Vote 
Share 
Winner
Seat 
Share 
Winner 
Seat 
Share 
Runner-
up 
Number and 
Names of 
‘Relevant’ 
Parties 
Freedom House 
scores302  
Degree of 
Party 
System 
Institutio-
nalization 
Type of Party 
System 
Sub-Sahara 
Africa (14) 
          
Angola  Presidential List PR 1992 53.7 58.6 31.8 1 (MPLA) PR 6 / CL 6 (NF) Fluid  Dom. aut. 
Burundi Presidential List PR 2005 58.5 54.2 25.4 1 (CNDD-FDD) PR 3 / CL 5 (PF) Fluid  Dom. non-aut. 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 
Presidential TRS 2004 n.a. 60.5 4.3 1 (PCT-FDU) PR 6 / CL 4 (PF) Fluid  Dom. aut. 
Congo 
(Kinshasa)* 
Presidential Parallel 2006 n.a. 22.2 12.8 > 9 PR 5 / CL 6 (NF) Fluid  Pulverised 
Eritrea Presidential n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 (PFDJ) PR 7 / CL 6 (NF) Fluid  Dom. aut. 
                                                 
300 ‘n.a.’ means data not available. Numbers marked in bold indicate a change in party winning the highest number of votes or seats. ‘Mod. Institution.’ stands for 
moderately institutionalized; ‘Dom. aut.’ stands for dominant-authoritarian; ‘Dom. non-aut’ stands for dominant non-authoritarian; ‘Non-dom.’ stands for non-
dominant; ‘Lim. pluralism’ stands for limited pluralism. Most abbreviations are spelled out in the main text, apart from TRS (Two Round System), SNTV (Single 
Non-Transferable Vote), BV (Block Vote) and CA (Constituent Assembly). Party acronyms are included in the list of acronyms at the beginning of this document. 
301 See Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, pp.29-30 and pp.166-173. 
302 Ratings presented are those of election year(s), and are taken from Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972–2006, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls; and Freedom in the World 2007, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_charts.pdf 
 
  
Ethiopia Presidential FPTP 1994 (CA) 
1995 
2000 
2005 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
88.4 
88.1 
87.9 
59.7 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
19.9 
1 (EPRDF) 
1 (EPRDF) 
1 (EPRDF) 
1 (EPRDF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
PR 4 / CL 5 (PF) 
PR 5 / CL 5 (PF) 
PR 5 / CL 5 (PF) 
Fluid Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
Guinea Bissau Presidential List PR 1999 
2004 
n.a. 
33.8 
37.2 
45.0 
28.4 
35.0 
> 9 
> 9 
PR 3 / CL 5 (PF) 
PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) 
Fluid Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Liberia  Presidential FPTP 2005 23.4 23.4 14.0 > 9 PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) Fluid Pulverised 
Mozambique  Presidential List PR 1994 
1999 
2004 
44.3 
48.5 
62.0 
51.6 
53.2 
64.0 
44.8 
46.8 
36.0 
1 (FRELIMO) 
1 (FRELIMO) 
1 (FRELIMO) 
PR 3 / CL 5 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) 
Mod. 
Institution. 
Predominant 
Predominant 
Predominant 
Namibia Presidential List PR 1994 
1999 
2004 
73.8 
76.1 
76.1 
73.6 
76.3 
76.3 
20.8 
9.7 
6.9 
1 (SWAPO) 
1 (SWAPO) 
1 (SWAPO) 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
Mod. 
Institution. 
Predominant  
Predominant 
Predominant 
Rwanda  Presidential List PR 2003 
2008 
73.8 
78.7 
75.4 
52.5 
13.2 
8.7 
1 (RPF) 
1 (RPF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
Fluid  Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
Sierra Leone  Presidential List PR 2002 
2007 
69.9 
40.7 
74.1 
47.6 
24.1 
34.7 
1 (SLPP) 
3 (APC, SLPP, 
PDMC) 
PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 4 / CL 3 (PF) 
Fluid  Dom. non-aut. 
Non-dominant 
Sudan* Presidential FPTP - - - - 1 (NCP) PR 7 / CL 7 (NF) Fluid  Dom. aut. 
Uganda* Presidential FPTP 1996303 
2001 
n.a. 
- 
56.5 
- 
n.a. 
- 
1 (NRM) 
1 (NRM) 
PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (PF) 
Fluid  Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
                                                 
303 The 1996 and 2001 National Assembly elections in Uganda were officially non-partisan and boycotted by opposition ‘parties’. 
 
 2006 n.a. 67.2 13.0 1 (NRM) PR 5 / CL 4 (PF) Dom. aut. 
           
Europe/Cauca
sus (4) 
          
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Presidential List PR 2000 
2002 
2006 
17.7 
23.7 
n.a. 
21.4 
23.8 
21.4 
19.0 
14.2 
19.0 
> 9 
> 9 
> 9 
PR 5 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) 
Fluid  Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Croatia Parliament. List PR 2000 
2003 
2007 
26.8 
33.9 
36.6 
32.4 
43.7 
43.1 
30.5 
28.5 
36.6 
> 9 
> 9 
> 9 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
PR 2 / CL 2 (F) 
PR 2 / CL 2 (F) 
Fluid  Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Kosovo Presidential List PR 2001 
2004 
2007 
45.6 
45.4 
34.3 
39.2 
39.2 
30.8 
21.7 
25.0 
20.8 
4 – 5 
4 – 5 
4 – 5 
PR 6 / CL 6 (NF) 
PR 5 / CL 5 (PF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
Fluid  Non-dom. 
Non-dom. 
Non-dom. 
Georgia Semi-
presidential 
Parallel 2003 
2004 
2008 
21.3 
67.0 
59.2 
25.3 
90.0 
79.3 
22.0 
6.3 
11.3 
3 – 4  
1 (NMD) 
1 (NMD) 
PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) 
Fluid  Non-dom. 
Dom. non-aut. 
Dom. non-aut. 
           
Americas (4)           
El Salvador  
 
Presidential List PR 1994 
 
1997 
45.0 
 
35.4 
46.4 
 
33.3 
25.0 
 
32.1 
2 – 3 (ARENA, 
FMLN, PCN) 
2 – 3 (ARENA, 
PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) 
 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
Mod. 
Institution. 
Lim. pluralism 
 
Lim. pluralism 
 
  
 
2000304 
 
2003 
 
2006 
 
35.2 
 
33.9 
 
39.2 
 
36.9 
 
36.9 
 
40.4 
 
34.5 
 
32.1 
 
38.0 
FMLN, PCN) 
2 – 3 (ARENA, 
FMLN, PCN) 
2 – 3 (ARENA, 
FMLN, PCN) 
2 – 3 (ARENA, 
FMLN, PCN) 
 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
 
PR 2 / CL 3 (F) 
 
Lim. pluralism 
 
Lim. pluralism 
 
Lim. pluralism 
Guatemala305  Presidential List PR 1995 
1999 
2003 
2007 
34.3 
n.a. 
24.3 
22.8 
53.7 
55.7 
29.7 
30.3 
26.2 
32.7 
27.2 
23.4 
1 (PAN) 
1 (FRG) 
> 9 
> 9 
PR 4 / CL 5 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 4 / CL 4 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 4 (PF) 
Fluid  Dom. non-aut. 
Dom. non-aut. 
Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Nicaragua  Presidential List PR 1990 
1996 
2001 
2006 
54.7 
46.0 
51.1 
37.9 
55.4 
45.1 
50.0 
42.2 
42.3 
39.7 
46.7 
27.7 
2 (PLC, FSLN) 
2 (PLC, FSLN) 
2 (PLC, FSLN) 
2 – 3 (PLC, FSLN, 
ALN) 
PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) 
PR 3 / CL 3 (PF) 
Mod. 
Institution. 
Two-party 
Two-party 
Two-party 
Lim. pluralism 
Haiti Presidential TRS 2006 n.a. 23.2 17.1 > 9 PR 4/ CL 5 (PF) Fluid  Pulverised 
           
Asia (5)           
Afghanistan* Presidential SNTV 2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. > 9 PR 5 / CL 5 (PF) Fluid  Pulverised 
                                                 
304 Despite a parliamentary majority of the FMLN, the presidency was won by ARENA (‘divided government’). ARENA has held the presidency continuously 
since 1989. 
305 The number of congressional seats in Guatemala changed several times; from 80 to 113 for the 1999 elections, and from 113 to 158 for the 2003 elections. 
 
  
Cambodia  Parliament. List PR 1993 
1998 
2003 
2008 
45.0306 
41.4 
47.3 
58.1 
47.5 
52.4 
59.3 
73.2 
41.8 
35.2 
21.1 
21.1 
2 (FUNC., CPP) 
1 (CPP) 
1 (CPP) 
1 (CPP) 
PR 4 / CL 5 (PF) 
PR 6 / CL 6 (NF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
Fluid  Dom. non-aut. 
Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
East-Timor Parliament. Parallel 2001 57.4 62.5 7.9 1 (FRETILIN) PR 5 / CL 3 (PF) Fluid  Dom. non-aut. 
Tajikistan  Presidential Parallel 2000 
2005 
n.a. 
64.5 
n.a. 
82.5 
n.a. 
6.3 
1 (PDPT) 
1 (PDPT) 
PR 6 / CL 6 (NF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
Fluid  Dom. aut. 
Dom. aut. 
Nepal Presidential Parallel 2008 30.5 38.1 19.1 2 – 3 (CPN-M, 
CPN-UML, NC) 
PR 5 / CL 4 (PF) Fluid Non-dominant 
           
Middle-East 
(2) 
          
Lebanon* Parliament. BV 1996 
2000 
2005 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
29.6 
n.a. 
n.a. 
13.2 
> 9 ? 
> 9 ? 
> 9 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
PR 6 / CL 5 (NF) 
PR 5 / CL 4 (PF) 
Fluid  Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Pulverised 
Yemen Presidential FPTP 1997 
2003 
n.a. 
58.0 
62.7 
79.0 
17.2 
15.2 
1 (GPC) 
1 (GPC) 
PR 5 / CL 6 (NF) 
PR 5 / CL 5 (PF) 
Fluid  Dom. non-aut. 
Dom. non-aut. 
                                                 
306 Despite the electoral result in which FUNCINPEC won a majority of the votes and was thereby entitled to form the new Cambodian government, the CPP 
refused to accept the outcome and forced FUNCINPEC into agreeing with a unique coalition government with two prime ministers. For more details, see chapter 5. 
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A closer look at table 3.2 brings out a number of interesting findings. First, most 
post-war countries have fluid party systems. This means that competition 
between political parties both as norm and as practice have not yet taken root, 
and that the nature of inter-party competition tends to be rather volatile. This 
should come as no surprise considering the fact that most post-conflict countries 
have only experienced a limited number of electoral rounds since the end of the 
war, with countries like the DRC and Liberia having had their first post-war 
elections as recent as 2006. The table shows that only 10 out of 29 post-war 
countries have had three or more rounds of elections, and that 8 post-war 
countries have only had one round of elections so far. Moreover, in some 
countries that have experienced multiple rounds of post-war elections since the 
early 1990s, such as Ethiopia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia, party systems 
are still best characterized as fluid (or weakly institutionalized). 
Second, the large majority of post-conflict party systems can be categorized 
as either ‘dominant’ or pulverised. 9 countries have a dominant-authoritarian 
party system, 2 countries have a predominant system, and 5 countries have a 
dominant non-authoritarian party system. This makes ‘dominant-party’ systems 
the most prevalent type of post-conflict party system, much more common than 
in industrialized, consolidated democracies. Important to note here, however, is 
that within the group of post-conflict countries parties have become dominant in 
very different ways. In some cases parties came to power through a military 
victory, had time to consolidate themselves and subsequently legitimized their 
rule via elections (e.g. Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda). In other cases, there was a 
negotiated settlement to the war and parties had to compete with each other in 
elections right from the start (e.g. Burundi, Mozambique). Moreover, there is 
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significant variety in terms of the strategies employed by parties to remain 
dominant once they were in power. The NRM in Uganda, for instance, 
introduced a ‘no-party system’ that legally prohibited multi-party electoral 
competition and allowed only non-party affiliated individual candidates to stand 
in elections. In Mozambique, on the other hand, FRELIMO did allow for multi-
party electoral competition, but used its executive authority and access to state 
resources for campaign purposes.307 
Pulverised party systems, where there are more than nine political parties 
represented in parliament with none of them capable of governing alone, are the 
second-most prevalent. Guinea-Bissau, Afghanistan, Guatemala and Lebanon are 
clear examples of such extremely fragmented party systems. The fragmentation 
can in many cases be related to the working of the (proportional) electoral 
system, which in most of these countries has led to a large number of parties (and 
individual candidates) gaining representation. Nevertheless, the exact outcome in 
each country depends not only on the electoral system but has also to do with the 
structure and degree of institutionalization of the party system as well as the 
nature of society. 
Another noteworthy finding is that, with the exception of countries with 
pulverised party systems, there has been limited alternation in government in 
most post-conflict countries. FRELIMO in Mozambique, the EPRDF in Ethiopia, 
SWAPO in Namibia, the NRM/A in Uganda, and the CPP in Cambodia have 
ruled with (mostly absolute) majorities for extensive periods of time, all more 
than twelve years. Mozambique’s FRELIMO is one of the longest-ruling post-
                                                 
307 On Uganda see Barya, “International Support to ‘No-Party’ Democracy in Uganda”, p. 26; on 
Mozambique see de Tollenaere, “Fostering Multiparty Politics in Mozambique”, p.78. 
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war parties, controlling government since the country gained its independence 
from Portugal in 1975.  
A look at the earlier table 3.1 also shows that a large majority of post-
conflict countries have a presidential form of government. In Africa and Central 
America, all post-conflict countries have presidential systems. Post-conflict 
countries in Europe, Asia and the Middle East show a slightly more varied 
picture, although the presidential form of government still dominates. Whether 
there is causal link between low degrees of party system institutionalization and 
strong presidents in countries that operate a presidential system –as suggested by 
the literature on established and new democracies– is difficult to establish from 
the general data provided. Countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador with 
moderately institutionalized party systems in fact seem to indicate that 
presidential systems do not necessarily undermine the development of stable 
inter-party competition, although even in these countries presidentialism seems 
to have had a negative effect on the institutionalization of individual parties, 
particularly opposition parties.308 
 Finally, it is important to note that as a tentative generalization, there does 
not appear to be a simple correlation between the nature of conflict (as identified 
in table 3.1) and the type of party system (as indicated in table 3.2). However, 
there does seem to be a correlation between the type of conflict ending and party 
system, in that dominant-authoritarian party systems are –perhaps not 
surprisingly– most prevalent in countries that have ended their wars through 
military victory. Nevertheless, the strength and explanation of this relationship 
would have to be further investigated before conclusions can be drawn, 
                                                 
308 For El Salvador, see chapter 4. For Nicaragua see Dye, Democracy Adrift: Caudillo Politics in 
Nicaragua. 
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especially as there are also a few countries with dominant-authoritarian party 
systems that have ended their wars through peace agreement (including Sudan 
and Cambodia). 
 
3.5 Introduction to Case Studies 
 
The previous sections have provided a general overview of the background, types 
and degree of institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war 
societies. In order to gain a deeper understanding of not only how certain post-
war parties and party systems develop, but particularly why they develop in the 
way they do, it is necessary to analyze a number of cases in greater detail. This 
also allows us to check the various alternative explanations offered by the party 
politics literature for the institutionalization of parties and party systems.  
 As already explained in chapter 1, El Salvador and Cambodia provide a 
suitable pair for analysis because of their representativeness and variation, 
political stability, the intense and protracted nature of their wars, the post-war 
engagement of international actors as well as the relatively limited attention for 
their parties and party systems. The next empirical part of this investigation 
therefore focuses on party development in these two countries, in both cases 
concentrating on the post-conflict period of the early 1990s until 2008. 
Each of the two chapters starts with a short country and historical 
background. The main part of the analysis, however, focuses on both countries’ 
political context and the characteristics of their party politics. The chapters first 
describe the origins and organizational development of the main political parties 
represented in parliament in the post-conflict period. In El Salvador, the 
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investigation concentrates on the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Christian Democratic 
Party (PDC) and the National Conciliation Party (PCN). In Cambodia, the 
analysis focuses on the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), the National United 
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC), and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). Other parties in the two 
countries are only discussed in the context of certain electoral coalitions, but do 
not feature as key objects of analysis. 
 The second part of each chapter analyzes the institutionalization of the 
various parties by examining each party’s systemness, decisional autonomy, 
value infusion and reification, and explaining the variation between parties on 
these dimensions. The third part analyzes the institutionalization of the party 
systems in both countries and focuses on the stability of inter-party competition, 
the rootedness of parties in society, and the popular legitimacy of multi-party 
competition and elections. The chapters conclude by explaining the difference in 
institutionalization by reference to the design of the electoral system, the 
cleavages in society, the formal institutional framework, and crucially, various 
conflict-related factors (including the role of international actors). A more 
explicit comparison of the two cases is elaborated in Chapter 6. 
 
 4 
 
Post-War Party Politics in El Salvador:  
The Institutionalization of Polarized Pluralism 
 
 
This chapter focuses on party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador 
and specifically on how the differences in individual party institutionalization 
can be explained. Drawing on original field research comprising an extensive 
number of interviews (see Appendix II) and consultation of local archival 
sources (see References), the chapter makes the following three key arguments.  
First, it shows that post-war party competition in El Salvador cannot be 
understood without reference to the country’s conflict history and pre-war party 
development. Second, it demonstrates that the development of individual 
political parties has been directly influenced by the broader political and 
institutional post-war context of the country. And finally, it argues that 
traditional theoretical approaches –focusing on electoral competition, societal 
cleavages and formal institutions– cannot fully explain the nature of party and 
party system institutionalization in El Salvador. Instead the chapter demonstrates 
that post-war party and party system institutionalization is primarily shaped by 
war-related factors, such as the war-time origins of parties, the nature of conflict 
ending and peace agreement, and design choices in key post-war institutions. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Deep socioeconomic inequalities and political exclusion lie at the roots of much 
of the instability, civil war, and criminal violence that El Salvador has 
experienced in the past half century. Concentration of land, labour and other 
economic resources in the hands of family oligarchies and business elites, in 
combination with market-oriented political regimes and an authoritarian military 
establishment, have led to a strongly polarized political system.  
Sixteen years after the 1992 Chapultepec peace accords, El Salvador is no 
longer ravaged by war and institutionalized political exclusion has largely 
disappeared. From a post-war peace-building perspective, El Salvador’s 
transition is therefore often considered a success story.309 However, since 1992 
criminal violence has replaced political and military violence. A high number of 
homicides, kidnappings, and robberies have turned El Salvador into one of the 
most violent countries in the western hemisphere.310 In addition, the 
socioeconomic paragraphs of the peace accords have failed to address the 
chronic income and social inequalities that continue to affect large parts of the 
Salvadoran population. And finally, the politicization of state and non-state 
institutions is again benefiting the power of a small elite of politicians and 
businessmen. 
                                                 
309 Call, “Assessing El Salvador’s Transition From Civil War to Peace”. However, looking at the 
Salvadoran transition from a democratization perspective, the assessment seems to be less 
positive. See, for example, Holiday, “El Salvador’s ‘Model’ Democracy”. 
310 In response to the rising crime levels caused particularly by maras [criminal gangs], the 
authorities have adopted tough mano dura [iron fist] policies. See Cruz, Street Gangs in Central 
America; and Hume, “Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs”. 
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 Since the end of the war competition between political parties has been more 
pluralist and competitive than ever before in El Salvador’s turbulent history. Yet 
not all parties have achieved the same degree of institutionalization. Some parties 
have developed strong party organizations, have become well-known throughout 
the country and are seen as clear political symbols. Other parties are only weakly 
organized, lack broad recognition and are seen as marginal players. Electoral 
competition has been dominated in the post-conflict period by the two strongest 
political parties, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The nature of the party 
system in El Salvador can probably best be characterized as a moderately 
institutionalized form of limited pluralism, for reasons that will be explained 
below. 
 
4.2 Conflict Background and Early Party Development311 
 
Since its independence from Spain in 1821, El Salvador’s political and economic 
spheres have been dominated by a small, but influential elite of business leaders, 
right-wing politicians, and military officers. Benefiting from the export sales of 
indigo and coffee, non-official kickbacks as well as the import taxation of luxury 
goods, the Salvadoran government considered the plantation holder elite as its 
principal backer and financial supporter. 
                                                 
311 For a more detailed analysis of the Salvadoran civil war and its historical background, see 
Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace; Baloyra, El Salvador 
in Transition; Byrne, El Salvador’s Civil War: A Study of Revolution; Stanley, The Protection 
Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador; and Wood, 
Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. 
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 When world prices for coffee fell sharply during the Great Depression in the 
early 1930s, the coffee elite tried to make up for its falling profits by lowering 
the already marginal wages of plantation workers. In combination with the 1931 
coup by General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez against pro-reform President 
Arturo Araujo, this led to a series of rural uprisings. One particular revolt in 
January 1932 that was encouraged by Marxist intellectual and leader of the 
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), Augustín Farabundo Martí, was 
violently put down by Martínez’ military forces. The resulting massacre of more 
than 30,000 indígenas, peasants and political opponents became known as La 
Matanza [the Slaughter].312 It provided the start of an almost fifty year long 
period (1932-1980) of direct and indirect military rule, in which successive 
governments would continue to protect the interests of the economic elite and 
(violently) resist socioeconomic reforms propagated by church leaders, labour 
unions, peasant organizations, and other progressive political groups. 
 In that period, elections for the national assembly and presidency were held 
only occasionally and manipulated in such a way that opposition parties were 
unable to challenge the dominant military-economic elite.313 While mass-based 
left-wing political organizations were repressed, or banned outright as in the case 
of the PCS, various new right-wing parties emerged between 1932 and 1960. 
Many of these parties served only a particular military leader or parts of the civil-
military elite.  
                                                 
312 Booth, Wade and Walker, Understanding Central America. Global Forces, Rebellion and 
Change, pp.96-97. 
313 Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, p.34. 
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The Pro-Patria [‘for the homeland’] Party (PPP) established by General 
Martínez, for example, “did not have a life of its own” and served mainly as a 
“[highly personalistic] instrument of social control”.314 Between 1948 and 1960, 
the military ruled through the Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification 
(PRUD). Supposedly created to promote democratic political reform, in practice 
the PRUD provided the military with abundant patronage resources and electoral 
advantages.315 In 1961, the National Conciliation Party (PCN) emerged out of 
the PRUD as the new ‘official’ governing party. Overseeing a period of rapid 
economic growth during the 1960s –partly facilitated by the US-sponsored 
regional economic support programme Alliance for Progress– the PCN further 
concentrated land and other sources of wealth in the hands of the civil-military 
elite.316 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, economic growth, US pressure for agrarian 
reform and a slightly more open political arena led to the emergence of several 
new left-wing opposition parties and other progressive popular organizations. 
These parties included the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), as well as the 
National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). The main opposition party to emerge 
in this period was the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Established in 1960, it 
quickly attracted support from not only “conservatives disenchanted with the 
official party” and other middle-class professionals, but also benefited from 
                                                 
314 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, p.38. 
315 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p.35. 
316 Booth, Wade and Walker, Understanding Central America, p.97. 
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lower- and middle-class voters “whose preferred alternatives were not available 
[as the parties of the Left were illegal]”.317  
When the separate candidates of the three opposition parties proved unable 
to defeat the official PCN candidate during the 1967 presidential elections, they 
decided to form the United National Opposition (UNO) in the run-up to the 1972 
elections. But when PDC/UNO’s José Napoleón Duarte defeated PCN candidate 
Colonel Arturo Molina in the 1972 presidential elections, the government 
rejected the election results and had the Legislative Assembly quickly appoint 
Molina as the new president. Despite complaints of massive electoral fraud and a 
mutiny of San Salvadoran army officers, the government’s candidate finally 
prevailed and Duarte was sent into exile.318 
 In the subsequent period things changed, particularly in terms of party 
development.319 The fraudulent 1972 elections and the surrounding political 
tensions spawned a variety of mass organizations that used demonstrations, 
strikes, occupation of official buildings and other forms of civil disobedience to 
protest the unequal socioeconomic conditions and the increasing restrictions of 
political space by the military-oligarchic elite.320 In 1977, the Catholic church –
                                                 
317 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p.44. For a more in-depth analysis of the PDC and José 
Napoleón Duarte, see Webre, José Napoleón Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party in 
Salvadoran Politics, 1960-1972. 
318 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.62-64. 
319 According to Cristina Eguizabal: “If the period 1963-1972 marked progressive 
institutionalization of political activity, the following period corresponded with a process of 
disintegration of the party political sphere”. Quoted in Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz, El Salvador. 
Elecciones 1997, p.54. 
320 Mass organizations included the large Revolutionary Popular Block (BPR), with a basis of 
60,000-80,000 members within the rural-urban proletariat, the urban-based United Popular 
Action Front (FAPU), and the much smaller Popular Leagues of 28th February (LP-28). López 
Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales y Cambio Social en El Salvador”, pp.572-573. 
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although strictly speaking not a political mass organization– joined the political 
protest with the support of Christian base communities and the critical voice of 
Catholic Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero. In addition, groups that no longer 
believed in a peaceful political reform established armed guerrilla organizations, 
using kidnappings, political assassinations and killings of military and police 
personnel in order to try and defeat the military-oligarchy and establish a 
revolutionary (socialist) government. The five main guerrilla groups, most of 
whom had close links with the above-mentioned mass organizations and the 
PCS, included the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the Armed Forces of 
National Resistance (FARN), the Revolutionary Party of Central American 
Workers (PRTC), the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), and the Armed 
Forces of Liberation (FAL).321 
 At the other end of the political spectrum there were the increasingly militant 
PCN, the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), broadly 
representing the oligarchy and bourgeoisie, and the more radical Agrarian Front 
of the Eastern Region (FARO), representing the traditional (coffee) oligarchy.322 
The military meanwhile set up or expanded already existing paramilitary 
organizations, some of which also doubled as “death squads”. These included the 
Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN) –an approximately 100,000 
strong peasant militia force set up in the 1960s to counter the activities of rural 
opposition organizations–, the White Warriors Union (UGB), as well as the 
                                                 
321 López Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales y Cambio Social en El Salvador”, pp.574-575; and 
Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, pp.64-74. 
322 López Vallecillos, “Fuerzas Sociales y Cambio Social en El Salvador”, pp.576-577. 
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extremist Wars of Elimination Anti-Communist Liberation Armed Forces 
(FALANGE).323  
Under pressure from the economic elite “to deal more firmly with the 
opposition” the government implemented a tough Public Order Law in 1977. 
This law expanded the activities of the paramilitary organizations and gave them 
“practically a license to kill”.324 And while these new legal powers contributed to 
a higher number of killings and disappearances, they did little to accommodate 
whatever moderate political parties and mass organizations still existed. In fact, 
they only hardened the guerrilla’s resolve. When tensions between conservative 
and more extreme rightwing elements in the military-oligarchic coalition started 
growing and international pressure from international organizations and the 
Catholic Church to address the human rights abuses mounted, the government 
looked increasingly fragile. Supported by a US administration that wanted to 
“prevent another Nicaragua”, a group of junior army officers toppled the 
government and replaced it with a different military junta in October 1979.325 
But when that junta initiated an ostensibly reformist programme, hard-line 
elements within the oligarchic elite and military again took over. The result was a 
quick succession of several military juntas, until eventually a new (civilian) 
government was elected in 1982. 
 By that time the popular mass organizations and political-military opposition 
had entered into a transition phase and started to unite and prepare themselves for 
                                                 
323 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.54-67. 
324 Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, p.66. 
325 In July 1979 in Nicaragua the left-wing Sandinistas managed to push the US-supported 
Somoza regime from power and take over the government. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, 
p.86. 
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an armed revolution. A month after Archbishop Romero was assassinated in 
March 1980, a coalition of centre-left political parties, labour unions, and other 
non-governmental organizations established the Democratic Revolutionary Front 
(FDR).326 With the FDR acting as their political voice, a few months later, in 
October 1980, the five guerrilla organizations decided to unite themselves in the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Each of the five 
organizations maintained its own command structures and distinct revolutionary 
ideology. But major offensives and strategy were coordinated by the FMLN’s 
General Command, which comprised five commanders, one from each group. 
In January 1981, the FMLN started its first major military offensive against 
government-supported military and paramilitary organizations. Having learned 
the lessons from other revolutionary struggles in Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia and 
elsewhere, the FMLN developed an effective grassroots governance system and 
made sure it could count on the support of the peasant population throughout 
large parts of the country.327 At the height of the war in the mid-1980s 
approximately 12,000 FMLN rebel fighters were pitted against an approximately 
56,000 strong Salvadoran army force, kept alive by large amounts of technical 
and logistic military assistance from the United States.328 Despite these large 
disparities in force size, it soon became clear that neither side would be able to 
                                                 
326 The FDR comprised the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC), the Revolutionary 
National Movement (MNR), and the National Democratic Union (UDN). Wade, “El Salvador: 
The Success of the FMLN”, p.51, n.6. 
327 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.115-126. 
328 The total amount of US military assistance to the Government of El Salvador in the 1980 – 
1989 civil war period has been estimated at USD6 billion. Martín-Baró and Cardenal, 
“Introduction – Fifteen Years Later: Peace at Last”, p.4. See also Booth, Wade and Walker, 
Understanding Central America, p.108. 
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win the war militarily. However, the war dragged on and it would not be until 
1989 for the first direct negotiations between the two sides to take place. 
Surprisingly, electoral and political party competition continued during the 
1980s, albeit in a rather artificial and severely restricted manner.329 Artificial 
because many people were unable to exercise their right to vote, electoral fraud 
was common, and results did generally not reflect the will of the people. 
Moreover, competition was restricted as it excluded centre-left and extreme left 
parties, either by (forcefully) exiling opposition leaders or by prohibiting parties 
with armed militias and those with links to armed groups from participating in 
elections. In retrospect, the main purpose of the ‘demonstration elections’ of the 
1980s seems to have been the legitimization of the civilian-military government, 
and to “[convince] the citizens of the United States that their client government is 
freely chosen”.330 
During the 1982 constituent assembly elections, the PCN, several other 
extreme right-wing parties and the recently established ARENA party created a 
parliamentary majority coalition that succeeded in defeating the PDC. ARENA 
founder Roberto D’Aubuisson was put forward as the new presidential candidate. 
However, because of his alleged ties to paramilitary organizations and death 
squads, D’Aubuisson’s nomination was blocked under heavy pressure from the 
United States. Instead, a banker with close connections to the military, Alvaro 
Magaña, was installed as (provisional) head of government until the 1984 
presidential elections. In those elections, the PDC candidate Duarte beat ARENA 
                                                 
329 For an overview of electoral results between 1982 and 1989, see Appendix II. 
330 Brodhead, “Demonstration Elections in El Salvador”, p.175, quoted in Montgomery, 
Revolution in El Salvador, p.156. 
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candidate D’Aubuisson in the second round with 53 to 46 percent. The US 
government responded by significantly increasing military assistance to the 
country and bolstering the Duarte government financially and politically. 
However, in the following years the Duarte government squandered its 
position by becoming increasingly corrupt and proving unable to bring the war 
with the FMLN to an end.331 These failures led to a resounding defeat of the 
PDC in the 1988 legislative elections, in favour of the increasingly popular 
ARENA party. From then on ARENA controlled the assembly in coalition with 
the PCN. 
ts on the institutionalization of political parties 
nd El Salvador’s party system. 
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As we will see below, this conflict history and the violent nature of early party 
development had profound effec
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A combination of developments at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s changed 
the conditions in which the war between the FMLN and the Salv
ernment took place and made a negotiated solution more attractive.332 
At the national level, the newly elected ARENA president, Alfredo Cristiani, 
almost immediately announced new peace negotiations with the FMLN. Part of 
the moderate faction within the ARENA party, Cristiani realized that in order to 
 
331 Zamora, El Salvador: Heridas Que No Cierran. Los Partidos Políticos en la Post-Guerra, 
p.149; and Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.185-211. 
332 Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, pp.37-40. 
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stimulate economic growth –one of his key campaign promises– the war had to 
be ended. In addition, weakened by the gain of the new Democratic Convergence 
(CD) party in the 1991 legislative elections, the ARENA-PCN coalition could no 
long
rogramme made negotiations 
viab
is time under strong pressure from the United 
                                                
er ignore the voice of the centre-left opposition.333  
The FMLN, meanwhile, adapted its revolutionary tone and changed its 
position about taking part in electoral competition. El Salvador expert Tommie 
Sue Montgomery attributes this apparent “ideological metamorphosis” to the 
FMLN’s awareness of the changing international context as well as to the fact 
that the FMLN had always been more pragmatic than ideological.334 Joaquín 
Villalobos, a former member of the FMLN General Command and ERP leader, 
ascribes the change to an internal power struggle: “towards 1990, when they 
were in a strong position again, the more moderate tendency was again able to 
promote a liberal democratic project, and this p
le and helped bring peace to El Salvador”.335  
But despite several face-to-face meetings between the government and the 
FMLN-FDR as early as 1984 and 1987 and pledges by both parties to negotiate, 
peace talks broke down in October 1989. Only after a renewed nationwide 
FMLN offensive in November 1989 and the murder of six prominent Jesuit 
priests by members of the US-trained Atlacatl battalion in that same month, did 
talks restart in early 1990. Th
Nations and the United States. 
 
333 The Democratic Convergence (CD) party comprised the MPSC, MNR and the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD). 
334 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, pp.215-216. 
335 Villalobos, “The Salvadoran Insurgency: Why Choose Peace?”. 
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 Engagement between the government and the guerrillas also received a boost 
by developments taking place in the region. The main stimulus came from the 
Esquipulas peace process during 1987 and 1988. This process consisted of a 
series of talks between Central American presidents that sought a regional, 
negotiated solution to the various conflicts in Central America. The resulting 
agreements put pressure on both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN to 
start negotiating too. The electoral loss of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua was 
another important regional development. For the FMLN the Sandinista 
government in neighbouring Nicaragua had been an example of what a socialist 
n and UN Secretary General 
                                                
country could look like. With its demise in 1990, the FMLN not only lost an 
important political supporter, but also one of its reference points. 
 At the international level, most of the pressure for a negotiated solution 
came from two actors. With the ending of the Cold War, the United States 
became somewhat less inclined to see the war in El Salvador in ideological 
terms. Moreover, the H.W. Bush administration came under increasing pressure 
from US Congress to push for a negotiated solution to the conflict and suspend 
military assistance, particularly after the murder of the Jesuit priests. In addition, 
the United Nations had become actively involved as a mediator in the Salvadoran 
peace process. With the organization’s reputatio
Peréz de Cuéllar’s commitment as a fellow Latin American on the line, United 
Nations officials pushed hard for a peace deal.336 
 Finally, on 16 January 1992 the Salvadoran government and the FMLN 
signed the Chapultepec Accords, which officially ended the Salvadoran civil 
 
336 Whitfield, “The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Preliminary 
Comparison”, p.208. 
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war; a war that lasted for more than 11 years and left more than 75,000 people 
dead and 1 million displaced. The purpose of the accords was “to end the armed 
conflict by political means as speedily as possible, promote the democratization 
of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights and reunify 
Salvadoran society”.337 To these ends the peace accords included a broad range 
of provisions for the reform of existing security and judicial institutions, the 
creation of new electoral institutions, and government support to address the 
soci
uman rights abusers, and replaced forces such as the National 
Gua
al electoral system and the replacement of the heavily 
                                                
oeconomic problems of former combatants. All these initiatives were 
supervised by the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).  
One of the primary reforms concerned the restructuring of the armed forces, 
which according to testimonies collected by the Truth Commission had been 
responsible for an overwhelming majority of the deaths and human rights abuses 
during the war.338 The peace accords led to a new doctrine and educational 
system for the armed forces, ‘purified’ the security apparatus from some of the 
most notorious h
rd, Treasury Policy and other paramilitary bodies with a new National 
Civilian Police.  
The peace agreement also referred to the need for electoral reform, which 
included a more proportion
 
337 United Nations, The United Nations and El Salvador 1990-1995, p.193. 
338 Of the more than 22,000 complaints of serious acts of violence, 85 percent was attributed to 
“agents of the State, paramilitary groups allied to them, and the death squads”. 5 percent of the 
cases were attributed to the FMLN. Over 60 percent of the complaints concerned extrajudicial 
executions; the rest included enforced disappearances (more than 25 percent) and torture (more 
than 20 percent). United Nations, De la Locura a la Esperanza: La Guerra de Doce Años en El 
Salvador, p.43. However, an amnesty law adopted a few days after the publication of the Truth 
Commission’s report effectively exonerated all members of the armed forces as well as the 
FMLN from prosecution. 
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poli
e FMLN to disarm and demobilize its armed 
ts, but also proved essential in transforming the former armed rebel 
 
341
ticized Central Elections Council (CCE) with a broader-based Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal (TSE). 
Finally, the peace accords explicitly mandated the legalization of the FMLN 
as a legitimate political party, and gave the organization “the freedom to canvass 
for new members, the right to set up an appropriate infrastructure (premises, 
printing works, etc.), free exercise of the right of assembly and mobilization for 
FMLN leaders, activists and members, and freedom (...) to purchase and use 
advertising space in the mass media”.339 This clause in the peace agreement was 
not only important in pressuring th
combatan
group into a viable political party. 
 
4.4 Post-Conflict Elections (1992-2008)340 
 
Once the peace agreement was signed, elections were quickly organized. In the 
1992–2008 post-war period El Salvador has had eight rounds of elections, 
including five municipal and legislative elections and three presidential 
elections.  The 84 diputados [deputies] of the Legislative Assembly are elected 
                                                 
339 Peace Accords, chapter 6, article 7, subarticles a – d. United Nations, The United Nations and 
El Salvador 1990-1995, pp.193-198. 
340 This section does not include the results of the most recent 2009 elections, which had not yet 
been held at the time of writing. It is important to note, however, that at the end of 2008 the 
FMLN had gained a significant advantage over ARENA in the polls and was even expected to 
 years, 
n de la Republica de El Salvador de 1983, art. 79, 80. 
win both the parliamentary and the presidential elections slated for 18 January and 15 March 
2009 respectively. 
341 According to the constitution of El Salvador, elections for president are held every five
with re-election not permitted. Legislative and municipal elections are held every three years. 
Republic of El Salvador, Constitució
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on the basis of (closed-list) proportional representation.342 For election to the 
country’s 262 municipal councils, a simple majority system is used. To win the 
presidential elections, a candidate needs an absolute majority of the votes, 
secu
                                                
red in a maximum of two rounds. 
Largely as a result of the end of military and political repression, post-war 
elections in El Salvador have become more open and competitive in comparison 
with previous periods. This is mainly reflected in the higher number of parties 
participating in elections. In addition, the rights and liberties of the participating 
parties have been less restricted, making the post-war electoral environment freer 
and fairer than before.343 But the main indicator for greater openness and 
competitiveness has been the electoral participation of left-wing opposition 
organizations, in particular the former armed guerrilla organization, the FMLN.  
 The first post-war elections in 1994 saw the number of right- and 
particularly left-wing parties participating almost double in comparison to the 
elections in the 1980s at the height of the war. As a result, El Salvador’s party 
scene expanded beyond the three-party clique of the ‘official’ PCN, the 
opposition PDC and the young ARENA party to include the rebel movement-
turned-political party FMLN, and the United Democratic Centre (CDU) (later 
Democratic Convergence, CD). Other smaller political parties have come and 
 
mproved scores on 
berties (see also chapter 3, table 3.2). 
342 Before the legislative elections in 1991 the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly were 
expanded from 60 to 84 diputados. 
343 The improved electoral context can partly be deduced from El Salvador’s i
the Freedom House index in the post-war period, showing significant improvements in the 
respect for political rights and civil li
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gone, mainly because they have not been able to reach the minimum 3% of the 
vote necessary to remain registered as a political party.344  
 More importantly, however, is the fact that some of the new (left-wing) 
parties have been able to challenge the much older, ‘traditional’ (right-wing) 
parties, which has led to the decline of the once-powerful PCN and PDC. 
ARENA consolidated, the CD/CDU entered as a small centre-left opposition 
party, and the FMLN became the strongest left-wing opposition party. Based on 
e official electoral results presented in Appendix III, the following three 
etailed description of these developments. 
th
sections give a more d
 
Municipal Elections 
Presenting the outcome of the 1994-2006 municipal elections, figure 4.1 below 
shows the sharp fall in the number of PDC mayoralships just after the war and 
the subsequent stabilization in support in approximately 15 municipalities, 
representing roughly 6% of the total 262 municipalities. The PCN, in contrast, 
managed to increase its share of mayoralships, from a low of 10 (4%) in 1994 up 
to 50 (19%) in 2003. The young CDU/CD was unable to win any mayoralships 
in 1994 and 1997, but gained control over 3 municipalities in the most recent 
elections (2000-2006). ARENA and the FMLN are clearly the strongest parties at 
the municipal level, together controlling more than 200 municipalities, covering 
a large part of El Salvador’s territory. In the first eight years after the war 
ARENA lost some of its support. The FMLN, either alone or in coalition with 
other parties, quickly managed to raise the number of municipalities under its 
                                                 
Código Electoral. Elecciones 2006. 
344 Titulo VII, Capitulo V, art. 182 of the Electoral Code. See Tribunal Supremo Electoral, 
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control from a mere 16 (6%) in 1994 to an impressive 79 (30%) in 2000. But in 
the most recent two elections, ARENA has regained some of its earlier losses. In 
006 the party controlled 147 (56%) of all municipalities. Most of the lost 
municipalities by the former centre-left but now centre-right PDC seem to have 
been taken up by the much more left-wing FMLN. On the other side of the 
spectrum, loss for the PCN has meant gain for ARENA and vice versa. 
 
Figure 4.1 Results Municipal Elections in El Salvador (1994-2006) 
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Legislative Assembly Elections 
At the legislative level, trends have been very similar (see figure 4.2). Declining 
electoral support has resulted in a clear downward trend for the PDC, the ruling 
party of the 1980s. The PCN’s support during the four most recent legislative 
elections has fluctuated somewhat, with the party taking between 12 and 19% of 
the seats in the Legislative Assembly. The CDU/CD is the smallest party in 
parliament with an average of only 2.6 seats (3%). Similar to the situation at the 
municipal level, ARENA and the FMLN are clearly the biggest parties at the 
legislative level as well. The main difference, however, is that at the legislative 
level the gap between ARENA and the FMLN is much smaller, with an average 
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difference of only 2.25 seats in the last four elections. In 2000, the FMLN gained 
31 seats, for the first time becoming the largest political party in parliament. 
owever, none of the two main parties has come close to securing the ‘magic 
number’ of 43 seats needed for an absolute majority. Only by enlisting the 
support of the PCN and PDC have successive ARENA governments managed to 
obtain a ‘governable’ parliamentary majority. 
 
Figure 4.2 Results Legislative Elections in El Salvador (1994-2006) 
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conventions to finally nominate party coordinator and reformist, Facundo 
Presidential Elections 
Finally, at the presidential level it is clear that competition over votes has been 
dominated by ARENA and the FMLN (see figure 4.3). In its first-ever 
presidential elections in 1994 the FMLN, in coalition with the CD and MNR, 
managed to force ARENA into a second round. However, in the second round 
FMLN-CD-MNR candidate Rubén Zamora lost against ARENA candidate 
Armando Calderón Sol. In the run-up to the 1999 presidential elections and 
against a background of infighting between the party’s internal factions of 
ortodoxos and renovadores [orthodox and reformists], it took the FMLN three 
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Guardado, as its presidential candidate.345 Pitted against the business-oriented 
ARENA candidate Francisco Flores, the FMLN’s Guardado lost in the first 
round with 29% to ARENA’s 52% of the votes. In 2004, after having purged the 
party from most reformist elements, the former Communist Party chairman and 
political hard-liner, Schafik Handal, became the FMLN’s presidential candidate. 
ARENA pushed forward Antonio (Tony) Elias Saca as its presidential candidate. 
After a bitter electoral campaign characterized by the use of fear and propaganda 
y both parties and strong anti-Handal sentiments expressed by the United States, 
the FMLN lost again, this time in the first round. As a result, ARENA controlled 
the presidency for the fourth time since it entered government in 1989. 
 
Figure 4.3 Results Presidential Elections in El Salvador (1994-2004) 
b
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1994 1999 2004
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f t
he
 V
ot
e
ARENA
FMLN
PCN
PDC
CDU/CD
 
 
                    
4.5 Institutionalization of Individual Parties 
 
We know now that ARENA and the FMLN have dominated post-conflict 
elections and that the PDC and PCN have lost much of their popular support. But 
                             
or: The Success of the FMLN”, pp.40-41; and additional information from 
an interview with Gerson Martínez, 16 October 2007, San Salvador. 
345 Wade, “El Salvad
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the 
and Svåsand is a useful tool in this regard.346 
y applying this framework on already existing and new empirical material 
ring interviews in San Salvador in September and October 2007, we 
al party is to analyze its ‘systemness’. This requires us to focus 
on t
Of all the main Salvadoran political parties ARENA has the most elaborate 
and stable party organization. The party has offices or representatives in all of the 
   
core focus of this chapter is not about the electoral performance of 
Salvadoran parties. Instead, it is about the organizational development of the 
individual political parties, which is related to elections but includes other 
aspects as well.  
In order to get a deeper understanding of the extent to which individual 
parties have become established in terms of their structure as well as patterns of 
behaviour and attitudes, we need to focus on their institutionalization. The earlier 
introduced framework of Randall 
B
collected du
can systematically assess the degree of institutionalization of all five main 
political parties in El Salvador.347 
 
Systemness 
One of the first ways to evaluate the degree of institutionalization of an 
individual politic
he organizational development of a specific political party, including aspects 
such as the regularity of interactions between leaders, members, activists and 
other supporters within the party structures, the degree of factionalism as well as 
party discipline. 
                                              
346 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”. See also section 2.3 in 
ix II. 
chapter 2. 
347 For a complete list of people interviewed for this chapter, see Append
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country’s 262 municipalities, controls 147 municipal councils since 2006, and 
has more than 8,000 committees throughout El Salvador.348 The reported number 
of p
 of people, all members of the powerful COENA and presided 
  
arty affiliates, including party members, varies from a low of 80,000 to a 
high of 1 million people.349 
 ARENA’s party structure is divided into six major party organs, and eight 
‘nationalist sectors’.350 The main organs are the General Assembly and the 
National Executive Committee (COENA).351 COENA is in charge of the 
structuring and functioning of all party organs and nominates all official electoral 
candidates to the General Assembly. ARENA’s elaborate party structure, 
particularly at the departmental and municipal level, provides ample room for 
consultation and relatively open, ‘bottom-up’ policy-making. In practice, 
however, major policy decisions and nominations are taken behind closed doors 
by a small group
                                               
348 Interview with Milena Calderón Sol, 1 October 2007, San Salvador. 
349 Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy. Political Parties in Central America, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic (Anexo 5. Partidos Incluido en la Sección I), p.460; and 
interview with Amílcar Mejía, 11 October 2007, San Salvador. In the absence of reliable data, 
asantry, youth, women, professionals and most recently, 
the Collective 
1-23. 
figures on party membership for ARENA and all other Salvadoran political parties should be 
treated with caution. 
350 In order to capture the main social groups in Salvadoran society, the party has sectors for 
workers, business, agro-industry, rural pe
Salvadorans residing abroad. Each of these sectors can nominate a representative to the party’s 
highest institutional organ, the COENA. 
351 The General Assembly comes together on an annual basis, whereas the COENA usually meets 
every sixty days or more, if needed. Lower-level party organs, such as 
Departmental Assemblies and Collective Municipal Committees meet more regularly, almost on 
a monthly basis. ARENA, Estatutos Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, art.1
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over by the party president, which is usually the same person as the President of 
the Republic.352 
The density of ARENA’s party organization is demonstrated by the 
existence of specific party officials within COENA for ideology, organization, 
campaigning and other party tasks. These officials disseminate the party’s 
positions among its members and activists, as well as reinforce the party’s links 
with the electorate. Policies set out by COENA are usually strictly followed by 
party members, making party discipline within ARENA (very) high. 
Nevertheless, there have been a number of bitter disputes in the mid-1980s and 
e in all of the 262 municipalities 
and 
                                                
late 1990s that led to members defecting to other parties or withdrawing from 
politics. But in contrast to the FMLN, disputes between ARENA party members 
are rarely made public and most are quickly solved internally. In general, 
therefore, the degree of factionalism within ARENA is relatively low.353 
 The FMLN comes as a close second in terms of systemness. Governing 59 
municipal councils in 2007, including 5 councils in coalition with other parties, 
the FMLN’s territorial control is significantly less than ARENA’s. But similar to 
ARENA the organization maintains a presenc
operates several thousands of municipal and base committees throughout the 
country. Since 1997 the FMLN is in power in San Salvador, the largest and most 
 
LN’s Schafik Handal would win the presidency. I am grateful for this information 
352 ARENA, Estatutos Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, art. 22f and art. 16a; see also Urquilla, 
“Regulación Jurídica de los Partidos Políticos en El Salvador”, pp.469-470. 
353 Several ARENA members have defected to the PCN. Others have protested their displeasure 
about COENA by withdrawing from politics as happened with the Founder’s Faction of ARENA 
in the late 1990s. However, many of these people returned to ARENA before the 2004 out of fear 
that the FM
received from Christine Wade and Ralph Sprenkels in e-mail correspondence between April and 
May 2008. 
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important municipality in the country. Its membership consists of approximately 
100,000 card-carrying afiliados [members].354 
In terms of party structure, the FMLN’s organization has probably changed 
the most of all political parties over the past 15 years. During the war, the 
FMLN’s General Command was the main policy- and decision-making body and 
consisted of five members –one from each of the five guerrilla organizations 
constituting the FMLN. After the signing of the 1992 peace accords, guerrilla 
members were disarmed and demobilized. Their leaders were subsequently 
integrated into a new Comisión Política [Political Commission] and the FMLN 
as such was transformed from a coalition front into one unified (unarmed) 
political party.355 The FMLN’s daily and most powerful decision-making body is 
the 18-member Political Commission, which is in charge of the development and 
execution of party policies and the nomination of party candidates to the National 
Convention.356 Party discipline in the FMLN is quite high, with the leader of the 
parliamentary fraction and the general coordinator usually dictating the main 
policy directions. In contrast to ARENA, however, the FMLN has seen 
mnu erous, very public disagreements among party members that have often 
resulted in expulsion and party splits. Therefore, the degree of factionalism 
                                                 
354 Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy, p.465; interview with Amílcar Mejía, 11 
October 2007, San Salvador. 
355 For an in-depth analysis of the FMLN’s transformation into a political party, see Wade, “El 
Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”. 
356 The FMLN’s highest party organs are the annual National Convention and the quarterly 
National Council. At the lower-level, there are various other party organs, including Municipal 
Committees and Base Committees that meet more regularly. FMLN, Estatuto de Partido Político 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, FMLN, art.17-50. 
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within the FMLN has been relatively high, which has significantly weakened the 
party as an organization. 
 The PCN still has a moderately developed party organization, despite its 
sharp decline and serious organizational problems in the 1980s. The party has 
succeeded in maintaining its electoral-organizational capabilities throughout the 
country, mainly because of its historical background and territorial power as the 
‘official’ military government party. After the war, the party has handily 
exploited its organizational capacities and remaining territorial base with an 
estim
social, political and organizational support quickly eroded. After the war, the 
leadership squabbles between 
ated 135,000 afiliados.357 Since 2006 it controls 39 municipalities and has 
10 legislative deputies. In terms of organizational structure, the PCN is 
hierarchically organized, similar to ARENA. According to the PCN’s statutes, 
the annual National Assembly brings together all the main party committees and 
is the party’s primary organizational body.358 In practice, however, key decisions 
are made by the National Executive Council, presided over by a powerful 
Secretary General. 
The PDC’s post-war party organization is only a ghost of what it was before 
the war. Originating in 1960 it is one of the oldest political parties in El Salvador 
and until the late 1970s it was the most organized opposition party. However, as 
a result of its participation in the military-led government and its association with 
counterinsurgency strategies and corruption problems in the 1980s, much of its 
PDC has seen several ideological disputes and 
different party factions, which have severely weakened its organizational 
                                                 
357 Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy, p.467. 
358 PCN, Estatutos y Declaración de Principios y Objetivos. 
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development and institutionalization.359 Since 2006 it leads a modest 14 
municipal councils and has only 6 deputies in the Assembly. Its current 
membership is estimated at 30,000.360 The National Convention is officially the 
onths, 
nd a small Political Commission.362 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the 
party’s highest organ. In practice, however, nomination, policy-making and 
decision-making revolve around a few people in the National Political 
Commission, chaired by the PDC’s Secretary General. As a political organization 
the PDC is only weakly institutionalized. 
 Finally, the CD has the least structured party organization of all. Although 
this is probably more a reflection of its limited territorial and political size than 
internal organizational problems. Since the 2006 elections, it controls only 3 
municipalities –all located in the department of Sonsonate–, occupies just 2 seats 
in the Assembly and has an estimated 7,000 party afiliados.361 Its organizational 
structure is limited to a Congress –which was convened for the first time in 
August 2007– a National Council that meets approximately every two m
a
organization emerged out of three previous political parties in the early 1990s, 
the CD seems to have had significantly less leadership problems or factional 
disputes than the FMLN, PDC or other, smaller post-war political parties. 
 
                                                 
359
between the ‘new political class’ and the ‘old guard’. This at one point led to the appointment of 
two Secretary Generals, each supported by one of the two cam
Salvador. Elecciones 1997, pp.56-58. See also PDC, Historia d
 The most public and damaging post-war dispute within the PDC has been the internal conflict 
ps. Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz, El 
el Partido Demócrata Cristiano. 
360 Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy, p.469. 
361 Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy, p.462. 
362 CD, Partido Cambio Democrático. Estructura Nacional. 
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The large differences in the degree of systemness among the five main political 
parties in El Salvador can be attributed to several factors. Political-military 
presence and control over large parts of territory during the war has provided the 
basis for the extensive party structures of ARENA and the FMLN. This is also 
true for the PCN, with its peak in power before the war. After the war, all three 
parties used their existing networks of departmental and municipal 
representatives, activists and offices to consolidate and expand their base of 
supporters and turn them into electoral supporters.  
 
       
But because it had already started to gain crucial electoral experience in the 
mid-1980s, by the time of the first post-war elections in 1994 ARENA had a ten-
year head start on the FMLN. ARENA’s control of the presidency from 1989 
onwards and its close links with the economic elite, gave the party’s 
organizational structures a much larger pool of political and financial resources 
to draw from, helping it to quickly outgrow that of its competitors. Moreover, 
ARENA’s easier access to the media and greater financial capacity to hire 
campaign advisors further contributed to its electoral success.363 
Another factor in determining the parties’ systemness is – perhaps somewhat 
paradoxically– the flexibility of their organizational structure and culture. Parties 
whose organization is characterized by rigid structures, procedures and behaviour 
–such as the FMLN, PDC and PCN– have proven more vulnerable to internal 
destabilization and splits. The clearest example of this is the FMLN, whose 
hierarchical structures and procedures as well as the inflexible, dogmatic attitude 
of some of its key leaders have clearly been detrimental to its organizational 
                                          
363 I am grateful to Ralph Sprenkels for pointing out several of these issues in email 
correspondence in May 2008. 
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cohesion and unity. Although not less hierarchical or dogmatic than the FMLN, 
ARENA’s party organization and leadership has proven much more flexible and 
pragmatic in this regard. In the case of ARENA, existing divisions and 
ideological disputes between different party factions have been accommodated 
ithin the party structures instead of expelling dissident factions. The bitter and 
etween two presidential candidates in the run-up to the 
rty (decisional autonomy) is the 
seco
w
quite public dispute b
2009 election campaign was therefore somewhat a surprise to many observers.364 
But in general, the rotation of power between different groups and the 
willingness to accept caras frescas [new faces] into the party have been crucial 
elements of ARENA’s successful organizational strategy of creating a unified 
political alliance.365 
 
Decisional autonomy 
The degree to which a party is able to shape its own policies and strategies 
without interference from actors outside the pa
nd important element of party institutionalization.366 The influence of extra-
party actors such as civil society groups, trade unions, state institutions, private 
companies and other ‘sponsoring’ institutions on party policy and decisions of 
the five main political parties in El Salvador is not easy to assess, however. 
Detailed information about how the parties are connected to other organizations 
                                                 
364 In the second half of 2007 and early 2008 tensions between various groups within ARENA 
erupted over the opposing self-nominations over the party’s 2009 presidential candidacy by Saca 
protégé and COENA vice-director, René Figueroa, and the Salvadoran vice-president, Ana Vilma 
de Escobar. La Prensa Gráfica, “Derecha en Pleno Pulso Interno”, 11 October 2007, pp.2-3. 
365 Ribera, “¿Hacia Dónde Va la Derecha?”, pp.38-41. Interviews with Carlos Ramos, 12 October 
2007; and Armando Calderón Sol, 24 October 2007, both in San Salvador. 
366 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.14. 
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or societal sectors is either not publicly available or tends to be of an anecdotal 
nature. Nevertheless, some points can be made. 
The FMLN nowadays seems to have only a small number of non-partisan 
actors directly influencing the party’s policies and key decisions. This was 
diffe
tical-military 
stru
 is slightly different. Its original set-up in the 
1980s as a political alliance of different societal sectors has been maintained over 
                                                
rent in the past. In the 1970s and during the war in the 1980s, many of the 
political-military organizations that constituted the FMLN were closely linked to 
left-wing social movements, workers unions and professional associations, 
human rights organizations and church groups. It remains unclear exactly how 
much leverage these groups had on early political decision-making within the 
FMLN. But because the leadership of these groups and the guerrillas were close 
and sometimes even overlapping, it is safe to assume that FMLN’s war-time 
leaders felt compelled to take views from outside the organization into account.  
After the war the FMLN’s ties with left-wing civil society groups weakened. 
Partly because of a preoccupation with transforming its divided poli
ctures into a single political party, the organization and its leaders became 
more inward-looking. In the process the party alienated itself from many of its 
former civil society supporters. The many splits and purges of senior, more 
moderate party leaders in the past 15 years have further narrowed the FMLN’s 
links with actors outside the organization. Only since 2004 has it started to re-
engage with civil society. Overall, the FMLN as a party organization seems to be 
relatively autonomous and slightly isolated, despite the strong ideological 
support it still has from the broader left-wing civil society sector.367 
With ARENA the situation
 
367 Interview with Ralph Sprenkels, 4 and 26 October 2007, San Salvador. 
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the 
id-1980s onwards it provided 
a si
political opponents in the post-war period.369 
                                                
years. And its extensive party organization is firmly controlled by the 
principal executive organ, COENA. The strength of COENA and its key role in 
decision-making has been indicated earlier. One of the reasons why COENA is 
so strong is because the COENA chairman, party president and the President of 
the Republic are all the same person. The resulting amalgamation of party and 
state under a strong presidential system has significantly boosted the party’s 
position vis-à-vis other actors.  
But this does not make ARENA completely autonomous. In fact, there is a 
small and supposedly influential group of businessmen that operates largely 
behind the scenes and is not directly part of the party’s structures. In the past this 
group mainly comprised the traditional oligarchic coffee and agro-industrial elite. 
Nowadays, it is much more diverse and includes prominent representatives of the 
service sector, including major transport, retail, banking and insurance 
companies.368 And although the exact political influence of this economic elite 
remains unknown, it is widely held that from the m
gnificant part of ARENA’s campaign finances, played a key role in the 
party’s neo-liberal reform agenda –together with the US– and had an important 
say in nominations of the party’s presidential candidate. Towards the end of 
2007, there were some who signalled a more autonomous position by COENA 
and the party’s president. But even though this might be changing now, 
ARENA’s decisional autonomy does seem to be somewhat lower than that of its 
 
368 For an in-depth analysis of the close relationship between prominent Salvadoran families, 
networks of large-scale companies and political parties, see Paniagua Serrano, “El Bloque 
Empresarial Hegemónico Salvadoreño”. 
369 Interviews with Álvaro Artiga-González, 21 September and 25 October 2007, San Salvador. 
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With regard to the PCN, PDC and CD, there is much less information related 
to aspects of their decisional autonomy. Because of its close historical ties with 
e armed forces and the continuing presence of former military officers in its 
ly that some of the PCN’s policy- and decision-
The
 the extent to which it 
sym
                                                
th
party structures, it is not unlike
making is still somewhat influenced by the more traditional elements in the 
armed forces. However, as a small political party with very limited influence on 
major governmental or legislative decisions it now operates relatively 
autonomously, just like the PDC and CD. 
 
Value infusion and Reification 
 degree to which the identification and commitment of officials, activists, 
members and supporters to their party goes beyond their own personal interests 
(value infusion) as well as a party’s strength as a political symbol and its 
recognition as an established organization by the population and other political 
actors (reification) are the final two dimensions for assessing the 
institutionalization of individual parties.370 
Value infusion is generally dependent on whether a party is recognized as 
representative of a particular ethnicity, religion, language or even class. It is also 
influenced by a party’s (perceived) ability to deliver tangible benefits to the 
individual or the wider community. Reification is shaped first and foremost by 
the party’s (perceived) place in a country’s history and
bolizes particular values. In addition, it is dependent on how well a party can 
project its message –especially through effective use of the media. A party’s 
longevity, i.e. its ability to survive over time, also plays a role. Because these two 
 
370 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.13 and p.23. 
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elements of party institutionalization are less related to the organizational 
structures of parties and more to attitudinal aspects and perceptions, they are less 
visible and therefore more difficult to assess in practice. 
ARENA and the FMLN are both political entities with large numbers of 
officials and supporters that have a strong commitment to the ideas and policies 
of the respective party. Opinions over important governmental and legislative 
policies of party activists from both parties are generally couched in 
diametrically opposed, highly ideological terms rather than more neutral, 
technical terms. For example, representatives from both parties discussed the 
dola
ioeconomic issues, such as violence, 
emp
                                                
rización –the wholesale conversion of the colón-based economy into a US 
dollar economy in 2001– as well as the conclusion of the free trade agreement 
with the United States in 2006 with direct reference to party slogans about the 
defence of liberties and anti-communism (ARENA) or anti-imperialism and 
socialism (FMLN).371 More factual information about the pros and cons of 
dollarization and free trade was rarely discussed by the parties.  
In addition, ARENA and the FMLN are currently probably the two most 
important political symbols in Salvadoran politics. The ubiquitous pinta y pega 
[painting and stickering] of electricity poles, curb stones, and other landmarks in 
ARENA or FMLN party colours and the habit of people to dress themselves in 
white-blue-and-red (ARENA) or red (FMLN) clothes during party activities are 
clear examples of this. Both parties are seen as icons that set the tone of national 
debate over important political and soc
loyment, education and healthcare. During election time their positions –for 
example, mano dura [iron fist] versus prevención social del delito [social 
 
371 Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, p.54, n.57. 
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prevention of crime]– become the markers of electoral debate among voters and 
other political parties. Because of the strength of commitment and political 
symbolism, both ARENA and the FMLN can therefore be said to have high 
degrees of value infusion and reification. 
The PDC, PCN and CD score much lower on these elements of party 
institutionalization. Although each of these parties has its own group of core 
supporters, their identification with the particular party and commitment to its 
ideological positions is just not as strong as in the case of ARENA and the 
FMLN. The PDC, PCN and CD often define their political positions in relation 
to those of ARENA and the FMLN rather than independently developing new 
proposals. In addition, the smaller parties lack the almost iconic status of the two 
main parties. The PDC was considered a strong political symbol during the 
1960s and 1970s, but because of its association with a repressive government and 
corruption scandals in the 1980s has lost a lot of its popular attraction and has not 
fully recovered since. The same goes for the PCN, which also lost a lot of its 
status and support. However, the PCN has been able to maintain some of its old 
status and is still considered a traditional political symbol among parts of the 
rural peasant population. Finally, the CD does not have such iconic status. Being 
just 15 years old, the CD is a relatively new party that has not (yet) become a 
household name. In addition, the party has a more nuanced and perhaps too 
intellectual political image that, until now, has not chimed well with the majority 
of Salvadoran voters. 
 
By applying the Randall and Svåsand framework for the first time in the case of 
El Salvador, we can conclude that the institutionalization of the five main 
 
198  Post-War Party Politics in El Salvador  
Salvadoran political parties differs substantially. With a very high degree of 
systemness, a moderate level of decisional autonomy and high degrees of value 
infusion and reification, ARENA is the most institutionalized political party in El 
alvador. The FMLN is close behind although its factionalization after the war 
e PCN can be considered 
oderately institutionalized, with a relatively high degree of systemness but only 
vels the 
S
has lowered its degree of systemness significantly. Th
m
moderate levels of decisional autonomy, value infusion and reification. The PDC 
and CD –despite their differences in age and history– are both weakly 
institutionalized. 
 
4.6 El Salvador’s Polarized Pluralist Party System 
 
If we focus only on the presidential level, which ARENA has dominated for 
more than 19 years (1989-2008), El Salvador seems to have a predominant party 
system. But if we take into account the legislative and municipal le
picture changes. In the Legislative Assembly the seat margins between ARENA 
and the FMLN are so small that one could easily conclude there is a two-party 
system. However, neither ARENA nor the FMLN has ever held an absolute 
parliamentary majority necessary for such a conclusion. Moreover, there are two 
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or three other relevant parties with the potential to form or block coalition 
governments. At the municipal level, the picture is even more varied.372 
 Nevertheless, in systemic terms pluralism is limited in El Salvador, as the 
country does not have the extreme fragmentation of party competition prevalent 
in post-conflict countries such as Guatemala and Afghanistan. Moreover, as we 
shal
                                                
l see in the next section Salvadoran party competition is also more 
institutionalized than other (neighbouring) post-conflict countries. Centred on 
two strong ideological poles, the nature of party competition in El Salvador can 
therefore best be described as a polarized pluralist system. Albeit one with 
dominant-party tendencies. A number of characteristics outlined by Sartori are 
proof for this.373 
First, there is one party (the FMLN) that at least until recently had an anti-
system attitude, contesting the legitimacy of the regime and the system of 
government. This is not to say, however, that the FMLN is a classic anti-system 
party. During the 1980s, the FMLN violently resisted the legitimacy and the 
undemocratic nature of the respective military, PDC and ARENA governments. 
However, upon signing the 1992 peace accords it gave up its violent resistance, 
 
including ARENA, the 
FMLN, PDC, and the PCN. At the presidential level there are only two relevant parties, namely 
ARE
legislation. At the municipal level it is unclear, among others because of multi-party coalitions. 
similar conclusion, with an average score of 3.7 effective parties for the five legislative elections 
and 2.6 effective parties for the two presidential elections in the period 1994-2006. Artiga-
verview of the characteristics of a 
372 At the legislative level there are four politically relevant parties, 
NA and the FMLN. In contrast to the other parties, the CD –albeit having parliamentary 
representation as well– has almost no influence on the formation of coalitions or the blocking of 
Using Laakso and Taagepera’s index of effective number of parties, Artiga-González comes to a 
González, “Las Elecciones 2006 en Perspectiva”, p.241. 
373 Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, pp.116-124. For an o
polarized pluralist party system, see section 2.4 in chapter 2. 
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transformed itself into a political party and was integrated in the political system. 
But although it no longer contested the democratic legitimacy of the ARENA-led 
governments, it continued to resist ARENA’s neo-liberal and in its view 
‘authoritarian’ system of government. One clear example of the FMLN’s anti-
system tendencies has been its continuing propensity to define itself as a 
“democratic revolutionary force that believes in a socialist future”.374 With the 
nomination of a more moderate presidential candidate in 2007 the anti-system 
image of the FMLN seems to be slowly changing, however. 
A second feature of the Salvadoran party system is the multi-polarity of 
party competition. There is not only a clear left and right-wing party but also a 
party or a group of parties occupying the political centre. According to Ulloa, 
Ramos and Cruz the “emergence of new political parties and the fractionalization 
of t
                                                
he traditional parties” changed “the composition and plurality of political 
actors”. Interviews conducted for the present study, however, show that this has 
not led to the unification of opposition forces.375 Despite the fact that the FMLN, 
CD, PDC and PCN together could muster a parliamentary majority and could 
thereby block government legislation or hypothetically even create a rainbow 
coalition government, they have not done so. The obvious reasons for this are the 
large ideological distance between the various opposition parties and the 
attractive ‘cash for parliamentary support’ deals that ARENA is widely believed 
to have made with the PCN.376 Because of this, even temporary alliances for 
 
374 Interview with Salvador Sánchez Cerén, 23 October 2007, San Salvador. 
375 Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz, El Salvador. Elecciones 1997, p.49. 
376 Interviews with Carlos Ramos, 12 October 2007; and Antonio Cañas, 1 October 2007, both in 
San Salvador.  
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electoral or parliamentary purposes between the opposition parties have been 
difficult to achieve and usually not lasted very long.  
Third, the Salvadoran political system is highly polarized. This has mainly to 
do with the large ideological distance between the two main parties, ARENA and 
the FMLN. With its emphasis on individual freedom and its belief in a very open, 
free
ed 
resis
elite political culture is seen by many as a key characteristic of El Salvador’s 
-market economy with a minimum role for the state and a maximum role for 
private enterprise ARENA is a conservative right-wing party. The FMLN, in 
contrast, is clearly positioned at the left end of the political spectrum, as it strives 
for a socialist society with an influential state that redistributes wealth and 
guarantees social justice. The resulting competition between these two parties 
has become a fierce ideological battle for the hearts and minds of the voter. The 
polarization on ideological issues is related to the highly unequal socioeconomic 
structure of Salvadoran society, visible in sharply contrasting living conditions 
for rich and poor. But this does not mean that the party system is a simple 
reflection of these divisions. The relationship between societal inequality and 
political polarization is much more complex than that (see also section 4.8 
below). 
It is important to note, for example, that it are mainly political parties and 
individual politicians that present the socioeconomic problems in extreme 
ideological and highly polarizing terms. Rooted in the long history of arm
tance, violent conflict and a repressive state, the discourse of Salvadoran 
politicians is strongly characterized by ‘friend or foe’ thinking. This polarizing 
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post-war party system and an obstacle to democratization.377 Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, Salvadoran society itself is not as polarized as its political 
party system. Despite the high levels of poverty and growing discontent over 
insecurity, unemployment, corruption and unevenly spread economic growth, 
there is little evidence of deep divisions or tensions between different societal 
groups. Although it is undoubtedly connected to the unequal structure of 
Salvadoran society, polarization seems to be mainly a political phenomenon 
whose primary actors –including some of the main political parties and the 
government– use it as an instrument to consolidate and expand their power.378 
Another characteristic of a polarized pluralist system clearly visible in El 
Salvador is the tendency of centrifugal competition, with popular support in 
terms of votes tending to go to one or both of the extremes. During the legislative 
elections in the period 1994-2006 ARENA and the FMLN together received on 
average 70% of the votes. The concentration of votes by the two main parties 
during the presidential elections was even higher and rose from 74% in 1994 and 
81% in 1999 to more than 93% in 2004.379 The strong centrifugal nature of the 
Salvadoran party system can partly be explained by voter preference in 
combination with voter manipulation through the media. Another reason lies in 
the organizational and ideological weakness of the centre-right and centre-left 
opposition parties. In the period that ARENA and the FMLN have become 
stronger and attracted more votes, support for center-left and traditional-right 
                                                 
377 See the various contributions in Artiga-González et al., La Polarización Política en El 
Salvador. 
iva”, p.240; and interview with Álvaro 
lvador. 
378 See, for example, Zamora, “Polarización y Democracia. ¿Un Mal Necesario?”. 
379 Artiga-González, “Las Elecciones 2006 en Perspect
Artiga-González, 21 September 2007, San Sa
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parties has diminished and they have become more fragmented.380 Whereas the 
PCN and PDC can still rely on some electoral and financial support due to their 
historical role, the much smaller and more recently established CD and FDR do 
not have these advantages. As a result, their resources are much smaller. Their 
cent
2008 post-war period there has been no alternation of power between different 
individual parties. The governing ARENA party has controlled the government 
                                                
re-left message and more nuanced, social-democratic political positions are 
also easily lost in the intense ideological battle between the more extreme 
ARENA and FMLN discourses. 
One result of the high degree of polarization and the centrifugal tendency of 
party competition is that there is almost no room for pragmatism, at least in 
practical political terms. Political bargaining, making compromises and working 
towards consensus are uncommon in Salvadoran political life and even 
negotiations over the creation of electoral alliances are usually preceded by long, 
principled discussions. The above-mentioned polarizing political culture stands 
in the way of pragmatism between the main political actors even when in 
practice differences over policy are often small and mainly motivated by 
electoral considerations.381 
A sixth feature of the Salvadoran post-war party system is that in the 1994-
 
380 Marsh, “Republic of El Salvador”, p.407. 
381 Rubén Zamora shows that the starkly contrasting discourses of ARENA and FMLN elites 
during the past two elections did not correspond to their more moderate and even congruent party 
programmatic proposals. Zamora, “Polarización y Democracia”, pp.90-94. This can also be 
explained by the personal commitment and style of some leaders. For example, according to 
Christine Wade it is clear that “there was a greater sense of pragmatism and cooperation between 
ARENA and the FMLN under Calderon Sol and Cristiani than under the Flores and Saca 
administrations”. E-mail correspondence in April 2008. 
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four consecutive times since it won the presidential elections in 1989. At most 
there has been a peripheral turnover in the sense that the ruling party has changed 
its g
ARENA government complied with its campaign promises, less than half (47%) 
o
overning partners, namely the PCN and PDC. But this has never affected 
ARENA’s dominant party position. In fact, the combination of such coalition 
deals and the financial, political (and media) resource advantages that come with 
the presidency have only strengthened ARENA’s hold on power and made an 
alternation to the FMLN extremely difficult. That is until now. Since the 
announcement of the popular TV interviewer Mauricio Funes as the FMLN’s 
presidential candidate in late 2007 the FMLN’s electoral odds have slowly 
improved. So much so that at the time of writing, in late 2008, the FMLN is 
ahead of ARENA in the polls and seems to have a good chance of winning the 
parliamentary and presidential elections for the first time in 2009.382 
Finally, party competition in El Salvador is characterized by the ‘politics of 
outbidding’ with particularly ARENA and the FMLN trying to surpass each 
other with direct citizen appeals and governance promises, most of which are 
eventually not met. This is most visible in electoral campaigns. During the 2004 
presidential election campaign, for example, candidates of both parties presented 
ambitious proposals to reduce poverty, improve security, combat corruption, and 
protect the environment.383 Asked in a 2005 public opinion poll whether the 
f the respondents indicated it complied with some promises. Only 25% stated it 
complied with all promises and 27% said the ARENA government did not 
                                                 
382 Carlos Dada, “Tres Encuestas Confirman Ventaja de Funes Sobre Avila”, El Faro, 28 October 
2008. http://www.elecciones2009.elfaro.net/Noticias43.html. Accessed on 12/11/08. 
383 ARENA, Pais Seguro: Plan de Gobierno 2004-2009; and FMLN, Programa Social y 
Democrático para El Salvador 2004-2009. 
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comply with its promises. One year later, the number of respondents saying that 
the government of President Saca has not complied with any of its promises rose 
to more than 30%.384 The degree of compliance with campaign promises by the 
FMLN is more difficult to measure, largely because it has not been in 
government. However, with some caution we can use evaluations about the 
municipal (ten-year) administration of greater San Salvador –with 2.2 million 
people the country’s largest and most important municipality– as a proxy 
indicator for the FMLN’s compliance with electoral promises. In a 2005 poll, 
spondents living in San Salvador indicated that the mayor and municipal 
pular demands.385 
lthough these figures do not provide a fully comprehensive picture, they do 
ion of the Party System in El Salvador 
                                                
re
council responded only little (45%) or not at all (22%) to po
A
give an indication of the significant discrepancy between electoral promises and 
actual compliance by ARENA and the FMLN. This reinforces the view that 
outbidding is above all a political tool for parties to stay ahead in El Salvador’s 
highly polarized party system. 
 
4.7 Institutionalizat
 
The characteristics mentioned above help us to understand the nature of El 
Salvador’s post-war party system, but they do not tell us how institutionalized it 
 
384 Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP), Encuesta de Evaluación del Primer Año 
de Gobierno de Elías Antonio Saca, Asamblea Legislativa y Alcaldías, p.25; and IUDOP, 
ded ‘to 
Gobierno de Elías Antonio Saca, Asamblea Legislativa y Alcaldías, p.90. 
Encuesta de Evaluación del Segundo Año de Antonio Saca, Asamblea Legislativa, Alcaldías y 
Post-Electoral., pp.23-24. 
385 In the 2005 poll, another 24% indicated that the mayor and municipal council respon
some extent’ and approximately 9% indicated ‘a lot’. IUDOP, Encuesta de Evaluación del 
Primer Año de 
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is. The next section will use the framework of Mainwaring and Scully introduced 
before to identify key aspects of party system institutionalization and to establish 
whether El Salvador’s post-war party system is highly, moderately or weakly 
institutionalized.386 
 The first condition for an institutionalized party system is stability in the 
rules and nature of party competition. A quantitative indicator for assessing such 
stability is Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility, which measures the net 
change in vote and seat share of all parties from one election to the next.387 A 
recent analysis of party system institutionalization in Latin America indicates 
that El Salvador’s mean electoral volatility over the 1984-2004 period is 
approximately 19, meaning that while some parties lost 19% of parliamentary 
relatively stable nature of inter-party competition in El Salvador. First, in the past 
  
seats or presidential votes from one election to the next, other parties won 19%. 
This is somewhat higher than Nicaragua (13%) but significantly lower than 
Guatemala (48%), the two other post-conflict countries in Central America.388 
What is more, between 1997 and 2006, seat volatility in El Salvador has dropped 
significantly from 26 to 11.5.389 This smaller difference in party seat share is an 
indication of the higher degree of stability in party competition and the growing 
consolidation of the Salvadoran party system. 
 But there are also other, qualitative indicators that seem to support the 
                                               
386 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, pp.4-6. See also chapter two, 
2006 = ½ · Σ | (8) + (1) + (7) + (2) + (4) + (1) = 11.5. 
section 2.6. 
387 Pedersen, “On Measuring Party System Change”. See also chapter two, section 2.6. 
388 Payne, “Party Systems and Democratic Governability”, p.154. 
389 Calculating the aggregate net percentage change (Volatility, V) in legislative seats for 1997 
and 2006 from the data in Appendix III results in Seat V 1997 = ½ · Σ | (13) + (7) + (8) + (13) + (1) 
+ (10) = 26, whereas Seat V 
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16 years there has not been much variation in the number of relevant political 
parties. The main five political parties have been the same since 1992, and there 
are only a handful of additional political parties that have come and gone since 
the end of the war.390 Second, splits within some of the main parties occurred 
regularly, but this has seemingly not affected the nature of party competition. 
 and are considered part and parcel of 
the 
                                                
Party factions breaking away from the party and setting up new parties have 
particularly damaged the systemness of the FMLN and PDC. Nevertheless, it has 
not significantly altered the power configuration between the parties. Finally, 
since 1992 there have been regular elections with no major disruptions in the 
form of coups, serious civil unrest or violent conflict. Judged on all these main 
indicators El Salvador has a stable form of party competition. 
 The ‘rootedness’ of parties in society is a second important condition for an 
institutionalized party system. The previous two sections already made clear that 
four of the five main parties have long historical ties with certain groups in 
society and are generally well recognized by voters. For the PCN and the PDC, 
established in 1961 and 1960 respectively, this is mainly due to the fact that they 
have been around for almost five decades
Salvadoran political landscape. The societal rootedness of ARENA and the 
FMLN, established in 1981 and 1992 respectively, relates more to their role as 
the two opposing protagonists in the war and subsequent peace process. Much of 
the electoral support for these four parties is therefore contingent on their 
 
the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD), the National Liberal Party (PNL), and the Revolutionary 
390 These include, among others, the National Action Party (PAN), the Democratic Party (PD), 
Democratic Front (FDR). 
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historical role. Lacking such a background and not having been established until 
1991, the CD’s roots are much shallower. 
But strong roots between political parties and society do not only depend on 
the age and historical role of parties. It also depends on whether voters have 
affinity with parties and vote for the same parties over a long period of time.391 
Party affinity in general has proven to be rather low in El Salvador, with almost 
70% of respondents in a survey of the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) saying that they do not sympathize with any political party. This 
corresponds with the lack of interest in politics and political parties among the 
Salvadoran population, as will be further explained below. However, of the 30% 
of respondents who do sympathize with a party, 29% feels somewhat close and 
role of parties, party affinity and voting support indicates that the main parties 
ely stable and in some cases strong roots in Salvadoran society. 
 
34% feels very close to that party.392 When we look at voting patterns in 
legislative elections between 1982 and 2006 presented in Appendix III, we see 
that there are three parties (ARENA, PDC and PCN) that together have received 
between 93% and 52% of the votes. Since 1992, the remainder of the votes has 
been taken up mainly by one party, the FMLN. In other words, over the past 25 
years it has been almost the same small group of political parties that have 
received almost all of the votes. Overall, these data on party age, the historical 
have relativ
A third requisite of an institutionalized party system is that political parties 
and elections are considered as the legitimate institutions for determining who 
                                                 
391 Achard and González, A Challenge for Democracy, p.33. 
392 Córdova, Cruz and Seligson, Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador: 2006, 
pp.166-167. 
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governs. In this regard, almost all recent surveys show that political parties rank 
bottom in terms of citizens’ confidence in public institutions.393 But although 
many Salvadoran citizens have a low opinion of political parties, this does not 
mean they are considered irrelevant.394 Informed observers interviewed for this 
study attribute this low degree of trust to the tendency of political parties to 
represent partisan and elite interests rather than citizens’ interests. Alleged 
corr
had little trust in the electoral process and 46% believed that there would be 
uption among party officials and the large distance between citizens and 
politicians, which is exacerbated by the closed party lists used in elections, also 
plays a role.395 In addition, there is widespread popular discontent over a 
political system that has not addressed the deep socioeconomic inequalities in 
society and has not led to a more participatory form of democracy.396  
As for trust in elections, this is also relatively low. Asked before the 2004 
presidential elections, 42% of respondents in an IUDOP survey replied that they 
fraud. Similar figures were reported just before the 2006 municipal and 
                                                 
393 In contrast, the Catholic Church, the attorney general and the armed forces are the three 
lenge for 
z, A Challenge for Democracy. 
institutions with the highest degree of citizen confidence. See Córdova, Cruz and Seligson, 
Cultura Política de la Democracia en El Salvador, p.61; Achard and González, A Chal
Democracy, pp.114-116; and Latinobarómetro, 1995-2005, A Decade of Public Opinion. 176,554 
Interviews. Ten Waves in 18 Countries, pp.59-61. 
394 According to one survey, 66% of Salvadoran respondents say that democracy cannot exist 
without political parties, which is much higher than in Nicaragua and Guatemala. 
Latinobarómetro, 1995-2005, A Decade of Public Opinion, p.48. 
395 Under the closed list system ballots do not show the names of individual candidates but only 
the party symbol. Originally intended to make voting easier for the still high number of illiterate 
voters, this system gives the party leaderships almost total control over candidate selection. 
Marsh, “Republic of El Salvador”, p.406. 
396 This is reported in many Latin American countries. See UNDP, Democracy in Latin America. 
Towards a Citizens’ Democracy; Achard and Gonzále
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legislative elections.397 As a result, voter turn out has fluctuated significantly and 
popular interest in elections and politics seems to have subsided.398 Therefore, on 
ect, it is clear 
at there is only one party (ARENA) with a very strong party organization, two 
egree of factionalism and organizational rigidity of 
me of the main parties. Taking into account all the four conditions outlined 
                                                
the aspect of trust in parties and elections as legitimate institutions, it seems fair 
to conclude that El Salvador’s party system shows signs of weak 
institutionalization. 
 Finally, for a party system to be institutionalized it must have parties with 
strong party organizations. This is roughly equivalent to parties having high 
degrees of systemness. Based on the previous discussion on this asp
th
parties with reasonably strong party organizations (FMLN and PCN), and two 
parties with moderate to weak party organizations (PDC and CD). 
 
The relatively high stability of inter-party competition and the rootedness of the 
majority of parties makes some parts of the Salvadoran party system relatively 
well-institutionalized. However, this is off-set by the low levels of trust in parties 
and elections, and the high d
so
 
7 IUDOP, Encuesta de Preferencias Políticas para las Elecciones Presidenciales de 2004, p.27 
and p.21; and IUDOP, Encuesta de Evaluación del Primer Año de Gobierno de Elías Antonio 
American countries. See Payne, “Party Systems and Democratic Governability”, p.162. 
See Artiga-González, “Las Elecciones 2006 en Perspectiva”, p.239; and Artiga-González, Dos 
39
Saca, Asamblea Legislativa y Alcaldías, p.67. Despite this significant degree of distrust in the 
cleanliness of elections, El Salvador takes a middle position in comparison with other Latin 
398 The number of voters voting in legislative elections has fallen from 53.6% in 1994, to 38.8% 
in 1997 and 38.5% in 2000. Only in 2003 and 2006 did the number increase again to 41% and 
54.2% respectively. In presidential elections, which are generally considered more important, 
voter turn out has been slightly higher, with 53.6% in 1994, 38.6% in 1999, and 69.4% in 2004. 
Décadas de Elecciones en El Salvador (1982-2003). 
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above, the post-war party system in El Salvador is therefore best described as 
moderately institutionalized. 
 
4.8 Explaining Party and Party System Institutionalization in El Salvador 
 
We now know that El Salvador has five political parties with varying degrees of 
 
y 
insti
e not been held 
until after the war. However, the party organizations of the PCN, PDC and 
                                                
institutionalization and a polarized party system that is moderately
institutionalized. However, we have not fully addressed the deeper questions why 
ARENA became the most institutionalized political party, how it managed to 
create such a strong party organization, and why the other parties did not or 
could not? Similarly, why is it that El Salvador ended up with a moderatel
tutionalized pluralist party system, while most of the other countries that 
experienced protracted violent conflict usually have much weaker and less 
pluralist party systems? To answer these questions and explain the rather unique 
case of party and party system institutionalization in El Salvador the three 
theoretical approaches discussed in chapter two can help. 
 
The Limits of the Electoral and Sociological Approaches 
The electoral competition approach argues that the structure of individual party 
organizations is a result of how parties mobilize voters in competitive elections 
and that the configuration of the overall party system stems from the number of 
parties participating in elections, their relative size and ideological distance.399  
In the case of El Salvador truly competitive elections hav
 
399 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 94-105; and see chapter 2, section 2.7. 
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ARE
 the introduction of a more democratic political framework in 1992 
state resources. With regard to the party system it argues that the configuration of 
NA were established long before that. As a result, their organizational 
structures were primarily shaped by an authoritarian political system that 
restricted the number of parties allowed to participate in elections and (pre-) 
determined the outcome of electoral competition. The relative size between 
parties in terms of votes and seats depended less on electoral competition than on 
parties’ links with powerful economic elites and state institutions like the 
military and the police. Also, under this system there was no free ‘spatial 
competition’ on ideological positions, as political actors representing (extreme) 
left-wing positions were banned. The pre-1982 dominant-authoritarian party 
system had therefore little to do with electoral competition.  
Only with
has electoral competition become more important as a factor influencing 
individual party organizations and the party system. Since then, parties like the 
PCN and ARENA have modified their organizations and turned them into 
structures to maximize votes and win elections. With its recognition as a political 
party, the FMLN has also tried to build an electorally strong party organization. 
However, the FMLN’s post-war party organization has been influenced more by 
the difficult rebel-to-party transformation process than by electoral competition 
itself. Overall therefore, the impact of electoral competition has certainly been 
noticeable but not determining for party and party system institutionalization in 
El Salvador. 
 The sociological approach argues that the organizational structure of an 
individual party reflects that party’s control or access to financial, human and 
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party competition reflects major societal cleavages.400 When we look at how the 
party organization of the five main Salvadoran parties developed, access to 
money, people and executive powers, or the lack of it, certainly seems to have 
had 
r have not determined or even shaped the 
Salv
                                                
an influence. For example, one of the main reasons why ARENA, in 
comparison with the other parties, has a well organized and generously funded 
party organization is because of its close almost cartel-like ties with the 
economic elite, big businesses and important media outlets. The FMLN and to a 
certain extent the PCN also have extensive party organizations, but these are less 
connected to other important economic or societal actors. For the PDC and 
particularly the CD a lack of financial, human and material resources has been an 
important contributing factor to their weak and underdeveloped party 
organization.  
But when it comes to the party system, the sociological approach seems to 
have only limited validity, however. Although societal cleavages certainly exist 
and are important in political discourse, the divisions between rich and poor, 
urban and rural, worker and owne
adoran party system in the way the sociological approach envisages. In the 
early phase of party development between 1960 and 1992, political parties 
aligned themselves mainly on the basis of their position in favour or contra the 
military regime and the export-focused capitalist system. Deep ethnic, religious 
or geographic divisions did either not exist or were almost not expressed 
politically.401 With the collapse of the military regime during the war, the regime 
 
400 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp.105-108. See also Lipset and Rokkan, 
“Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments”; and chapter 2, section 2.7. 
401 Artiga-González, “Viejos y Nuevos Partidos Políticos en El Salvador”, pp.259-262. 
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division became less important. The continuously growing socioeconomic 
inequalities meant that socioeconomic divisions became more important, 
especially when the war was over.  
But this does not mean we can say that El Salvador’s party system is now 
base
cal parties cuts across classes, socioeconomic and 
eographic cleavages. This is also the case for the PCN, PDC and to a lesser 
 the party 
system in El Salvador. 
d on socioeconomic cleavages. For example, the right-wing ARENA party, 
whose policies generally cater more to the interests of the middle- and upper 
class, in fact receives electoral support across all socioeconomic groups, notably 
also from less-educated voters in poorer, rural areas. The left-wing FMLN, one 
of whose primary aims has been to reduce poverty and redistribute wealth, 
actually attracts more support among higher educated, urban middle-class voters 
than among the rural and urban poor.402 In other words, voting support for the 
two Salvadoran politi
g
extent the CD.  
All Salvadoran parties operate as electoral machines that favour the 
maximization of votes among as many groups as possible over the representation 
of narrower interests of different socioeconomic groups. It therefore seems that 
the configuration of the Salvadoran party system –apart perhaps from an existing 
pro- or anti-neoliberal system cleavage– is mostly related to the political-
pragmatic positions of parties rather than pre-existing societal cleavages. The 
sociological approach can therefore not fully explain the nature of
 
                                                 
402 IUDOP, Encuesta de Preferencias Políticas, p.15; and IUDOP, Encuesta de Evaluación del 
Segundo Año de Antonio Saca, p.19. 
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The
petal or coalition-building advantages are 
                                                
 Greater Relevance of the Institutionalist Approach… 
The institutionalist approach, on the other hand, seems to have greater 
explanatory value in the case of El Salvador. This approach argues that the party 
system is mainly shaped by the workings of formal institutions, most importantly 
the electoral system and the type of government regime (presidential or 
parliamentary). According to the historical institutionalist variation of this 
approach, moreover, the founding moment and origins of political parties are 
also said to play a key role in parties’ organizational development.403  
The proportional electoral system used for legislative elections in El 
Salvador has indeed stimulated the participation of smaller political parties, 
although only one of them (CD) has managed to win enough votes to gain seats 
in the Legislative Assembly. However, the 3% threshold for winning seats, the 
closed list nature of balloting, and the ever increasing concentration of votes by 
ARENA and the FMLN makes that the PR system in practice does not 
automatically benefit all political parties. Also, because of the high degree of 
polarization, the PR system’s centri
usually underutilized in Salvadoran politics. Moreover, the formula used for 
translating votes into seats and the uneven distribution of seats among 
departments works to the advantage of the three largest parties –i.e. ARENA, the 
FMLN and PCN– that can field electoral candidates wherever they want.404 
Finally, the majoritarian systems for presidential and municipal elections have 
clearly favoured the two largest parties, ARENA and the FMLN. Overall, 
 
l Parties; 
o Artiga-González, Dos Décadas de Elecciones en El Salvador, pp.173-180. 
403 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp.190-199; Duverger, Politica
Panebianco, Political Parties. 
404 See als
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therefore, the electoral system is an important factor when it comes to party 
competition in post-war El Salvador. 
 The presidential system is another important institutional factor. Under the 
198
 has 
ertainly contributed to the high institutionalization of ARENA as a political 
 an absolute legislative 
                                                
3 constitution, the President of El Salvador has several executive powers, 
including the right to issue decrees, veto legislation as well as nominate and fire 
ministers. According to the constitution all presidential decrees and initiatives 
have to be authorized and communicated by the relevant ministers and approved 
by the Legislative Assembly.405 But because the president’s party (ARENA) has 
held a relatively reliable legislative majority in collaboration with the PCN, the 
last four presidents have had few problems in gaining parliamentary approval for 
their policies.406  
But the impact of presidentialism on party and/or party system 
institutionalization is mixed, however. The combination of being the president’s 
party and having the President of the Republic functioning as party chairman
c
party. But because it has not won sufficient votes for
majority, ARENA’s power position in the overall party system has strongly 
relied on patrimonial coalition arrangements with other parties, in particular the 
PCN. The latter party’s organization has clearly benefited from such lucrative 
arrangements. However, the organizational development of the other political 
 
405 Republic of El Salvador, Constitución de la Republica de El Salvador de 1983, art. 137, 163 
 the legislature”, seem significant therefore. Mainwaring and Shugart, 
and 164. 
406 ARENA’s ‘partisan powers’, based on “the extent to which the president’s party holds a 
reliable majority in
“Introduction”, p.5. 
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part
al ideas and programmes.408 The highly 
insti
                 
ies has suffered from the financial, political (and media) resource advantages 
that ARENA has accumulated as a result of it being the president’s party.407 
 
…and Particularly of War-Related Institutional Factors 
Apart from these ‘conventional’ explanations, there are several other institutional 
factors that have had a significant, if not more important influence on party 
development and party competition. Crucial for the argument of this thesis, all of 
these factors are directly related to the war and the post-war institution-building 
process. 
The first factor concerns the war-time origins of ARENA and the FMLN. 
The fact that both parties were established in the repressive environment of the 
early 1980s and are therefore hijos de la guerra [sons of the war] has had 
important effects on the nature of their party organization, their leadership 
culture, as well as their politic
tutionalized party organization of ARENA, for example, can to a large extent 
be traced back to its establishment in mid-1981 as a tightly controlled and 
strongly hierarchical party organization.409 The rather closed and authoritarian 
political culture that has characterized the party throughout its existence was 
mainly instilled by its charismatic founder, Roberto D’Aubuisson. The 
continuous reactionary ideological positioning of ARENA is partly a result of its 
                                
eptember 1981 by intelligence chief and alleged 
t
n in El Salvador, p.157. 
407 Zamora, El Salvador: Heridas Que No Cierran, p.111. 
408 Interviews with Jorge Villacorte, 14 September 2007; and Rubén Zamora, 24 October 2007, 
both in San Salvador. 
409 ARENA’s establishment between May and S
dea h squad organizer, Roberto D’Aubuisson, was supported by prominent business leaders and 
senior military officers as well as by New Right elements from the US Republican Party. 
Montgomery, Revolutio
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(earlier) anti-reformism and anti-communism that rejected “doctrines that extol 
class struggle” and vehemently resisted the “Marxist-Leninist aggression of 
which El Salvador is a victim”.410  
A similar assessment can be made of the FMLN. Its high degree of 
factionalization and faltering institutionalization as a party organization in the 
post-war period partly stems from the ‘united but divided’ front structure that 
was
 And 
na
f the most salient. 
 
                                                
 created in October 1980 by the five constituent guerrilla organizations. The 
fact that the FMLN had initially been set up as an armed (political-) military 
organization further complicated its development as a political party. The 
hierarchical and semi-authoritarian behaviour of some of the FMLN leaders after 
the war has its roots in the political military background of the organization.
fi lly, the FMLN’s earlier revolutionary, anti-system ideas continued to inspire 
the organization’s political ideology and programmes even when it became a 
political party after the war.  
This is not to say that ARENA and the FMLN have not changed over the 
years. Both parties have undergone major structural and attitudinal changes since 
the end of the war. Nevertheless, among the various factors that have shaped the 
institutionalization of individual parties and the party system in El Salvador, the 
war-time origins of the two main parties seem to be one o
A second ‘institution’ that has had an important influence on the shape of 
post-war party politics is the way in which the war ended and the nature of the 
subsequent peace agreement. The fact that the war ended in a (mutually hurting) 
 
http://www.arena.com.sv
410 La Historia del Futuro; and Principios y Objetivos de ARENA, no. 13. 
 Accessed on 24/09/07. See also Ulloa, Ramos and Cruz, El Salvador. 
Elecciones 1997, p.65. 
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stalemate instead of a decisive victory for one of the main actors created a 
situation in which neither ARENA nor the FMLN could fully dominate the 
negotiations and/or dictate the terms of the peace settlement. This implied that 
both organizations would have to tolerate each other’s political existence and that 
the FMLN could no longer be excluded from elections.  
As for the peace agreement itself, that not only ensured the transformation of 
the FMLN into an unarmed political party but also provided the first democratic 
political framework in Salvadoran history. As a direct result of the peace 
agreement, a new party emerged –i.e. the FMLN– and El Salvador’s party 
system became more pluralistic and competitive. The FMLN replaced the PDC 
as t
ree party competition, the peace 
agre
of El Salvador’s post-conflict legal, electoral, public and media institutions. 
Arguably one of the most serious weaknesses is the absence of a law on political 
t of clear legal principles that regulates the democratic functioning, 
he main left-wing opposition party and now became ARENA’s primary 
political opponent. However, the peace agreement was not a broad consultative 
process. It was primarily an elite agreement between the FMLN and the 
ARENA-led government that focused mainly on political and military-security 
issues. Other political parties and civil society actors had little say in the process. 
Moreover, the deep socioeconomic inequalities that had been at the roots of the 
armed conflict were largely unaddressed by the peace agreement. This gave the 
parties the possibility to continue their fight over the nature of the economy and 
the role of the state. So although it enabled f
ement also contributed to the intense political polarization between ARENA 
and the FMLN that followed. 
The third series of factors consists of design choices and weaknesses in some 
parties or a se
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financing, and campaigning of political parties. Largely because it was 
considered too sensitive and problematic during the peace negotiations, the 
articles of the Código Electoral [Electoral Law] dealing with aspects of parties’ 
organization and behaviour were kept procedural and vague, leaving much 
freedom to the political parties themselves.411  
There are no clear guidelines on internal party democracy, for example, 
exce
among the main Salvadoran parties is therefore rather weak in practice. 
Party finance regulations in El Salvador are also very limited. Apart from the 
so-called deuda política [political debt], there are no legal norms that regulate or 
parties by private donors. Nor are there 
pt for an unclear constitutional article indicating that the norms, organization 
and practices of parties should conform to the principles of representative 
democracy.412 Until recently, the FMLN was the only party whose statutes 
provided for a direct, secret vote of party members on all major party decisions 
and appointments of officials and electoral candidates. However, in late 2006 this 
article was deleted from the party statutes in order to ensure greater control for 
the Political Commission over party decision-making.413 Internal democracy 
limit financial contributions to political 
                                                 
411 See Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), Código Electoral. Elecciones 2006, Titulo VII, 
Capitulos I-VI. 
412 Republic of El Salvador, Constitución de la Republica de El Salvador de 1983, Titulo III, Art. 
artido Político Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
 October 2007, San Salvador. 
85. 
413 The cancellation of article 64 in December 2006 was apparently motivated by hard-line 
elements in the party to suppress reformist proposals and regain control over the party’s top 
leadership, including the Political Commission. A similar thing seems to have happened in early 
2000 with the elimination of regulations for gender and minority representation within the 
FMLN. FMLN, Estatuto de P
Nacional, FMLN, art.68; and interview with Facundo Guardado, 17
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any obligations to disclose the origins, name or identity of such donors.414 As a 
result, there is little transparency in how Salvadoran political parties finance their 
can easily block or delay unwelcome proposals for electoral reform by 
electoral campaigns and party activities.415 Other norms that are regulated, such 
as the rule that party campaigns should not be started earlier than 3 months 
before the elections, are not enforced and therefore easily played down or simply 
ignored by the parties.416 
 Another institutional weakness is the deeply politicized nature of the 
electoral administration and other public bodies. The most important electoral 
institution, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) has a ‘mixed’ composition 
with three representatives from different political parties and two 
‘independents’.417 Immediately after the war this was seen as the best 
institutional guarantee for the integration of the FMLN into the political system. 
But because of the strong partisan umbilical cord of most TSE magistrates and 
the TSE’s simple majority voting system, in practice the ruling ARENA party 
                                                 
414 The deuda política is a form of public party funding, in which a party receives a certain 
amount of money for each vote it received in the previous municipal, legislative, presidential and 
Central American Parliament elections. Urquilla, “Regulación Jurídica de los Partidos Políticos 
ga-González, 21 
on infusion of public institutions with partisan political content. 
en El Salvador”, pp.474-475. See also Tribunal Supremo Electoral, Código Electoral. Elecciones 
2006, Titulo VII, Capitulo VI, Art.187; and interview with Álvaro Arti
September 2007, San Salvador. 
415 Interview with Amílcar Mejía, 11 October 2007, San Salvador. 
416 For example, asked about the renewed pinta y pega [painting and stickering] in ARENA 
colours in October 2007 –almost one and a half years before the 2009 elections– ARENA’s vice-
president of ideology indicated that “orderly painting is no propaganda because no vote is asked; 
therefore it is legal”. La Prensa Gráfica, “ARENA Intensifica el Pintado de los Postes”, 8 
October 2007, p.18. 
417 Here, politicization refers to the use of public institutions for partisan political purposes, not 
the more comm
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opposition party representatives.418 Similarly, in key government ministries like 
the Ministerio de Gobernación [freely translated as the Ministry of Public 
ffa
g party.420 As a result of this and 
e other institutional problems mentioned above, some political parties have had 
heir organization, to reinforce their status and 
A irs] and the Ministerio de Seguridad Pública y Justicia [Ministry of Public 
Security and Justice] many employees are ruling party members or ‘motivated’ 
to vote for ARENA during elections.419 
 A last institutional problem impacting on party politics is the post-war trend 
towards privatization and ownership concentration of media institutions. Despite 
significant improvements in media freedom since the end of the war, the 
concentration of media institutions in a few politically well-connected hands has 
led to more restraint in critical reporting and investigative journalism, as well as 
greater media exposure and access for the rulin
th
more opportunity to strengthen t
support, and ultimately improve their position. 
                                                 
418 Three of the TSE’s five magistrates are directly appointed by the three largest political parties 
Supreme Court of Justice [Corte Suprema de Justicia – CSJ], which in practice tends to b
in parliament (ARENA, FMLN and PCN). The remaining two magistrates are nominated by the 
e 
ntro
estimated 2 million Salvadorans living abroad. Interviews with Roberto Rubio-Fabian, 11 
September 2007; Jorge Villacorte, 14 September 2007; and Antonio Cañas, 1 October 2007, all in 
ersonal 
t 2007, p.43. See also Lefèvre, “Promoting 
co lled by ARENA and the PCN. The political manipulation of the TSE is considered to be 
one of the main causes for the poor management of the electoral register, the slow 
implementation of residential voting, and the absence of a specific voting system for the 
San Salvador. 
419 In some ministries government membership of ARENA seems to be a tacit requirement when 
applying for a job or promotion. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that in election times 
employees that have not registered as party members are asked to hand in their DUI [ID and 
voting card], making it impossible for them to vote. Information obtained during various p
interviews in the period September-October 2007 with people who requested anonymity. 
420 Reporters Without Borders, Annual Repor
Independent Media in El Salvador”, pp.251-252. 
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The Role of International Actors 
Finally, the overall context influencing the development of the parties and party 
system has been shaped by the engagement of international actors. Over the 
entire post-war period (1992-2007) the international community has disbursed 
more than USD 3.6 billion in official development assistance to El Salvador.421 
 The United States has arguably been the most important donor. In the 1980s, 
US political and financial support for the ‘demonstration elections’ as well as 
exte
government policies such as the 
depl
   
nsive military assistance helped topple the PCN-led military regime and 
ensured the domination of first the PDC and later ARENA. The US also played a 
role in blocking the emergence of left-wing political parties such as the old FDR. 
At the same time it supported ARENA’s efforts for neo-liberal reform by 
financing and helping establish the Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and 
Social Development (FUSADES), one of the country’s most influential policy 
think tanks. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, ARENA governments could count 
on the strong political and financial support of successive US administrations.  
More recently, domestically unpopular 
oyment of Salvadoran troops to Iraq and the support for a Central American 
Free Trade Agreement have strengthened ties between the ARENA-led 
government and Washington D.C. The latter has reciprocated not only by 
protecting the interests of Salvadoran immigrant workers in the US –many of 
whom are ARENA supporters– but also by openly backing ARENA candidates 
                                              
421 For a more detailed overview of the top 15 aid donors to El Salvador, see Appendix V. 
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during elections.422 Through large-scale economic and infrastructural assistance 
programmes, the Inter-American Development Bank and Japan have also been 
major donors to the Salvadoran government.  
Left-wing political parties and political-military organizations such as the 
FMLN benefited in the 1980s from the military support and training from Cuba 
and Nicaragua and gained important international legitimacy from the political 
and moral support of countries like Mexico and France. Contacts and support 
from the Socialist International and several German Stiftungen [political 
foundations] allegedly also played a role in this.423 At the end of the 1980s, there 
was
the FMLN but all main political parties.424 
  
 significant pressure on the ARENA-led government to open up the political 
system from Central American actors promoting the regional Esquipulas peace 
process. After the war, it was the United Nations through its observer mission 
(ONUSAL) and UNDP that helped ensure the FMLN’s participation in the 
political process. Since then, a variety of international organizations, NGOs, 
political foundations and Salvadoran diaspora groups have provided a broad 
range of party assistance and election observation activities, benefiting not only 
                                               
422 Holiday, “El Salvador’s ‘Model’ Democracy”; Wade, “The Challenge of Being Left in 
er Stiftung (KAS) and the 
23 October 2007. 
Neoliberal Central America”. 
423 Grabendorff, “International Support for Democracy in Contemporary Latin America: The 
Role of the Party Internationals”. 
424 Party assistance activities included training of party leaders, provision of office space and 
computers, legislative assistance and parliamentary exchange programmes. Organizations 
involved include UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican 
Institute (IRI), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Norwegian Center for Democracy 
Support (NCDS), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Konrad Adenau
Hanss Seidel Stiftung (HSS). Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, pp.47-48; and 
interviews in San Salvador with Manuel Vásquez, 8 October 2007; Rosamaría de Colorado, 20 
September 2007; and Ingrid Schlaffke de Escobar, 
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International assistance and other forms of engagement certainly has been an 
important contextual factor therefore. But the majority of that assistance has 
often not focused on direct party-related activities, which makes it extra difficult 
to assess how international action has impacted on the institutionalization of 
individual parties and the overall party system.425 What is clear, however, is that 
some of the largest post-war donors, including the United States, Inter-American 
Development Bank and Japan, have mainly been interested in funding 
infrastructural reconstruction, economic liberalization and administrative reform. 
These donors gave limited support to programmes aimed at creating democratic 
institutions, reinserting ex-combatants in society and implementing 
socioeconomic reforms, such as land distribution and agricultural development, 
hich were considered key elements of the Chapultepec Accords, especially for 
Moreover, their assistance was given to the ARENA-led 
nt with little or no political or peace implementation conditionalities 
at this largely unconditional international support has indirectly 
w
the FMLN.426 
governme
attached. Although a more definitive conclusion about the impact of international 
engagement on party institutionalization requires further study, it seems fair to 
conclude th
strengthened ARENA’s position vis-à-vis its competitors. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
  
                                                 
 The problem of attribution is endemic to the study of political party support in general. 
Burnell, “Political Parties, International Party Assistance and Globalisation”; and Carothers, 
425
Confronting the Weakest Link. See also note 236. 
426 For a fuller analysis of donor funding in post-war El Salvador, see Rosa and Foley, “El 
Salvador”. 
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This chapter has demonstrated that the institutionalization of political parties and 
party system in El Salvador has been profoundly shaped by the war and its 
aftermath.  
 Fifteen years of post-war party politics in El Salvador has been characterized 
by an elitist form of electoral competition, a pluralist but highly polarized party 
system as well as a weak and highly politicized institutional environment. As the 
two mostly institutionalized parties in post-war El Salvador, ARENA and the 
FMLN have benefited most from these problematic ingredients of the Salvadoran 
party system. Both have seen their electoral support grow, their party 
organizations strengthened and their popular image as the two key national 
vador, this chapter 
has 
litical parties and 
changing the configuration of inter-party competition. But contrary to 
conventional thinking about party development, societal cleavages have only 
been of limited influence. In line with the overall argument of this thesis, the 
political symbols confirmed. Because of its control of the presidency and its 
close ties with the economic elite of El Salvador, ARENA is clearly the most 
dominant and institutionalized party of the two. The PCN has significantly 
recovered from its earlier electoral loss and remains moderately institutionalized. 
The PDC and CD have suffered from the electoral growth of the other main 
parties and remain little institutionalized. At the systemic level, party competition 
in El Salvador is relatively stable, with several strongly rooted and well-
organized parties. Trust and legitimacy of parties is limited, however. This makes 
the overall party system in El Salvador only moderately institutionalized. 
 In trying to explain the post-war party politics of El Sal
indicated that the introduction of competitive elections after the war played 
some role in shaping the party organizations of Salvadoran po
 
     Post-War Party Politics in El Salvador  227 
 
chapter has shown instead that war-related factors such as party origins, the way 
in which the conflict ended, the nature of the peace agreement, and design 
choices in legal, electoral, public and media institutions give a fuller explanation 
for party and 
r 
examining El Salvador and applies it to the case of Cambodia. 
party system institutionalization in El Salvador. 
The next chapter utilises a similar framework to the one employed fo
 5 
 
Post-War Party Politics in Cambodia:  
tionalization of a Dominant-Authoritarian 
Party System 
 
party and party system institutionalization in post-war Cambodia. In doing so, 
the chapter shows that war-related factors –such as the war-time origins of 
The Institu
 
 
This chapter analyzes the degrees of institutionalization of the main political 
parties and party system of Cambodia. It specifically concentrates on the various 
factors that have influenced party development in the post-war period and looks 
at possible explanations for the differences in institutionalization. Based on an 
extensive number of interviews (see Appendix II) and examination of party
documents and other primary sources (see References), the chapter makes the 
following three key arguments, similar to the El Salvador chapter. 
First, it shows that post-war party competition in Cambodia cannot be 
understood without reference to the country’s conflict history and pre-war party 
development. Second, it demonstrates that the development of individual 
political parties has been strongly influenced by the power configuration and 
institutional choices made in the immediate post-war period. And finally, it 
argues that traditional theoretical approaches –focusing on electoral competition, 
societal cleavages and formal institutions– cannot fully explain the nature of 
228 
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parties, nature of conflict ending and peace agreement, and design choices for 
key post-war institutions– have played a significant role in shaping the 
institutionalization of Cambodia’s parties and party system. 
 
eace Accords in 1991 was 
ambodia finally set to enter a new phase of peacebuilding, post-conflict 
boom in large-scale construction and foreign direct investments. However, much 
nected people and the 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A weak state controlled by all-powerful leaders with a strong political machine 
features prominently in Cambodia’s long conflict history. After independence in 
1953, successive Cambodian regimes espoused different types of authoritarian 
leadership and single-party rule. In combination with repeated foreign (military) 
interventions, this formed the basis for two decades of war that engulfed the 
country between 1970 and 1989. Not until the Paris P
C
development and a more democratic form of multi-party politics. 
 In 2008, the violence of the 1970s and ‘80s has indeed disappeared and 
Cambodia now enjoys relative political stability. Those considered most 
responsible for the mass killings under the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) 
have recently been put on trial in the hope of offering justice and some form of 
closure to the millions of victims and survivors. The country is also witnessing 
spectacular economic growth, due in large part to growing tourism, as well as a 
of this growth benefits a small, urban elite of well-con
double-digit macro-economic growth figures disguise the continuing high rural 
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poverty rates.427 Moreover, high levels of corruption, a weak judicial system and 
related problems such as land grabbing and illegal logging need to be set against 
e positive effects of economic development.428 
ore pluralist in the 
ost-war period and more or less free elections are now regularly organized by 
 continues to dominate Cambodia’s weakly 
insti
th
On the political front, party competition has become m
p
Cambodians themselves. Yet, the degree of institutionalization of the different 
parties differs widely. The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) is the only opposition party 
with a reasonably developed organization, but is eclipsed in every aspect of party 
organization by the far more institutionalized ruling Cambodian People’s Party 
(CPP). What is more, competition between the various political parties remains 
skewed in favour of the CPP, which
tutionalized dominant-authoritarian party system. 
 
One note of caution is in order here. As was indicated in chapter 2, Cambodian 
political parties cannot easily be equated with parties in more established 
democracies. Similar to parties in other (post-conflict) developing countries –
albeit perhaps less so in El Salvador– Cambodian political parties generally lack 
an ideological profile, a consistent political platform or concrete governance 
proposals. In Cambodia, as we will see below, ruling as well as opposition 
parties are first and foremost patronage networks that allow members to gain 
                                                 
427
and Hughes, “Cambodia in 2007. Development and Dispossession”. 
 According to Transparency International, Cambodia ranks among the most corrupt countries 
in the world. In 2008 it occupied the 166th place of 180 countries surveyed. Transparency 
International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2008. See also United Nations Development 
 World Bank, Sharing Growth: Equity and Development in Cambodia. Equity Report 2007; 
428
Programme, Tackling Corruption, Transforming Lives. Accelerating Human Development in Asia 
and the Pacific. 
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access to certain services and resources in return for loyalty, political support 
and, crucially, votes. 
were 
brou
and fragmented socio-political environment.429 This almost structural imbalance 
                                 
 
5.2 Conflict Background and Early Party Development 
 
Cambodia’s political development over the past centuries has been characterized 
by foreign interventions and domestic turmoil, interrupted by periods of 
relatively stable, but predominantly (semi-) authoritarian rule. Between the end 
of the Khmer empire in the 14th century and the mid-19th century, Cambodia was 
repeatedly fought over and controlled by its larger and more powerful 
neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam.  
From 1863 until 1953 Cambodia was temporarily ‘protected’ from the 
expansionist policies of its neighbours by becoming a protectorate in French 
Indochina. France’s “mission civilisatrise” for Cambodia consisted of preserving 
Khmer cultural heritage, preserving but steadily weakening the country’s 
dominant royalist elite, while exploiting its limited natural resources (rubber, 
corn). Under French rule, Cambodia’s indigenous political-administrative 
structures were left fragmented and undeveloped while Vietnamese workers 
ght in to serve as (junior) civil servants in the French colonial 
administration. The period of French colonial rule perpetuated what one observer 
has described as Cambodia’s “unstable hegemonic [power structure]”, consisting 
of a dominant political leader, party or organization trying to control a weak state 
in power –exacerbated by the various foreign military interventions– is clearly 
                
s Democracy?, pp.119-121. 429 Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia. Toward
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visible in each of the subsequent periods of Cambodia’s post-independence 
history. 
 In the period 1953–1970, immediately following independence, the 
country’s political, economic and socio-cultural life was dominated by King 
Norodom Sihanouk. After abdicating the throne for the first time in 1955, 
Sihanouk and his advisers established the Sangkum Reastr Niyum [People’s 
Socialist Community], a national political movement based pragmatically on 
Buddhist socialist principles. Until then, Cambodia’s politics had been 
dominated by a handful of elite-oriented political parties. The earliest parties 
were established in 1946 and included the Liberty Party, the Democratic Party 
and the Progressive Democrats. Of these three, the Democratic Party was the 
most popular and well-organized, being the only one with a nation-wide party 
orga
This effectively halted the development of Cambodia’s nascent political 
dominantly left-wing parties that refused to merge into the 
nization and coherent (nationalist) political message.430 Later parties 
included the more royalist Khmer Renovation Party and the Victorious Northeast 
Party. Inspired by the emerging communist and radical left organizations in 
China, France and Vietnam, the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) –
later renamed the Communist Party of Kampuchea or CPK– was formed in the 
early 1950s and directly supported by the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP).  
By allowing only non-party affiliated supporters as members, Sihanouk 
succeeded in co-opting the majority of prominent politicians into the Sangkum. 
parties.431 The pre
                                                 
430 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History. Politics, War and Revolution Since 1945, 
pp.29-32. 
431 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p.79. 
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Sangkum, such as the Pracheachon and the KPRP/CPK, could only continue 
their activities clandestinely. With the opposition intimidated into silence, the 
Sangkum easily won the 1955 elections. It gave Sihanouk the mandate to run the 
coun
repressive, however. In response to the adoption of an undemocratic 
try and push through his policies virtually unopposed for the next 15 years. 
Sihanouk’s paternalistic rule created a short period of relative political stability 
and economic prosperity, but at a cost of wide-spread corruption, heavy-handed 
suppression and persecution of anti-royalist and radical opposition groups, 
newspapers and other dissident voices.432 However, by the end of the 1960s 
Sihanouk’s complex manoeuvres to keep his political opponents at bay, the 
country’s peasants happy, and Cambodia’s territory from being used by North 
Vietnamese forces and ‘secretly’ bombed by US warplanes, were no longer 
working.433  
In March 1970 Sihanouk was finally deposed by a group of conservative 
politicians led by General Lon Nol. Almost immediately, the country’s political 
system was changed from a parliamentary monarchy into a presidential Khmer 
Republic (1970-1975). Despite the adoption of a more democratic constitution 
and the allowance of opposition parties, Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic quickly 
turned 
election law, the 1972 elections were boycotted by the Democratic Party and the 
Republican Party. The result was a landslide victory for Lon Nol’s Social 
                                                 
432
Cambodia, pp.40-48. 
 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p.89; Peou, Intervention and Change in 
433 Osborne, Sihanouk. Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness, pp.185-201; Chandler, The Tragedy 
of Cambodian History, p. 173 and pp.178-191. For an extensive analysis of the US bombing raids 
ing of Japan– see the aptly titled book by Shawcross, Sideshow. Kissinger, 
in Cambodia –during which more than three times as much bomb tonnage was used as in the 
World War II bomb
Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. 
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Republican Party in what had almost become a single-party system. After the 
elections political rights were further curtailed and attacks on royalist and 
communist opponents increased.434  
Self-exiled in Beijing, Sihanouk meanwhile agreed to a secret alliance with 
the Chinese and Vietnamese governments to foster a national resistance front 
under his command in exchange for allowing the North Vietnamese and 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) forces to expand their operations on 
Cambodian soil. Growing increasingly more hard-line in its anti-Vietnamese and 
anti-communist policies, Lon Nol’s regime stepped up attacks, effectively 
push
poorly trained and badly coordinated troops failed to fight back the Khmer 
Rouge forces.435 Eventually, Lon Nol’s army was defeated and in their final 
offensive of 17 April, 1975, the Khmer Rouge took control of the capital, Phnom 
Penh. 
 With the subsequent establishment of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) 
ing the country further into conflict with the much better trained Vietnamese 
forces. When North Vietnamese troops withdrew in 1972, the armed resistance 
was taken over by CPK forces –also described as ‘Red Khmer’ or ‘Khmer Rouge 
(KR)’– that continued to be heavily supported by political advice and military 
assistance from Hanoi. Despite large-scale US military assistance, Lon Nol’s 
regime (1975-1979), the Khmer Rouge embarked on an all-encompassing project 
of political, economic and social transformation aimed at creating a self-reliant 
communitarian peasant society. Violently and rapidly breaking with Cambodia’s 
                                                 
434 Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia, pp.48-54; and interview with Uk Phourik, 9 July 
2008, Phnom Penh. 
435 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p.229. 
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past history and way of life, the borders were closed and foreigners expelled, the 
market economy dismantled, agriculture collectivized, and people’s free thinking 
and behaviour replaced with KR revolutionary doctrine and strict codes of 
conduct. In order to make Cambodia’s rice-based economy fully self-supportive, 
large sections of the population were uprooted from the cities and put to work in 
agricultural labour camps in the countryside. Intellectuals, professionals such as 
judges, lawyers, doctors as well as Buddhist monks, civil servants and high-
ranking officials and former politicians were considered threats to the new 
regime. Most of them were imprisoned, tortured and/or killed.436 
Competitive party politics –to the limited extent it had still existed under the 
Khmer Republic– was replaced with a communist party state. During the first 
few DK years, the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) did 
not publicly declare itself and was only referred to as Angkar Loeu [the Upper 
Organization]. Only later did it become clear that the regime’s hierarchy was led 
                                                 
established between 1975-1979, characterizing it alternately as a ‘peasant revolutionary state’ 
436 Experts on Cambodia continue to differ in their assessment of the regime the Khmer Rouge  
(Michael Vickery), a ‘racialist, nationalist state’ (Ben Kiernan); or a ‘Stalinist, totalitarian state’ 
of these different evaluations, see Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia, 
(David Chandler). This difference in opinion has led to an acrimonious debate in the Cambodian 
studies literature between advocates and opponents of a so-called ‘Standard Total View’ that 
accuses the Khmer Rouge of a systematic campaign of genocide. Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-
1982; Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime. Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer 
Rouge, 1975-1979; and Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot. For a 
wider discussion 
pp.54-58.  
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by Saloth Sar, better known for his revolutionary name Pol Pot.437 After its early 
‘successes’ in eliminating its political enemies, the CPK soon fell victim to 
internal factionalization or at least the perception thereof by its leaders. This 
resulted in widespread purges and executions of ‘suspect’ –i.e. disloyal and pro-
Vietnamese– local and regional cadre at the hands of the dominant Pol Pot and 
Ieng Sary faction.  
In 1977, the Khmer Rouge leadership’s antipathy against their former 
backers in Hanoi and other pro-Vietnamese Khmer reached a new height and 
finally led to a full-scale war with Vietnam. By that time, the CPK’s radical 
‘Four-Year Plan’ of increasing agricultural production through collectivization 
and forced labour had led to “administrative chaos and exhaustion from 
overwork and malnutrition”.438 Internally weakened, KR forces were unable to 
defeat the much more powerful, recently united Vietnamese army –despite the 
strong support of Maoist China. After Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia at 
the end of 1978, the DK regime collapsed on 7 January, 1979. The remaining KR 
forces were pushed towards the western and north-western border areas, where 
they would remain until their final defeat in 1994. 
of the 
 With the establishment of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 
(1979-1989) the war in Cambodia did not end, however. With much 
country’s physical infrastructure destroyed by the Khmer Rouge, the country’s 
                                                 
437 The CPK’s central committee consisted of secretary-general and DK prime minister, Saloth 
Sar (Brother Number One), deputy party secretary and DK deputy prime minister, Nuon Chea 
(Brother Number Two), DK deputy prime minister in charge of foreign affairs, Ieng Sary 
(Brother Number Three), DK defense minister, Son Sen (Brother Number Four), and DK head of 
state, Khieu Samphan (Brother Number Five). Chandler, Brother Number One; and Kiernan, The 
Pol Pot Regime. 
438 Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p.270. 
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economy in ruins and large sections of the population killed or displaced 
throughout the country, the Vietnamese-backed Kampuchean People’s 
Revolutionary Council (KPRC) started a significant state-building project, 
including the creation of a centralized, party-led bureaucracy. In an effort to 
reconnect with the original communist party of the early 1950s and distance itself 
from Pol Pot’s CPK, the KPRC established a new Khmer People’s Revolutionary 
Party (KPRP), modelled on the Vietnamese Communist Party, in 1979.439 The 
members of the party’s small central committee, comprising “an assortment of 
Khmer Rouge defectors and Hanoi-trained revolutionaries”, soon became –and 
some still are– the most powerful politicians in Cambodia.440 In an effort to 
distance itself from the Khmer Rouge and gain much-needed domestic and 
international legitimacy, the PRK regime quickly organized a trial denouncing 
the genocidal regime of ‘the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique’. The trial also served the 
purpose of trying to co-opt other KR commanders and absolving the many lower-
and mid-level KR cadres in the PRK’s own ranks from personal responsibility of 
crimes (‘blood debts’) committed during the DK period.441 
                                                 
439 Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ It to a New Political Context: The 
Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party’s Historiography (1979-1991)”, p.810; and Vickery, 
Where Is It Going?”, p.102. 
mmittee, Say Phouthang; Bou Thang; and finally foreign minister, Hun Sen. 
pp.60-69. 
“The Cambodian People’s Party. Where Has It Come From, 
440 According to Evan Gottesman, the PRK(P) inner circle consisted of PRK president and head 
of state, Heng Samrin; vice-president, minister of defense, prime minister as well as party 
secretary, Pen Sovan; minister of the interior, Chea Sim; chairman of the party’s central 
organization co
Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge. Inside the Politics of Nation Building, pp.45-48. 
Since the end of the war in 1991, Heng Samrin has become president of the National Assembly 
and honorary chairman of the CPP; Chea Sim serves as president of the Senate and chairman of 
the CPP; and Hun Sen has continued his role as prime minister (since 1985) and vice-chairman of 
the CPP. 
441 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, 
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Although the PRK’s socialist policies were a far cry from the violent 
totalitarianism of the Khmer Rouge, domestically the regime was still perceived 
as restrictive, among others because of its ban on the formation of political 
opp
                                                
osition parties.442 At the regional and international level, it had to deal with 
two opposing forces. On the one side, there were Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
that credited the Heng Samrin-led group of communist leaders for overthrowing 
Pol Pot’s radical DK regime and restoring political stability. These actors 
supported the PRK regime with military, economic, and political assistance that 
according to several experts significantly aided Cambodia’s post-DK 
recovery.443 On the other side, there were China and the United States, which 
considered the PRK a puppet regime of the Vietnamese and refused to recognize 
it as the legitimate government of Cambodia.444 By the mid-1980s the PRK 
regime faced not only an international boycott but also opposition from three 
externally-supported armed groups. These included the republican Khmer 
People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea (NADK or Khmer Rouge), and the National Sihanoukist Army 
(ANS), an umbrella organization of royalist forces that also comprised the 
 
443 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99. Power, Elitism and Democracy, p.60. See 
 After the 
Khmer Rouge. 
444 In
legitimacy of Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations. Instead it was given to the CGDK, which 
442 Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia, pp.63-65.  
also Vickery, Kampuchea. Politics, Economics and Society; Slocomb, The People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea, 1979-1989: The Revolution After Pol Pot; and Gottesman, Cambodia
 response to the Vietnamese occupation and subsequent Vietnamese-Soviet backing of the 
PRK regime, China, the United States, France and other Western countries recognized the CGDK 
as the only legitimate Cambodian government. Cold War dynamics within the United Nations 
Security Council subsequently ensured that the de facto regime in Phnom Penh was denied 
controversially included Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. 
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National Liberation Movement of Kampuchea (MOLINAKA) and the National 
United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC).   
Opportunistically allied in the Sihanouk-led Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), the ‘resistance front’ was able to hold out 
against the PRK and Vietnamese troops through the diplomatic, monetary, 
ilitary support offered by China, major Western powers, 
ountries from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as 
the political situation started to change. Motivated by a desire to normalize its 
relations with other countries in order to improve its economic problems, the 
   
logistical and even m
c
by gaining income from illegal logging. Meanwhile, the PRK’s growing state 
apparatus and the consolidation of power of the PRK elite was made possible 
both through economic assistance from Vietnam and the Soviet Union as well as 
via a large-scale patronage network ‘serviced’ by contributions and payments 
from private investment and smuggling activities. At the province and commune 
level, the PRK elite gave military commanders and other authorities widespread 
autonomy over taxation and the exploitation of natural resources such as timber 
and rubber; this was one of the decisions with far-reaching implications for the 
distribution of power and related governance problems in Cambodia today. 
Slowly, the accumulation and consolidation of power by the small PRK elite 
became less dependent on ideological and party commitment, but more on 
hierarchical patterns of patronage and loyalty. As a result, “the Party became 
more fractious (…). Personal relationships held the system together”.445 
Towards the end of the 1980s, with the Cold War slowly coming to an end, 
                                              
445 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p.237, p.299 and p.329. 
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Soviet Union decided to lower its involvement in Indochina. Recognizing the 
indispensability of Soviet support for its own survival, Vietnam finally withdrew 
ted any agreement that 
failure 
its troops from Cambodia in late 1989. The new situation forced the regime in 
Phnom Penh –now ‘re-branded’ as the State of Cambodia (SOC)– to finally look 
for a political solution to its conflict with the CGDK resistance. 
 
5.3 Imposing Peace 
 
With the Cold War coming to an end and the major powers seeking a 
normalization of their relations, the US, China, and Soviet Union started to put 
more pressure on their respective ‘clients’ in Cambodia to come to a negotiated 
solution to their conflict. After PRK/SOC prime minister Hun Sen and CGDK 
head Norodom Sihanouk had met previously, two informal meetings between the 
four main warring parties took place in Indonesia in July 1988 and February 
1989. But because of fundamental disagreement between the parties over how to 
share power during the transitional period, over whether to include the Khmer 
Rouge in a quadripartite coalition government and over what role was acceptable 
for a large UN peacekeeping force, the talks soon stalled. The deadlock was 
compounded by the fact that the US and China rejec
excluded the Khmer Rouge, while the SOC and Vietnam wanted to prevent “the 
return of the genocidal regime [of Pol Pot]”.446 A second important attempt to 
bring all the parties together in Paris in July 1989 again resulted in 
                                                 
446 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, pp.20-22; and Gottesman, Cambodia 
After the Khmer Rouge, p.337.  
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because of the unwillingness of the parties and their external sponsors to make 
concessions on any of the key issues. 
 The negotiations for a political solution received a new boost, however, with 
an Australian proposal to create a UN interim authority for Cambodia intended to 
oversee the country’s civil administration during the transitional period. This was 
soon further elaborated by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
They suggested the creation of a quadripartite Supreme National Council (SNC) 
providing domestic legitimacy and authority to the UN’s role. With stronger 
political messages and sharply reduced financial and military assistance from 
China and the Soviet Union, the Cambodian parties were further pressured to 
find a middle ground. Despite continued heavy resistance from the various 
parties, compromises over the wording of the KR legacy, the SNC’s composition 
and the UN’s control over state administration were soon reached. These 
com
assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the policies and practices 
                                                
promises finally enabled the parties to sign the Accords on a Comprehensive 
Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (referred to as the ‘Paris Peace 
Accords’) on 23 October 1991.447 The agreement concluded two decades of war 
in Cambodia, which reportedly claimed the lives of more than two million 
Cambodians, and led to more than half a million refugees located along the Thai, 
Lao and Vietnamese borders and many more abroad.448 
 The Paris Peace Accords comprised a large number of “special measures to 
 
447 Song, “The Political Dynamics of the Peacemaking Process in Cambodia”, pp.68-76. 
 
448 Depending on definitions and sources used, estimates of battle-related deaths for the 1970-
1991 war period range from 2 to 3 million, with more than 1 to 1.5 million deaths reported for the 
DK period alone. See Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, pp.456-460; Chandler, The Tragedy of
Cambodian History, p.215 and p.236; and Leitenberg, Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th 
Century, p.76. 
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of the past”, the latter euphemistically referring to what the PRK/SOC 
government and others had described as the ‘genocidal regime’ of Pol Pot.449 
elections an additional 1,400 international election observers and 56,000 
  
Key provisions focused on the withdrawal of foreign (i.e. Vietnamese) forces, the 
cessation of outside military assistance, the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of a substantial part of all armed factions, the return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic 
infrastructure and public utilities, as well as the organization of free and fair 
elections aimed at forming a constituent assembly to be tasked with the 
formulation of a new constitution. In addition, the accords stated that “Cambodia 
will follow a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism”.450 
Significantly, however, the accords did not provide much clarity on how such 
pluralism would be achieved and remained silent about how to transform the 
various armed factions into political parties. 
To ensure implementation of the accords, a United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was mandated to supervise the various tasks. It 
received the unprecedented authority to control Cambodia’s civil administration 
with the consent and consultation of the quadripartite SNC, headed by King 
Sihanouk. With an 18-month budget of USD2.8 billion and 15,900 troops, 3,600 
civilian police monitors, 1,000 international civilian staff –and at the time of the 
                                               
449 United Nations, Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian 
Conflict, p.8. Whether or not the atrocities committed during the DK regime can be considered as 
‘genocide’ continues to be the subject of acrimonious scholarly, legal as well as political debate. 
450 Annex 5, Principles for a New Constitution for Cambodia. United Nations, Framework for a 
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict. 
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Cambodian polling monitors– UNTAC was the largest peacekeeping mission of 
the early 1990s.451 
 
the Khmer Rouge whose forces 
wer
Though the debate over the impact, success and legacy of UNTAC 
continues, there is general agreement that the execution of UNTAC’s mandate 
was more difficult than originally expected.452 UNTAC’s control over the 
country’s civilian administration, including defence, public security, finance, 
information and foreign affairs, proved particularly challenging. For example, the 
UN failed to separate the almost completely merged structures of the SOC and 
the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP, formerly KPRP). Moreover, the SOC’s vast 
state, administrative and security apparatus soon comprised various parallel 
structures, set up to evade UNTAC control. Similarly, UNTAC had almost no 
control over the other factions –in particular 
e located in more remote areas and resisted every attempt to disarm them. In 
the fields of human rights, UNTAC was doing slightly better. Its interventions 
facilitated the adoption of important human rights covenants, a press law and 
helped raise awareness over key human rights issues. But it was unable to stop 
continuing human rights violations, abuse and attacks against Vietnamese 
immigrants, opposition party activists and other Cambodian citizens. UNTAC’s 
electoral component on the other hand was more successful and in 1993 the UN 
                                                 
451 United Nations, The United Nations and Cambodia, 1991-1995, p.12; and Suntharalingam, 
452 For a more extensive analysis of UNT
“The Cambodian Settlement Agreements”, p.90. 
AC, see Findlay, Cambodia. The Legacy and Lessons 
from UNTAC; Heder and Ledgerwood, Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia: 
Democratic Transition Under United Nations Peace-keeping; Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the 
Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box; Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, Keeping the Peace. 
; Roberts, Political Transition in Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador
Cambodia 1991-99; and MacLeod (2006). 
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m aged to organize and supervise elections despite widespread violence and 
intimidation in both the pre- and post-electoral period.
an
ent by itself. With the BLDP and MOLINAKA not 
aving received enough seats either, a coalition between FUNCINPEC and its 
ered as the only realistic option. At 
rst, the CPP refused to accept the results, accusing UNTAC of anti-CPP bias. 
  
453 
The improved political and security environment under UNTAC –albeit far 
from peaceful and stable– did allow each of the four factions to prepare 
themselves for Cambodia’s first-ever ‘free and fair’ elections in May 1993. 
FUNCINPEC was recognized as an official political party before the elections 
and was led by Prince Ranarridh, who had taken over the party presidency from 
his father King Sihanouk. The KPNLF was transformed into the Buddhist Liberal 
Democratic Party (BLDP) and led by KPNLF founder, Son Sann. The ‘Khmer 
Rouge’ Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) refused to participate in the 
elections, claiming that the SOC had not complied with their promise in the Paris 
Accords to withdraw all Vietnamese forces.454  
The 1993 elections were eventually won by the royalist FUNCINPEC party, 
but its win was not sufficient to give the party the 2/3 majority constitutionally 
required to form a governm
h
erstwhile enemy, the CPP, was soon consid
fi
But with the help of Sihanouk a power-sharing deal between FUNCINPEC and 
the CPP was eventually reached, locking both parties into an unwieldy coalition 
government with two prime-ministers and parallel structures of authority 
throughout the state bureaucracy.  
                                               
453 Doyle, “Authority and Elections in Cambodia”, pp.140-156. 
454 Vickery, Cambodia: A Political Survey, p.59. 
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 Although the Paris Accords ended the war between three of the four main 
protagonists, low-intensity conflict between the FUNCINPEC-CPP government 
and the still armed Khmer Rouge continued for another four years. In addition, 
tensions between the two coalition partners accumulated and finally came to a 
head in 1997. On July 5–6 of that year, violent clashes took place between 
different army factions loyal to the CPP and FUNCINPEC respectively. The 
clashes resulted in the deaths of dozens of FUNCINPEC soldiers and senior 
officers and led to the self-exile of Prince Ranarridh. Whereas most observers 
ave described this event as a coup by Hun Sen and the CPP to silence the 
e prime minister’s power position, others have 
 
h
opposition and strengthen th
suggested that the attack was a response to an attempt by FUNCINPEC and 
Khmer forces to overthrow the CPP.455 Whatever the truth, the result was that the 
fragile government coalition collapsed, the last remaining KR forces defected to 
the new, Hun Sen-led government and the CPP further consolidated its control 
over the Cambodian state. 
 
5.4 ‘Post-Conflict’ Elections (1993-2008) 
In the 17-year period since the Paris Peace Accords, Cambodia has experienced 
six rounds of elections under universal suffrage, including two commune council 
elections and four legislative elections. In addition, there has been one round of 
non-universal senatorial elections. Under Cambodia’s electoral law, the (at least) 
                                                 
455 See Peou, “Hun Sen’s Pre-Emptive Coup: Causes and Consequences”; and Osborne, 
“Cambodia: Hun Sen Consolidates Power”. For an alternative view, see Vickery, Cambodia: A 
Political Survey, pp.159-166. 
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120 members of the National Assembly as well as the members of the 1,621 
commune councils are elected every five years via proportional representation 
(PR) using closed party-lists and provincial member districts.456 The 61 members 
of the Senate are elected directly by members of the National Assembly and 
commune councils. Based on the official electoral results presented in Appendix 
IV, the following paragraphs provide an overview of the election results over the 
past two decades for the two most important levels of government, the National 
Assembly and the commune councils.457 
 
National Assembly Elections 
Figu
                                                
re 5.1 below presents the results of the last four National Assembly elections 
in terms of seats won by each of the main Cambodian parties. The upward trend 
line of CPP seats clearly shows the continually growing support that the CPP has 
received since the 1993 elections. After losing the 1993 UNTAC elections to 
FUNINCPEC with a lower-than-expected 38% of the vote, the CPP won the 
1998 elections and secured 64 seats in the National Assembly. In 2003 the CPP 
gained an additional 9 seats, giving it a plurality of seats but still not sufficient to 
 
456 T
committee that takes into account changes in demographic, geographic, social and economic 
council members based on the percentage of votes received in each province. Kingdom of 
seats and SRP 2 seats. The other 4 senators were appointed by the King and the National 
he final number of seats in the Cambodian National Assembly is decided by a special 
factors since the last elections. Under the (closed) party list system, votes are given to a specific 
party (not to candidates directly) and each party selects its National Assembly or commune 
Cambodia, Amended Law on Elections of Commune Councils, art. 5 and 22; and Kingdom of 
Cambodia, Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA) and Amended 
Law of the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly, art. 7 and 37. 
457 In the 2006 (non-universal) Senate elections, the CPP gained 43 seats (70%), FUNCINPEC 9 
Assembly. 
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rule alone. The refusal of FUNCINPEC and the SRP to join a CPP-led 
government led to political deadlock which lasted for almost one year. 
Ostensibly to prevent future post-election deadlocks, in early 2006 the CPP 
man
 in 2003, with the party obtaining only 26 seats. In 2008 
upport for FUNCINPEC plummeted. Obtaining just 5% of the votes, the party 
received a meagre 2 seats, turning the winner of the 1993 elections into one of 
the smallest parties in Cambodia. 
The Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), which had been founded in 1995 as the Khmer 
Nation Party (KNP) by former Finance Minister, Sam Rainsy, has steadily 
increased its number of seats over the past four elections. In its first election in 
1998, the party gained an impressive 15 seats. In 2003 the SRP fell just 2 seats 
C gave in and decided to join the CPP in yet another 
aged to convince the other parties to accept a constitutional change that 
lowered the required seat share for a party to form a government by itself from 
the original 2/3 majority to a simple 50% + 1 plurality. The latest round of 
elections, on 27 July 2008, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the CPP. 
With only 58% of the vote the CPP secured 73% (90) of the available 123 seats, 
giving it enough seats to govern alone –although it has asked FUNCINPEC to 
join its government once again. 
By contrast, FUNCINPEC’s seat share has dropped sharply over the past 
decade. After winning the elections in 1993 with 45% of the vote and 58 seats, it 
was severely weakened by the violent clashes with its coalition partner, the CPP, 
in July 1997. In 1998 FUNCINPEC lost almost a quarter of its seats. Electoral 
support dropped further
s
short of FUNCINPEC and managed to convince the latter to join the party in an 
‘Alliance of Democrats’ aimed at removing Hun Sen from power. Eventually, 
however, FUNCINPE
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unequal coalition government. In 2008, the SRP received 22% of the vote, giving 
the party an additional 2 seats. It now has 26 seats in the National Assembly, 
making it Cambodia’s largest opposition party. 
Other parties have had little success in Cambodia’s national elections. After 
a strong showing in the 1993 elections, the BLDP, for example, split into two 
parties that subsequently failed to gain any seats in the 1998 elections and finally 
disappeared. The FUNCINPEC splinter party MOLINAKA experienced a 
similar fate. The 2008 elections saw the emergence of several new (splinter) 
parties, including the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP), which is led by former 
 son of King Sihanouk, Prince Ranariddh, as well FUNCINCPEC president and
as the Human Rights Party (HRP), which is led by former BLDP Secretary 
General and FUNCINPEC Deputy Secretary General, Kem Sokha. But despite 
high expectations and high-profile election campaigns, these new parties each 
gained less than 6% of the vote in 2008, resulting in only 2 seats for the NRP and 
3 seats for the HRP.458 
 
                                                 
458 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, p.80; Vander Weyden, “Parliamentary 
Elections in Cambodia 1998”, pp.617-618; Sullivan, “The Parliamentary Election in Cambodia, 
National Assembly, 2008. 
July 2003”,  p.134; NEC, Official Election Results. 4th Mandate Election of the Members of the 
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Figure 5.1 Results National Assembly Elections in Cambodia (1993-2008) 
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Commune Council Elections 
At the commune level, the difference in electoral support for the CPP and the 
two main opposition parties is even more striking. As shown in figure 5.2 below, 
the CPP has overwhelming control over commune councils. With 8 political 
parties participating in Cambodia’s first-ever commune council elections in 
(ordinary) commune council member.  
eputy 
2002, the CPP received 61% of the vote. This was enough to secure 1,598 
(98.6%) out of a total of 1,621 commune council chief positions. In addition, it 
won 789 deputy commune chief positions and seated 5,162 ordinary council 
members. In contrast, the SRP won only 13 council chief positions (0.8%) 
whereas FUNCINPEC gained no more than 10 positions (0.6%). The five other 
participating parties obtained no chief positions at all and together only seated 1 
In the 2007 elections, the CPP lost control of 7 commune councils. 
FUNCINPEC lost 8 commune council chief positions, in addition to many of its 
other council members. The SRP, on the other hand, more than doubled its 
commune council chiefs from 13 to 28, increased the number of SRP first d
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chiefs from 285 to 403 and tripled the number of SRP council members from 433 
to 1,266. The royalist NRP benefited strongly from FUNCINPEC’s loss and 
gained a reasonable number of first, second deputy chiefs and council member 
positions.459 Nevertheless, with 1,591 chiefs elected in 2007, the CPP still 
controls almost all (98.1%) commune councils and remains the most powerful 
party throughout Cambodia.  
 
Figure 5.2 Results Commune Council Elections in Cambodia (2002-2007) 
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In comparison with the pre-1991 regimes, elections in the 1993-2008 period have 
generally been more democratic. According to international and domestic 
election observer reports, the electoral administration, the electoral campaign and 
the balloting itself has slowly become more professional and better organized.460 
However, the increasingly positive verdicts about the free and fairness of the 
 to stand in sharp contrast with more critical 
  
elections on polling day seem
                                               
459 National Election Committee, Official Results of the 2007 Commune Council Elections; and 
National Democratic Institute, The 2002 Cambodian Commune Council Elections. 
460 European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report. National Assembly Elections, 27 
July 2008; National Democratic Institute, “NDI Pre-Election Delegation to Cambodia Says 
Political Environment Improved; Critical Problems Remain”; and Committee for Free and Fair 
nd Report. Elections in Cambodia, 2008 National Assembly Elections. Final Assessment a
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assessments of the pre- and post-electoral periods. Independent assessments have 
roblems 
highlighted continuing structural problems related to voter registration, gift-
giving and vote buying, limited opposition party access to the media, as well as 
the disputed neutrality of key electoral institutions. The widespread use of 
intimidation and violence against opposition party supporters –particularly prior 
to the elections– are other oft-cited problems. In combination, these p
have placed severe restrictions on political party competition in Cambodia.461 
 
5.5 Institutionalization of Individual Parties 
 
The patterns of electoral competition discussed above are important for the main 
focus of this chapter, namely the organizational development of individual 
political parties. In order to assess the degree of institutionalization of the main 
Cambodian parties I will again make use of the Randall and Svåsand framework 
that was introduced in chapter 2. Most of the material presented in the section 
below is derived from interviews with a large number of senior politicians, 
electoral officials, and representatives of civil society and international 
organizations in Phnom Penh, Battambang and Kampot between April and 
August 2008.462 
 
                                                 
461 National Democratic Institute, Cambodian Elections: Lessons Learned and Future Directions. 
A Post-Election Conference Report; Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia, Final 
Assessment and Report on 2007 Commune Council Elections; and McCargo, “Cambodia: Getting 
Away with Authoritarianism”. The increasingly restricted nature of party competition is also 
reflected in the deteriorating Freedom House scores for Cambodia over the period 1993 – 2008 
(see chapter 3, table 3.2). 
462 For a complete list of people interviewed for this chapter, see Appendix II. 
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Systemness 
The CPP has the most extensive and developed party structure of all Cambodian 
parties. It has a large number of representatives at all levels of state 
m
ent Committee.464 This 30-member 
com
ad inistration and has multiple offices in each of the 1,621 communes of the 
country’s 24 provinces. In addition, it has an estimated 4–5 million card-carrying 
party members, including many ministry and government employees.463 
 The formal structure of the CPP is divided into a central, provincial, district 
and grassroots level, with each level having a party committee that meets on a 
monthly or sometimes weekly basis and a party assembly that meets once or 
twice every five years. Modelled on the Vietnamese Communist Party, the CPP’s 
most important party organ, at least formally, is the Party Central Committee. 
This committee comprises 263 members who meet every six months and are 
responsible for all the major decisions related to party policy, recruitment, 
organization and finances. According to one well-informed observer, de facto 
decision-making power lies with a dozen or so people that were part of the KPRP 
Politburo and are now part of the Perman
mittee meets on an almost weekly basis and is responsible for all major party 
initiatives.465 The Permanent Committee regularly invites governors, ministers 
and other high-ranking officials to account for their actions and/or to question 
                                                 
463 Interviews with Som Soeun, 12 June 2008; Koul Panha, 6 June 2008; and Ke Bun Khieng, 31 
July 2008, all in Phnom Penh. Membership of the CPP is widely seen as a requirement for 
several large-scale voter enrolment efforts. However, as Cambodian voters often sign up as 
employment in public institutions and has been boosted by gift-giving and the use of threats in 
members for different political parties in the hope to pocket gifts –often in the form of a small 
amount of money–, ‘official’ party membership figures are not necessarily a reliable indicator of 
lism in Cambodia”, pp.172-173. 
. 
2. 
actual political support. See Hughes, “Parties, Protest and Plura
464 Interview with Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008, Phnom Penh
465 CPP, The Statutes of the Cambodian People’s Party, chapter VII, art.19-2
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and brief them before they speak in the National Assembly. It also has an 
important disciplinary function for party members that do not comply with the 
party’s strict regulations.466 
 A unique aspect of the CPP’s party organization is its dense and elaborate 
party hierarchy and individual responsibility as well as the party’s collective 
leadership. Because of strict party discipline, factional strife within the party 
seems to be relatively low. And even if it exists it remains hidden from the public 
eye. Though several (violent) clashes between different factions loyal to Prime 
Minister and CPP Vice-Chairman Hun Sen and CPP Chairman Chea Sim have 
   
network of party cadres below the central level. Each district, commune and 
village in Cambodia has CPP party branches and sub-branches [sakha]. Each 
branch consists of a committee that ranges from 5–9 members at the village level 
to 27–33 members at the district level. The branches are responsible for keeping 
track of, managing and addressing the problems of ordinary citizens, often in 
close coordination with the local CPP-affiliated authorities. If a certain problem 
cannot be resolved at the lower level, it has to be reported up to a higher level.467 
Conversely, all decisions taken at the central level are passed down through the 
party hierarchy. Following the Leninist principle of ‘democratic centralism’, 
party members are allowed to debate the appropriate response to certain 
problems. But after a party decision is adopted –particularly at the central level– 
“the minority must follow the majority”.468  
Therefore, the CPP places strong emphasis on each member’s respect for the 
                                              
466 Interview with Cheam Yeap, 6 August 2008, Phnom Penh. 
467 Interview with Cheung Sin, 16 June 2008, Battambang. 
468 CPP, The Statutes of the Cambodian People’s Party, chapter VII, art.10. 
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been reported, this rivalry has not led to party splits or fundamentally challenged 
party unity.469 Overall, the CPP has a densely structured, unified and disciplined 
orks and the poor showing in the 2007 commune council elections 
FUN
party organization with many interactions between party leaders, members, 
activists and other supporters. It is therefore highly institutionalized. 
 FUNCINPEC’s party structure is significantly less institutionalized in 
comparison with the CPP, particularly in terms of unity, discipline and 
interactions with people living in the villages. Since its transformation into a 
political party in the early 1990s FUNCINPEC has suffered from infighting 
between different competing factions, sometimes instigated by CPP infiltrators. 
The result has been a splintering of FUNCINPEC into various new parties. The 
party still has a nation-wide network of party offices, but due to neglect of its 
rural netw
CINPEC has lost the political authority over the many villages and districts 
it controlled in the past. Moreover, many of FUNCINPEC’s local party structures 
do not function effectively. As a result, the party lacks the type of close 
connection between party officials and ordinary citizens that is so typical of the 
CPP. Correspondingly, FUNCINPEC’s membership has declined from an 
                                                 
469 Some argue that both leaders’ patronage networks have become so intertwined that it prevents 
at it will hurt their (lucrative) business and personal the CPP from splitting openly, out of fear th
interests. Interviews with Chea Vannath, 3 June 2008; and Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008, both in 
Phnom Penh. 
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estimated 1–2 million in the mid-1990s to an estimated 500,000–800,000 party 
members in 2008.470 
 The main party organs within FUNCINPEC are the Congress and the 
National Board of Directors. The former, which in principle is convened 
annually, is responsible for the approval of party policy and major amendments 
to the party’s procedures and organization. The main decision-making power 
rests with the 15-member National Board of Directors, which is responsible for 
the daily implementation and initiation of party policies. The 120+ member 
Nati
 the lack of 
      
onal Advisory Board reviews the National Board of Directors’ compliance 
with party policies. The President is the chairman of both boards, and is assisted 
by a Secretary General, who is responsible for the overall leadership of the 
party.471  
The president of the party has historically been the most important position 
in FUNCINPEC’s hierarchy. In the 1980s this position was occupied by King 
Sihanouk. In the period 1991–2006 Sihanouk’s son, Prince Ranariddh, took over. 
Both leaders were treated as ‘historic presidents’ whose term was unlimited and 
their rule almost absolute. For a long time FUNCINPEC’s party structure only 
seemed to have a nominal existence. Particularly under the presidency of Prince 
Ranariddh the party’s structure is said to have suffered from
                                           
470 Interviews with Long Sarin and Suon Khieu, 5 August 2008; Koul Panha, 6 June 2008; Tep 
high number of party supporters cited by FUNCINPEC party leaders is not an accurate reflection 
Nytha and Khan Keomono, 3 June 2008, all in Phnom Penh. As mentioned before, however, the 
of political support. For example, in the most recent elections (2008) the party obtained just over 
=com_content&view=article&id=5&Itemid=2
300,000 votes.  
471 FUNCINPEC Principles and Structure,  
http://funcinpec.free.fr/index.php?option . Accessed 
on 24/09/2008. 
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management and internal democracy. The highly personalized nature of decision-
making and the limited appreciation from senior leaders for the grassroots 
network of supporters have significantly weakened the party.472 Whether 
Ranariddh’s departure from the party in 2006 and the recent reform measures by 
the new party leadership are sufficient to reinvigorate the party structures 
remains to be seen. The party’s devastating defeat in the 2008 elections gives 
little
president. That president is elected every three years and is assisted by a 
                                                
 reason for optimism. In any case, FUNCINPEC’s party organization 
remains weakly institutionalized. 
The party structure of the Sam Rainsy Party is more mature and a lot more 
developed than that of FUNCINPEC. In the first few years of its existence, 
between 1998 and 2003, the party relied heavily on its urban supporters and 
lacked a real grassroots network. However, since 2003 and with support from the 
US-based International Republican Institute (IRI), the SRP has paid significant 
attention to the strengthening of its party organization throughout the country. 
This seems to have paid off for the first time in the 2007 commune council 
elections. The SRP now has offices and representatives in almost all 1,621 
communes across the country and enjoys the support of an estimated 500,000–
700,000 party members. Unlike most of the other parties, it has a reasonably 
developed youth and women wing as part of its party structures.473 
At the top of the SRP’s party organization there is a congress which meets 
annually and is responsible among other things for the election of the party 
 
472 Interviews with Hun Ly Oeur, 6 June 2008; Long Sarin and Suon Khieu, 5 August 2008, all in 
Phnom Penh; and Yok Sithoun, 17 June 2008, Battambang. See also Hughes, “Parties, Protest 
Phnom Penh. 
and Pluralism in Cambodia”, p.171. 
473 Interviews with Eng Chhay Eang and Keo Phirum, 31 July 2008, 
 
      Post-War Party Politics in Cambodia 257 
Secretary General. The next organizational level consists of the 13-member 
Permanent Committee, which is responsible for all major decisions. The SRP 
also
 
llegedly domineering influence of the party president continues to exist.474 The 
f SRP members of parliament (MPs) and other senior SRP 
 has a Steering Committee, which acts as a board of advisors and comprises 
100 members. Finally, the party has provincial, commune and village committees 
that regularly bring together party representatives from each of the administrative 
levels. 
In response to internal and external criticism, the SRP has implemented a 
number of reforms in the past few years to make decision-making more 
participatory, democratic and less top-down. Whether those reforms are having 
the desired effect is unclear and perhaps too early to tell. Interviews with former 
party members and other informed observers show that criticism over the
a
considerable number o
officials defecting to other parties in 2007 and 2008 is often cited as proof for 
this discontent. However, the last-minute defections of some SRP members in 
the run-up to the elections in 2008 had probably also to do with the lucrative 
advisory and government positions offered by the CPP. Nevertheless, what is 
clear is that the SRP is the most institutionalized opposition party and probably 
the only Cambodian political party that organizes serious internal elections for 
most of its official positions. Somewhat perversely, however, the latter also 
seems to have made the SRP more vulnerable to infighting and infiltration by 
                                                 
474 For a more extensive assessment of Sam Rainsy’s leadership, see Un, “Sam Rainsy and the 
Sam Rainsy Party: Configuring Opposition Politics in Cambodia”. 
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members from other parties. This would indicate a potential trade-off between 
intra-party democracy and party institutionalization.475 
The organizational structures of the other parties are still weakly developed. 
Both the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) and the Human Rights Party (HRP) 
                                                
have offices in all of the 24 provinces but have been struggling to find 
experienced people to run them. Other parties such as the Hang Dara Democratic 
Movement Party, the Society of Justice Party, the League for Democracy Party, 
the Khmer Anti-Poverty Party, the Khmer Republican Party, and even the much 
older Khmer Democratic Party do not have country-wide representation. Their 
structures are often revived in the run-up to elections but in the period between 
elections are limited to a part-time party president and a handful of party cadres. 
 
Decisional Autonomy 
The second important element of party institutionalization is a party’s ability to 
shape its own policies and strategies without interference from external actors.476 
The influence of state institutions, private companies, civil society groups, 
including trade unions and NGOs, and other ‘sponsoring’ institutions on party 
policy- and decision-making is difficult to assess, just like in El Salvador. But 
unlike in El Salvador, in Cambodia this is mainly because there is no strongly 
developed civil society. Most civil society actors are Western-modelled NGOs 
that focus on human rights, education and other development issues. Many of 
 
g raises the important question whether internal democracy is always a necessary 
condition for party institutionalization –as is often assumed in the literature as well as in party 
assistance programmes– or whether there are also situations where a more open, democratic party 
d, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.14. 
475 This findin
organization can undermine the institutionalization of a party. This question exceeds the scope of 
this thesis, but will briefly be addressed in the concluding chapter.  
476 Randall and Svåsan
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them associate party politics with corruption and personal interests and therefore 
try to stay away from political parties. In the absence of publicly available and 
interview material about this dimension of party institutionalization, only a few 
points can be made here. 
 Several of the opposition parties have –or used to have– links with non-party 
actors. The royalist FUNCINPEC party, for example, has traditionally had strong 
links with Cambodia’s much revered royal family. For a long time it could count 
on the support of the many princes and princesses who are part of the royal 
family as well as their countless advisors and supporters. The new Human Rights 
Party (HRP), whose president used to be the director of a prominent 
internationally-supported human rights NGO, has the support of many human 
rights activists and intellectuals. The Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP), which 
since 2006 is the new name of the student-led Khmer Front Party (KFP), draws a 
t of its support from students and former FUNCINPEC supporters. The largest 
ties with several newspapers, non-governmental 
re generally very autonomous, with 
                                                
lo
opposition party, the SRP, has 
organizations as well as labour unions. The latter are mainly active in the 
garment factories, many of whose workers are SRP supporters. However, in 
general most of the links between parties and non-party actors are informal and 
limited to provision of supporters and activists and political support at elections. 
Cambodian opposition parties are therefo
only a few examples of external pressure on party policy- and decision-
making.477 
 
entatives to the re-election of Eng Chhay Eang as SRP Secretary-General in 
477 One such example of pressure from extra-party actors includes the strong objection of trade 
union repres
September 2007.  
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 In the case of the ruling party the situation is slightly different. Whereas 
opposition parties stand on a more or less equal footing with non-party actors and 
have to negotiate the terms of their ‘partnership’ with them, the CPP tends to 
‘absorb’ most of the actors it works with. According to a representative of an 
international organization active in Cambodia, the CPP seems to have adopted 
Indonesian President Suharto’s ‘corporatist model of control’. This has led to the 
party’s ‘branching out’ in various directions, particularly towards the media and 
business sector.478 The only institution that does seem to have an influence on 
CPP policies is the government itself, most of whose senior members are also 
prominent CPP officials. But because of the near merger between the 
government and ruling party it is difficult to determine who influences who. 
Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that of all Cambodian political parties the 
CPP has the highest degree of decisional autonomy. 
 
Value Infusion and Reification 
The degree of identification and commitment of officials, activists, members and 
supporters to their party (value infusion) as well as a party’s strength as a 
the party is relatively high in the case of the CPP, albeit not for ideological 
  
political symbol and its popular and political recognition as an established 
organization (reification) are the final two dimensions for assessing the 
institutionalization of individual parties.479 
 The commitment of its large number of cadres, members and supporters to 
                                               
478 Interview in Phnom Penh between April – August 2008 with an observer who requested 
anonymity. 
479 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, p.13 and p.23. 
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reasons. Having exchanged its communist agenda for a more market-oriented 
profile at the end of the 1980s, the CPP has essentially become a non-ideological 
party that is characterized by a high degree of pragmatism. In Cambodia’s 
relatively culturally homogeneous society, political parties do generally not 
represent specific ethnic, religious or minority groups –although the issue of 
Khmer nationalism combined with anti-Vietnamese sentiments has been an 
p
not so much because 
peop
im ortant constant in Cambodian politics.480 The lack of ethnic or minority 
representation is also visible in the case of the CPP. Although there are no 
longitudinal survey data available on this issue, voting patterns suggest that the 
CPP receives support from broad sections of the Cambodian population, not only 
from the rural poor but also from the small and quickly growing economic elite. 
The party’s popularity is closely linked to its ability to spend (government) 
money on desirable infrastructural projects, including roads, bridges, schools, 
and hospitals (see also below).481 So overall, the CPP scores high on value 
infusion. However, it is important to emphasize that this is 
le strongly identify with the party’s political positions, but mainly because 
the CPP is believed to be the only party capable of delivering tangible results. 
 As one of the oldest political parties with a recognized position in 
Cambodia’s turbulent history, the CPP also scores high on the aspect of 
reification. The CPP is, for example, credited by many of its supporters for 
“liberating Cambodia from Pol Pot’s genocidal regime” and for having brought 
                                                 
480 Un, “Sam Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party: Configuring Opposition Politics in Cambodia”. 
481 This can be deduced from a survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in August 
07.  
2007. See International Republican Institute, Survey of Cambodian Public Opinion, July 27 – 
August 31, 20
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“stability and reconciliation”.482 Its detractors disagree with this self-ascribed 
qualification and are quick to point out that the CPP was a “puppet of the 
Vietnamese authorities” in the 1980s and that its heroic self-portrayal is 
FUNCINPEC and the SRP score only modestly on these dimensions of party 
 strong political symbol and is now well-known among a large part of 
e Cambodian population. Running on a somewhat populist platform of anti-
wages, the party has 
ained broad support among factory workers, teachers, and students, especially 
                                                
reinforced by state-controlled media. Nevertheless, it remains to difficult to deny 
that the CPP is a strong political symbol in Cambodia with a highly recognized 
party organization. 
 
institutionalization, albeit for different reasons. The until recently strong 
commitment and identification of FUNCINPEC supporters with their party was 
mainly related to the party’s link with its much revered founder, King Sihanouk. 
With King Sihanouk no longer politically active and Prince Ranariddh having set 
up his own party in 2006, FUNCINPEC has recently lost much of its appeal to 
voters and party activists. And because of its long-time position as the CPP’s 
junior coalition partner, people have often found it difficult to make a distinction 
between the political agenda of FUNCINPEC and the CPP. 
Established much later than the CPP and FUNCINPEC, the SRP has quickly 
become a
th
corruption, anti-immigration, and the promise of higher 
g
in urban areas. However, because the party has never been part of the 
government, only of the National Assembly and a relatively small number of 
commune councils, it has few people with governance experience. In 
 
482 Interviews with Som Soeun, 12 June 2008, Phnom Penh; and Choeung Sin, 16 June 2008, 
Battambang. 
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combination with the large number of defections in the run-up to the 2008 
elections, this seems to have negatively affected the party’s perceived political 
As there are at least three ‘politically relevant’ parties (CPP, FUNCINPEC and 
s to have a non-dominant party system. At 
   
strength.  
 With regard to the other much younger opposition parties, such as the HRP 
and the NRP, there is not enough information to evaluate their institutionalization 
on these dimensions. 
 
The above assessment reveals a large gap in institutionalization between the 
main Cambodian political parties. With (very) high degrees of systemness, 
decisional autonomy, value infusion and reification, the CPP is highly 
institutionalized and clearly the most organized party in Cambodia. With a 
reasonable degree of systemness, a relatively high degree of decisional 
autonomy, but medium to low scores on value infusion and reification, the SRP 
is only moderately institutionalized. Despite its historical role, FUNCINPEC 
scores medium to low on all the four dimensions and should therefore be 
classified as weakly institutionalized, similar to the much younger HRP and 
NRP.483 
 
5.6 Cambodia’s Dominant-Authoritarian Party System 
 
SRP) that have competed with each other in a series of relatively free and fair 
elections, Cambodia at first sight seem
                                              
483 For a similar conclusion based on different measures of institutionalization, see Peou, 
International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding. Cambodia and Beyond, pp.100-111. 
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closer inspection, however, Cambodia has several typical features of what Sartori 
defined as a dominant-authoritarian party system.484 
 First, having won the past three legislative elections with an absolute 
majority of seats already makes the CPP a ‘dominant party’ according to 
Sartori’s definition. However, the real source of the CPP’s dominance lies in its 
de facto control over state institutions and personnel, especially local authorities 
and security forces whose loyalty is assured through patronage.485 The fact that 
the CPP did not obtain the necessary 2/3 parliamentary majority to form a 
government by itself (until 2008) and the presence of two other parties with the 
power to block a coalition government has not prevented the CPP from 
mon
of intimidation by CPP officials and/or local authorities aimed at reducing 
                                                
opolizing government decision-making. Partly as a result of international 
pressure, opposition parties have been allowed to exist and participate in 
elections since 1993. However, at moments when those parties directly 
challenged the CPP’s power position –such as FUNCINPEC’s electoral victory 
in 1993, armed clashes between pro-FUNCINPEC and pro-CPP forces in 1997, 
and the mass SRP-led demonstrations in 1998– the CPP has used armed force 
and other non-democratic measures to protect its interests and prevent a potential 
transfer of power.486  
 A second, related feature of Cambodia’s party system is the widespread use 
 
484 See Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, p.229-231; and section 2.4 in chapter 2. 
485 See also Un, “Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy: Political Change in Cambodia, 
1993-2003”; Heder, “Hun Sen’s Consolidation. Death or Beginning of Reform?”; and Osborne, 
“Cambodia: Hun Sen Firmly in Control”.  
486 Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War; Ashley, “Between War and Peace: 
Cambodia 1991-1998”; and Hendrickson, “Institutions Versus Personalities: International 
Peacebuilding Dilemmas”. 
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popular support for opposition parties and sabotaging their organizational 
growth. Such intimidation comes in different forms and has changed over time. 
In the first decade or so after the war ended, cases of harassment, threats, 
arbitrary arrest, attacks and even killings of non-CPP politicians, opposition party 
supporters, human rights workers and journalists by security forces and other 
pro-
supported anti-opposition activities are still very common, particularly in rural 
government actors were widespread and often quite public. This was 
particularly the case during the first highly unstable CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition 
government between 1993 and 1998. The March 1997 grenade attack during an 
opposition party rally added to the climate of fear that prevented opposition party 
supporters as well as voters in general from expressing their opinions freely.  
After the CPP was able to consolidate its power in the 1998 and 2003 
National Assembly elections, political intimidation became more subtle and 
perpetrated by actors other than the security forces. But although the number of 
violent attacks and politically-motivated killings in the past two elections has 
fallen sharply in comparison to the elections of the previous decade, CPP-
areas. Examples include the tearing down of opposition party signs by local 
authorities, delays by commune councils or village chiefs in granting certain 
permissions to opposition party members, and the use of the non-independent 
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court system to silence and punish opposition party members and other critics.487 
A series of recent speeches by Prime Minister Hun Sen indicating that “if the 
people vote for me [the CPP] there is no war” and other, similar references to 
war and instability are other examples of a more subtle, but no less clear form of 
intimidation.488 
A particularly powerful instrument in the hands of the CPP is the 
broadcasting media. TV and radio stations, which enjoy a far greater reach and 
popularity among the poor and often illiterate rural population of Cambodia than 
newspapers, are strongly biased towards the CPP. According to a recent report by 
a local human rights organization, all of the seven TV stations in Cambodia are 
currently “either owned or closely affiliated to the government and more 
particularly to the CPP”.489 The CPP’s control over Cambodia’s airwaves in 
practice means that news programmes are mainly filled with reports about visits 
and speeches by CPP officials, praising government and CPP achievements. 
Opposition party requests for radio licenses are almost always denied, while 
                                                 
487
Monitoring of Election-Related Intimidation and Violence, Augu
 See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), 
st 20 – October 28, 1998; 
Hum
Elect
Cambodia: Attacks on Freedom of Expression and Political Rights; and Committee for Free and 
 The Cambodia Daily, “PM Says a Vote for CPP is a Vote for Peace”, Wednesday 23 April 
2008, p.4. 
ding 
tics, Money and Fear Control Cambodia’s Media, pp.10-18. 
an Rights Watch, Cambodia At War; Human Rights Watch, Cambodia’s Commune 
ions. Setting the Stage for the 2003 National Elections; Un, “Patronage Politics and Hybrid 
Democracy”; Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), 
Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL), Final Assessment and Report on 2007 Commune 
Council Elections. 
488
2008, pp.1-2; The Cambodia Daily, “SRP: Hun Sen’s Pre-Vote Remarks ‘Intimidation’”, Friday 
25 April 2008, p.32; Phnom Penh Post, “PM Warns Private Sector Ahead of Election”, May 2 – 
16, 2008, p.5; Cambodge Soir, “Hun Sen Met En Garde Ses Opposants”, no.29, 24 – 30 April 
489 Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), Rea
Between the Lines: How Poli
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programmes and stations that are critical of the government are regularly closed 
down and their editors or owners arrested. There have been various international 
efforts to promote more equitable media access for all political parties, but these 
programmes have been limited to election campaign periods and do generally not 
compensate for the inequality in media access in the long period between 
elections.490 
A third characteristic of Cambodia’s party system is the non-programmatic, 
non-ideological form of party competition and the related personalization of 
power. Political parties do generally not have a coherent political platform that 
guides their policies or actions. The only thing that parties produce before 
elections is an eclectic set of ‘principles’. These often lack prioritization, 
explanation, financial motivation and rarely guide party behaviour. The same 
goes for ideology. The CPP is the only party with strong ideological roots, but 
since it abandoned communism at the end of the 1980s the party has an 
essentially non-ideological platform. Today all Cambodian parties have highly 
prag
political leaders and their power. What the CPP, FUNCINPEC, SRP and also the 
NRP and HRP have in common is the dominance of their leaders over all aspects 
of
s, however. It has long been considered a key 
matic, populist agendas to which standard ideological labels such as 
‘centrist’, ‘left-wing’ or ‘right-wing’ are not applicable.  
Instead of ideology, competition between parties revolves mainly around 
 party life. The almost ‘absolutist’ form of leadership that often results, is not 
unique to the particular individual
attribute of Khmer political culture, in which leaders see themselves as ‘kings of 
                                                 
490 See Hughes, “Candidate Debates and Equity News: International Support for Democratic 
Deliberation in Cambodia”. 
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the people’ who can rule by divine right. They want to control power, but 
generally do not want to share it with others. This combination of absolutist 
leadership and lack of a power-sharing tradition has resulted in an extremely 
personalist form of zero-sum politics. According to one observer, the importance 
of party leaders is also reflected in voting behaviour: “when people vote, they 
vote for a certain leader, not for a party”.491 
Underpinning the power bases of the main political leaders and parties are 
informal (neo-) patrimonial networks, which are a fourth key feature of the 
Cambodian political system.492 These networks essentially consist of a variety of 
relationships between political patrons and their ‘clients’ who exchange favours, 
benefits, protection, loyalty, and other resources in order to accumulate wealth 
and power. Traditionally limited to personal relationships of kinship and 
eaff ction within rural communities, patron-client relations today pervade almost 
all aspects of Cambodian society and play a particularly significant role in the 
functioning and survival of political parties.  
At the village level, for example, politicians regularly hand out gifts to rural 
villagers in the form of a sarong, krama [type of scarf], rice and small amounts of 
money. The expectation is that the recipients will vote for their party in the next 
                                                 
491 Interviews with Kim Sedara, 6 May 2008; and Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008, both in Phnom 
tronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy”; and Cambodian Development Resource 
Penh. See also Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, pp.115-118 and Chandler, 
The Tragedy of Cambodian History, p.4. 
492 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, pp.117-118; Hughes, The Political 
Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991-2001; Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge; 
Un, “Pa
Institute (CDRI), Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature 
Review. 
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elections.493 Although this practice is common among all Cambodian parties, 
because of its control over state resources and administrative structures the CPP 
has had far greater opportunity to institutionalize and exploit this informal 
ractice of ‘gift-giving’ to buy votes. At government level, the CPP has made 
                        
p
sure to look after the patronage system that was originally created in the 1980s to 
ensure loyalty to the ruling regime. Particularly after the events of 1997, the CPP 
has extended its control over almost all the major institutions of the country, 
including the army and police, the judiciary, the civil service, and the media. 
Nowadays, the CPP and its leaders continue to use their authority to create new 
high-level positions for loyalists from their own networks as well as defectors of 
other parties, in the process making the current government cabinet one of the 
world’s largest.494 
 A final defining feature of Cambodia’s party system is its limited 
competitiveness, which is first of all a consequence of the small number of 
relevant opposition parties. Although 53 parties are nominally registered with the 
Ministry of the Interior, only five of them now have seats in the Assembly or 
municipal councils. Moreover, in the last decade the overall number of parties 
participating in elections fell from 39 to 11. Some observers have attributed this 
decrease to the growing maturity of Cambodia’s party system. But as long as 
there has not been a peaceful transfer of power between different political 
                         
 This expectation is not always guaranteed as Cambodia has a system of secret balloting. As a 
result, voters can still vote for another party than the one they have received gifts from. 
Anecdotal evidence from the 2008 election campaign, for example, suggests that there were 
493
many people who accepted gifts from the ruling party, but eventually voted for opposition 
parties. 
494 Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism 
in Cambodia, p.59. 
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parties, there might be doubts as to how democratic Cambodia’s party system is. 
stead, unequal access to human, financial and other resources seems a more 
n particular have generally not 
capi
emacy.495 
In
plausible reason for the short lifespan of most political parties. 
 
The preceding analysis has shown that its patrimonial governance style, its 
control over almost all state institutions and its astute leadership have turned the 
CPP into the strongest party of Cambodia, not only in political and financial 
terms, but also organizationally. The CPP’s incumbent position and use of party 
infiltrators has given it an ability to foster splits among its political opponents, in 
the process strengthening the CPP’s support in all of the post-1991 elections. 
Nevertheless, the limited competitiveness of Cambodia’s party system is also 
related to the behaviour of opposition parties themselves. If the main opposition 
parties had paid more attention to the strengthening of their grassroots networks, 
the democratization of their decision-making and the development of concrete 
political plans earlier on, their performance in elections, parliament and local 
governance would likely have been better. As we have seen above, the SRP, 
other opposition parties and FUNCINPEC i
talized on their electoral gains and failed to work together. Therefore, 
Cambodia’s uneven dominant party system is for some almost as much a 
consequence of the opposition parties’ weaknesses as it is a result of the CPP’s 
supr
 
                                                 
495 Several interviewees referred to the “missed opportunities” of party building and party 
strengthening of FUNCINPEC in the mid-1990s and the SRP in the early 2000s. Many of them 
described the opposition parties’ weaknesses as a “blessing for the CPP”. See also Un, “Sam 
nd Pluralism in Cambodia”. Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party”; and Hughes, “Parties, Protest a
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5.7 Institutionalization of the Party System in Cambodia 
 
Following Mainwaring and Scully’s framework, there are four criteria for 
establishing the degree of institutionalization of Cambodia’s party system.496 
 A stable form of party competition is the first condition for an 
institutionalized party system. Applying Pedersen’s quantitative index of 
electoral volatility shows that Cambodia’s overall mean volatility over the period 
1993-2008 is only 9.9. This means that while some parties lost 9.9% (of seats in 
the Assembly or chief positions in the commune councils) from one election to 
the next, other parties won 9.9%. Mean electoral volatility for the four rounds of 
parliamentary elections is slightly higher at 18.3, reflecting the fact that there 
have been several new parties entering and leaving the National Assembly and 
that one party (FUNCINPEC) has seen its seat share sharply reduced.497 
Compared to other (post-conflict) developing countries –for example Guatemala, 
where the net percentage change in seats has been as high as 50%– volatility is 
rather low in Cambodia.498 As a result party competition has been relatively 
stable, at least from an electoral point of view. 
The relative stability of inter-party competition in Cambodia is also 
noticeable by other, qualitative indicators. For example, over the past 15 years 
                                                 
496 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions, pp.4-6. See also chapter 2, section 
2.6. 
497
data in Appendix IV results in Seat V 1998 = ½ · Σ | (9) + (13) + (12) + (8) + (1) = 21.5, Seat V 2003 
= ½ · Σ | (7) + (14)
aggregate net perce
 Calculating the aggregate net percentage change (Volatility, V) for legislative seats from the 
 + (8) = 14.5 and  Seat V 2008 = ½ · Σ | (14) + (19) + (1) + (2) + (2) = 19. The 
ntage change for commune council chief positions is Council V 2007 = ½ · Σ | 
outcomes. 
(1) + (1) + (1) = 1.5. The overall mean volatility figures follow from taking the average of these 
498 Payne, “Party Systems and Democratic Governability”, p.154. 
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the number of politically relevant parties has remained constant, which is similar 
to the situation in El Salvador. Although there are many smaller political parties 
that have come and gone since the end of the war, the three largest parties have 
long been the same. Only in the most recent 2008 elections has the composition 
of the small group of politically relevant parties changed, with the SRP taking 
over from FUNCINPEC as the second largest party and the HRP becoming the 
third largest party. Another indicator of the party system’s increasing stability is 
the fact that internal splits within some of the parties have not significantly 
affected inter-party competition. Although party factions breaking away from the 
party and setting up new parties has certainly damaged the systemness of the 
SRP and FUNCINPEC in particular, it has not significantly altered the power 
configuration of the Cambodian party system as such. Finally, since the war 
ended there have been regular elections, which have slowly become more 
peaceful. Whereas elections in 1993 and particularly 1998 were still marred by 
high levels of violence, the 2003 and 2008 elections were considerably less 
violent.  
Nevertheless, a relatively stable form of party competition does not mean 
that Cambodia’s party system is now institutionalized. As noted before, 
intimidation and politically-motivated killings continue to exist and still prevent 
a completely free and fair competition between parties. Moreover, as the main 
party is too entrenched to be dislocated from power anytime soon, Cambodia’s 
party system is likely to remain stably dominated by one political party for some 
years to come. 
 The degree to which parties are ‘rooted’ in society is a second important 
indicator of party system institutionalization. Although this is partly related to the 
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age of political parties, the shallow roots and limited popular support for the 
Khmer Democratic Party –with its 1946 establishment Cambodia’s oldest 
political party– indicate that longevity alone is not enough. For a long time there 
were only two Cambodian parties that were well-known throughout the country 
and had strong roots in society, i.e. the CPP and FUNCINPEC. Established 
around the same time in the early 1980s, both parties were known for their 
historical role in the post-Khmer Rouge civil war period: the CPP for its self-
acclaimed role as ‘liberator of the Pol Pot regime’ and FUNCINPEC for its 
royalist resistance against ‘the Vietnamese-backed PRK puppet regime’. 
However, whereas the CPP has become deeply rooted in all aspects of the 
Cambodian state and society, FUNCINPEC’s ties with the population and state 
institutions have drastically weakened over the years. Established in 1998, the 
SRP is much younger and does not have the same historical role as the other two 
parties. However, as a result of its well-publicized fight against corruption, 
impunity and other major problems in Cambodian society the SRP’s grassroots 
upport has grown quickly in the past decade, particularly among young, urban 
voters. At the time of writing, at the end of 2008, the SRP’s societal roots were 
much stronger than those of FUNCINPEC, but still significantly weaker than the 
eived legitimacy of elections and political parties in determining 
ast three elections is an indication that Cambodian elections are not 
s
CPP’s. Except for the CPP and SRP, political parties are generally not well 
entrenched in Cambodian society.  
 The perc
who governs is another factor in assessing the institutionalization of Cambodia’s 
party system. The typical rejection of election results by opposition parties and 
the organization of large mass demonstrations to challenge the results after each 
of the p
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considered legitimate by many actors, despite the earlier mentioned positive 
ents of international election observers. In addition,  interviewees 
ated that the legitimacy of parties themselves is limited, mainly 
erso n t l e o  i
ent resources than party membership. 9 And finally, 
elections 
s the means to change the current political leadership.501 On this particular 
                                                
assessm  some
have indic
because p nal con ections wi h powerfu  leaders ar ften more mportant for 
49gaining access to governm
in accordance with their deep lack of trust in state institutions the Cambodian 
population also seems to be increasingly wary of political parties and 
elections.500 As shown in table 5.1 below, the number of registered voters that 
actually voted has decreased from a high of 94% in 1998 to a low of 68% in 
2007. Although this significant decrease in voter turn-out can be related to 
various issues, one important factor is the Cambodian people’s dissatisfaction 
with the high levels of corruption and their general disillusionment with 
a
aspect, therefore, the Cambodian party system seems only weakly 
institutionalized. 
 
 
ristina Chhim, 7 July 2008 and Im Francois, 4 
August 2008, all in Phnom Penh. 
0 Henke and Sokhom, The State of Democracy in Cambodia. The Added Value of Opinion Polls, 
.10. 
1 This view was expressed by Thun Saray, President of the Cambodian Human Rights and 
Development Association (ADHOC), during a press conference of the Committee for Free and 
Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) on 28 July 2008. Other reasons often cited for the 
decreasing voter turn-out in Cambodia include personal problems (no money, work, and illness), 
499 Interviews with Chea Vannath, 3 June 2008, K
50
p
50
the high prices of fuel and transportation, and problems faced at the polling station (such as 
people not being able to find their name on the voter list, as happened regularly in the 2008 
election). 
 
      Post-War Party Politics in Cambodia 275 
Table 5.1 Voter Registration and Turn-out in Cambodia (1993-2008)502 
Year   1993 1998 2002 2003 2007 2008
Registered  4,764,430 5,395,595 5,190,307 6,341,834 7,799,371 8,125,529
voters 
voters 4,267,192 5,057,830 4,543,974 5,277,494 5,293,327 6,010,277Turn-out 
% 90% 94% 88% 83% 68% 74%
 
The final aspect of party system institutionalization is the strength of the 
organizational structures of parties. As indicated before, the CPP and the SRP are 
the only two parties in Cambodia with a structured, nation-wide network of party 
activists, who meet regularly from the grassroots level up to the national level. 
he other parties have weak party organizations that do not extend to all parts of 
d beset by factionalism. 
that are often not considered legitimate or 
trus
                                                
T
the country, are generally poorly staffed, under-funded an
On this aspect therefore the party system is only moderately developed. 
 
To conclude, Cambodia’s party system is characterized by a relatively stable 
form of party competition, but has a majority of parties that are not rooted in 
society, parties and elections 
tworthy, and only two parties with a strong party organization. This means 
that, on the basis of the Mainwaring and Scully criteria at least, Cambodia’s 
party system is weakly institutionalized. 
 
 
 
tion Committee (NEC), Election of the National Assembly, Sunday, July 28, 
2008; and National Election Committee (NEC), NEC Adds 1,138 Voters’ Names to the 2007 
502 National Elec
Voters List for the 4th Election of the Members of the National Assembly, 2008. 
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5.8 
 
stricted communist political 
syst
y 
the lack of it. 
  
Explaining Party and Party System Institutionalization in Cambodia 
 
Having established that Cambodia has only one institutionalized party and a 
weakly institutionalized party system dominated by that same party, we should 
now turn to the various factors that might explain this situation and determine 
which ones are the most relevant. In the process, I will also evaluate the 
relevance to the Cambodian context of the three theoretical approaches for party 
and party system institutionalization that are offered in the academic literature on 
party politics. 
The Limits of the Electoral and Sociological Approaches 
As we have seen before, the electoral competition approach argues that the 
structure of individual party organizations is a result of how parties mobilize 
voters in competitive elections and that the configuration of the overall party 
system stems from the number of parties participating in elections, their relative 
size and ideological distance.503 
Similar to the situation in El Salvador, competitive elections in Cambodia 
did not take place until after the war ended in 1991. The CPP and FUNCINPEC 
were both established during the 1980s when a re
em allowed only one party to exist. At that time the main raison d’être of 
both parties was not to contest elections but to fight the enemy and gain control 
over the country’s territory. The initial organizational structures of the CPP and 
FUNCINCPEC were therefore not shaped by electoral competition but rather b
                                               
503 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp. 94-105; and see chapter 2, section 2.7. 
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Electoral competition became more important with the introduction of multi-
party democracy by UNTAC in 1993. Since then, several Cambodian parties –
most notably the SRP– have set up structures, changed tactics and attracted some 
new people to mobilize popular support and maximize votes. However, most of 
the structures and senior leadership of the CPP have remained the same. 
Electoral competition only strengthened its already strong ties with local 
authorities. FUNCINPEC has not capitalized on the opportunities offered by a 
more open political system and increased electoral competition. Because of that 
it has largely failed its rebel-to-party transformation. 
mpact on the 
insti
                                                
Due to the introduction of electoral competition in 1993 Cambodia’s party 
system has changed from a communist one-party system to a (semi-) democratic 
multi-party system. Nevertheless, party competition remains highly opportunist 
and non-ideological in character, making the measurement of parties’ ideological 
distance –a key element of the electoral competition approach– impossible and 
even irrelevant. Increased electoral competition therefore has had an effect on the 
institutionalization of some parties and it has certainly changed the dynamics of 
party competition. But it has not had the decisive i
tutionalization of individual parties and the overall party system that the 
electoral competition approach wants us to believe. 
The sociological approach argues that the organizational structure of an 
individual party reflects that party’s control or access to financial, human and 
state resources. With regard to the nature of party competition it argues that the 
configuration of a party system essentially reflects major societal cleavages.504  
 
504 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp.105-108; Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage 
Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments”; and see chapter 2, section 2.7. 
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It is indeed clear that not all parties have the same amount of human 
resources. The CPP has a large number of well-trained, experienced and well-
paid staff. As the principal political master of the country’s bureaucracy and 
security apparatus, the party can informally avail of several thousands of 
additional supporters, including many police, army and local government 
officials. Furthermore, the elaborate grassroots structure of the CPP and its close 
relationship with village chiefs is a reflection of the party’s belief that local party 
activists and state officials are crucial in mobilizing electoral support in the rural 
areas.  
The other parties generally have much fewer party staff or supporters. 
Con
ess to people as the CPP and is therefore not in the 
posi
ities, and indirectly uses income from corporate and public taxes, 
vinced that its future was mainly dependent on the support of urban, more 
educated voters, the SRP for a long time cultivated its ties with trade unions and 
student associations. Recognizing somewhat belatedly that the rural vote was too 
important to ignore, the party has recently expanded its grassroots structures and 
party activities. But like other Cambodian opposition parties, the SRP does not 
have the same degree of acc
tion to increase its membership or popular support as easily. 
A similar situation applies to the financing of political parties. Due to the 
lack of regulation and transparency of party financing in Cambodia, there is no 
reliable data on exactly how much the CPP, FUNCINPEC, the SRP or any of the 
other parties collect and spend during and between election campaigns. However, 
it is widely acknowledged that the CPP makes little distinction between party and 
state activ
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investments and even foreign aid for party political purposes.505 FUNCINPEC 
and the SRP generally do not have access to such resources. They depend for 
most of their income on fundraising activities among the Cambodian diaspora 
that lives in the United States, Canada, France, Australia and elsewhere. 
Additionally, in the run-up to elections it is quite normal for an opposition party 
candidate to provide a significant monetary contribution that covers the 
candidate’s campaign spending as well as other party activities in return for 
being selected as an official party candidate. This arrangement is often perceived 
as ‘buying’ seats.506 It also means that central party leadership loses influence 
over individual candidates. 
jecting its image across the country; all key issues benefiting a 
arty’s institutionalization.  
ation, the sociological 
zens, urban and 
                                                
Finally, the CPP enjoys a degree of access to the media that the opposition 
parties simply do not have. As discussed earlier, the direct and indirect control of 
the CPP over the country’s broadcast media gives the party a disproportionately 
large advantage in promoting its policies, in disseminating the speeches of its 
leaders, and in pro
p
So in terms of explaining the variety in party organiz
approach’s focus on access to resources seems definitely relevant in the case of 
Cambodia. But so far as the configuration of the Cambodian party system is 
concerned, this is not shaped by major societal cleavages in the way described by 
the sociological approach. Divisions between rich and poor citi
 
505 See Calavan, Diaz and O’Brien, Cambodian Corruption Assessment; Kovick and Thornton, 
“Cambodia”; Un, “Sam Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party”; and information from various 
interviews. 
e also the interview with the 506 Interview with Kristina Chhim, 7 July 2008, Phnom Penh. Se
Human Rights Party president, Kem Sokha, in the weekly French newspaper Cambodge Soir, 19 
– 25 June 2008, p.5. 
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rural dwellers, workers and owners are growing rapidly in Cambodian society, 
but they do not (yet) form the foundations on which political parties are based. 
Unlike the party systems of Western Europe, where at least historically such 
socioeconomic divisions were clearly recognizable and represented by different 
parties, Cambodia does not have typical labour, rural, communist or conservative 
parties that cater to the interests of particular groups in society. As indicated 
before, Cambodian parties are all pragmatist, ‘catch-all’ organizations that seem 
more interested in delegitimizing their opponents and maximizing votes and 
pow
  
er than genuinely representing the interests and socioeconomic concerns of 
groups in society.507 
The relevance of the sociological approach to the Cambodian context seems 
limited therefore to explaining how some parties have structured their 
organizations. Similar to the electoral competition approach, it fails to give a full 
rationalization of why the Cambodian party system developed as it did in the 
post-war period. 
 
The Greater Relevance of the Institutionalist Approach… 
The institutionalist approach argues that individual party organizations as well as 
the overall party system are mainly shaped by the workings of formal and 
informal institutions, including the electoral system.508 This approach seems to 
be more relevant for explaining the party situation in Cambodia. 
                                               
507 See also Hughes, “Parties, Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia”. 
ter 2, section 2.7. 
508 Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, pp.190-199; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, Electoral 
System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook; and see chap
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 The replacement in the early 1990s of Cambodia’s former single-member 
district system with a new system of proportional representation based on multi-
member provincial districts only marginally opened the party system to smaller 
ula awards any remaining seats in a provincial district to 
the 
                                                
parties. The first elections under the new system introduced by UNTAC in 1993 
resulted in a total of four parties obtaining seats, including two parties that each 
received less than 4% of the vote.509 However, several aspects of Cambodia’s 
electoral law have gradually made it more difficult for smaller parties to gain 
seats. 
In 1997, under circumstances that remain unclear, the so-called Hare quota 
for calculating seat allocations was changed to a ‘highest average method’ 
formula.510 This form
party with the highest average number of votes.511 Instead of giving smaller 
parties a relatively bigger chance to gain seats, the highest average formula 
effectively over-represents the largest party, which in almost all provinces is the 
CPP. The workings of this method have made Cambodia’s electoral system 
increasingly less proportional, as reflected in the fact that the CPP during the 
most recent elections managed to obtain 73% of the seats with only 58% of the 
vote. Another factor working against smaller parties is the increasingly uneven 
distribution of voters and seats between the 24 provinces. This malapportionment 
is largely caused by the fact that the total number of National Assembly seats has 
remained almost the same since 1993, despite significant increases in the overall 
 
tionment; Vander 
509 Rowley, “Cambodia”. 
510 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, pp.182-183; and Reilly, “Post-War 
Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition”. 
511 National Election Committee (NEC), The Parliamentary Seats Appor
Weyden, “Parliamentary Elections in Cambodia 1998”, pp.617-618. 
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population and the number of registered voters. The net effect is that it takes 
more and more votes to obtain a seat in parliament, which is particularly 
prob
n of 
lected representatives in commune councils and the National Assembly 
 officials, their primary 
12 
regime. On the other hand, however, the rule never fostered any degree of 
                                                
lematic for the smallest parties. 
 The closed-list nature of Cambodia’s PR system has contributed to the 
highly in-ward looking nature of most party organizations. As the positio
e
ultimately depends on the party and senior government
focus is pleasing –or at least not angering– the party leadership. This not only 
adds to the already strong influence of some party leaders, but also gives little 
incentive to party representatives to be more accountable or responsive to 
ordinary citizens.5
And finally party competition has been shaped by the requirement that a 
government could only be formed if it had the support of a 2/3 majority in the 
National Assembly. Considered by most as a mechanism to stimulate power-
sharing between rivalling parties, but by some as a clever tactic by Hun Sen to 
prevent FUNCINPEC and the BLDP from forming a government after the CPP 
unexpectedly lost the elections in 1993, the 2/3 majority rule has had a mixed 
effect on party competition.513 On the one hand, it has forced the two largest 
parties –CPP and until recently FUNCINPEC– into a coalition government for 
more than 15 years, preventing the country from slipping back into a one-party 
 
512 This conclusion was supported by several people interviewed for this study. However, there is 
y, “Cambodia”; Vickery, Cambodia: A Political Survey, p.104. 
some evidence that this effect might be less strong in the case of the SRP. See also Un, 
“Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy”; and Cambodian Development Resource Institute 
(CDRI), Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia, p.26 and p.59. 
513 Rowle
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reconciliation between the former warring parties. It only added to the political 
instability of the immediate post-war period.  
With the replacement of the 2/3 majority rule by a 50% + 1 formula the need 
for 
riod and circumstances in which the parties originated, for example, 
have
 separate in 
theo
   
unstable coalition governments came to an end in 2006 –and with it the last 
institutional obstacle to single-party government has now been removed.514 
 
…and Particularly of War-Related Institutional Factors 
In addition to these formal rules, there are other ‘informal’ institutions that are 
just as, if not more, important to an understanding of Cambodia’s party context. 
Many of these factors are directly related to the war and the post-war institution-
building process. 
The pe
 had a significant influence on how they subsequently developed. The CPP 
emerged during the period of war in the 1980s. Crucially, according to in-depth 
studies by Gottesman and Chhim, its predecessor, the KPRP, was created at the 
same time as the PRK state structure. Under the tutelage of Vietnamese advisors 
the KPRP’s party organization was subsequently expanded “with branches in 
every state institution, from ministries to local government offices, military units, 
schools and hospitals”. Soon, most party and state structures –though
ry– had in fact merged with the numerous substructures “[serving] as 
                                              
514 The 50% + 1 formula was reluctantly accepted by SRP members of parliament in early 2006 
in an apparent quid pro quo for Prime Minister Hun Sen’s approval of a royal pardon to Sam 
Rainsy, who had earlier been sentenced to 18 months in prison for defaming the government and 
the PM.  
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extensions of each leader’s personal authority”.515 This process of ‘state-cum-
party’ building continued throughout the war and post-war period and has 
resulted in the formidable party organization that the CPP is today. 
s been the 
only
Despite having been established around the same time as the CPP, 
FUNCINPEC did not succeed in developing a well-structured party organization. 
This is partly related to the fact that in its early years, due to the war and the 
repressive PRK policies of the 1980s, the organization was unable to organize 
itself as a political party. But even when it was given the opportunity in 1991 to 
transform its military structures and rural support into a democratic political 
party, FUNCINPEC leaders failed to do so. As late as the end-1990s, the main 
focus of FUNCINPEC was the consolidation of power for its leaders, not party-
building.  
The SRP and most of the opposition parties emerged in the post-war period 
and are therefore still relatively young. For example, the NRP was only created 
in 2006 and the HRP as recently as 2007. With the CPP’s party organization 
firmly rooted since the 1980s and an overall atmosphere of fear and intimidation 
present throughout Cambodia, it has been difficult for these new parties to create 
groups of local supporters and build up their organizations. The SRP ha
 party that managed to do so in a relatively short period of time.  
These party histories show that the war-time (or post-war) origins of the 
parties have had a strong influence on their organizational development.516 As in 
                                                 
 Gottesman, Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge, p.48; Chhim, Die Revolutionäre Volkspartei 
Kampuchea 1979 bis 1989. 
516 Admittedly, this explanation does not fully account for the SRP’s growth, but it does show 
515
how the SRP’s organizational development was affected by other parties that were established 
much earlier. 
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the case of El Salvador then, this conclusion supports the key historical 
institutionalist argument in this thesis that there is a degree of path dependence in 
post-conflict party development. 
 A second important institutional factor is the way in which the war ended 
and the nature of the subsequent peace agreement. Early talks and closer 
engagement between the main warring parties neither came about spontaneously 
nor as a result of changed views on how the groups saw each other. It was almost 
exclusively initiated by foreign powers that wanted to extract themselves from 
the Cambodian conflict by weaning off their client factions from the international 
recognition and financial and material support they had so long enjoyed. The 
provided by the Paris Peace Accords, including a new Electoral Law and Law on 
Political Parties, did not create the peaceful, competitive and democratic party 
system the international community had hoped for. The internationally-brokered 
                                                
Paris Peace Accords were therefore primarily an imposed agreement among four 
parties that remained reluctant to share power.517 And although UNTAC and the 
quadripartite Supreme National Council were nominally in charge of 
administrating the country and disarming all armed factions during the 2-year 
transitional period, the SOC/CPP did not give up its control over the country’s 
security and administrative apparatus, FUNCINPEC retained its army and the 
Khmer Rouge continued its armed attacks. Security remained the key priority for 
all factions, and as a result there was little attention for party-building. 
When free and fair elections were organized in 1993 under the supervision 
and military protection of UNTAC they did introduce a new chapter of multi-
party politics in Cambodian history. However, the regulatory framework 
 
517 Ashley, “Between War and Peace”; and Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99. 
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power-sharing deal between FUNCINPEC and the CPP after the 1993 elections 
proved highly unstable. With the renewed violence of 1997 it became clear that 
the 
members representing the 4 parties in the National Assembly, 1 member 
representing NGOs and 6 so-called ‘independent’ members. In 2002 the 
membership of the NEC was reduced to 5 members while in 2006 it was again 
increased to its current level of 9 members. Formally it has changed from a 
party-based to an apolitical institution. According to the most recent version of 
th
battlefield, not the ballot box was still determining who controlled power. 
From a party political perspective therefore, the Paris Peace Accords and the 
UNTAC intervention have had a long-lasting effect in that they helped make 
political pluralism possible. But in contrast to peace processes in other countries, 
it did not fundamentally alter the configuration of power between the key 
political players nor create a more balanced party system. Against this 
background the early 1990s can therefore only be seen as a brief, rather 
exceptional period in Cambodian political history. 
 The post-war institutional design of Cambodia’s most important electoral 
institution has also impacted on how parties developed and competed. The 
National Election Committee (NEC) was established in 1998 and at the time 
consisted of 11 members. Because of the deep suspicions and lack of trust 
between the parties, it was decided that the committee would comprise 4 
e electoral law, the NEC members are “competent in politics, have [relevant] 
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work experience and have a good reputation and are not representing political 
parties”.518 
But because NEC members are selected by the Ministry of the Interior, their 
nominations approved by the Council of Ministers and ratified by the National 
Assembly –all of which are controlled by the CPP– the NEC has continuously 
been accused of favouring the CPP. The fact that it is still located within the 
powerful, CPP-controlled Ministry of the Interior has also not helped. Moreover, 
formally the Provincial Election Committees (PECs), the Commune Election 
Committees (CECs) should be comprised of non-partisan officials. But the 
perception of many people interviewed for this study is that a lot of the electoral 
officials are biased towards the CPP. This is apparently particularly the case with 
commune clerks, who are responsible for the important process of voter 
registration.519 The almost systematic rejection of opposition party complaints 
during election campaigns is another indicator of the NEC’s lack of 
independence, at least according to domestic election monitoring organizations. 
                                                 
518 Kingdom of Cambodia, Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA), 
art.13; and National Election Committee (NEC), Election of the National Assembly, Sunday, July 
28, 2008. 
519 Election stakeholders, including a large number of opposition parties and NGOs, identified the 
alleged pro-CPP bias of local government and electoral officials as one of the key problems of 
Cambodia’s election administration. Information based on personal observation of three Conflict 
Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) meetings in Battambang and Phnom Penh 
between May and August 2008. 
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This allegedly unfair treatment is said to have resulted in an electoral playing 
field that is heavily tilted towards the ruling party.520  
To be fair to the NEC, however, it should be said that the committee has 
over the years become more professional, transparent and accessible to parties 
and the media. The NEC now has an elaborate procedure for dealing with 
electoral complaints and is capable of organizing “logistically and technically 
competent elections”, with only limited support and advice from international 
consultants.521 Nevertheless, continuing doubts over its neutrality and its 
reluctance to intervene in some of the most problematic areas of Cambodian 
politics –such as party financing and party access to the media outside the 
campaign period– indicate that it is not (yet) universally accepted as the 
“independent, neutral and impartial electoral body” it claims to be.522 
Lastly, the divergence in party institutionalization can be attributed to 
political leadership. Hun Sen in particular is recognized for having a talent of 
                                                 
520 Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (NICFEC), 
NICFEC National Assembly Election Report 2003; and Committee for Free and Fair Elections in 
also: Cambodge Soir, “Le PPC Et l’Opposition: Un Rapport de Force Inégal”, nr. 41, 17–23 July 
2008, p.8. 
521 Bartu, “Cambodia: Tensions Around the National Election Committee”, p.288. 
522 According to article 16, point 17 and point 18 of the Law on the Election of Members of the 
expenses incurred by candidates and political parties during election campaigns” and for “taking 
measures and facilitating to ensure equal access to the public media”. During an interview on 3 
confirmed his organization’s mandate in these two areas. But he also indicated that because 
parties did not submit the account book of income and expenses (as stipulated in article 82 of 
LEMNA) and because the law did not clearly specify what campaigning outside of the campaign 
Cambodia (COMFREL), Final Assessment and Report on 2007 Commune Council Elections. See 
National Assembly (LEMNA), the NEC is responsible for “auditing the income and financial 
June 2008 in Phnom Penh with two senior NEC officials, the Secretary General of the NEC 
period constituted, the NEC was not in the position to address these issues. See Kingdom of 
rg.kh
Cambodia, Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly (LEMNA); and the NEC 
website at: http://www.necelect.o  
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building networks based on patronage and loyalty as well as for outmanoeuvring 
and weakening political opponents –both inside and outside the CPP. Despite the 
ontinuous struggle for power between the more ideological traditionalist Chea 
matist Hun Sen, the CPP as an organization has 
party-related observers the party is described as a loosely structured 
orga
c
Sim and the non-ideological prag
strongly benefited from the leadership skills of both. Crucial, moreover, is that 
the top leadership positions of the CPP are deeply embedded in the institutional 
structures of the party, in line with the principles of Leninist party organization. 
The accumulation of power by leaders like Hun Sen and Chea Sim has therefore 
been an integral part of the process of creating a strongly rooted and centralized 
party. It has not come at the expense of party building, as in the case of some of 
the other parties.523 
FUNCINPEC’s leadership, for example, has been disastrous for party-
building. Under Ranariddh’s 14-year leadership there was little attention for the 
construction of a well-functioning party organization, particularly at the 
grassroots level. In various interviews with FUNCINPEC representatives and 
other, non 
nization, which is still reeling from years of weak, highly personalist 
management, internal splits and defections. The situation is slightly better at the 
SRP, whose leader has given considerable attention to party building at an early 
stage. However, as reported above, Sam Rainsy’s assertive leadership style has 
also alienated several prominent party members and negatively affected the 
SRP’s internal cohesion. As Cambodian politics revolves mainly around the 
actions of party leaders, the personalities, management styles and power bases of 
                                                 
523 This finding is supported by the observations of Roger Henke in an email communication with 
the author on 23 October 2008.  
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thos
d financial resources to develop an 
elec
e leaders have therefore had a disproportionately large influence on the 
institutionalization of the various parties. 
 
The Role of International Actors 
The actions –and oftentimes lack thereof– of different types of international 
actors have also influenced the political landscape in Cambodia. Over the entire 
post-war period (1992-2007) Cambodia received more than USD 6.8 billion in  
official development assistance.524 The most intrusive forms of foreign 
intervention in Cambodia’s political context took place in the early 1990s during 
the negotiations leading up to the Paris Peace Accords and the subsequent 
transitional period under UNTAC. At that time, the permanent five members of 
the UN Security Council actively engaged with all main Cambodian parties and 
party leaders in order to cajole them into compromise. UNTAC was able to back 
this up with significant man power an
toral law, educate and register voters, register parties and organize the 1993 
elections. 
But once UNTAC left at the end of 1993, the influence of international 
actors over Cambodian politics gradually subsided. Although international 
leverage in the mid-1990s was potentially high because of the Cambodian 
government’s dependence on foreign assistance, major donors such as Japan, 
France, the European Commission, the World Bank, and the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) did not tie their aid to progress on key democratic reforms affecting 
party competition, such as improvement of the rule of law, implementation of 
anti-corruption measures and equal access to the media.  
                                                 
524 For a more detailed overview of the top 15 aid donors to Cambodia, see Appendix VI. 
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For example, when fighting between the CPP and FUNCINPEC resumed in 
1997 the international response was muted. The serious human rights violations 
reportedly committed by the government in that period did not impede 
Cambodia’s membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) two years later. And when violence and major irregularities were 
reported in the 1998 and 2003 elections, most international observation teams 
quickly accepted the elections as ‘free and fair’. The United States, Canada and 
the Nordic countries have generally been more critical, but in general the donor 
community has remained reluctant to openly criticize the CPP-led government. 
Disagreements over the effectiveness of aid conditionalities as well as different 
national interests have not only made it difficult to adopt a united, consistent 
international approach for stimulating democratic party competition in 
Cambodia, but also allowed the Cambodian government to become skilled at 
playing out donors against each other.525  
have worked and are mostly still working on political party issues in Cambodia 
directly are UNDP, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International 
                                                
At the moment, the vast majority of bilateral, multilateral and international 
non-governmental organizations present in Cambodia do not engage directly 
with Cambodian political parties. Assistance activities that relate to political 
parties and party competition indirectly include voter education, election 
monitoring, decentralization and other issues. The only international actors that 
 
525 The limited direct international engagement with political parties and the ‘pro-stability/CPP’ 
stance of most international donors was highlighted by several party leaders and independent 
 Dilemmas”, p.85; St John, “Democracy in Cambodia – One Decade, 
analysts interviewed for this study. See also: Hendrickson, “Institutions Versus Personalities: 
International Peacebuilding
US$5 Billion Later: What Went Wrong?”; and Peou, International Democracy Assistance for 
Peacebuilding, pp.193-206. 
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Republican Institute (IRI) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). Their 
political party assistance activities have included constituency dialogue 
programmes, training on how to do public opinion polling, organize election 
lection observation by party agents, women leadership training 
nd equal-access radio and TV programmes.526 Although some of these 
l engagement –often in combination with monetary support from the 
am
tional party assistance 
has 
campaigns and e
a
programmes have been targeted at specific parties, most training workshops have 
been open to all parties. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this type of 
internationa
C bodian diaspora– has benefited opposition parties in particular and provided 
them with a degree of credibility and legitimacy.527 But in the absence of more 
detailed information and due to difficulties in measuring the impact of such 
activities, it is difficult to say what specific effects interna
had on the development of individual parties or on the nature of party 
competition. 
Overall, the reluctance of many international actors to take a critical stance 
towards the CPP-led government and the only limited amount of attention given 
to party development activities by the main donors seems to have been of most 
benefit to the CPP. With increasing investments from China, growing income 
from tourism and construction, and potentially large revenues from future oil and 
                                                 
526 Information from interviews with representatives of NDI, IRI and UNDP between May and 
July 2008 in Phnom Penh. 
527 On the important role of the Khmer diaspora in supporting opposition parties see Un, “Sam 
Rainsy and the Sam Rainsy Party”. 
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gas exploitation, international aid’s already limited leverage is likely to diminish 
further and the CPP’s ability to do as it pleases will continue to grow.528 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
This
ian 
parties, in particular FUNCINPEC. Over the years the latter has been 
significantly weakened and more than 15 years after its transformation into a 
political party it remains weakly institutionalized. The SRP, in contrast, has 
gradually become stronger and is now moderately institutionalized. Other parties, 
including the NRP and HRP that obtained seats only recently, are still weakly 
developed. At the systemic level, party competition in Cambodia has for a long 
                                                
 chapter has demonstrated that the institutionalization of political parties and 
party system in Cambodia has been profoundly shaped by the war and its 
aftermath.  
 Two decades of post-war politics in Cambodia has been characterized by a 
relatively stable but personalized form of party competition in which a bitter 
power struggle, uneven access to resources, and poor leadership in opposition 
parties have led to a dominant authoritarian party system. 
With an elaborate party structure that from its war-time beginnings has been 
closely intertwined with the state, the CPP has become the most institutionalized 
political party in Cambodia. Over time, the CPP has seen its electoral support 
grow, its party organization strengthened and its position as ruling party further 
consolidated. This has largely come at the expense of the other Cambod
 
528 Ear, “The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia”; and Hughes, “Cambodia 
in 2007. Development and Dispossession”, p.72. 
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time been unstable, with parties that are poorly organized and have only shallow 
roots in society. In addition, there has been a growing scepticism about the 
y and trustworthiness of elections and parties among the population. For 
ese reasons, the Cambodian party system can only be described as weakly 
stitutionalized. 
As explanations for this assessment, this chapter has highlighted that the 
introduction of multi-party elections competition at the beginning of the 1990s 
has changed the dynamics of party competition. However, it also concluded that 
this has not fundamentally altered the structures of individual parties nor 
corrected the dominant-authoritarian political system. Some sociological factors 
such as the access to resources were also found to be important, whereas other 
factors such as societal cleavages are not considered particularly relevant for 
understanding the nature of Cambodia’s party system. Rather, this chapter has 
demonstrated that for a fuller understanding of Cambodian party politics 
particular attention should be given to war-related institutional factors, including 
the war-time origins of parties, the nature of the peace process, the institutional 
design of key electoral bodies and last but not least, the quality of leadership. 
legitimac
th
in
 
 6 
Cross-National Patterns and the Impact of War 
 
 
 
he preceding analysis about post-war party development in El Salvador and 
riety of factors, in particular war and post-war institution 
uilding processes. But whereas the previous two chapters mainly used a ‘within-
case analysis’, this chapter will go a step further by identifying some of the 
cross-national patterns of post-war party development as well as exploring how 
far the findings can be generalized to other post-conflict cases. 
 It is important to remember that the primary aim of this study was to assess 
the relevance of three conventional theories and an additional ‘war-focused’, 
historical-institutionalist approach for explaining political party development in 
two very different post-war countries. El Salvador and Cambodia were selected 
as the most interesting pair for comparison because of the intensity and 
protracted nature of their wars, the significant number of years passed since their 
wars ended, the substantial international peacebuilding and electoral engagement 
in both cases, as well as the relatively limited scholarly attention for political 
party development in the two countries.  
 El Salvador and Cambodia are obviously very different as they neither have 
a comparable cultural and socioeconomic background nor share the same 
regional context. Moreover, the previous chapters have shown that the nature of 
T
Cambodia has shown that in each country political parties and party systems 
were shaped by a va
b
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the war and the political history of the two countries differ substantially. 
Nevertheless, both countries have experienced a long and turbulent conflict 
history that has profoundly affected the institutionalization of ruling and 
opposition parties as well as their interactions. This chapter will show that 
despite clear differences in their background, war has had a number of similar 
effe
Due to their unique historical, cultural and geographical backgrounds, 
Salvadoran and Cambodian political parties are quite different. Generally 
speaking, parties in El Salvador have a clearer ideological profile, are more 
policy- and interest-oriented and are therefore closer to the elusive ‘model’ of a 
Western political party than parties in Cambodia. Nevertheless, as we have seen 
before, most Salvadoran and Cambodian political parties operate on a similar 
patrimonial logic and both perform essentially the same role in presenting 
candidates for public office during elections. In addition, there are a number of 
other interesting similarities. 
One of the most salient parallels between the two countries is the similar gap 
in the degree of individual party institutionalization. The two ruling parties of El 
Salvador and Cambodia are each politically and organizationally significantly 
stronger than the various opposition parties. ARENA’s strength is a function of 
its organizational set-up as an alliance of influential societal sectors and its 
popular recognition as a symbol of anti-communist nationalism. The CPP derives 
cts in El Salvador and Cambodia. 
 
6.1 Political Parties: Different Backgrounds, Similar Gaps in 
Institutionalization 
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much of its strength from its hierarchical and centralized (communist) party 
structure pervading all administrative levels and institutions in Cambodia. 
Because of its relatively open alliance structure, ARENA has been able to adapt 
mor
e out of government 
with
e opposition parties. More than 15 years after both wars ended, opposition 
arties in El Salvador and Cambodia are only weakly to moderately 
institutionalized. As the previous two chapters have shown, there are big 
 and 
e quickly to new challenges and allowed for the emergence of new leadership 
within the party than the structurally more rigid CPP.  
Despite these differences, however, the organizational strength and 
privileged position of ARENA and the CPP vis-à-vis other parties is in both 
cases related to how the ruling parties came to power. In El Salvador and 
Cambodia alike the ruling party won government authority and managed to take 
control over the state long before the end of the war. In El Salvador, ARENA 
obtained governing power by winning the elections in 1988. In Cambodia, the 
CPP attained governing power by forcing the Khmer Roug
 the help of the Vietnamese army in 1979. This early capture of power 
enabled ARENA and the CPP not only to extend their political control over state 
policies but also over the state’s administrative and security apparatus. In both 
cases this led to deep penetration of the party into the state; in Cambodia, it led to 
an almost complete merger of party and state structures. 
With the institutionalization of the ruling parties has come a weakening of 
th
p
differences in the organizational and political strength of the opposition parties. 
The PDC in El Salvador, for example, is stronger than the CD, just as the SRP in 
Cambodia is stronger than the NRP. But more important is the huge gap in 
institutionalization between the various opposition parties on the one hand
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the two ruling parties on the other. In El Salvador and Cambodia, as perhaps in 
ther post-conflict societies, this gap seems to be much bigger than in even the 
allenges in building and 
stren
                                                
o
most asymmetrical party systems of more established democracies.  
If we compare, for example, ARENA and CD in El Salvador on two 
rudimentary indicators of political and organizational strength indicated in 
chapters 4 and 5, ARENA outperforms CD with a ratio of 49:1 in terms of 
control over municipalities (since 2006) and 142:1 in terms of estimated number 
of party members. In Cambodia this gap is even wider, with the CPP 
outnumbering the NRP with 1,591:0 in terms of municipal control (since 2007) 
and 7:1 in terms of party membership.529 For the two more moderately 
institutionalized opposition parties, the FMLN in El Salvador and the SRP in 
Cambodia, these ratios are much lower but still significant.  
As we have seen before, this lack of organizational strength is mostly related 
to the unequal access to (state) resources and in some cases poor leadership in the 
two respective countries. But what this also shows is that opposition parties in El 
Salvador and Cambodia have faced similar ch
gthening their organizational structures and have struggled to expand their 
political base vis-à-vis the highly institutionalized ruling parties. 
 
 
 
 
votes in the 2007 elections. Therefore, rather than intending to provide an accurate picture of 
party membership, these numbers are only used as an indication of organizational strength. 
529 See section 4.4 in chapter 4 and section 5.4 in chapter 5. It is important to remember that these 
numbers are rough estimates taken from various interviews. For example, the number of 700,000
NRP party members mentioned by Deputy Secretary-General, Suth Dina in an interview for this 
study seems to be grossly exaggerated if we consider that the NRP received less than 420,000 
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6.2 Party Systems: Different Make-Up, Similar Outcome 
 
The
sely at how 
part
rty activities. In order to retain 
where it did not have the necessary 2/3 majority to rule until 2008– but because 
 two countries also exhibit a number of commonalities in their overall party 
systems. Cambodia clearly has all the features of what Sartori calls a dominant-
authoritarian party system. El Salvador’s party system is more difficult to 
classify, however. In chapter four we concluded that it seems to correspond most 
with Sartori’s category of a polarized pluralist party system. But, looking beyond 
classifications, we can question the different nature of party competition in the 
two countries. At first sight, when analyzing El Salvador and Cambodia as two 
distinct case studies, the ostensibly more competitive form of party interaction in 
El Salvador –especially between ARENA and the FMLN–appears to have little 
in common with the relatively uncompetitive nature of party interaction between 
the CPP, FUNCINPEC and the SRP in Cambodia. However, when we consider 
the two cases from a more comparative perspective and look more clo
y competition works out in practice, it becomes clear that ‘party dominance’ 
is a crucial aspect of both countries’ party systems.  
In Cambodia, none of the opposition parties can compete with the CPP’s 
access to and use of the state and other resources. Chapter 5 has shown how the 
CPP relies on elaborate patronage networks to have access to state personnel, 
equipment and financial resources to support its pa
its dominant position, the CPP has also not hesitated to use the security forces 
and media outlets to attack and undermine the work of political opponents. The 
CPP has been able to do this not because of its formal position in parliament –
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of its informal, de facto control over almost all state, security and media 
institutions. 
Similarly in El Salvador –where ARENA has not had an absolute majority of 
seats– the ruling party has dominated the political arena. The data from chapter 4 
suggests that ARENA’s dominant position in the Salvadoran party system is also 
more a result of the party’s success in exploiting its control over the presidential 
office, state bureaucracy and the country’s media than stemming from its 30-odd 
seats in the Legislative Assembly. ARENA has tended to use this privileged 
access to strengthen its position not only during election campaigns but also 
between different elections. So although it theoretically does not qualify as such, 
the Salvadoran party system of the past two decades has come very close to a 
(pre)dominant party system. And despite the presence of a much stronger 
opposition party in El Salvador, the strategies employed by ARENA to maintain 
its dominance are not unlike those used by Cambodia’s ruling party.  
This comparative analysis of the Salvadoran and Cambodian party system 
shows that an exclusive focus on elections and seat shares (as in Sartori’s 
definition) might not always be appropriate. Findings from El Salvador in 
particular indicate that the relative access to and control over state resources 
among parties have a much greater influence on the degree of party dominance 
than exactly how many seats the ruling party has. 
 The unbalanced development of the party systems of El Salvador and 
Cambodia has also been made possible because of the relative absence of 
international pressure on the two ruling parties to stick to the ‘democratic rules of 
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the game’.530 In the early 1990s, major powers had a strong desire to reduce their 
military involvement and to exit and disengage themselves from the domestic 
politics of the two countries. For a long time therefore the primary focus of 
international post-war assistance to both countries was peacebuilding, not 
democratization and/or political party development. Not wanting to jeopardize 
the fragile political stability, important bilateral actors such as the US, EU, 
France, and Japan were reluctant to criticize the partisan use of state resources by 
ARENA and the CPP and ‘tolerated’ all but the most egregious limitations put on 
competitive politics. The channelling of massive international aid packages 
thro
dor to become a more democratic state with fair and 
nrestricted electoral competition. ARENA therefore knows that there are limits 
There has been no such message from the international 
ctors in Cambodia. As the two largest post-war donor countries Japan and 
                                                
ugh party-controlled government agencies further boosted the organizational 
development of ARENA and the CPP. However necessary for peacebuilding this 
strategy may have been, the consequence was that ARENA and the CPP could 
expand their control over the state, media and other institutions virtually 
unchecked and thereby strengthen their position vis-à-vis other parties.531 
The extent to which the ruling parties have been allowed a free hand by the 
international community has varied per country, however. Despite its public 
support for ideologically like-minded ARENA governments, the US has made it 
clear that it wants El Salva
u
to how far it can go. 
a
 
Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99; Peou, International Democracy Assistance 
530 As highlighted in chapters 4 and 5 international actors have engaged in different ways with El 
Salvador and Cambodia. Despite the occasional critical remarks, on balance this international 
engagement has been mainly accommodating and sympathetic towards the two ruling parties.  
531 This view is supported by several of the personal interviews conducted for this study. See also 
for Peacebuilding; and Wade, “The Challenge of Being Left in Neoliberal Central America”. 
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France have not wanted to interfere in any way in Cambodia’s political 
development. The US has been more critical towards the CPP government, 
although this position seems to have changed since oil was discovered off the 
coast in 2005. Generally positive assessments of international election 
observation missions, which have tended to play down widespread electoral 
irregularities such as in 1998 and 2003, further contributed to legitimize the 
CPP’s rule. In the absence of a strong, unified message from Cambodia’s 
ternational donors, it is therefore likely that the CPP has felt it enjoys more 
nd abuse power for its own partisan interests than ARENA has. 
post-war El Salvador and Cambodia. Arguments centred on the nature of 
 and the workings 
in
licence to use a
Finally, it is clear that the post-war party systems of the two countries are 
not fully institutionalized. Compared to the volatile and at times violent party 
politics of Cambodia, party competition in El Salvador has certainly been more 
stable and peaceful in the post-war period. Yet in both countries opposition 
parties remain weak, people have little trust in political parties and are becoming 
more and more disillusioned with elections as the mechanism to change 
government leadership. This lack of institutionalization in combination with the 
dominance of the ruling party has in both countries contributed to an uneven 
form of party competition. 
 
6.3 Impact of War... 
 
The previous two chapters have indicated that conventional theories cannot fully 
account for how parties and party systems developed and institutionalized in 
electoral competition, the presence of socioeconomic cleavages
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of formal electoral and government institutions have been found wanting. War-
related factors and war itself have proven to be a key missing element in the 
explanation of the uneven degree of party institutionalization and the unbalanced 
form of inter-party competition in El Salvador and Cambodia. If we look closer 
at the empirical findings from the two case studies, we can see that war has had a 
relatively similar impact on the political parties and party systems of El Salvador 
and Cambodia.  
 
… On Parties 
With
g local offices and organizing their electoral 
cam
                                                
 regard to individual political parties, war has had three specific effects. 
First, in both cases the war has provided a distinctive context for party 
development as postulated in chapter 3. Because of continuous violence it was 
virtually impossible for political parties to organize themselves and canvass mass 
support during the war. In El Salvador, only the right-wing and centre-right 
parties (PCN, ARENA and PDC) competed for votes, while the FMLN was 
excluded from elections. In Cambodia, no competitive elections were held 
between 1972 and 1993 and only one political party was allowed to exist. Even 
in the post-war period poor security hindered political parties in building up a 
local support base, establishin
paign. In the run-up to the 1994 elections in El Salvador, dozens of political 
activists were killed, many more intimidated and party property damaged or 
destroyed, despite pacts signed by all the main political parties.532 In the months 
before the 1993 elections in Cambodia, there were hundreds of allegedly 
 
 et al., Democratic Transition in 
ommunity, p.22. 
532 Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, p.258; Rubio-Fabián
Post-Conflict El Salvador. The Role of the International C
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politically-motivated murders and violent attacks against (opposition) party 
members and property. In some parts of the country artillery attacks by the 
Khmer Rouge made it almost impossible for political parties to conduct any party 
activities.533 Overall therefore, war and its aftermath had a generally negative 
environmental effect on political party development, either by disrupting or 
stifling the normal growth of already existing political parties or by altogether 
denying organizations the possibility to become a political party. Because of their 
incumbent position, ARENA and the CPP are the only two parties in Cambodia 
and El Salvador that have been less affected by this effect. 
Second, in both countries war has influenced and shaped the organizational 
structures of political parties. The highly centralized and disciplined party 
organization of the PCN in the 1960s in El Salvador, for example, was 
significantly weakened as a result of the conflict. During the war the party 
became increasingly dominated by the decentralized para-military ORDEN 
militias that were set up to control the rural population and repress guerrilla 
activities. As a result, central authority weakened and the party organization 
became much more militarized.534 Such a structural effect of war on party 
organization is visible in most parties, but has been greatest for those parties that 
emerged during the war itself.  
In the case of ARENA and the CPP the war has been a primary factor in the 
establishment of their party organizations. ARENA was set up to ‘defend’ El 
Salvador against the armed resistance of the left-wing guerrillas. The CPP’s 
predecessor, the KPRP, was created to ‘liberate’ Cambodia from the Pol Pot 
                                                 
534 Zamora, El Salvador: Heridas Que No Cierran, p.97 
533 Doyle, “Authority and Elections in Cambodia”, pp.154-155. 
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regime and install a different regime. As their political opponents were either 
weakened or outlawed, ARENA and the CPP could take over the state 
administration and security apparatus relatively easily and build up a nationwide 
netw
lthough political development was 
cert
of military commanders. In order to maximize operational effectiveness, the 
nt– were 
sed on 
ork of party cadre and supporters. This required a high degree of formal 
organization and a hierarchical, tightly controlled party structure to link the local 
and regional party branches and state institutions to the higher-level central party 
committee. From this perspective, the war put a premium on political-
administrative development of the ruling parties as one of the ways to gain as 
much control as possible over the state, territory and population. The war 
provided the ‘ideal’ conditions for young parties like ARENA and the CPP to 
grow quickly, attract and train new people and embed them in the most important 
state and non-state institutions. As a result, by the time the war ended ARENA 
and the CPP had highly institutionalized party organizations with a large number 
of experienced, well-trained party cadre and administrators. 
For the former rebel groups FMLN and FUNCINPEC the war gave a 
similarly strong impetus for organizational expansion. But because they were not 
allowed to participate in the political and electoral arena, their initial focus was to 
build up military structures and capabilities. A
ainly part of their activities –for the FMLN even more so than for 
FUNCINPEC– the development of their political wings was trumped by the 
focus on the military part of the organization. Both rebel groups had few trained 
and experienced political staff and their senior leadership was mainly comprised 
various armed groups –whose ideologies were sometimes very differe
united into a single resistance front under a unified command structure ba
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strict military discipline. But despite this unified structure at the top, during the 
war the FMLN and FUNCINPEC were by nature relatively loosely organized 
structures with different (regional) power bases.  
When the war ended, the FMLN and FUNCINPEC struggled to make the 
transformation from an armed rebel group to political party. Both faced an acute 
shortage of staff trained and experienced in governance and party administration. 
In addition, the unified structure that had kept the organizations together during 
the war disintegrated to a large extent. Old personal and ideological rivalries 
between groups and leaders quickly re-emerged and translated into a high degree 
of party factionalism. The FMLN became consumed in an internal power 
struggle between the ideologically strict ortodoxos and the more reform-oriented 
reno
 chapters have 
alre
                                                
vadores, which led to a number of splits. Groups united under the 
FUNCINPEC umbrella first split into different royalist (FUNCINPEC, 
MOLINAKA) and non-royalist political parties (e.g. BLDP). A few years later, 
FUNCINPEC splintered further into as many as eight different parties.535 In both 
cases, the military-oriented, decentralized structures of the FMLN and 
FUNCINPEC as rebel organizations had a detrimental impact on their post-war 
institutionalization as party organizations.536 
The third effect of war on political parties is attitudinal, meaning that war 
influences the behaviour of party leaders. The previous two
ady indicated the important role of leadership in the institutionalization of 
individual political parties in El Salvador and Cambodia. A large part of that 
 
536 For a more extensive analysis of the challenges faced by former rebel groups turning into 
535 Wade, “El Salvador: The Success of the FMLN”, pp.40-44; Rowley, “Cambodia”. 
political parties, see the various contributions in de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians. 
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leadership is made up of how a particular leader manages certain problems and 
which methods he/she uses to deal with these problems. This leadership style 
ranges from an authoritarian, confrontational approach to a more consensual, 
give-and-take approach. If we look at the behaviour of some of the main 
Salvadoran and Cambodian politicians it is obvious that most of them have a 
very forceful, confrontational leadership style that leaves little room for dissent. 
This
gstanding conflict 
etween the right-wing government and left-wing guerrillas spilled over into an 
At the same time, prominent FMLN leaders such as 
 has partly to do with the authoritarian political culture and tradition of 
‘strong leaders’ common to many Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. 
But the already existing undemocratic leadership styles of Salvadoran and 
Cambodian politicians were also exacerbated by the long period(s) of war in 
these countries. 
ARENA’s founder and early leader, Roberto D’Aubuisson, became more 
reactionary and repressive in his views and tactics when the lon
b
all-out war in the 1980s. 
Joaquín Villalobos and Salvador Sánchez Cerén also hardened their views and 
became increasingly intolerant of those who resisted armed struggle. Later party 
leaders, such as Alfredo Cristiani, Armando Calderón Sol (ARENA) and 
Facundo Guardado (FMLN), were markedly more moderate but their willingness 
to compromise with their political opponents remained limited.  
The KPRP/CPP’s Hun Sen emerged when the country had just been 
devastated by the extremist Khmer Rouge regime and was now trying to fend off 
attacks from an externally-supported armed resistance front that included KR 
forces. Right from the beginning Hun Sen’s leadership was therefore primarily 
focused on how to defeat his enemies –both in- and outside the party– and how 
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to consolidate a one-party socialist state. Key rebel leaders such as the KPNLF’s 
Son Sann and FUNCINPEC’s Nhiek Bun Chhay also concentrated on military 
affairs and were less interested in making compromises with the enemy. 
Norodom Ranarridh and even Sam Rainsy have continued this winner-takes-all 
attitude in the management of their own parties as well as in their interactions 
with
nt that provides the rules and 
regu
 political opponents.  
This analysis shows that leadership is not an unchangeable constant, but is 
rather something dynamic that can be influenced by other factors, including war. 
The uncompromising and confrontational leadership style of most Salvadoran 
and Cambodian politicians is certainly rooted in the respective country’s history 
of undemocratic, zero-sum politics. But the long period of war seems to have 
undermined the limited power-sharing or compromise elements there were and 
aggravated the authoritarian tendencies in leaders’ behaviour.  
 
… And On Party Systems 
The long and violent period of war in both countries has also shaped the way in 
which the various parties interact, or failed to interact. First, war has had a 
detrimental effect on the institutional environme
lations under which party competition takes place in El Salvador and 
Cambodia. By establishing extra-legal paramilitary structures to undermine 
opposition forces (El Salvador) or by banning non-ruling political parties outright 
(Cambodia) the war further weakened already fragile constitutional and other 
legal safeguards for free and fair party competition. After the war, new more 
democratic institutions were adopted, but both countries continued to have a 
weak regulatory framework with regard to political parties. In El Salvador, there 
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is still no specific law that regulates the formation, functioning and financing of 
political parties. In Cambodia such a law does exist, but is ambiguous when it 
comes to crucial areas such as intra-party democracy and party finance. 
Moreover, because of a biased and extremely weak judiciary –another legacy of 
the war– the law is just not enforced.  
Similar institutional weaknesses exist in the election administrations that in 
both countries are not considered neutral and independent. In an effort to appease 
formerly warring parties both countries opted for the establishment of election 
committees with non-independent, party-affiliated compositions. However, by 
basing their membership on party affiliation, the Salvadoran Supreme Electoral 
Trib
and ‘puppets backed or installed by 
unal (TSE) and the Cambodian National Election Committee (NEC) 
institutionalized old war-time divisions. This has made it very difficult for these 
institutions to be the neutral organizers and arbiters of elections the law requires 
them to be. After several changes, the Cambodian NEC now formally consists of 
independent experts only. The Salvadoran TSE has a mixed composition of 
party-affiliated members and independent experts. In practice, however, both 
electoral management bodies are still heavily politicized and their decisions 
generally indicate a bias towards the ruling party. 
A second common legacy of the war on Salvadoran and Cambodian politics 
is the hostile nature of party competition, especially during election campaigns. 
This is, for example, audible in the insulting, polarizing and abusive language 
party leaders use to discredit each other or their parties. ARENA and the CPP 
commonly brand their political opponents as ‘terrorists’ whose rule will ‘once 
again lead to instability and anarchy’, whereas the FMLN and the SRP accuse the 
ruling parties of being ‘corrupt oppressors’ 
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foreign regimes’ (i.e. the US and Vietnam respectively).537 Many of these labels 
are directly associated with the war period, during which parties were each 
othe
d by the total lack of trust between party leaders, which 
an often be traced back to the war or immediate post-war period. Because the 
 the sides wanting to give way. The concepts of ‘accountable 
overnment’, where the ruling party is held to account by the opposition, and 
                                              
r’s military opponent. These rhetorical devices appear to have been effective 
to some extent as they help cement support among party cadres as well as party 
supporters. The hostility of party interactions is also visible in the continuation of 
violent attacks on active party members and ordinary supporters in the post-war 
period, although this has been worse in Cambodia than in El Salvador. What is 
clear is that as a result of the war, attempts to undermine, block and attack 
political opponents by any means have almost become second nature to most 
parties. 
A final, related similarity at the party system level is that the war in El 
Salvador and Cambodia has reduced the willingness of parties to cooperate 
substantively. As mentioned above, many party leaders have an uncompromising 
leadership style, which hinders closer engagement of parties. This lack of 
engagement is exacerbate
c
war is a relatively recent phenomenon, many politicians still consider their 
political opponents as ‘enemies’ and find it difficult to cooperate with them. As a 
result, plenary and committee debates in parliament in both countries generally 
result in acrimonious disputes between the ruling party and opposition parties 
with none of
g
   
7 These descriptions are commonly used in local media reports and were referred to by several 
terviewees in El Salvador and Cambodia interviewed for this study. See also the various 
contributions in Artiga-González et al., La Polarización Política en El Salvador; and Hughes, 
“Parties, Protest and Pluralism in Cambodia”, p.171. 
53
in
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‘loyal opposition’, whereby parties agree to set aside their partisan differences 
r the greater good, seem anathema to Salvadoran and Cambodian party politics. 
f 
on in established 
em
nd Cambodia. Moreover, they demonstrate that its 
effe
 
fo
The only sorts of collaboration that can be found are the patrimonial 
arrangements between the ruling parties and their junior coalition partners, such 
as ARENA-PCN in the case of El Salvador and CPP-FUNCINPEC in the case o
Cambodia. But these arrangements are usually very unequal and have more to do 
with political expediency and personal gain than with genuine policy dialogue or 
team work. Moreover, this lack of cooperation is not only limited to interactions 
between ruling and opposition parties. Multi-party coalitions or even electoral 
alliances among opposition parties themselves –quite comm
d ocracies– are extremely rare in El Salvador and Cambodia. When such 
alliances do occur, such as the joint 1994 FMLN-CD-MNR bid for the 
presidency or the 2003 Alliance of Democrats between FUNCINPEC and the 
SRP, they are usually short-lived because leaders do not trust each other and are 
reluctant to compromise. 
 
These findings show that war has had a significant impact on parties and party 
systems in El Salvador a
cts on party development are remarkably similar across the two cases. The 
next section will look at whether these findings might in principle also apply to 
other cases.  
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6.4 Scope of Findings 
 
The analysis in this thesis is primarily based on empirical data from El Salvador 
and Cambodia. The conclusions drawn from that data in this and the previous 
two
 only on relatively similar cases it is possible to 
high
Guatemala, Haiti to Liberia and East-Timor. This diversity makes classification 
                                                
 chapters are therefore first and foremost pertinent to these two cases alone. 
But knowing that the experience of long and violent conflict has not been limited 
to El Salvador and Cambodia, it is fair to ask what the relevance of this research 
is for other post-conflict countries. Moreover, it is logical to ask whether there is 
the potential to generalize some of the findings and patterns of political party and 
party system development beyond the two cases studied here. 
 Realizing that conflict history, societal divisions and the electoral as well as 
political-institutional framework are usually quite distinct among countries, we 
should be very cautious in making generalizations, particularly if they concern 
countries from different parts of the world. Nevertheless, by treating the cases of 
El Salvador and Cambodia as examples of certain types of post-war party 
systems and by concentrating
light a few modest beyond-case inferences without incurring too great a risk 
of over-generalization.538 
Table 3.1 in chapter 3 identified 29 countries that can be defined as ‘post-
conflict’. This universe of post-conflict cases is very diverse and ranges from 
 
538 According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, “contingent or typological 
generalizations are often the most useful kind of theoretical conclusions from case studies, as 
l Sciences, p.110-111. 
they build on and go beyond improved historical explanations but present limited risks of 
extending these conclusions to causally dissimilar cases”. George and Bennett, Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Socia
 
314  Cross-National Patterns and Impact of War  
into neat, distinct party system types rather difficult. Nevertheless, from table 3.2 
we learned that post-war countries can be subdivided into four or five different 
type
e seen in the dominant-
  
s of party systems. Dominant-authoritarian and pulverised systems turned 
out to be the most prevalent post-war party systems.  
At first sight, El Salvador’s polarized pluralist party system seems rather 
exceptional in the wider group of post-conflict cases, partly because it is more 
institutionalized and partly because ideological differences play a bigger role 
than in the other cases. However, certain aspects of El Salvador’s party system 
are arguably representative of two different party system types, depending on our 
focus. If we focus solely on the close and ideologically charged electoral 
competition between ARENA and the FMLN, the dynamics of the Salvadoran 
party system are not unlike those of its eastern neighbour, Nicaragua, which also 
has a polarized pluralist party system.539 If, however, we focus more on the 
institutional strength of the main parties and the de facto dominance of ARENA, 
El Salvador’s party system seems quite similar to that of Mozambique, which has 
a predominant party system.  
Cambodia is a clearer case of a dominant-authoritarian party system and 
exemplifies several typical features, including highly unequal access to media, 
state and financial resources among parties and weakly institutionalized 
opposition parties. These same features can also b
                                               
539 This would be even more so in case of an electoral victory of the FMLN in 2009, something 
which is not entirely unlikely according to recent polls. Dada, “Tres Encuestas Confirman 
Ventaja de Funes Sobre Ávila”. 
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authoritarian party systems of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, whose dynamics 
resemble those of Cambodia’s party system.540 
The absence of fully comprehensive comparative data means that the 
relevance of the war-related factor approach vis-à-vis the three conventional 
theoretical approaches discussed before is difficult to assess for post-war 
countries that have similar party systems as El Salvador and Cambodia. In 
Nicaragua, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda comparable arguments 
can probably be made with regard to the role and influence of electoral 
competition, societal divisions, formal political institutions and war-related 
factors on party and party system development. But because the institutional, 
political and socio-cultural contexts of these countries are mostly very different 
from El Salvador and Cambodia, the relevance of the various theories is likely to 
differ as well. For example, the salience of ethnic divisions in party formation in 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and other African post-war countries might give a greater 
weight to the sociological approach in these cases. Therefore, although it seems 
ne of the main conclusions of this thesis –namely that the 
xplanatory power of the three conventional theoretical approaches on party and 
plausible that o
e
party system development is limited in post-war countries– is valid beyond the 
two cases of El Salvador and Cambodia, we cannot be absolutely certain in the 
absence of detailed information about the other cases. 
This also goes for the generalisability of the impact that war and war-related 
factors have had on individual parties and the overall party system in El Salvador 
                                                 
540 Just like in Cambodia, the ruling parties of Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda have all come to 
power through a military victory, which has arguably played a major role in their subsequent 
institutionalization and dominant position. See also Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of 
War”, p.270, n.1. 
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and Cambodia. The three groups of parties found in these two countries –ruling 
parties, rebels-turned-parties and new post-war parties– can be found in most 
post-war countries as indicated in section 2.2 of chapter 2. Because of similarly 
devastating and traumatic war experiences, it is therefore probable that the 
indi
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Parties and party systems in El Salvador and Cambodia are different, not in the 
least because of their varying history, cultural background and location. But 
despite the many differences there are important similarities. Both countries have 
ruling parties that are much more institutionalized than opposition parties, 
because of the same reason of capture of power during the war. Moreover, both 
countries have a party system that is dominated by a ruling party which has 
                                                
vidual parties of countries such as Nicaragua and Ethiopia, for example, will 
also have been affected by the environmental, structural and attitudinal effects of 
war as described above. The role of the war in the continuing factionalization of 
opposition parties and the no-compromise, (semi-) authoritarian leadership styles 
of many Nicaraguan and Ethiopian politicians are clear parallels.541 And the wars 
in Mozambique and Rwanda are likely to have had a similarly detrimental effect 
on the institutional environment of party interaction, and contributed to the 
hostility of party competition and the unwillingness of parties to cooperate, as in 
El Salvador and Cambodia. But further studies would be needed to confirm these 
extrapolations in full. 
 
541 On Ethiopia, see Abbink, “Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia 
and its Aftermath”; on Nicaragua, see Dye, Democracy Adrift: Caudillo Politics in Nicaragua. 
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exploited its incumbent position during
Massive and largely unconditional international aid packages channelled through 
the national government have further reinforced the position of the two ruling 
parties. 
The cross-case analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that the war that 
oth countries have experienced has had a significant, lasting impact not only on 
igorous extrapolation of conclusions from this 
thes
 and after the war against its opponents. 
b
the formation, development and institutionalization of parties and party systems, 
but also on the behaviour and interactions of party leaders. Generalizing these 
conclusions beyond El Salvador and Cambodia is possible but problematic. It is 
plausible that war and war-related factors have had a similarly important impact 
on the parties and party systems of other post-war countries, particularly in those 
countries with similar party and party system characteristics as El Salvador and 
Cambodia. Nevertheless, a more r
is requires further empirical research. 
 
 7 
 
ocracies, there are almost no studies that specifically address the 
rowth and institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war 
s. Moreover, there exists no single-authored study that 
xplicitly assesses existing theories of party formation and investigates the 
Conclusion 
 
 
Although there is growing scholarly interest in political party development in 
young dem
g
developing countrie
e
impact of war and post-war institution-building on parties and party systems 
from a comparative perspective.  
This study has attempted to fill this gap, at least in part, by reviewing the 
validity of three widely accepted theories of party development that focus on 
electoral competition, socioeconomic resources and cleavages, and formal 
institutions in El Salvador and Cambodia. The purpose of this exercise was to 
establish whether war has an influence on the political parties and party systems 
of these two post-war countries.  
The principal findings of the research are that not only are the mainstream 
explanations inadequate, but also that for a fuller understanding of post-war 
politics in El Salvador and Cambodia we need to take into account specific war-
related factors, especially the war-time origins of certain political parties. 
Another principal finding is that war has indeed had a significant impact on the 
formation, development, behaviour and interactions of parties in El Salvador and 
318 
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Cambodia. The overall conclusion of this study is that civil war is an important 
part of the explanation for the development and institutionalization of parties and 
ion competition, class-based socioeconomic 
party systems in post-war societies. 
This final chapter will briefly revisit the key propositions we started out with 
and highlight the main findings from each chapter that support the above 
conclusion. Subsequent sections will identify what the implications from this 
study are for theory and policy, and provide suggestions for future research on 
this topic. 
 
7.1 Main Findings 
 
As outlined in the introduction, the present study was informed by two 
hypotheses that linked war to party development. Reflecting the belief that war is 
more than just context and should be considered as an important independent 
variable in explaining post-war party development, the first proposition held that 
conflict history and the political conditions after civil war have a significant 
influence on the organization, functioning and interaction of individual parties in 
post-conflict societies. Challenging the Western-oriented, formalistic accounts of 
most academic studies of party development, the second proposition claimed that 
a historical-institutionalist perspective that takes into account the conflict-related 
dynamics of party development can complement mainstream theories of party 
politics, which rely on elect
cleavages and formal political institutional factors and fail to fully capture the 
institutionalization of party politics in post-conflict societies. Based on these two 
hypotheses, chapter 1 defined a number of research questions that guided the 
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subsequent literature review and helped the structured, focused analysis in the 
two (very) different cases of El Salvador and Cambodia.  
 Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed the existing literature on party and party system 
development in consolidated and new democracies as well as in post-conflict 
developing countries. Chapter 2 made clear that in Western established 
democracies electoral competition, the nature of socioeconomic cleavages and 
the workings of formal institutions, such as the electoral system and 
parliamentary or presidential form of government, were key factors in the 
development of parties and party systems. It discussed the strengths and 
weaknesses of different attempts to categorize parties and party systems. Also, it 
highlighted the importance of the two concepts of party institutionalization and 
Cambodia. Findings from extensive field research presented in chapters 4 and 5 
party system institutionalization. The chapter concluded that it is possible to use 
these concepts in trying to understand post-war party politics, as long as we are 
aware that they have certain methodological limitations and that not all their 
aspects are easily transferable to non-Western contexts. Based on the limited 
number of studies available about post-war politics, chapter 3 indicated that 
political parties in post-conflict countries face a unique set of challenges that 
shapes and/or hinders their growth. It argued that the key factors for Western 
party development are probably less significant for the development of political 
parties in post-conflict settings. Moreover, it concluded that the type and degree 
of institutionalization of post-war parties and party systems differ significantly 
from those in non-war contexts. 
 The empirical part of this study focused on the development and 
institutionalization of parties and party systems in post-war El Salvador and 
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have shown that the protracted and extremely violent period of war in both 
countries has shaped their post-war party politics in a way that cannot be 
xplained by the nature of electoral competition, social cleavages and formal 
pters have demonstrated that Salvadoran and 
ambodian post-war party politics can only be understood by taking into account 
ational actors should not be 
forg
explaining how war in both countries has had lasting effects on the formation, 
e
institutions alone. The cha
C
specific war-related institutional factors, including the war-time origins of 
parties, the way in which the war ended, the nature of the peace agreement, the 
post-war design of key electoral, media and other public institutions as well as 
the quality of leadership. The involvement of intern
otten either. By doing so, the findings from these two chapters essentially 
confirm the two propositions outlined at the beginning of this study. 
 Comparative analysis in chapter 6 has shown that despite clear differences, 
there are also important similarities with respect to post-war party development 
in El Salvador and Cambodia. Both cases show a similar pattern of uneven 
institutionalization of ruling and opposition parties with significant gaps in 
organizational and political strength between the two. Also, in both countries the 
ruling parties have used their war-time incumbent position to expand their 
control over state resources and institutions in the post-war period, which up 
until now has led to de facto dominant party systems. Massive and largely 
unconditional international aid packages channelled through the Salvadoran and 
Cambodian national government have further reinforced the position of the two 
ruling parties. Finally, chapter 6 re-affirmed the first proposition of this study by 
development, behaviour and interactions of parties and party leaders. It was 
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argued that such effects are likely to be similar in other post-war countries as 
well. 
 
ut also in Africa and 
                                                
7.2 Implications for Theory 
 
Apart from the specific empirical findings about patterns of post-war party 
politics in El Salvador and Cambodia, the outcome of this research has a number 
of implications for academic thinking about parties and party systems as well as 
for ongoing research on conflict and peacebuilding. 
First of all, this study has drawn attention to a gap in knowledge about post-
war party development that exists in the party politics literature. A few recent 
studies have gone beyond the ‘heartland’ of party development in Western 
established democracies and have focused on new areas of interest. Slowly but 
surely, more scholarly attention is being given to party development in young 
democracies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, b
Asia. Remarkably, however, the countries deeply affected by long and violent 
conflict within these new areas have been largely omitted from academic 
theorizing.542 This might be because data is often absent or unreliable, because 
war is seen as merely ‘difficult context’ not as a key factor, or even worse, 
because post-war political systems do generally not lend themselves to neat 
classification. This study has shown that that it is possible to collect relevant 
information from these areas, that war should be treated as an important 
 
542 See, for example, the otherwise very comprehensive analyses of Pridham and Lewis, 
Stabilising Fragile Democracies; and Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler, Votes, Money and 
Violence. 
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independent variable, and above all, that there are certain cross-case patterns in 
post-war party development that merit further systematic analysis.  
A similar gap in information and analysis exists in the literature on conflict 
and peacebuilding. Political parties have often not been included in the analysis, 
nner as in 
                                                
or if they have, are unhelpfully grouped together with other domestic actors, 
including civil society and government. Nowadays there are a few scholars 
working on post-conflict transition and electoral system design that have 
highlighted (but not yet fully explored) the important role of parties, their 
behaviour and interactions for the creation of a sustainable and democratic 
peace.543 But this type of research is rare and in the absence of larger systematic 
comparisons remains tentative. By looking at a broader set of cases, building on 
the data about post-war party-systems presented in table 3.2 in chapter 3, and 
following up on the many other leads presented in this study, it is possible to gain 
a deeper understanding of the development of post-war parties and party systems. 
Such attention is long overdue in both bodies of research. 
 A second implication of this research is that some of the existing theories of 
party development seem inadequate in certain contexts and therefore need to be 
revisited. This study has shown that in post-war societies elections are often not 
free and fair, that parties’ access to the media is unequal and that electoral 
competition does usually not revolve around ideological differences between 
parties. As a result, the structure of individual party organizations and the overall 
party system is not influenced by electoral competition in the same ma
 
Manning, “Party-building on the Heels of War”; Manning, The Making of Democrats; and Lyons, 
543 This includes Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”; 
Demilitarizing Politics. 
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established democracies. Similarly, socio-economic, cultural and other societal 
cleavages do not translate in the same way into post-war party systems as they 
have been said to do in many West-European countries at least in the early period 
of party development.  
 Cambodia’s party system, for example, is not built on the socioeconomic 
divisions in society that have been steadily growing since the end of the war. 
Rather than interest representation, Cambodian parties’ main aim is vote and 
power maximization and, in the CPP’s case, voter control. In El Salvador 
socioeconomic cleavages ostensibly have influenced the make-up of party 
competition, but not in a clear-cut one-to-one way. Finally, formal institutions 
like the electoral system, system of government and power sharing agreements 
have had an impact on the post-war parties and party systems. But because they 
are often accompanied by informal practices related to non-transparent party 
finance, partisan composition of election committees and patrimonial coalition 
arrangements, this study has shown that such institutions tend to work differently 
than a parsimonious theoretical model would suggest. The role of informal 
politics is obviously not unique to post-war situations. But because institutions 
that regulate party behaviour are either non-existent, underdeveloped or directly 
hat post-war parties and party 
vailable cannot fully 
associated with the violent past, there is much greater tendency to resort to 
informal arrangements in countries coming out of war. Therefore, if mainstream 
theories of party development are to be relevant for non-Western, post-war 
contexts, they need to take into account the informal practices as well. 
 Thirdly, this research has demonstrated t
systems cannot be easily classified, which presents a challenge to existing 
typologies. Even the two most extensive classifications a
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capture the variety of post-war politics. An organizationally thick, non-
ideological, hegemonic party like the CPP in Cambodia, for example, does not fit 
any of the 15 different party species in the elaborate typology of Gunther and 
Diamond.544 Similarly, El Salvador’s moderately institutionalized, highly 
polarized pluralist party system with clear one-party dominant tendencies seems 
to fall in between three different categories in Sartori’s typology of party 
systems.545 Because post-war countries so far have not been recognized as a 
separate ‘universe’ with highly distinctive, possibly unique contexts for party 
development, existing typologies cannot easily accommodate all the specific 
part
tionalization. This 
st
ies and party systems found in these settings. In order to address such 
shortcomings, more thought should be given to what it means for existing 
typologies that there are certain parties that have originated during war, that 
(partly because of their distinct origins) use specific, sometimes violent strategies 
to acquire and maintain a dominant position, and that fail to or only marginally 
interact with one another. If it is found that these aspects are significantly 
important for party development in a large number of cases, as this study might 
be thought to suggest, then we need to think carefully about whether and how 
existing typologies should be improved. 
 Another related implication concerns the need to further refine or perhaps 
revise the criteria for assessing party and party system institu
udy has found the concept of party institutionalization as proposed by Randall 
and Svåsand very useful, in that it covers the most important dimensions of 
                                                 
544 Gunther and Diamond, “Species of Political Parties”. 
545 The closest fit with El Salvador’s party system is Sartori’s polarized pluralist system. 
However, as indicated in section 4.6 in chapter 4, it also has several elements of a two-party and 
rtori, Parties and Party Systems. even a one-party dominant system. Sa
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political party development and facilitates comparison of individual party 
strength within and across countries.546 However, two of its dimensions –namely 
value infusion and reification– have proven extremely hard to assess in practice. 
This might partly have to do with the choice of cases. Both in El Salvador and 
am
                                                
C bodia political parties are generally not seen as representative of certain 
ethnic, religious or socioeconomic groups, nor are many of them sufficiently old 
and established enough to be considered as political givens. This naturally limits 
the extent to which supporters identify themselves with the party (value infusion) 
and reduces parties’ potential symbolical value (reification).  
However, it might also have something to do with the fact that in post-war 
and developing countries in general there is limited survey data available on 
people’s attitudes towards parties, which makes detailed assessment of the two 
dimensions practically impossible. Unlike in established democracies, in these 
countries there are few opinion polls that regularly ask about how voters feel 
about parties, why they vote for certain parties, which parties they think are most 
important and why.547 Inclusion of more specific party-related questions in future 
surveys is a first step in addressing this problem. Such information would 
presumably also make it easier to assess the perceived legitimacy of elections 
and political parties, which is a key aspect of Mainwaring and Scully’s theory of 
 
mocracies”. 546 Randall and Svåsand, “Party Institutionalization in New De
547 Even the widely respected and used surveys by the Latinobarómetro, Afrobarometer, 
Asiabarometer, and World Value Survey include only limited information about political parties. 
Despite their focus on democratization, many of the survey reports lack specific data on voting 
behaviour and party preference (though the World Value Survey questionnaire does include a few 
questions about these aspects). Moreover, most of them do not include post-war countries, 
presumably because of difficulties with data collection. See: http://www.latinobarometro.org/; 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/; https://www.asiabarometer.org/; and 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. 
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party system institutionalization.548 Subsequent clarification and further 
operationalization of value infusion and reification in concrete, measurable 
indicators is a second necessary step in order to improve the practical value of 
the party institutionalization concept defined in this way.549 
 Finally, this research shows that the evaluation of a political party or party 
system as weakly, moderately or highly institutionalized is rather subjective. The 
various dimensions and conditions spelt out by Randall and Svåsand as well as 
xample, when a party system has a 
latively stable form of party competition, a few parties with strong party 
and limited legitimacy –as in the case 
f Cambodia– is such a system weakly institutionalized or moderately 
Mainwaring and Scully provide useful indicators of party and party system 
institutionalization. However, they give limited guidance on how to value the 
overall degree of institutionalization and fail to establish the thresholds or  
benchmarks that would enable us to determine what stage of institutionalization 
has been reached in any particular case. For e
re
organizations, but with only shallow roots 
o
institutionalized? Do all the aspects carry an equal weight in deciding the degree 
of institutionalization, or are some more important than others? How should we 
value, rank or compare the various significant (and, possibly, opposite) changes 
in a party’s degree of systemness and other institutional dimensions, in practice? 
                                                 
548 Mainwaring and Scully, Building Democratic Institutions. 
549 For a recent attempt at operationalizing the concept in an index of party institutionalization, 
authors propose a
see Basedau and Stroh, Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries. The 
 modified version of Randall and Svåsand’s model by replacing the dimension 
‘rei
d 
to mix up or conflate various concepts, making their model –at least in the view of this author– 
of fication’ with ‘roots in society’ and by treating ‘autonomy’ and ‘coherence’ as the external 
an internal dimensions of ‘value infusion’. However, in the process of attempting to clarify 
party institutionalization, Basedau and Stroh lose the structural-attitudinal perspective and seem 
rather fuzzy. 
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And how many (time series) measurements do we need to conclude that a certain 
party is indeed institutionalized or not? The literature remains largely silent about 
these issues. Although this outcome confirms that any party or party system 
assessment remains above all a subjective judgement –affirming this author’s 
view that comparative politics is just as much art as it is science– it should not 
prevent us from building on the existing literature and trying to obtain a more 
precise account.  
 This thesis makes no pretence to address let alone resolve all these 
outstanding issues, but it does make clear that in order for there to be further 
progress along these lines, further refinement and development of the concepts of 
party and party system institutionalization might be a first requisite, especially if 
they are to apply equally across all societies. 
 
7.3 Implications for Policy and Practice 
 
 This study shows that knowing how and under what conditions political 
t 
er, when looking at how party 
The outcome of this research is also relevant to the design of international 
assistance policies and programmes that aim to foster stable and democratic 
parties and party systems. Although there is a growing recognition among 
democracy assistance actors that political parties play a key role in the 
development of more responsive and participatory governance systems, this has 
not always translated into more specific or appropriate assistance policies or 
programmes. 
parties emerge is extremely important for understanding their subsequen
development and institutionalization. Howev
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assistance programmes are designed in many countries, it is somewhat surprising 
to see that there is generally little systematic effort to learn about the historical 
background of individual political parties or to identify the long-term patterns of 
power distribution between parties and non-party actors. Yet, to know the origins 
and early decisions taken by parties makes it easier to understand why, for 
example, certain parties are so highly centralized (CPP) or particularly prone to 
factionalization (FMLN, FUNCINPEC). Sensitivity to such knowledge and the 
rela
   
ted respect for the difficult history of most post-war parties among their 
international ‘partners’ would be appreciated by party leaders; several of those 
interviewed claimed to be offended by the generic capacity-building programmes 
of most Western democracy assistance organizations.550 In addition, a more 
detailed assessment of parties’ historical development can identify the main 
internal obstacles to change, which in turn can help to design better targeted and 
more realistic assistance programmes. 
Second, findings from this research corroborate the conclusions of two other 
recent studies that the current party assistance approach has had little direct 
impact on the institutionalization of individual political parties.551 This is partly a 
result of the overriding influence of domestic factors and actors that often run 
counter to international efforts or are aimed at undermining party development. 
But it probably also has to do with the ‘business-as-usual’ nature of the many 
internationally supported (and designed) training and capacity-building 
programmes, which fail to take seriously enough the special organizational and 
                                              
550 Information from several author interviews with party leaders in El Salvador and Cambodia. 
551 See Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link, pp.163-166; and Burnell, “Looking to the 
Future. Practice and Research in Party Support”, p.200. 
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political difficulties many post-war parties face. In this connection, evidence 
gleaned from Cambodia suggests that for a party like the SRP efforts to 
mde ocratize and open up the party to (Cambodian) outsiders might have 
increased the level of infiltration by opponents and defections. In circumstances 
such as these, then, an ‘automatic’ focus by foreign assistance on encouraging 
greater intra-party democracy might be misplaced and even undermine the 
prospects for party institutionalization. 
More finely targeted programmes that take into account the distinctive post-
war conditions are therefore required. Based on the responses of several 
interviewees in El Salvador and Cambodia, there is an urgent need for more 
confidence building initiatives in order to address the lack of trust in and between 
parties after conflict, and to stimulate the necessary measure of inter-party 
cooperation.552 Special training and organizational development programmes 
that cater to the needs of those former armed groups that are genuinely interested 
in becoming normal (unarmed) political parties is another area of support that 
merits further attention. Moreover, in El Salvador, Cambodia and undoubtedly 
also in other post-war countries the institutionalization of opposition parties is 
negatively affected by a lack of money, unequal access to the media and the pro-
ruling party bias of the official election committee. In order to strengthen such 
parties and help create more stable, representative and balanced party systems, 
assistance providers should therefore also address the broader institutional 
environment influencing party competition, especially with regard to party 
                                                 
552 The Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) programme –which comprises a 
regular series of meetings between a broad range of Cambodian election stakeholders and has 
t is COPCEL?”. 
generally been positively evaluated by the participants– could serve as a positive example in this 
regard. See Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), “Wha
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finance, media access as well as the professionalism and neutrality of electoral 
institutions. 
 Finally, this study points out that international efforts to support the 
ntative parties and a democratic party 
ystem have often been undermined, not only by domestic governments and 
e. But 
 has done little to counter the pro-government 
–and
development of well-organized, represe
s
party leaders being resistant to change but also by the trade and security agendas 
of the same donor countries professing support for democratization. Aligning the 
various agendas of all these actors is not easy and perhaps even impossibl
it is certainly worthwhile to make the conflict between the different agendas 
more explicit in order to be able to isolate areas where compromise and/or 
coordination could be possible. In addition, we have to think about the 
justification for international actors giving direct and indirect support to political 
parties. Directly assisting political parties is something that remains highly 
controversial and can easily backfire, particularly in post-war societies where the 
political stakes are already extremely high and the risk of a relapse into violence 
is significant. Findings from El Salvador and Cambodia indicate, however, that 
indirect assistance such as international election observation and technical 
assistance to election commissions
 by extension pro-ruling party– bias of most bilateral development 
assistance programmes. In order to redress the structural imbalances in many 
post-war party systems in a way that is not too destabilizing, a more balanced, 
gradualist party assistance approach is needed.553 Moreover, if international party 
assistance is to have a greater and constructive impact on party and party system 
                                                 
553 See also Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”; and ten Hoove and Pinto-Scholtbach, 
Democracy and Political Party Assistance in Post-Conflict Societies. 
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development it should no longer be offered as an isolated activity. Instead, it 
should become an integral part of the broader democratic governance agenda. 
odia in 
this 
lighted in this study. A parallel or 
subs
 
7.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
To address the gaps in knowledge, understanding, policy and programming, 
further research about post-war party and party system development is needed. 
Such research could explore a variety of aspects and take different shapes. 
 In terms of empirical research, the most logical first step would be to 
increase the number of case studies, which will help to check whether the 
conclusions drawn in this study can indeed be generalized to other post-war 
countries. A broader set of cases would also allow us to examine whether there 
are others patterns or anomalies in post-war party development that have not 
been brought forward by the particular focus on El Salvador and Camb
study. In addition, by looking at all post-war cases it becomes possible to see 
the entire range of post-war parties and party systems, which helps to assess the 
relevance of existing typologies and/or identify what must be done in order to 
make them more comprehensive.  
A combined quantitative and qualitative research design would be 
particularly well suited to address the relative absence of systematic information 
about post-war party development. Quantitative research could help to spot 
similar and outlying cases and statistically measure relationships between the 
large number of factors already high
equent detailed qualitative analysis of several representative and deviant 
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cases could help to explain how the factors work and interact in a variety of post-
war settings. 
 Apart from the issues mentioned above, there are several additional 
questions that could feature in future research. As was flagged up in the 
introductory chapter, one topic particularly relevant to post-war politics concerns 
the links between party and party system institutionalization, peacebuilding and 
democratization –links that might run in either direction. This could include 
questions such as “is one-party dominance a necessary condition for political 
stability and democratization in post-war countries; and if not always the case, 
what are the circumstances that do make it necessary?”; “can political stability in 
ost-conflict countries also be achieved without one-party dominance, i.e. p
through multi-partyism?”; and “what is the significance of party 
institutionalization and party dominance for democratization in post-conflict 
countries?” These are all big questions that merit much further attention. 
Another fruitful topic for research concerns the (clientelistic) relationships 
between post-war parties and other societal actors and their implications for party 
and party system institutionalization. Following a similar interest already present 
in the mainstream party politics literature, such research could focus on parties’ 
links with the state and civil society. More specific to post-war contexts, it could 
also study party linkages with (para)military groups, armed militias and criminal 
organizations. It would be interesting to learn more about how these actors 
influence party behaviour and organization, and what causes such relationships 
to change. 
Finally, more thought could be given to the role and influence of 
international actors on post-war party and party system development. Empirical 
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evidence from El Salvador and Cambodia suggests that in this regard we should 
not only focus on bilateral and multilateral agencies or specialized party 
ssistance foundations, but also pay attention to diaspora groups and regional 
actors such as the OAS and IADB in the case of El Salvador and ASEAN and the 
ADB in the case of Cambodia. Possible questions could be: “what different 
actors are there and how does their engagement with parties differ, both in 
content and in impact?”; “what is the significance of the diaspora in party 
development in post-war countries?”; “is there evidence that post-war parties 
emulate the growth strategies of successful parties in neighbouring countries, and 
if so, what are the implications of such a ‘diffusion effect’?” 
 
This study has taken a first step to understand the institutionalization of parties 
and party systems in post-war societies. It has established that war has a 
significant impact on the formation, development, behaviour and interactions of 
parties and that war-related factors are an important part of the explanation for 
the institutionalization of post-war parties and party systems. This has been 
arrived at by independent research, posing and addressing questions and 
gathering information over and above what can be found in the existing 
literature. However, for practical reasons, the research here could only focus on 
two cases of post-war party development and a limited number of causal 
relationships. The many questions that still remain, including new questions that 
the research for this thesis and its findings have brought to light possibly for the 
very first time, are an indication that there is much scope for further research that 
could make a significant contribution to knowledge in this area. To reduce the 
gap in our knowledge about post-war parties and party systems and make sure 
a
 
      Conclusion 335 
 
that its should 
ow move forward as soon as possible. 
findings will benefit future assistance programmes, such research 
n
 
 Appendix I Interview Strategies and Structure 
 
 
 
The two main research methods used for this study are literature analysis and 
semi-structured, elite interviews. Where conclusions or judgements are made on 
the basis of existing party documents, official documents, reports as well as 
academic literature, these inferences can be verified by checking the footnote 
references systematically used throughout this thesis. It is therefore not necessary 
here to further elaborate on this method. However, where inferences are made on 
the basis of interviews with senior representatives of different organizations, this 
information is more difficult to verify. In view of the importance of elite 
interviewing for this study, and to be as transparent as possible, this appendix 
takes a closer look at how this particular research method has been applied. The 
first section discusses some of the main methodological problems and pitfalls of 
semi-structured, elite interviews and describes the strategies that were used in 
this study to mitigate them. The second section of this appendix gives an 
overview of how the actual interviews were structured. 
 
Methodological Challenges and Solutions 
 
As described by Burnham et al., elite interviewing comprises a four-step process 
of deciding who you want to see, getting access and arranging the interview, 
conducting the interview and analyzing the results.554 Each of these steps has its 
own practical and methodological challenges, but fortunately there are several 
ways to deal with them.555 
 Different types of selection bias are the main problem in the first step of 
deciding who to interview. There is a risk of political bias when interviewing 
only or mainly people from one particular political persuasion. Closely related, 
an organizational or institutional bias creeps in when only one type of 
organization or institution –such as a political party, a university or an NGO– is 
targeted for interviewing. A geographic bias occurs when interviewees are 
exclusively from one particular region, city or village. And finally, interviews 
can have an elite bias when only the most senior leaders or staff of certain 
organizations are consulted. To mitigate these biases and to make sure that the 
final selection of interviewees was as representative as possible, a number of 
measures were taken in this study.  
Because of limited time and resources I only had one opportunity to visit 
each case study country. Before deciding on whom to interview in El Salvador 
and Cambodia, I first contacted a number of recognized country specialists and 
asked them for suggestions. Having met or worked with some of them before this 
was not too difficult and resulted in a first tentative list of names of contact 
persons and potential interviewees. Going through that list I subdivided the 
names in three different categories, including a first category of political party 
                                                 
554 Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, pp.205-220. 
555 One practically-oriented guide to interviewing that was particularly helpful for this study is 
that by Kumar, Conducting Key Informant Interviews in Developing Countries. Other works 
consulted include Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing. The Art of Hearing Data; and 
Arksey and Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists. 
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representatives, a second category comprising academic experts, independent 
political analysts (including journalists) and civil society representatives, and a 
third
o be party 
repr
I used the same 
crite
act details, contact the interviewee –or in most cases 
eir ‘gate keeping’ secretaries– and make the appointment. This arrangement 
well in Cambodia, where because of the language barrier and 
e limited use of e-mail by political party representatives I was often unable to 
sing a digital recorder and taking additional 
otes. In Cambodia only notes were taken. The main reason for this difference is 
that it is less common, and perhaps culturally less accepted, to use a recording 
device during personal interviews in Cambodia. There, using a recorder would 
probably have made interviewees more reluctant to speak openly. In El Salvador, 
 category of staff of international organizations, including international 
NGOs. Later I added a fourth category of electoral officials. The main reason for 
this categorization was to increase the number of different perspectives on the 
research topic.  
At first the list of names was limited, with only a few potential interviewees 
for each category. But after contacting and interviewing several key informants 
the list of names quickly expanded until at the end it comprised more than 50 
experienced and knowledgeable potential interviewees per country. At that stage 
I became more critical and started to identify the people whom I assumed were 
the most relevant in terms of seniority, professional and/or personal background 
and the organization or perspective –academic, official/governmental, 
practitioner, etc. – they were representing. As political parties were my main 
points of interest most of my interviewees would have t
esentatives. To avoid any political bias in my selection I made certain that 
the list included a similar number of interviewees for each political party, 
particularly in the case of the two or three largest parties. Moreover, I took care 
that the list comprised people from different levels in the party hierarchy and 
from different factions (if any). For the other three categories 
ria and mainly focused on those people or organizations that were working 
on or directly with political parties. The final, fairly representative list of people 
included just over 70 interviewees and can be found in Appendix II. 
To get access to people and arrange the interview, I used two strategies. The 
first was to hire at local rates a well-connected research assistant or intermediary, 
who would retrieve cont
th
worked extremely 
th
contact people directly. In El Salvador, my Spanish language skills were 
sufficient enough to contact people directly and make appointments by e-mail or 
telephone myself. Nevertheless, also here I could still contact someone who 
would help me trace people’s whereabouts. Both strategies worked well and 
made it possible to contact and interview a relatively large number of people in a 
limited period of time. 
The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview guide with 
mostly open and a few closed questions. The use of this flexible but structured 
guide gave a certain freedom to dig deeper on certain aspects while maintaining a 
clear focus on key issues and core research questions. In El Salvador most of the 
interviews were fully recorded by u
n
by contrast, using a recorder was not an obstacle and many people, especially 
politicians, were accustomed to being interviewed and their comments recorded 
by journalists. The interviews took place at different locations in the capital or 
another major city of El Salvador and Cambodia, usually in the office of the 
interviewee. Exceptions included two interviews of opposition party politicians 
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in Cambodia, one of which took place on the campaign trail and the other one 
pening of a new regional party office.  
 I prepared a summary, or if appropriate, full 
ut the 
ltiple interviews by trustworthy people, had been cross-
st other sources where possible and seemed plausible considering 
notes by mentioning the name of the 
e interview. Where only one 
f Warwick’s Guidelines on Ethical 
de of Conduct, I have made every effort possible to 
d below.557 The nature and content 
r answered) in each of the interviews. 
epending on the professional background, experience, expertise and initial 
e available for the interview some 
ub-) questions were left out and/or shortened. In line with the focus of the 
during the o
After an interview was finished
transcript on the basis of my notes or the digital recording and tried to present the 
responses of each interviewee as accurately as possible. The format of each 
interview was generally the same because it followed the standardized structure 
of the interview guide. This uniform structure of the resulting transcripts made 
quick comparison easy and helped to highlight new or interesting findings. In 
case of conflicting or unexpected results I made an effort to ask abo
finding’s accuracy in subsequent interviews and/or check it by consulting 
relevant documentation, including party documents, websites, official documents 
and reports as well as academic books and articles. Only when the same finding 
was reported in mu
checked again
the wider context, did I conclude that the information was reliable.  
Where findings or conclusions presented in this study are based on interview 
material, this is clearly indicated in foot
interviewee as well as the date and location of th
interviewee is identified in a footnote, the information gained was subject to the 
same process of checking for verification against other sources.  
Finally, and in line with the University o
Practice and Research Co
protect my interviewees from any harm as a result of my research, informed them 
in advance about the nature of my research, obtained their consent when 
recording data, and honoured guarantees made for confidentiality and anonymity 
during the interviews.556 
 
Interview Guide 
 
Almost all interviews conducted for this study followed the same structure based 
on a list of open and closed questions outline
of the questions are derived from issues highlighted in the literature and were 
refined several times after the first interviews and after consultations with my 
supervisor. Not all questions were asked (o
D
responses of the interviewees as well as the tim
(s
research, priority was given to those questions that addressed the historical 
development of parties and the explanation for the nature of post-conflict party 
politics (see Parts II and V below). 
 
                                                 
 S556
R
ee University of Warwick, Guidelines on Ethical Practice; and University of Warwick, 
 further suggestions on how to 
proach certain research questions in El Salvador and Cambodia and who to contact on which 
articular issue. 
esearch Code of Conduct. 
557 The more informal conversations I had with country specialists were more loosely structured 
and, in addition to data collection purposes, also served to obtain
ap
p
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Preamble 
Including:  
 Opening / formal introduction: 
ral student in the 
Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of 
om. [where useful: I am also a research 
associate at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 
l research focuses on the development of political 
parties and party systems in post-conflict countries, and particularly 
 in order to learn more about the 
origins, development, and nature of political parties and party 
-45 
minutes, depending on the discussion 
- Would it be okay if I would electronically record this interview and/or 
are extremely important and do not want to forget what is being 
said. Nevertheless, I want to reassure you that the recording/notes taken 
search 
purposes and will be kept safe through electronic encryption on my 
id during the interview will 
be treated confidentially and will not be used or distributed without your 
ve you held? 
 
t the time about party politics? 

- my name is Jeroen de Zeeuw and I am a docto
Warwick in the United Kingd
‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, where I have worked on several research 
projects about the building of democracy in post-conflict societies] 
- My current, doctora
addresses the effects of civil war on party organization and inter-party 
competition. 
 Purpose: 
- I would like to ask you a few questions
competition in [name of country]. 
 Scope and expected time needed for interview: 
- The interview consists of five parts, each with a small number of 
questions. The entire interview will probably not take more than 30
 Permission to record: 
take some notes during our conversation? I do this because I believe your 
views 
during the interview will only be used for my own personal re
computer. 
- Please feel free to stop me recording or taking notes in case you would 
like to say something ‘off the record’ 
- Finally, I want you to know that everything sa
permission. 
 
Part I – General Introduction and Context 
 
1. Could you tell me a bit more about your own personal background; what is 
your current position in [name of party, organization, etc.]; and what previous 
positions ha
 
2. Why did you become involved in party politics? 
3. Cast your mind back to the early 1990s [end of the war]; were you optimistic 
or pessimistic a
 
4. Can you describe some of the main developments in the field of party politics 
that have taken place since the end of the conflict? 
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5. In your view, what are the major issues and problems for political parties in 
general in [name country] today? 
. How did [name party] originate and what were the key motivations for its 
. How is the party organized? How have the party’s organizational structures 
, de/centralized, 
etc.)? How do you consult your members?  
. Some people would say all political parties look like a pyramid with the party 
uld you categorize the organizational development of the main parties 
in [name country] today? In your opinion, what explains the difference in 
art III – Party Institutionalization 
 considered to be a function of its 
rganizational strength, its autonomy, the identification and commitment of its 
 and supporters, and its symbolic and political value as an important 
3. Would you say your party is better organized than the other parties? Please 
 
 
 
Part II – Party Origins and Organizational Development 
 
[specifically for party representatives] 
 
6
establishment? Have there been any changes in the party’s aims/objectives 
over the years? 
 
7
changed since the end of the conflict? How would you characterize the 
organizational structure of the party now (non/hierarchical
 
8
members and supporters at the bottom and the party leadership at the top. If 
you would have to make a drawing that represents your party’s structure, 
what would it look like, and where does the decision-making power lie?  
 
[specifically for staff of international (non-governmental) organizations] 
 
9. How does your organization help the development of political parties in this 
country? 
 
[specifically for other interviewees (from civil society, media, academia)] 
 
10. On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being weakly developed, 5 being strongly developed, 
how wo
organizational development between the parties? 
 
P
 
[The institutionalization of a political party gives an indication of its routine 
functioning and durability over time, and is
o
members
political actor] 
 
11. What would you say the main achievements of your party are? 
 
12. How important is public funding to your party? Who do you regard as your 
main backers? 
 
1
give examples? How do you explain this difference?
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Part IV – Relations With Other Parties and Party System 
Institutionalization 
 
14. How would you characterize your party’s relationship with the other main 
parties? Does your party have any formal or informal links with other parties 
inks 
consist of? (sharing ideological goals, coalition voting, etc.) 
 
15. Would you say there is a level playing field for all parties? Is it always 
obvious who will win the election (same for presidential, parliamentary, 
municipal elections)? 
 
16. Do the people of this country accept political parties as legitimate? How 
would you characterize their attitude towards party politics? 
 
Part V – Explaining Post-Conflict Party Politics 
 
There are different explanations for the nature of political party development and 
inter-party competition in a particular country. One theory argues that the 
structure of political parties and the party system reflects the main social 
divisions or cleavages in society. Another theory asserts that the organizational 
structures of parties and the nature of party competition results from the 
workings of the electoral system. A third theory claims that the 
institutionalization of political parties and party competition can be explained by 
the particular origins of parties and their historical legacy. 
 
17. In your view, what has been the most important influence on political parties 
and party competition in [name country] over the past fifteen years? What is 
the most important determinant for a party to be successful (now and in the 
past)? 
 
18. Can you think of ways in which the civil war period still influences political 
parties today? 
 
19. Do you anticipate any significant developments to take place in the near 
future (in terms of number of parties, balance of power between them), and 
why? 
 
Closing 
We have almost come to the end of the interview. 
 
20. In trying to understand the essence of political parties in [name country], is 
there something I left out/overlooked? Are there any remaining issues you 
would like to raise that we have not yet discussed? And are there any 
publications or documents relevant to my research that you could 
recommend? 
 
A few small issues to finish with: 
in parliament (or political groups outside parliament), and what do these l
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 If I decide to use some of the material from this interview as literal quotes in 
my thesis report, may I attribute the information to you personally, or 
alternatively would you prefer to remain anonymous? 
 If I have any further questions, would it be okay to contact you again? 
 
Thank you very much for taking time out of our busy schedule to talk to me. 
 
 Appendix II List of Inte
 
1 arty re
ana N
rviews 
 
 
Interviews El Salvador (September – October 2007) 
 
.  Political p
 
presentatives 
Alianza Republic acionalista (ARENA) 
Milena Calderón de 
Escalón 
1 October 20 dor President of External Affairs 
Committee 
07, San Salva
Luis Cardenal  
 
13 September 2007, San 
S
Former Minister of Tourism (2004-
2005), former Director of Center of
Democratic Studies (CEDEM) 
alvador 
Armando Calderón lic 24 October 2007, San Salvador 
Sol 
Former President of the Repub
(1994-1999), President of the Union of 
Latin American Parties (UPLA) 
 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) 
Salvador Sánchez 
Cerén 
ary Fraction and 
vice-presidential candidate, FMLN 
2 ador Coordinator Parliament 3 October 2007, San Salv
Gerson Martínez  
MLN 
1 ador Secretary of the Board of the National 
Assembly, representing the F
6 October 2007, San Salv
Blanca Flor Bonilla 1Diputada (member of parliament) for 
San Salvador 
 October 2007, San Salvador 
Walter Durán Diputado for Usulután 2 October 2007, San Salvador 
 
Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN) 
José Antonio 
Almendariz 
l 
bly, representing the PCN 
23 October 2007, San Salvador Secretary of the Board of the Nationa
Assem
 
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) 
Ana Guadalupe 
Martínez  
2 vador Deputy-Secretary PDC; former FMLN 
comandante 
 October 2007, San Sal
 
Cambio Democrático (CD) 
Jorge Villacorte Diputado Central American Parliament 
(PARLACEN), long-term diputado for 
CD 
1
S
4 September 2007, San 
alvador 
Ruben Zamora 
e for CD-FMLN 
24 October 2007, San Salvador Long-term diputado for CD, and former 
presidential candidat
(1994) and CD 
Héctor Silva Argüello 
(2004) 
1  Two-time mayor for FMLN and 
presidential candidate for PDC-CDU 
8 October 2007, San Salvador
 
Frente D mocrático Revolucionario (FDR) e
Julio Hernández  1 General coordinator FDR; former 
FMLN campaign coordinator 
October 2007, San Salvador 
 
Partido de Movimiento Revolucionario (PMR) 
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Facundo Guardado ral 
tial candidate FMLN (1999)  
17 October 2007, San Salvador Former president PMR, former gene
coordinator FMLN (1997-1999) and 
presiden
 
.  Aca2 demic experts resentatives 
Artiga-  Political 
ana 
21 September and 25 October 
, political analysts, civil society rep
 
Álvaro 
González 
Director Masters Programme in
Science, Universidad Centroameric
‘Jose Simeón Cañas’ 
2007, San Salvador 
Jeanette Aguilar tario 
cana ‘Jose 
18 October 2007, San Executive Director Instituto Universi
de Opinión Pública (IUDOP), 
Universidad Centroameri
Simeón Cañas’ 
Salvador 
Eduardo Sancho Francisco 
Gaviria (UFG), and former leader of 
LN) 
007, San 
Salvador 
Researcher, Universidad 26 October 2
Resistencia Nacional (FM
Amílcar Mejía Journalist and Coordinator of the Political 
a Prensa Gráfica 
11 October 2007, San 
Salvador Section, L
Anne Germain Independent consultant 17 September 2007, San 
Salvador Lefèvre 
Inés Ortiz Independent consultant 25 September 2007, San 
Salvador 
Roberto Rubio- 11 September 2007, San 
Fabián 
Executive Director Fundación Nacional 
para el Desarrollo (FUNDE) Salvador 
Antonio Cañas 1 October 2007, San Salvador Independent consultant, former 
programme officer UNDP 
Gerardo Balzaretti cal Studies 
th” 
4 October 2007, San Salvador 
Kriete 
President,  Center for Politi
“Dr. Jose Antonio Rodriguez Por
Manuel Vásquez Executive Director, Center for Political 
Studies “Dr. Jose Antonio Rodriguez 
h” 
8 October 20
Port
07, San Salvador 
Roberto Ortíz 
Avalos 
Vice-president Banco Cuscatlán 8 October 2007, San Salvador 
Carlos Ramos Researcher, Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) 
12 October 2007, San 
Salvador 
Wim Savenije Researcher, Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) 
26 Septem
Salvador 
ber 2007, San 
Ralph Sprenkels Programme coordinator for Interchurch 
Organization for Development Co-
4 and 26 October 2007, San
Salvador 
Operation (ICCO), and researcher, 
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias 
Sociales (FLACSO) 
 
Christine Wade Assistant professor of political science 
d El Salvador and international studies, an
specialist, Washington College (USA) 
Several e-mail conversations 
between December 2006 and 
October 2007 
 
3  Staff of international organizations . 
 
de Rosamaría 
Colorado 
Programme Officer Governance, United 
Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
20 September 2007, San 
alvador S
Claudia Dubón de Programme Officer, United Nations 2 October 2007, San Salvador 
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Morales Development Programme (UNDP) 
Ingrid Schlaffke de idel Foundation 
Escobar 
Representative, Hanns Se
(HSS) 
23 October 2007, San 
Salvador 
Deborah Kennedy-
Iraheta pment (USAID) 
 October 2007, San Salvador Director, United States Agency for 
International Develo
9
Mauricio Herrera 
oello Governance Office (USAID) 
or 
C
Deputy Director, Democracy and 9 October 2007, San Salvad
Roberto Rodríguez Director Justice and Governance 
ncia Española de 
Cooperación Internacional (AECI) 
11 October 2007, San 
Programme, Age Salvador 
Alejandra (Sofia) Programme
Castillo 
 officer, Delegation of the 
ission 
15 October 2007, San 
European Comm Salvador 
Wouter Wilton Chargé d’Affaires, Delegation of the 
European Commission 
19 October 2007, San 
Salvador 
 
In ambodia (A
 
1. prese
 
People’s Pa
terviews C pril – August 2008) 
Political party re ntatives 
Cambodia rty (CPP) 
Cheam Yeap  Committee of 
 
6 August 2008, Phnom Penh Member of Standing
Central Committee and Member of
Parliament, CPP 
Ke Bun Khieng Deputy Chief of Central Commission of 31 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Propaganda and Education, CPP 
Som Soeun Deputy Chief of Cabinet of the CPP 12 June 2008, Phnom Penh 
Central Committee 
Choeung Sin  June 2008, Battambang Vice Governor Sangker district 
(Battambang) 
61
 
Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) 
Mu Sochua Deputy Secretary General, SRP 14 June 2008, Kampot 
Eng Chhai Eang 1 July 2008, Phnom Penh Secretary General, SRP 3
Keo Phirum Deputy Chief of Cabinet, SRP 31 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Khem Sita Reserve Candidate for Battambang 
province 
16 June 2008, Battambang 
 
National Unit
(FUNCINPEC
ed Front for an Independent, Neutra
) 
l, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 
Yok Sithoun  Vice Provincial Director FUNCINPEC 
(Battambang) 
17 June 2008, Battambang
Hun Ly Oeur Advisor to Keo Puth Reasmey (Party 
President and Deputy Prime Minister) 
6 June 2008, Phnom Penh 
Long Sarin Deputy Secretary General 5 August 2008, Phnom Penh 
Suon Khieu Advisor to Nhek Bun Chhay (Deputy 
Secretary General) 
5 August 2008, Phnom Penh 
 
Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) 
Suth Dina Deputy Secretary-General, Chairman of 
Electoral Task Force, Battambang 
13 June 2008, Phnom Penh
 
 
Muth Chanta  August 2008, Phnom Penh Official spokesperson, NRP 5
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Human Rights Party (HRP) 
Ou Chanrath Secretary General, HRP 7 June 2008, Phnom Penh 
Pen Sovan  
Minister of the People’s Republic of 
RK) 
 Penh 
 
Vice-President HRP, former Prime 13 June 2008, Phnom
Kampuchea (P
Sun Kim un Provincial Director HRP (Battambang) 17 June 2008, Battambang h
 
Khmer Democratic Party (KDP) 
Uk Phourik President, KDP 9 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
 
Khmer Republican Party (KRP) 
Lon Rith RP 12 June 2008, Phnom Penh President, K
 
2.  Electoral officials 
3. A
Tep Nytha n 3 June 2008, Phnom Penh Secretary-General, National Electio
Committee (NEC)  
Khan Keomono  Penh Chief of Public Information Bureau 
(NEC) 
3 June 2008, Phnom
Vorn Porn ittee 
(PEC), Battambang 
bang Chairman Provincial Election Comm 17 June 2008, Battam
Luy In Ad
 
cademic experts, political analysts, civil society representatives 
ministrator Provincial Election 17 June 2008, Battambang 
Committee (PEC), Battambang 
K m Penh oul Panha 2008, PhnoExecutive Director, Committee for Free 6 June 
and Fair Elections in Cambodia 
(COMFREL) 
 
Im Francois Head, Elections and Parliamentary Unit, 4 August 2
Center for Social Development (CSD) 
008, Phnom Penh 
Chea Vannath Independent political analyst, former 
director of Center for Social Development 
(CSD) 
3 June 2008, Phnom Penh 
 
Ok Serei Sopheak Political analyst and independent 
consultant 
4 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Kim Sedara Research Fellow, Cambodia Development 
Resource Institute (CDRI) 
6 May 2008, Phnom Penh 
Han Phoumin Programme Manager, Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI) 
6 May 2008, Phnom Penh 
Sok Sethea Programme Officer, Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI) 
6 May 2008, Phnom Penh 
Kristina Chhim Political analyst and independent 
consultant 
7 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Kheang Un Assistant Director and Cambodia 
specialist, Center for Southeast Asian 
Studies, Northern Illinois University 
(USA) 
21 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Hean Sokhom President, Center for Advanced Studies 5 August 2008, Phnom Penh 
Caroline Hughes Lecturer and Cambodia specialist, 
Department of Political Science and 
International Studies, University of 
1 April 2008, Birmingham 
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4. Staff of international organizations 
 
Jerome Cheung Resident Country Director, National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) 
4 June 2008, Phnom Penh 
John Willis Resident Country Director, International 
Republican Institute (IRI) 
25 June 2008, Phnom Penh 
Nicole Sayres Deputy Country Representative, Asia 
Foundation 
14 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Khut Inserey Senior Programme Officer, Asia 
Foundation 
14 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Aamir Arain Project Manager, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
6 May 2008, Phnom Penh 
Hassan Kelleh Sesay Elections Adviser, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
6 May and 21 July 2008, 
Phnom Penh 
Sarah Dietch Voter Education Advisor, United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
6 May and 21 July 2008, 
Phnom Penh 
 
5. Observation of Meetings 
Observation of formal meetings between election stakeholders –including 
representatives of political parties, NEC/PEC, government officials and civil society 
organizations– organized by the Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI) 
under their Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) initiative: 
- COPCEL Provincial Meeting, 27 May 2008, Battambang 
- 35th COPCEL Enlarged Meeting, 29 May 2008, Phnom Penh 
- 37th COPCEL Enlarged Meeting, 24 July 2008, Phnom Penh 
Birmingham (UK) 
Roger Henke Coordinator, Democratization and 
Peacebuilding Programme, ICCO 
25 June and 21 August 2008, 
Phnom Penh 
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able III.1 Results Legislative Elections El Salvador (1982-1991) (Val
ix II Election esults El Salvad r, 1982 – 2006 
T id 
Votes and Seats)558 
 Election Year 
Political Party 1982 1988 1991 1985
votes 546,218 71 294,505,338 326, 6 029 P
24 33 2
DC 
seats 2 26 
votes 04 6,665 447,69 46402,3 28 6 6,091 A
seats 19 n.a. 3
RENA 
0 39 
votes 2 53 30 78,7 94,531 61,1 80,7 56P
seats 14 n.a. n
CN 
.a. 9 
votes - - - 127,855 C
seats - - -
D 
8 
votes 80 98 77,591 68,995,9 89,4 75 Other 
seats 3 n.a. n.a. 2 
votes 1,305,655 962,231 930,759 1,051,481 Total 
seats 60 60 60 84 
 
Table III.2 Resu
ats
lts Legisl ections El Salvador (1994-2006) (Valid 
 and )559 
Election Year 
ative El
Votes  Se
 
Political 
Party 
1 199 2000 2003 2006  994 7
votes 605
(45
396,301 
(35%)
6,169 
)
446,279 
(32%) 
783,230 
(39%) 
,775 
) %
43
(36%
ARENA 
 39 (46 28 (33%) 27 (32%) 34 (40%) seats %) 29 (35%)
votes 28 369,70
(33%
6,289 
)
475,130 
(34%) 
785,072 
(39%) 
7,811 
(21%) 
9 
)
42
(35%
FMLN 
ats 21 (25%) 27 (32%) 31 (37%) 32 (38%) se  31 (37%)
votes 83,520 
(6%) 
97,362 
(9%)
106,802 
(9%)
181,167 
(13%) 
228,
(11
196 
%) 
PCN 
seats 4 (5%) 11 (13%) 14 (17%) 16 (19%) 10 (12%) 
votes 240,451 
(18%) (8%)
87,074 
(7%)
101,854 
(7%) 
138,538 
(7%) 
93,645 PDC 
seats  (21% (6% 5%) 6 (7%) 18 ) 7 (8%) 5 ) 4 (
votes 59,483 
(
45 
(3
,070 
(5%)
,090 61,022 
(3%) 4%) 
39,1
%)
65 89
(6%) 
CDU/CD 
seats 1 (1%) (4%) (6%) 2 (2%) 2 (2%) 3 5 
votes 68,237 
(5%) 
123,441 
(11%)
88,865 
(7%)
105,206 
(7%) 
1,956  
(0%) 
Other 
seats 1 (1%) 9 (11%) 2 (2%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 
                                                 
558 1982-1988 results from Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador, p.161, p.196 and p.208; 1991 
results from Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (CIDAI), “Las 
Elecciones del 12 de Marzo: ¿Triunfo del FMLN o Fracaso de ARENA?”, pp.244-245. Note: n.a. 
m
559 1994 results from Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación 
(CIDAI), “Las Elecciones del 12 de Marzo”, pp.244-245; 1997-2006 results from Centro de 
Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (CIDAI), “Las Elecciones Legislativas 
y Municipales de 2006”, pp.212-213. 
eans ‘not available’. 
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votes 1,345,277
(100%)
9,603 
100%)
9 
00%)
,726 
0%) 
1,998,01
4 (100%)
 1,11
(
1,210,26
(1
1,398
(10
Total 
seats (100% 100%) 0% 0%) 84 
(100%)
84 ) 84 ( 84 (10 ) 84 (10
 
Table III.3 Results Municipal Elections El Salvador (1994-2006) (Number of 
alships)560
 Election Year 
Mayor  
Political party 199 199 003 20064 7 2000 2
ARENA 206 160 127 111 147
FMLN 16 54 (a) 79 (c) 74 (c) 59 (e)
PCN 9 18 33 53 39
PDC 30 19 (b) 16 18 (b) 14
CDU/CD 0 0 4 4 3 (d)
Other 1 11 3 2 0
Total 262 262 262 262 262
 
Table III.4 Results Presidential Elections El Salvador (1984-1989) (Valid 
Votes and Percentages)561 
 Election Year 
Political Party 1984 1989
votes 549,727 338,369PDC 
% 43.41 36.03
votes 376,917 505,370ARENA 
% 29.77 53.82
votes 244,556 38,218PCN 
% 19.31 4.07
votes 95,076 57,121Other 
% 7.51 6.08
votes 1,266,276 939,078Total 
% 100 100
 
Table III.5 Results Presidential Elections El Salvador (1994-2004) (Valid 
Votes and Percentages)562 
 Election Year 
Political Party  1994 1999 2004 
votes 651,632 614,268 1,314,436 ARENA 
% 49.11 51.96 57.71 
votes 331,629 (a) 343,472 (b) 812,519 FMLN 
% 24.99 29.05 35.68 
                                                 
560 1994 results from Centro de Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación 
(CIDAI), “Las Elecciones del 12 de Marzo”, p.244; 1997-2006 results from Centro de 
Información, Documentación y Apoyo a la Investigación (CIDAI), “Las Elecciones Legislativas 
y Municipales de 2006: Polarización Sociopolítica y Erosión Institucional”, p.209. Notes: (a) 6 
mayoralships in coalition; (b) 4 mayoralships in coalition; (c) 12 mayoralships in coalition; (d) 1 
mayoralship in coalition; (e) 5 mayoralships in coalition. 
561 Results from Artiga-González, Dos Décadas de Elecciones en El Salvador, p.120. 
562 1994 results from Artiga-González, Dos Décadas de Elecciones en El Salvador, p.120; 1999 
and 2004 results from Córdova, Cruz and Seligson, Cultura Política de la Democracia en El 
Salvador: 2006, p.9. Notes: (a) in coalition with CD and MNR; (b) in coalition with the USC; (c) 
in coalition with PD, PPL, MUDC and FE; (d) coalition of PDC and CD. 
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votes 70,854 45,140 61,781 PCN 
% 5.34 3.82 2.71
votes 215,936 67,207 88,737 (d) PDC 
% 16.27 5.68 3.9
votes - 88,640 (c) - (d)CDU/CD 
% - 7.50 - 
votes 56,785 23,521 -Other 
% 4.29 1.99 -
votes 1,326,836 1,182,248 2,277,473Total 
% 100 100 100
 
 
 Appendix IV Election Results Cambodia, 1993 – 2008 
 
 
 
Table IV.1 Results Parliamentary Elections Cambodia (1993–2008) (Valid 
Votes and Seats)563 
 
  Election Year 
Political Party 2003 2008  1993 1998
votes 1,533,4 2,030,79 2,447,259 
(47%)
3,492,374 
(58%)
71 
(38%)
0 
(41%)
CPP 
5 73 (59%) 90 (73%)seats 1 (43%) 64 (52%) 
votes 1,824,18
(45%
1 1,072,313 
(21%)
303,764 
(5%)
8 
)
,554,405 
(32%)
FUNCINPEC 
58 (48% 43 (35% 26 (21%) 2 (2%)seats ) )
votes 6
(14%
1,130,423 
(22%)
1,316,714 
(21%)
- 99,665 
)
SRP 
seats 24 (20%) 26 (21%)- 15 (12%)
BLDP 15 - -votes 2,764 
(4%)
n.a. 
 
  seats 10 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
votes 55,107 
(1%)
n.a. 6,808 
(0%)
-MOULINAKA 
seats 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
votes - - - 337,943 
(6%)
NRP 
seats - - - 2 (2%)
votes - - - 397,816 
(7%)
HRP 
seats - - - 3 (2%)
votes 446,101 
(11%)
617,628 
(13%)
518,842 
(10%)
161,666 
(3%)
Other 
seats 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
votes 4,011,631 
(100%)
4,902,488 
(100%)
5,168,837 
(100%)
6,010,277 
(100%)
Total 
seats 120 
(100%)
122 
(100%)
123 
(100%)
123 
(100%)
 
 
                                                 
563 Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, p.80; Vander Weyden, “Parliamentary 
, 2008. 
Elections in Cambodia 1998”, pp.617-618; Sullivan, “The Parliamentary Election in Cambodia, 
July 2003”, p.134; National Election Committee (NEC), Official Election Results. 4th Mandate 
Election of the Members of the National Assembly, 2008; and National Election Committee 
(NEC), Number of Seats that Political Parties Obtained at Provincial and Municipal 
Constituencies for the 4th Mandate Election of the Members of the National Assembly
354 
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Table IV.2 Results Municipal Elections Camb 2002–200 d Votes 
and Numbe 564 
 
  Election Year 
odia ( 7) (Vali
r of Commune Council Chief Positions)
Po
Pa
litic
rty 
al   2002 2007
votes 2,674,303 3,148,533CPP 
chiefs 1,598 1,591
votes 958,326 277,545FUNCINPEC 
chiefs 10 2
votes 731,150 1,303,906SRP 
chiefs 13 28
votes - 419,791NRP 
chiefs - 0
votes 8,934 27,094Other 
chiefs 0 0
votes 4,372,713 5,176,869Total 
chiefs 1,621 1,621
 
 
                                                 
564 N ocr  T b n Commune ions; 
Nati Co 7 Commun ions; 
Nati r Political 2007 
mmun  an int ment 
obtained during an interview with Mr. Som Soeun on 12 June 2008 in Phnom Penh. 
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 Appendix V Total ODA Disbursements to El Salvador (USD million) (1992 – 2007)565 
 
Name of Donor 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1992-
2007 
United States 230.0 207.0 142.0 115.0 74.0 89.0 40.0 49.4 36.6 50.9 62.0 72.9 114.8 47.0 24.5 39.0 1,394.2 
Japan 7.9 14.9 21.0 48.8 70.4 68.3 40.7 53.0 66.9 58.2 32.9 21.4 2.3 22.7 29.8 26.8 586.0 
Spain 8.7 5.3 4.9 9.3 11.1 11.1 16.4 19.7 22.4 45.9 55.7 27.0 27.5 42.6 44.1 61.1 412.7 
EC 23.8 43.0 24.8 22.7 30.0 17.5 22.2 13.9 14.5 15.9 23.4 33.9 22.1 36.6 17.0 25.2 386.5 
Germany 20.5 14.4 29.6 44.0 37.3 25.7 19.6 19.8 14.5 25.8 15.2 12.4 12.7 8.9 9.2 9.2 318.7 
Netherlands 8.6 7.1 7.7 8.6 8.0 8.5 9.5 3.7 2.8 9.5 8.4 6.4 6.5 6.2 0.9 0.4 102.6 
Sweden 4.1 6.9 5.3 4.5 7.3 4.8 5.1 7.1 7.9 8.3 5.3 5.5 7.7 6.0 4.3 4.2 94.1 
Luxembourg 0.0 1.4 1.8 0.0 1.1 1.5 2.3 6.0 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.1 6.9 6.9 10.3 9.1 68.4 
Canada 4.0 2.9 1.0 0.8 4.3 6.6 3.3 2.6 1.7 5.3 3.3 5.4 4.8 4.4 3.0 4.2 57.6 
France 2.5 0.4 1.7 2.0 4.1 6.4 7.4 3.9 1.0 1.1 3.0 2.7 3.6 3.4 3.3 5.7 52.2 
Italy 11.3 7.0 4.7 0.3 0.9 3.8 1.3 0.9 0.1 4.0 4.4 0.3 4.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 44.5 
Switzerland 8.2 0.5 8.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 2.0 1.4 2.4 3.1 4.1 2.0 2.6 3.5 2.8 2.3 46.1 
Norway 4.8 3.6 2.0 2.1 3.3 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.2 2.6 1.7 1.1 1.1 2.1 0.5 0.7 32.9 
IDB Spec. Fund 41.0 58.4 31.7 16.8 26.7 12.8 -6.1 -14.4 -12.5 -15.6 -16.1 -19.2 -21.1 -19.3 -19.5 -18.3 25.2 
Belgium 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 3.0 1.4 1.1 2.3 3.3 1.6 1.4 25.2 
Other 27.7 24.9 17.0 18.4 19.4 17.9 14.7 14.2 14.9 13.9 23.2 14.1 18.0 25.0 24.7 -83.3 204.8 
All Donors Total 403.7 399.5 305.1 296.0 300.8 278.5 181.0 183.5 180.0 237.4 233.4 192.2 216.3 199.5 156.8 88.1 3,851.6 
 
                                                 
565 Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprises grants or loans to recipient countries and territories that are undertaken by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies 
at concessional terms –i.e. with a grant element of at least 25%– and that have the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as their 
main objective. In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is also included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Data from the on-
line Query Wizard for International Development Statistics by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD DAC), available at: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Accessed on 23/02/2009. 
 
 Appendix VI Total ODA Disbursements to Cambodia (USD million) (1991-2007)566 
 
 
Name of Donor 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1991-
2007 
Japan 0.5 4.7 61.3 64.5 152.0 71.3 61.6 81.4 50.9 99.2 120.2 98.6 125.9 86.4 100.6 106.3 113.6 1,399.0 
Asian Dev.Fund .. 6.0 6.0 16.4 45.4 32.1 10.7 29.3 26.2 50.8 48.4 79.1 74.1 78.8 85.7 55.1 55.2 699.1 
United States 6.0 13.0 29.0 16.0 33.0 28.0 30.0 32.5 14.1 21.5 22.4 44.4 51.2 48.1 70.4 57.9 87.2 604.7 
IDA (World Bank) .. .. .. 38.2 24.6 45.6 30.4 19.2 26.8 36.6 39.6 47.3 63.8 47.4 35.5 20.7 37.1 512.7 
France 5.3 8.7 16.8 28.4 53.4 52.1 27.1 21.4 22.1 21.5 21.4 24.6 25.8 25.6 29.3 29.8 35.0 448.4 
EC 3.8 15.7 17.0 11.4 33.0 52.6 32.9 32.9 27.5 26.1 24.2 27.8 15.4 11.8 20.3 28.8 44.8 425.9 
Australia 4.8 7.7 10.4 14.3 25.8 28.2 24.0 21.9 16.7 25.7 15.8 21.6 19.9 25.0 28.4 33.1 27.7 351.0 
Germany 6.7 10.2 5.5 12.2 19.6 14.2 17.0 17.9 21.6 19.4 18.7 18.4 22.0 22.5 24.8 27.6 37.6 315.9 
Sweden 3.8 18.5 11.8 10.1 10.9 16.0 23.0 14.3 7.6 16.8 16.9 14.5 18.7 22.6 14.8 17.1 17.9 255.3 
United Kingdom 1.9 1.7 6.6 7.0 10.7 12.3 7.4 9.9 7.5 13.0 11.7 13.2 15.0 17.6 21.5 22.3 24.6 203.8 
UNDP 0.3 7.2 17.9 17.8 19.1 18.1 17.5 9.8 7.9 3.1 3.9 3.1 4.2 6.3 4.5 5.7 7.4 153.8 
Netherlands 7.8 13.6 12.6 11.0 11.8 8.4 11.5 9.3 6.3 7.4 8.2 9.3 7.2 8.7 8.0 2.0 0.2 143.3 
Korea .. .. 0.0 0.0 .. 0.2 1.8 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.1 22.7 10.8 23.9 17.8 13.8 35.3 128.6 
Canada 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.2 4.2 2.1 5.3 3.4 1.2 2.6 8.0 4.9 9.0 8.5 8.5 8.1 15.3 93.8 
Belgium 0.2 3.6 2.7 2.6 5.0 5.6 2.9 2.2 3.3 3.1 2.8 3.1 5.3 5.7 11.8 12.0 10.4 82.3 
Other Donors 36.3 77.8 64.3 51.4 91.1 18.5 16.4 18.6 24.5 33.9 35.5 34.1 30.2 22.1 35.9 67.7 93.0 751.3 
All Donors Total 89.7 200.5 300.5 313.4 551.0 416.5 335.3 337.4 277.2 395.9 415.0 484.3 514.3 483.1 540.4 529.4 671.6 6,855.6 
 
                                                 
566 Data from the on-line Query Wizard for International Development Statistics by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development 
Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), available at: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Accessed on 23/02/2009. 
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